

ISSN 1563-0285; eISSN 2618-1215

ӘЛ-ФАРАБИ атындағы ҚАЗАҚ ҰЛТТЫҚ УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ

# ХАБАРШЫ

Халықаралық қатынастар және халықаралық құқық сериясы

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КАЗАХСКИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ имени АЛЬ-ФАРАБИ

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AL-FARABI KAZAKH NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

# INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

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№1 (97)

Алматы  
«Қазақ университеті»  
2022



# ХАБАРШЫ

ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАР ЖӘНЕ  
ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚҰҚЫҚ СЕРИЯСЫ №1 (97) наурыз

ISSN 1563-0285; eISSN 2618-1215



04.05.2017 ж. Қазақстан Республикасының Ақпарат және коммуникация министрлігінде тіркелген

**Куәлік № 16503-Ж**

*Журнал жылына 4 рет жарыққа шығады  
(наурыз, маусым, қыркүйек, желтоқсан)*

## ЖАУАПТЫ ХАТШЫ:

**Жекенов Д.К.**, PhD-доктор (Қазақстан)

Телефон: +7 701 830 7457

E-mail: Duman.Zhekenov@kaznu.kz

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## Жоба менеджері

**Гүлмира Шахкозова**

Телефон: +7 701 724 2911

E-mail: Gulmira.Shahkzova@kaznu.kz

## Компьютерде беттеген

**Айгүл Алдашева**

## ИБ № 15342

Пішімі 60x84/8. Көлемі 4,5 б.т. Тапсырыс № 14763.

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университетінің «Қазақ университеті» баспа үйі.

050040, Алматы қаласы, әл-Фараби даңғылы, 71.

«Қазақ университеті» баспа үйінің баспаханасында басылды.

Авторлық редакциямен жарыққа шықты

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1-бөлім  
**ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАРДЫҢ  
ӨЗЕКТІ МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ**

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Section 1  
**CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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Раздел 1  
**АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ  
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ**

IRSTI 11.25.07

<https://doi.org/10.26577/IRILJ.2022.v97.i1.01>

**Ka Wai Christopher Hor<sup>15</sup>, F. Kukeeva<sup>15</sup>,  
K. Userova\*<sup>15</sup>**

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Kazakhstan, Almaty

\*e-mail: k.userova84@gmail.com

## **«GREEN KAZAKHSTAN»: ITS RELEVANCE TO THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AMBITIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN**

Climate change makes and shapes the globalized world in important ways. As the COVID-19 pandemic brings the health of the human race and the health of the Earth to the forefront of world politics, urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts has been called for. Given the pledge of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev that Kazakhstan is to reach carbon neutrality by 2060, this research paper aims to investigate the Republic's domestic and international climate ambitions with specific attention paid on the national development project «Green Kazakhstan.» The research question is: to what extent are Kazakhstan's domestic and international climate ambitions complementary, or disparate? Constructivism is employed as the theoretical framework to unveil the domestic challenges faced by President Tokayev to pursue a low-carbon transition in referral to Kazakhstan's latest foreign policy concept, supplemented by the use of quantitative results produced by the Climate Change Performance Index and the Global Carbon Project to assess the Republic's capability and responsibility to display a climate ambition. The findings indicate that Kazakhstan's domestic and international climate ambitions are considered disparate on most occasions but nonetheless have undeniable domestic and international significance.

**Key words:** Kazakhstan; capability; climate; emissions; energy; environment; green; responsibility.

Ka Wai Christopher Hor, Ф. Кукеева, К. Усєрова\*

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Қазақстан, Алматы қ.

\*e-mail: k.userova84@gmail.com

## **«Жасыл Қазақстан»: оның Қазақстан Республикасының ішкі және халықаралық климаттық амбициялары үшін өзектілігі**

Климаттың өзгеруі жаһанданған әлемді маңызды жолдармен қалыптастырады. COVID-19 пандемиясы адамзат денсаулығы мен Жердің денсаулығын әлемдік саясаттың алдыңғы қатарына шығаратындықтан, климаттың өзгеруі мен оның салдарымен күресу үшін шұғыл шаралар қажет. Президент Қасым-Жомарт Тоқаевтың 2060 жылға қарай Қазақстан көміртегі бейтараптығына қол жеткізуі керек деген уәдесін ескере отырып, бұл зерттеу жұмысы «Жасыл Қазақстан» ұлттық даму жобасына ерекше назар аудара отырып, республиканың ішкі және халықаралық климаттық амбицияларын зерттеуге бағытталған. Зерттеу мәселесі мынадай: Қазақстанның ішкі және халықаралық климаттық амбициялары бір-бірін қаншалықты толықтырады немесе салыстыруға келмейді? Конструктивизм Қазақстанның сыртқы саясатының соңғы тұжырымдамасына сәйкес төмен көміртекті ауысуды жүзеге асыру үшін Президент Тоқаев бетпе-бет келіп отырған ішкі мәселелерді ашу үшін теориялық негіз ретінде, климаттың өзгеру тиімділігінің индексі және республиканың климаттық амбициялау қабілеті мен жауапкершілігін бағалау үшін жаһандық көміртегі жобасының көмегімен алынған сандық нәтижелерді пайдаланумен толықтырылып қолданылады. Алынған нәтижелер Қазақстанның ішкі және халықаралық климаттық амбицияларының көп жағдайда салыстыруға келмейтіндігін көрсетеді, бірақ, соған қарамастан, сөзсіз ішкі және халықаралық маңыздылығы бар.

**Түйін сөздер:** Қазақстан; әлеует; климат; шығарындылар; энергия; қоршаған орта; жасыл; жауапкершілік.

Ка Вай Кристофер Хор, Ф. Кукеева, К. Усерова\*

Казахский национальный имени аль-Фараби, Казахстан, г. Алматы

\*e-mail: k.userova84@gmail.com

### **«Зеленый Казахстан»: его актуальность для внутренних и международных климатических амбиций Республики Казахстан**

Изменение климата важными способами создает и формирует глобализированный мир. Поскольку пандемия COVID-19 ставит здоровье человечества и здоровье Земли на передний план мировой политики, требуются срочные действия по борьбе с изменением климата и его последствиями. Учитывая обещание Президента Касым-Жомарта Токаева о том, что Казахстан должен достичь углеродной нейтральности к 2060 году, эта исследовательская работа направлена на изучение внутренних и международных климатических амбиций Республики с уделением особого внимания национальному проекту развития «Зеленый Казахстан». Исследовательский вопрос заключается в следующем: в какой степени внутренние и международные климатические амбиции Казахстана дополняют друг друга или несопоставимы? Конструктивизм используется в качестве теоретической основы для раскрытия внутренних проблем, с которыми сталкивается Президент Токаев для осуществления низкоуглеродного перехода в соответствии с последней концепцией внешней политики Казахстана, дополненной использованием количественных результатов, полученных с помощью Индекса эффективности изменения климата и Глобального углеродного проекта для оценки способности и ответственности Республики проявлять климатические амбиции. Полученные результаты показывают, что внутренние и международные климатические амбиции Казахстана в большинстве случаев считаются несопоставимыми, но, тем не менее, имеют неоспоримое внутреннее и международное значение.

**Ключевые слова:** Казахстан; потенциал; климат; выбросы; энергия; окружающая среда; зеленый; ответственность.

## **Introduction**

The Republic of Kazakhstan is one of the largest countries in the world on stocks of hydrocarbon raw materials. With an impressive 40-year reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio for oil, 35 R/P for natural gas, and 150 R/P for coal (Cohen, 2019), energy resources – oil in particular – were described by former president Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991-2019) as an enormous wealth: «the very ‘key of gold’ that would enable us to open the door to welfare and independence». The Kazakhstan 2030 Strategy, announced in 1997, detailed five points for the energy resources utilization strategy, which also hinted the significant role of petroleum in the Republic’s multi-vector foreign policy, economic security and energy security since the first decade after independence: (1) concluding long-term contracts with major international oil companies in order to obtain technologies and know-how and attract major companies to ensure that the natural resources of the Republic are effectively exploited; (2) building a pipeline system for oil and natural gas exports; (3) attracting investments from the United States, Russia, China, Japan and Western Europe in Kazakhstan’s oil and natural gas sector; (4) maintaining self-sufficiency and competitive independence of domestic energy infrastructure through foreign investments; (5) sensible spending

of future revenues (Address of the President. 1997). Although Kazakhstan’s potential in utilizing solar and wind energy was mentioned in this document, renewable energy projects and negative effects caused by the extractive economic model on human and ecological security were not given sufficient weight in the Republic’s policy-making until 2012 when the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy was introduced.

Reflecting the declaration in the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy that «the era of hydrocarbon economy is coming to its end,» development of alternative and green energy technology had emerged to become a policy orientation in Kazakhstan (Address by the President, 2012). In 2013, with the adoption of the Concept on Transition to a Green Economy until 2050, the ambitious plan to increase the share of renewable energy in electric power generation to 3% by 2020, 10% by 2030 and 50% by 2050 was outlined (Concept, 2013). Kazakhstan’s hosting of EXPO-2017 under the theme «Future Energy» in 2017 further underlined the regime’s determination to seek a renewable energy future for the Republic. However, environmental degradation through continual depletion of resources has already resulted in biodiversity loss, reduction of air quality, water scarcity and declining quality food. Together with the practical needs to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it came as no surprise that «environmental protection, rational management of water resources

of transboundary rivers, development of alternative and renewable energy sources» were on the agenda when current president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's (2019-present) made his state visit to neighbouring China in 2019 (Kazakhstan and China, 2019). In 2020, at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Tokayev said that «Kazakhstan is very vulnerable to the various effects of climate change». The consequences of the Aral Sea and Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, the melting of glaciers, and desertification were among several of the major environmental issues for Central Asia as well as for other nations (Shayakhmetova, 2021).

Being aware of the extremely small weight of renewable energy sources in Kazakhstan's electricity generation, besides pledging to reach carbon neutrality by 2060 during the Climate Ambitions Summit held online at the end of 2020, the Republic's climate ambition had been displayed in a series of decisions made by Tokayev – a proclaimed «firm supporter of clean energy and green technologies as a whole» (Satubaldina, 2021) – in subsequent years. First and foremost, in order to comply with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement, the Kazakhstan government adopted a new Environmental Code – which was worked out in accordance with the principles of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union. Under this Code, the 50 largest enterprises that account for 80% of emissions in Kazakhstan are required to replace their old technologies with the best available technologies by 2025 (Shayakhmetova, 2021). Following the announcement of the National Development Plan Through 2025 and a new green energy target that raised the share of renewable energy sources in electricity generation from Nazarbayev's 10% to 15% for 2030 (Erubaeva, 2021), Tokayev adopted the Ten National Development Projects on October 13, 2021, of which «Green Kazakhstan (Zhasyl Kazakhstan)» – developed by the Ministry of Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources in parallel with the Doctrine of Carbon Neutral Development until 2060 – set greening the economy and environmental protection as the agenda of the Republic's imminent economic course. Four streams were consisted: (1) «Taza Kazakhstan», in which measures were to be taken to improve the quality of atmospheric air, waste management and preservation of ecosystems of water bodies of the Republic; (2) «Unemdi Kazakhstan», which was about increasing productivity through economical

use of water and energy efficiency improvement; (3) «Tabigat», in which 2 billion trees were to be planted and the number of rare and endangered species of animals are to be restored; and (4) «Ecologia Bolashagy», which was aimed at increasing the level of environmental education and culture of the population (Government, 2021).

When Tokayev made his remarks in 2021 that «it is important to understand that at this stage of world development, the status, reputation, and the international capabilities of any country will be largely determined by the contribution to the decarbonization of the world economy (Satubaldina, 2021),» he had implied that Kazakhstan's policy orientation was in need to entail a broader ecological perspective on common human interests, mutual benefits and win-win results if the Republic was to be positioned positively in the international arena. In fact, with global policy agenda since the COVID-19 pandemic increasingly interwoven with the health of the Earth and the health of the human race, an ecocentric value-based approach to domestic and foreign policy-making has begun to resonate across the globe. This research paper aims to investigate Kazakhstan's domestic and international climate ambitions with specific attention paid on national development project «Green Kazakhstan.» The research question is: to what extent are Kazakhstan's domestic and international climate ambitions complementary, or disparate? Widely acknowledged as a post-Soviet petrostate, a developing middle-income economy and one of the worst-performing countries when it comes to GHG emissions, Kazakhstan's capability and responsibility to contribute to climate change mitigation are analysed.

### **Literature review and hypothesis**

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries have proposed for «green recovery» by putting emphasis on climate action and environmental sustainability while reviving the economy. However, green recovery programmes vary with countries, and ranking of countries' climate ambitions is sensitive to which metric is used to quantify ambition. One key indicator that is reflective to a country's capability to display its climate ambition is its climate finance for domestic and international climate action. Page's (2008) «ability to pay» principle argues that countries with the greatest resources can reasonably be required to contribute more to tackling the problem (Page,

2008). However, sufficiency of economic resources is by no means a conclusive factor as Halimanjaya (2015) observes a negative correlation between gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and international climate financing (Halimanjaya, 2015). Madden (2014), likewise, discovers that higher-income developed countries do not necessarily adopt highly ambitious domestic climate policies (Madden, 2014). As the shift to a climate-friendly low-carbon economy is largely a shift toward the use of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, the level of their adoptions is another key indicator of a country's capability. The study of Adua et al. (2021) on the United States confirms the effectiveness of these technologies to reduce GHG emissions but other important actions, such as lifestyle modifications, should not be neglected (Adua, 2014). Hepburn et al. (2020) propose a «division of labour» model with respect to different countries' capabilities in response to post-pandemic green recovery to achieve globally agreed climate goals, in which the world community is divided into two categories: industrialised countries, and lower- and middle-income countries. Industrialised countries are recommended to focus on backing «clean physical infrastructure», such as solar or wind farms, upgrading electric grids or boosting the use of hydrogen, together with retrofits to improve building efficiency, education and training, projects to restore or preserve ecosystems, and research into clean technologies. While all these are applicable to the lower- and middle-income countries, support for farmers to invest in climate-friendly agriculture was considered a higher priority for them. (Hepburn, 2020).

It is worth noting that one of the most relevant factors in climate mitigation policy is the extent to which a country is responsible for causing anthropogenic climate change. This norm is internationally codified as the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) in Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992), which states that countries – the Parties – «should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. (United Nations, 1992) This implies the logic that: the larger the pollution a country makes,

the greater the responsibility it has for causing climate change, and the heavier the burden it has in tackling climate change.

**Hypotheses.** The literature review results in these two hypotheses regarding Kazakhstan's capability and responsibility in response to climate change mitigation:

1. If Kazakhstan has a high domestic climate ambition and a middle-income economy, then an average international climate ambition is displayed by the Republic in accordance with its capability.

2. If Kazakhstan has a high domestic climate ambition and produces large greenhouse gas emissions per capita, then a high international climate ambition is displayed by the Republic in accordance with its responsibility.

### **Methodology and theoretical framework**

Kazakhstan's recent policy orientation cannot be understood without addressing the Republic's emergence as both a fossil fuel producer and a green advocate under President Tokayev in response to the modern international relations system. When analysing the research question posed in this research paper, in addition to using a qualitative method to define the weight of climate change in Kazakhstan's foreign policy, quantitative results produced by other external agencies can serve as supplements to unveil the essence of Kazakhstan's domestic and international climate ambitions. On this basis, a theoretical framework formulated by constructivism is employed to analyse the decree On Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020-2030 – announced by Tokayev on March 6, 2020 – with respect to the national development project «Green Kazakhstan». Constructivism is an approach to social analysis based on these basic assumptions: (a) human interaction is not shaped by material factors, but primarily by ideational ones; (b) the most significant ideational factors in this context are inter-subjective beliefs as shared collective understanding; and (c) these beliefs construct the actors' identities and interests (Finnemore, 2001). Among these assumptions, the most innovative scholarly contributions of constructivism to the field of international relations would be the argument that state's identity shapes its interests, preferences, and behaviors – which makes it possible to integrate changes to the actors' interests into the research framework. Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein argue that states can have multiple identities that are socially constructed through interaction with other

actors. According to Wendt (1992), «identities are the basis of interests» and «actors do not have a portfolio of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situation» (Wendt, 1992). Katzenstein (1996), however, proposes that identity is commonly articulated as «varying constructions of statehood» and «varying national ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose» across countries; therefore, these variations in turn constitute state interests which have a further influence on state policy (Katzenstein, 1996).

The analysis of the Concept by the use of constructivism is accompanied by the use of quantitative results provided by the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) – an independent monitoring tool published by Germanwatch, with analysis of countries' climate protection performance – to measure the Republic's climate ambition based on experts' evaluation of its domestic climate policies compared with its potential capability. The CCPI indicators and subindicators are particularly helpful as they cover a wide range of issues, including energy efficiency, the promotion of renewable energies and efforts to reduce emissions from electricity production, manufacturing, transport, deforestation, forest degradation and national peatland protection efforts, etc. (Burck, 2021) – which correspond with various type of climate action recommended to any countries. In a similar manner, to measure the scale of responsibility that Kazakhstan ought to bear for contributing to anthropogenic climate change, the Global Carbon Project (GCP)'s dataset on the Republic's carbon emissions for the past three decades is referred to. As a platform that was formed to support policy debate and action to slow down and ultimately stop the increase of GHG in the atmosphere, the GCP's account of emissions produced by Kazakhstan helps explain Tokayev's concerns for the Republic's international prospects and the considerations behind «Green Kazakhstan».

## Results

**An analysis through constructivism.** The adoption of the decree On Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020-2030 had its symbolic meaning as it was the first document of the appropriate level approved by Tokayev as President of Kazakhstan and, for the first time, the horizon of foreign policy planning was extended to a decade. While continuity in exercising his predecessor's endorsed political course could be

traced – such as the continual pursuit of a multi-vector and well-balanced foreign policy with the great powers, the economic dimension of Kazakhstan's foreign policy had seen a simultaneous proliferation. The number of its constituent priorities, compared to the previous Concept, increased from 9 to 14 (Chebotaryov, 2020). Kazakhstan's investment cooperation with foreign partners was concretized through listing the economy sectors requiring foreign investment, such as mechanical engineering, appliance industry, agriculture, light manufacturing, healthcare, education, transport, tourism, etc. Besides, the configuration of the Concept was set to promote the development of Kazakhstan's transit and logistics potential, including the introduction of an «open skies» regime, the expansion of the range, volume and geographical destinations of national exports, dismantling various export barriers in foreign markets, as well as the promotion of institutions like the Astana International Financial Centre, The Khorgos International Centre for Cross-Border Cooperation and created jointly with Uzbekistan the Central Asia Centre for Trade and Economic Cooperation. Increased engagement with non-state international and regional economic and financial actors – such as the OECD, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, the Eurasian Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and other institutions – also was set among other foreign policy priorities (On the Concept, 2020). These specific features – a new level of «economization» of foreign policy – demonstrated a shift in the configuration of the Republic's identity as it no longer solely focuses on promoting the raw-materials sectors but developing a diversified economy that attracts global business in preparation for a more balanced domestic economic structure and a low-carbon future.

There is little doubt that Kazakhstan's climate ambition could only be found at very mild levels in the Concept. Compared to the previous Concept in which terms such as «climate», «environment» and «green» were mentioned 11 times, this Concept only referred them 6 times in total. This implies that Tokayev – as a new Head of State and a career diplomat, before bringing a low-carbon transition to the forefront of Kazakhstan's domestic and foreign policy-making – had to first take into account the change competency of his administration and the informal networks composited by the Republic's



oligarchs and political elite with respect to Kazakhstan's need to take on an identity as a green advocate in accordance to the global trends. It is also noteworthy that – unlike fossil fuel extraction and the perpetuation of fossil fuel dependence that concentrate wealth and power among a few corporate and political elite – the movement for a renewable energy transition potentially includes grass-roots activism, technological innovation and efforts to restructure governance systems for community-controlled and dispersed energy systems (Stephens, 2019). Such movement has been termed «democratization of energy resources» (Van der Schoor, 2016) – which was best demonstrated by progressive environmental and social justice movement that built the Green New Deal in the United States in 2018. Energy-related mass agitations in France, Ecuador, Pakistan, Iran, Zimbabwe and Lebanon since 2018 – in which ordinary people faced the unpleasant effects of fuel subsidy cuts or new fuel tax caused by their governments' respective responses to either global decarbonisation movement or market forces (Kasturi, 2022) – are of exceptional importance as references to the policymakers in Kazakhstan. According to the trajectory made by ex-Minister of Energy Magzum Mirzagaliyev (2021-2022) in 2021, oil production was expected not to decrease but to grow from 85.7 million tons and reach 104.2 million tons by 2030 (Nurmaganbetova, 2021), illustrating the continual dominance of petroleum in Kazakhstan's policy orientation and identity configuration.

Having experienced the worst mass riots triggered by a sudden spike in prices for liquefied gas – with hints of intra-elite conflict – in January 2022, the national development project «Green Kazakhstan» is best speculated as one of Tokayev's measures to consolidate the public support in the aftermath of chaos through creating a favourable living environment rather than a display of the Republic's international climate ambition. In this context, the two hypotheses of this research paper regarding Kazakhstan's international climate ambition cannot be verified, indicating the disparity between Kazakhstan's domestic and international climate ambitions.

**An analysis on capability.** Considering the national development project «Green Kazakhstan» is still in its infancy with few impacts being registered, Kazakhstan had marked a «very low» rating among all the CCPI categories and was ranked to the lowest spot with an overall score 19.23 as of January 2022 among the 60 countries

that the CCPI has been conducting analyses on – in contrast to top-performing country Denmark's 76.67. Between 2020 and 2021, many shortcomings were expressed about Kazakhstan's climate change performance, in addition to the insufficient energy efficiency measures, the heavily subsidised energy prices and coal, and high emissions found in the transport sector due to vehicles non-compliant with European emissions standard being imported into the Republic. The only indicator in which Kazakhstan was able to score respectably was «Renewable Energy – current trend (excluding hydropower)» – with a «medium» rating, which could be considered as an acknowledgement of Kazakhstan's accomplishment in reaching its 3% renewable energy target by 2020 and ambition of having a 15% – an increase from the original 10% – renewable energy share in its national energy matrix by 2030. However, the CCPI experts commented that planned renewable energy production seemed to be for foreign investors and there was a lack of support for individual renewable energy stations for the domestic population (Burck, 2021). Overall, Kazakhstan's lack of meaningful climate change performance for the past three decades has implied the Republic's lack of capability to display a convincing international climate ambition, which undermined the Republic's presumed capability as a middle-income economy. Hypothesis 1 of this research paper is not in compliance with the quantitative findings from the CCPI, indicating the disparity between Kazakhstan's domestic and international climate ambitions.

**An analysis on responsibility.** According to the 2020 Global Carbon Atlas produced by the GCP based on level of carbon emissions from human activity, Kazakhstan was ranked 20th among all countries in the world – with a total of 291 megatons of carbon dioxide. If calculated by emissions per capita, Kazakhstan was 10th in the world; and by emissions per GDP, 7th (Friedlingstein, 2021). When analysing Kazakhstan's fossil emissions, coal had maintained its position as the top source of GHG emissions (Andrew, 2022). Regarding the annual growth rate of energy consumption from 2015 to 2020, while coal, oil and gas all had registered low-to mid-single digit growth, the biggest growth was found in renewable energy – from 0% to 52.9% in five years (Andrew, 2022). However, renewable energy had not been deployed at a scale that could replace fossil fuels and curbs emissions in the near future. In 2020, Coal's 1.65 Exajoule (EJ), oil's 0.75 EJ and gas' 0.60 EJ were by far more

significant for Kazakhstan’s energy security than hydropower’s 0.08 EJ and renewable energy’s 0.03 EJ (Andrew, 2022). The quantitative findings from the GCP illustrate that Kazakhstan’s economy has been extremely carbon-intensive, meaning the Republic has an indisputable responsibility to proactively contribute to climate change mitigation as itself is at the core of the solution. The national development project «Green Kazakhstan» thus could be understood as a timely response from the regime before consequences of inaction will become too costly to bear, in particular Kazakhstan has frequently declared itself as a «responsible participant in the world community» (On the Concept, 2020). In this connection, hypothesis 2 of this research paper cannot be refuted, in which Kazakhstan’s responsibility as a large producer of GHG emissions per capita prompts it to display high domestic and international climate ambitions. Kazakhstan’s domestic and international climate ambitions can be considered complementary.

## Discussions

Although the analyses above demonstrate that the national development project «Green Kazakhstan» is the results of the regime’s efforts to consolidate public support and Kazakhstan’s declared responsibility to the international community, the Republic’s ties with the European Union and China – leaders in energy transition, green tech and ecological restoration – have to be taken into account when analysing Kazakhstan’s overall climate ambitions. Aiming to become the first carbon neutral continent by 2050 and being the biggest investors in Kazakhstan, the European Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism – a tax on carbon-intensive imports – to compel non-member countries to implement more aggressive climate rules from 2026 onwards has already prompted the Tokayev’s government to accelerate decarbonisation progress across seven sectors of the economy – energy, agriculture and forestry, industry, utilities, coal industry, waste management, and transport – between 2023 and 2030 by collaborating with the World Bank on the Partnership for Market Readiness Programme, which provides short- to medium-term policy recommendations and builds capacity to support Kazakhstan on its path to carbon neutrality (Marteau, 2021). The Republic’s plan to build the world’s largest green-hydrogen project – in cooperation with Swedish-German renewable energy firm Svevind – further represents the investment of

European Union’s private sector in Kazakhstan no longer rests on carbon-intensive petroleum but tech-based energy solutions, supporting the Republic’s domestic and international climate ambition.

China’s experiences in embedding ecological restoration in its economic development are equally influential to Kazakhstan’s low-carbon transition pathways, especially after the launch of China’s massive infrastructure diplomacy in the format of the «Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)» in 2013 and an upgraded «Green BRI» in 2017. The slogan «to build the community of a shared future for humanity» implied the promotion of global environmental governance and green development concept among participating countries – neighbouring Kazakhstan included – in compliance with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement (Dong, 2020). In addition to China’s dominance of renewable energy supply chains, its domestic sustainability programmes – such as the Grain for Green Programme, the Natural Forest Conservation Programme, and the Three North Shelterbelt Programme – have successfully slowed and reversed desertification with the planting of a 4,500km Great Green Wall (Bryan, 2018). Rather than focusing on merely tree planting, artificial intelligence (AI) has been applied to forecast air pollution, track pollution sources and produce potential strategies in response, such as restriction to the number of drivers or closure of certain power plants in order to reduce pollution in a particular area (Cho, 2018). It was reported that research teams from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were attracted to conduct studies on China’s greening work and its green tech (Campbell, 2017), suggesting that China’s experience can serve as a roadmap for other developing countries. In 2020, a USD\$1.4 trillion low-carbon stimulus package was adopted to revive China’s economy as well as those along the BRI between 2020 and 2025 (The Energy, 2020). The construction of Central Asia’s largest wind farm near the city of Zhanatas in the Zhambyl Region, south Kazakhstan – a renewable energy project funded by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and completed by a Chinese firm in 2021 – demonstrated the significance of China’s contributions to Kazakhstan’s domestic climate ambition despite the COVID-19 pandemic (Feature, 2021).

Although the European Union’s carbon border tax and China’s Green BRI appear to have exceeded the designated scope of «Green Kazakhstan», a careful inspection of the Ten National Development

Projects shows that the projects enclosed are indeed mutually complementary and – as a whole – address human capital issues and create enabling conditions that decrease Kazakhstan’s reliance on fossil fuel extraction and build a diversified innovation-based economy (Nursultan, 2021). «Green Kazakhstan» thus is not a typical stand-alone project but shares common tasks with other national development projects, in particularly «Sustainable Economic Growth», «Technological Breakthrough through Digitalization, Science and Innovations» and «The Safe Country» under other Ministries. Given Kazakhstan’s growing role as a logistics pivot connecting Europe and Asia, the Republic has an advantage in its geographical location to consolidate its cooperation with multiple countries to address common development issues – including carbon mitigation, renewable energy development and ecological restoration. «Green Kazakhstan», in the context, enables the Republic – despite a lack of capability to produce any meaningful climate change performance – to resonate with other economies for climate action collectively at national, regional and global level.

### Conclusion and recommendations

This research paper demonstrates that although Kazakhstan’s domestic and international climate ambitions are considered disparate on most occasions, the national development project «Green Kazakhstan» – in which the intrinsic value of nature is recognised with ecological protection and

restoration projects embedded – is of undeniable domestic and international significance due to Kazakhstan’s needs to consolidate public support by creating a favourable living environment while presenting itself as a responsible participant in the world community. The latter, in particular, resonates with global environmental sustainability – which is set to play a prominent role in future domestic development and international collaborations. Capability – or the lack of, in terms of economic, technological and human capital resources – appears less essential to Kazakhstan’s pursuit of international cooperation to combat climate change, and vice versa.

This research paper has vital implications on understanding the domestic and international climate ambitions displayed by the petroleum-exporting countries that are middle income economies. Future research can complement this study, in particular if responses of the private sector and public budgeting in specific countries for domestic and international climate action can be taken into account. For Kazakhstan, it is of utmost importance to address how the Republic can benefit from being both a petroleum producer and an advocate of a fossil-free future to assert its global presence with the minimum of friction and the maximum of goodwill.

*The article was prepared within the framework of the project: No. AP08857403 «The influence of the transit of power on the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan: new opportunities and new challenges».*

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**A. Frigerio\***, **D. Yessenbayev**, **M. Galagan**

Almaty Management University, Kazakhstan, Almaty

\*e-mail: f.alberto@almau.edu.kz

**PRESIDENT BIDEN'S REMARKS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN:  
THE END OF US LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM?**

In August 2021, the United States completed their military mission in Afghanistan and withdrawn all their troops after 20 years of war. This article provides a discourse analysis of the public speeches released by US President Joe Biden during such a month, from 16<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> August. The primary goal is to critically address the US President's speeches on Afghanistan to the contextual situation on the ground as well as to the conceptual basis of the US foreign policy strategy. What emerges from this study is a revised US foreign policy where some of the basic pillars of liberal interventionism are sacrificed in the name of a renewed national interest. In particular, the prospect of directly fostering democracy in foreign states as a way to promote international peace and security seems here abandoned for more surgical interventions of counterterrorism. Likewise, the world is depicted as a zero-sum game where the gain of one player is inevitably associated with the loss of another one. Such strategical change, if confirmed in the next years, will produce noteworthy consequences on the future US global policy.

**Key words:** Afghanistan, US military withdrawn, Joe Biden, discourse analysis, liberalism.

А. Фриджеро\*, Д. Есенбаев, М. Галаган

Алматы Менеджмент Университет, Қазақстан, г. Алматы

\*e-mail: f.alberto@almau.edu.kz

**Президент Байденнің Ауғанстан бойынша пікірлері:  
АҚШ -тың либералды интервенционизмінің соңы ма?**

2021 жылдың тамызында Америка Құрама Штаттары Ауғанстандағы әскери миссиясын аяқтап, 20 жылдық соғыстан кейін барлық әскерлерін шығарды. Бұл ғылыми мақалада 16-26 тамыз аралығында Америка Құрама Штаттары президенті Джо Байденнің осы айдағы көпшілік алдында сөйлеген сөздеріне дискурс талдауы келтірілген. Мақаланың негізгі ғылыми мақсаты – Америка Құрама Штаттарының Президенті Джо Байденнің Ауғанстандағы жағдайға қатысты мәлімдемелеріне елдегі контекстік жағдай және тұжырымдамалық негіздер тұрғысынан сыни баға беру. Америка Құрама Штаттарының сыртқы саяси стратегиясы. Бұл зерттеуден туындайтын нәрсе Америка Құрама Штаттары тың қайта қаралған сыртқы саясаты, онда либералды интервенцияның кейбір негізгі тіректері жаңартылған ұлттық мүдделер үшін құрбан болады. Атап айтқанда, халықаралық бейбітшілік пен қауіпсіздікке ықпал ету тәсілі ретінде шет мемлекеттердегі демократияны тікелей нығайту перспективасы терроризмге қарсы күресте неғұрлым жедел араласу үшін осында қалдырылған сияқты. Сол сияқты, әлем нөлдік ойын ретінде бейнеленген, онда бір ойыншының жеңісі сөзсіз екіншісінің жоғалуымен байланысты. Мұндай стратегиялық өзгеріс, егер ол алдағы жылдары расталса, Америка Құрама Штаттарың болашақ жаһандық саясатына айтарлықтай әсер етеді.

**Түйін сөздер:** Ауғанстан, АҚШ әскерінің шығарылуы, Джо Байден, дискурстық талдау, либерализм.

А. Фриджеро\*, Д. Есенбаев, М. Галаган

Алматы Менеджмент Университет, Қазақстан, Алматы қ.

\*e-mail: f.alberto@almau.edu.kz

**Высказывания президента Байдена об Афганистане:  
конец либерального интервенционизма США?**

В августе 2021 года США завершили свою военную миссию в Афганистане и вывели все свои войска после 20 лет войны. В данной статье представлен дискурс-анализ публичного выступления президента США Джо Байдена за период с 16 по 26 августа. Основная цель статьи – дать критическую оценку заявлений президента США по ситуации в Афганистане, с точки зрения контекстуальной ситуации в стране и концептуальных основ внешнеполитической стратегии США. Результатом этого исследования является пересмотренная внешняя политика США, в

которой некоторые из основных столпов либерального вмешательства будут принесены в жертву во имя обновленных национальных интересов. В частности, перспектива прямого укрепления демократии в зарубежных странах как способ содействия международному миру и безопасности, похоже, оставлена здесь для более быстрого вмешательства в борьбу с терроризмом. Точно так же мир изображается как игра с нулевой суммой, в которой победа одного игрока неизбежно связана с поражением другого. Такое стратегическое изменение, если оно будет подтверждено в ближайшие годы, окажет значительное влияние на будущую глобальную политику США.

**Ключевые слова:** Афганистан, вывод войск США, Джо Байден, дискурс-анализ, либерализм.

## Introduction

In August 2021, the US proceeded with their complete military withdrawal from Afghanistan. The decision of US President Biden generated diverse reactions. While some people supported the arguments raised by the US President about the need to leave the country, others harshly criticized it because it gave Taliban the chance to get, again, control over the whole country, thus subverting all those efforts made in the last 10 years. One of the main risks is that Afghanistan might turn back to the 2001 scenario, with the Afghan population suffering extensive violations of human rights and terrorist groups finding a «safe-haven» place for their illicit activities.

Understanding the reasons behind the choice taken by US President Biden as well as its consequences for the future US foreign policy strategy is, therefore, a critical issue that deserves attention. In this regard, this article provides a discourse analysis of the speeches publicly released by US President Joe Biden in the month of August. A renewed strategic approach seems to emerge from such remarks: the democratic peace theory, once promoted by former US President George W. Bush, is here abandoned and substituted by a more cynical and focused realpolitik. While not determining a complete turnaround, Biden's speech still represents an important update of US foreign policy.

So, the object of this analysis is to critically assess President Biden's remarks about the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to reveal both his communication techniques as well as the renewed features of US global strategy. The subject of this study is the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its implication for the US liberal approach in the framework of international relations. The research method used in this article is a qualitative content study based on the discourse analysis of US President Biden's speeches on Afghanistan that have been publicly released in the month of August 2021. The main hypothesis of this article is that Biden's exit strategy from Afghanistan might foster a renewed US global approach in which

some of the key principles of liberal interventionism will be intentionally sacrificed to redirect the public narrative toward a zero-sum game framework where a selective limited-engagement will be presented as the most preferable choice to defend the US national interests abroad.

## Material and Methods

Methodologically, this study is based on the discourse analysis of US President Biden's remarks about Afghanistan, which have been publicly released from 16<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> August. Such type of qualitative analysis entails the codification of the examined speeches and the re-organization of discourse in diverse categories, which share similar patterns and meanings. On the basis of such construct, it is then possible to develop some critical interpretations and coherent implications. Texts like, for example, Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough's *Political Discourse Analysis. A Method for Advanced Students*. (2012) and James Paul Gee's *How to Do Discourse Analysis: A Toolkit* (2014) offer some tools and recommendations about how to conduct a critical discourse analysis as the one proposed in this article.

During the content analysis the authors have also put attention on the diverse techniques of persuasion used by President Biden to support his view. Such a condition is of academic relevance since it is a practice of political communication that is regularly used by heads of states to convince the masses about the correctness of their choices. Here, it will be helpful to distinguish between facts and rhetoric.

The main research question of this article is how Biden's speeches on the US withdrawal from Afghanistan design a renewed US foreign policy strategy. While addressing such key question, additional issues will be considered, such as the use of persuasion as a technique to convince the audience (the US population) about the necessity to militarily leave Afghanistan and the effective reliability of the US official narrative considering the recent history of such a country.

## Literature Review

The academic literature stresses the importance to analyse the political discourses as key sources for critical reflections. In this regard, Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith's book *The White House Speaks. Presidential Leadership as Persuasion* (1994) is a good point of reference to understand US Presidents' approaches toward influential communication and Evan Osnos's book *Joe Biden: The Life, the Run, and What Matters Now* (2020) provides some relevant insights to better understand the political figure of US President Joe Biden. Likewise, Jonathan L. Lee's book *Afghanistan. A History from 1260 to the Present* (2018) offers a comprehensive historical framework, which allows to comprehend the challenges faced by Afghanistan since its independence, and Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi's book *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* (2008) identifies the factors that made Taliban such a resilient armed group. Concerning the ongoing situations in Afghanistan, articles such as Daniel Byman's *The Good Enough Doctrine. Learning to Live with Terrorism* (2021), Sajjan M. Gohel's *The Taliban Are Far Closer to the Islamic State Than They Claim* (2021) and Anchal Vohra's *It's Crazy to Trust the Haqqanis* (2021) provide judicious reflections on the ongoing situation. Still, a critical discourse analysis aimed to connect US President Biden's speeches on Afghanistan to the contextual situation on the ground as well as to the conceptual basis of the US foreign policy strategy is missing. This article raises some preliminary reflections on Biden's remarks that might be used to partially close such knowledge gap.

## Results and Discussion

A critical discourse analysis of US President Joe Biden's remarks on Afghanistan reveals interesting information about the dialectical narrative that have been used to convince the US population on the necessity to military leave the country as well as it presents some noteworthy implications for the future US foreign policy strategy. Five key themes are argumentatively introduced by the US President in his public speeches from 16<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> August.

The first point is related to the US national interests in Afghanistan. The objectives of the US mission in the country were, on one hand, to kill Osama bin Laden and, on the other, to make sure that Al Qaeda could not use anymore Afghanistan as a training base for organizing massive terrorist attacks

against the US. According to Biden, in these terms, the US mission has been a success. Differently, 'our mission in Afghanistan was never supposed to have been nation building. It was never supposed to be creating a unified, centralized democracy.' (Biden 2021a) With this phrase, US President Biden denies any national security interests in an active democratization of Afghanistan. And, as President, he does not intend to sacrifice other US soldiers in an endless civil war like the one in Afghanistan. This message is repeated in the remarks of August 20<sup>th</sup> (Biden 2021b), when he offered an estimation of the US costs for the war – from \$1 to \$2 trillion – and in the speech of 22<sup>nd</sup> August, when he stressed that 2,448 Americans died during the course of the conflict (Biden 2021e). Even more, while answering the questions of journalists on 26<sup>th</sup> August, US President Biden clearly states: 'I have never been of the view that we should be sacrificing American lives to try to establish a democratic government in Afghanistan – a country that has never once in its entire history been a united country'. (Biden 2021c) As a result, for Biden a US permanent military presence in Afghanistan is no longer warranted.

As suggested in the book of Osnos (2020, 38), the current US President already expressed a similar perspective while he was working under the Obama administration: two of the key questions that Biden regularly reminded to the former US President Barack Obama were, first, about the US strategic interests in Afghanistan and, second, the amount of resources effectively needed to achieve them. Such an approach clearly breaks with George W. Bush's democratic peace theory, which supported the idea that spreading democratic institutions in foreign countries could foster global peace and security. Instead, a «good enough success», aimed at surgically hit terrorist organizations through tactical counter-terrorism actions so that they can no longer harm the US citizens and their lifestyle, is the new emerging doctrine (Byman 2021). This approach does not represent a complete turning point in the US foreign policy: its basic premises were already partially introduced during the presidencies of both Barack Obama and Donald J. Trump and, in addition, similar operations have been regularly performed by the US in other countries of the world (e.g. Yemen, Somalia, etc.) where the presence of terrorist groups was viewed as a threat for the US national interests. However, it is under President Biden that such a discourse gets officially embraced and defended in front of the US public opinion.



It is also interesting to notice how US President Biden defines the conflict in Afghanistan as a civil war without placing much attention to the central role played by the US in such a scenario. Actually, in some parts of his speeches, the US President seems to admit that some mistakes have been made: '...our mission in Afghanistan has taken many missteps'. (Biden 2021a) However, much more emphasis is put on the diligence and sacrifice made by the US soldiers sent in Afghanistan 'to defend what we love and the people we love'. (Biden 2021c) Otherwise, a harsh criticism is reserved for the Afghani leaders, who failed to unite the country through diplomacy, and the Afghani army, which suddenly dismantled against the Taliban notwithstanding the training and equipment given them by the US along these 20 years. Using Biden's words, 'We gave them every chance to determine their own future. What we could not provide them was the will to fight for that future.' (Biden 2021a) Notwithstanding such criticisms, the US President uses repetition and a chant-like rhythm to emphasize what the US will continue to do for the Afghan population: 'We will continue to support the Afghan people... We'll continue to push for regional diplomacy and engagement to prevent violence and instability. We'll continue to speak out for the basic rights of the Afghan people...' (Biden 2021a) So, the official choice is to move from hard power to soft power in the promotion of democratic principles. How much effective will be such approach is a different issue.

The second point is related to the arguments used by Biden to justify the necessity to military leave Afghanistan in this precise moment (31<sup>st</sup> August). Beyond the remarks about the lack of US national interests in Afghanistan, he refers to five additional reasons to support his decision. First, he is enforcing a plan already accepted by former US President Donald Trump: '...I inherited a deal that President Trump negotiated with the Taliban. Under his agreement, U.S. forces would be out of Afghanistan by May 1, 2021'. (Biden 2021a) In other terms, the US already committed themselves to military leave the country and the President is just putting in act such a decision. Second, he uses simplification – a technique of persuasion which intentionally reduced the amount of examined options to implicitly suggest that no other choice is possible – by claiming that he had only two possible choices: on one side, the withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan as previously agreed or, on the other, the sending of new US troops in Afghanistan with a correlated high risk of a renewed escalation of violence. Such

second «false-option» is dismantled by recurring to emotional appeal: 'How many more generations of America's daughters and sons would you have me send to fight Afghans – Afghanistan's civil war when Afghan troops will not? How many more lives – American lives – is it worth? How many endless rows of headstones at Arlington National Cemetery?' (Biden 2021a) Third, Biden claims that leaving Afghanistan now or after several other years of fight would not have changed the final outcome for the country. According to US President Biden, 'no amount of military force would ever deliver a stable, united, and secure Afghanistan – as known in history as the «graveyard of empires.» What is happening now could just as easily have happened 5 years ago or 15 years in the future.' (Biden 2021a) To further support his point, Biden creates a parallelism between the endless war in Vietnam and the one in Afghanistan, and conclude his statement with an assertion: 'I know my decision will be criticized, but I would rather take all that criticism than pass this decision on to another President of the United States... Because it's the right one – it's the right decision for our people... And it's the right one for America.' (Biden 2021a) Fourth, US President Biden uses a metaphorical image to explain how terrorism has, nowadays, «metastasized» all over the world like a cancer. As such, it has to be dealt with surgical interventions because 'That is about America leading the world...' (Biden 2021a) So, the idea of a permanent military presence in failed states should be put aside and being substituted by *ad hoc* counter-terrorism interventions, 'working in close coordination with our allies and our partners and all those who have an interest in ensuring stability in the region.' (Biden 2021b) Actually, this is one of the rare parts of Biden's speeches in which the US-centred focus temporarily moves toward a more international perspective. Fifth, Biden believes that remaining in Afghanistan would reward the global competitors of the United States. Both in his speeches of 16<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> August, Biden emphasizes how Russia and China would get strategic benefits from a US endless military presence in Afghanistan. (Biden 2021a; Biden 2021e) Hence, the world is depicted by Biden as a zero-sum game where any unnecessary cost paid by the US would automatically produce some advantages to its long-term «rivals».

The third critical point of Biden's speeches concerns the departure of US citizens and of those eligible Afghan civilians who directly cooperated with the USA in the last 20 years. The US President stresses in several occasions the importance of

cooperation with US allied forces for such operations, the high risks – confirmed by the terrorist attack conducted by ISIS-K at the airport of Kabul on 26<sup>th</sup> August – associated with such evacuation, and the outstanding achievements reached by the USA in the process (over 75.000 people transported out of Afghanistan since the end of July). Biden justifies the delayed begging of the evacuation due to the fact that, before the collapse of the Afghan army, many people did not want to leave the country and the Afghan governments was discouraging an earlier initiative because it could have spread negative signals to the population. Moreover, responding to criticisms about the difficulties at the airport of Kabul, Biden uses pre-emptive arguments to support his view: the images coming from Afghanistan are heart-breaking ('We're all seeing it. We see it. We feel it. You can't look at it and not feel it.'), but the US are nonetheless doing what is right while 'acting bravely and with professionalism and with a basic human compassion'. (Biden 2021a) Likewise, he uses assertion to sustain that the difficulties that are taking place during the rescue activities were inevitable: 'There is no way to evacuate this many people without pain and loss, of heart-breaking images you see on television. It's just a fact.' (Biden 2021a) So, the message (addressed to the US population) is clear: notwithstanding the threats and difficulties, the US are operating at the best of their capacity and, in doing so, they are achieving outstanding results.

The fourth point is related to the Taliban. In his speech of 20<sup>th</sup> August, Biden asserts three important issues: first, that the US government is in constant contact with Taliban to ensure a successful process of evacuation; second, that any attack against US forces during the process of evacuation would be met with a forceful response; third, that Taliban are looking for legitimacy and, therefore, it might be possible to make international pressure on them. (Biden 2021b) On both speeches of 22<sup>nd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> August, the US President repeated this last point, while adding that any decisive evaluation will be determined by Taliban's effective behaviour. (Biden 2021c; Biden 2021e) On 26<sup>th</sup> August, such message is again replicated, but with an important variation: 'No one trust them [Taliban]; we're just counting on their self-interest... They are not good guys, the Taliban. I'm not suggesting that at all. But they have a keen interest.' (Biden 2021d) So, in this last speech all the doubts about Taliban are finally revealed even if there is still the hope that diplomacy and economic pressure might induced

them to operate according to acceptable standards. This cautious, but quite optimistic approach seems supported by Desha Girod (2021) who believes that the diplomatic relations and humanitarian aids from Western countries might possibly push the Taliban to enforce more «moderate» policies whereas they would see such a condition as a necessary step to keep internal political control. This perspective is, however, contested by Anchal Vohra (2021) who believes that there are too many links between the Taliban and diverse members of terrorist organizations to see them as reliable international actors.

The fifth and final point is related to the terrorist group known as ISIS-K (the armed branch of ISIS in Afghanistan). In all his speeches from 20<sup>th</sup> August on, US President Biden has repeatedly suggested that ISIS-K is an arch-enemy of the Taliban. In such a statement emerges the blurred idea that the enemy (Taliban) of my enemy (ISIS-K) might not really be my friend (the Taliban 'are not good guys', as mentioned above), but at least someone with whom to share a common battle. This narrative about ISIS and Taliban is, however, contested by Sajjan M. Gohel, who affirms that the situation in Afghanistan is far from being a black and white scenario. Thus, 'sworn enemies can fight each other one day and collaborate for mutual gain the next day.' (Gohel 2021) Anyway, in response to the ISIS terrorist attack at the airport of Kabul, Biden demands a firm approach: 'The lives we lost today were lives given in the service of liberty, the service of security, in the service of others, in the service of America... To those who carried out this attack, as well as anyone who wishes America harm, know this: We will not forgive. We will not forget. We will hunt you down and make you pay. I will defend our interests and our people with every measure at my command.' (Biden 2021d) The repetition of the word «service» is used here to remark the positive intents of those Americans who perished during the attack. Likewise, the passage from the inclusive first-person plural pronoun «we» to the singular first-person pronoun «I» sign a sort of personal promise where «we – America» will not forgive or forget them, and «I – the US President» will do whatever I can to defend our interests and our people.

## Conclusions

The US foreign policy has always been grounded on a balance between realism and liberalism. Some US presidents in the past have pushed more

weight on the realist side (e.g. Richard Nixon), while others preferred to give more attention to the liberal perspective (e.g. Woodrow Wilson). In the case of Joe Biden, his foreign policy strategy cannot be completely labelled as realist or liberal because, as many of his predecessors, he operates in a grey area where elements of both ideologies are combined into a new chimera. Still, from his speech about Afghanistan it seems that he is completely rejecting the liberal interventionism approach promoted by George W. Bush within the framework of the democratic peace theory. The US will continue to promote human rights and democratic principles around the world, but using diplomacy and economic relations instead of massively employing their military contingency. Likewise, the US will maximize the efficiency of their actions in the war against terrorism by recurring to surgical operations instead of long-term military interventions. After all, as long as Taliban can constrain the advance of ISIS in Afghanistan, they do not represent a top priority for the US national security. In a zero-sum game context, such strategy will suitably limit the potential side

advantages for the US global adversaries (mainly China and Russia).

Interestingly, all the speeches of US President Biden are highly «US-centred»: the techniques of communication selected and used by Biden are specifically aimed for the American electorates, with only a few mentions to the international community as a whole. Arguably, this approach also reveals the prioritization, under Biden, to turn the international role of the US from a global policeman to a specialized surgeon. If such perspective will be confirmed, the US foreign policy strategy under the Biden's presidency will mostly follow a *realpolitik* approach where the effective costs and benefits will be, time by time, measured according to the strategic advantages that the US could gain from their global rivals. Possibly, there will be some areas where ideology and internationalism will still represent core assets (like, for example, in relation to the issue of climate change). However, concerning the national security, the US will conduct surgical intervention only when and where the defence of the US national interests will be at stake.

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**A.B. Kuzembayeva\***, **A. Aussadyk**, **D. Sarsekbay**

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Kazakhstan, Almaty

\*e-mail: asiya.kuzembayeva@kaznu.kz

## **AMERICAN CINEMA IMPACT ON THE FORMATION, REFLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL STEREOTYPES**

In the current age of widespread mass culture, cinema, as its most popular and widespread medium, is a rich source of information. In a world of rapidly developing technologies and a high pace of life, when the printed word, unfortunately, fades into the background, cinema acquires a special role in shaping the worldview of entire generations. Reality in art culture is the most important ideological problem. The version of reality in the «big staging of life» – in particular, on the screen – determines both our attitude to reality and this reality itself. Our whole life is stereotyped, and whatever the attitude to stereotypes, they have become a criterion for an individual's assessment of the surrounding reality and judgments about his own and other peoples. Cinema, which is an expression of the most common and widespread stereotypes, is an example of the practical application of stereotypical thinking. Hollywood plays a huge role in portraying different races and different cultures by virtue of their movies. In this regard, in the current article the author analyzes the means of formation of national stereotypes. The main focus of this study is Hollywood as an instrument for the stereotypes dissemination and reflection all over the world in simple movies. By means of a thorough analysis and practical research (survey and interview), the author reveals whether stereotypes do really correspond to the realities they show in the movies and if different nationalities/ethnicities are satisfied with their depiction in the American movies that are incredibly popular all over the world. In the end, there are some advisory and recommendary assumptions for the people not to be exposed to the superficial images they see in the movies because it may impede them from successful international relations.

**Key words:** stereotypes, Hollywood, soft power, American cinema, racism, prejudice, international image, national representation, national depiction, discrimination, Asian stereotypes, Black people stereotypes, Muslim stereotypes.

А.Б. Күзембаева\*, А. Аусадық, Д. Сарсекбай

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Қазақстан, Алматы қ.

\*e-mail: asiya.kuzembayeva@kaznu.kz

### **Америка киносының ұлттық стереотиптердің қалыптасуына, бейнеленуіне және таралуына әсері**

Қазіргі кезде кино ең танымал және кең таралған бұқаралық ақпарат құралы болып табылады. Технологияның дамуы мен өмірдің қарбалас қарқыны дәуірінде және фильмдердің баспа бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарынан басым бола бастаған кезеңде, кинематограф тұтас ұрпақтың дүниетанымын қалыптастыруда маңызды рөл атқаруда. Кинематограф өнерінде көрсетілетін шындық өзекті мәселеге айналды. Экрандағы шындық нұсқасы көбіне біздің оған деген көзқарасымыздың және нақты жағдайдың көрінісі болып табылады. Біздің бүкіл өміріміз таптауырындарға негізделген және оларға қатысты біздің жеке көзқарасымызға қарамастан, олар тұлғаның айналадағы шындықты, өзін және басқа адамдарды бағалауда маңызды өлшемге айналды. Ең көп таралған таптауырындардың жиынтығы ретінде кинематограф қабылдау таптауырынын іс жүзінде жүзеге асырудың мысалы болып табылады. Голливуд өз кезегінде фильмдері арқылы әртүрлі нәсілдер мен мәдениеттерді стереотиптеуде үлкен рөл атқарады. Осыған орай авторлар бұл мақалада ұлттық стереотиптерді қалыптастырудағы құралдарға талдау жүргізген. Бұл зерттеуде басты мақсаты – фильмдер арқылы бүкіл әлемге таптауырындарды тарату және көрсету құралы ретінде Голливудтың рөлін айқындау. Мұқият талдау мен практикалық зерттеулер (сауалнамалар мен сұхбаттар) жүргізу арқылы авторлар таптауырындардың қаншалықты фильмдерде көрсетілетін шындыққа сәйкестігін және әртүрлі ұлттық/этникалық топтардың танымал американдық фильмдердегі өз бейнесіне қаншалықты қанағаттанатындығын анықтайды. Зерттеу адамдарға фильмдерден көретін үстіртін бейнелерді қалай айқындау керектігі туралы ұсыныстар жасаған, себебі осындай бейнелер халықаралық қарым-қатынастардың сәтті дамуына кедергі келтіруі мүмкін.

**Түйін сөздер:** таптаурын, Голливуд, жұмсақ күш, американдық кино, нәсілшілдік, нанымдар, халықаралық бейне, ұлттық өкілдік, ұлттық бейне, кемсітушілік, азиялық таптаурын, қара нәсілшілдер туралы таптаурындар, мұсылмандар туралы таптаурындар.

А.Б. Кузембаева\*, А. Аусадық, Д. Сарсекбай

Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, Казахстан, г. Алматы

\*e-mail: asiya.kuzembayeva@kaznu.kz

### **Влияние американского кино на формирование, отражение и распространение национальных стереотипов**

В нынешнюю эпоху кино является наиболее популярным и распространенным средством массовой информации. В эру быстро разрабатывающихся технологий и бурного темпа жизни, когда печатные средства массовой информации начинают уступать фильмам, кинематограф начинает играть важную роль в построении мировоззрения целых поколений. Реальность в кинематографическом искусстве – насущная проблема. Версия реальности на экране – во многом определяет, как наше отношение к ней, так и фактическое положение дел. Вся наша жизнь построена на стереотипах, и каково бы ни было наше личное отношение к ним, они волей-неволей стали критерием оценки индивидом окружающей действительности и суждений о себе и других людях. Кинематограф, являющийся выражением наиболее распространенных стереотипов, является примером практического применения стереотипного мышления. Голливуд в свою очередь играет огромную роль в стереотипизации разных рас и культур благодаря своим фильмам. В связи с этим в настоящей статье авторы анализируют средства формирования национальных стереотипов. Основное внимание в этом исследовании уделяется Голливуду как инструменту распространения и отражения стереотипов во всем мире посредством фильмов. При помощи тщательного анализа и практических исследований (опросов и интервью) авторы выявляют, действительно ли стереотипы соответствуют реалиям, которые показаны в фильмах, и удовлетворены ли разные национальности / этнические группы их изображением в американских фильмах, которые невероятно популярны во всем мире. В заключении исследования, даются некоторые рекомендации для людей не подвергаться воздействию поверхностных образов, которые они видят в фильмах, потому что это может помешать им в успешных международных отношениях.

**Ключевые слова:** стереотипы, Голливуд, мягкая сила, американское кино, расизм, предрассудки, международный имидж, национальная репрезентация, национальный имидж, дискриминация, азиатские стереотипы, стереотипы чернокожих, мусульманские стереотипы.

### **Introduction**

At the stage of modern development of society in the context of globalization, an urgent problem is the increase in international conflicts. The strengthening of economic, political, and cultural ties between the countries, high rates of migration have necessitated the search for new ways of peaceful coexistence in a changing ethnic composition of society. Representatives of various linguistic cultures in intercultural communication are often guided by various national stereotypes, therefore, for successful intercultural interaction in certain fields of activity (for example, in the sphere of movie industry), it is necessary first of all to know and take into account the mechanisms of formation of these stereotypes. Thus, interethnic perception is currently the key point of understanding and interaction between representatives of different cultures, and national stereotypes are an important component of international perception.

Cinema, having entered public life more than a hundred years ago, continues to have a huge impact on the formation of a person's worldview, his consciousness and state of mind. Cinema changes views, forms public opinion and helps shape stereotypes, including in such an important area as international relations. The unexplored nature of this issue is quite large, which determines the *relevance* of this research.

The authors do not set the task of debunking the existing and repeatedly embodied images of different nationalities in Hollywood cinema, moreover, she will try to avoid emotionally colored value judgments. The practical significance of this study is to reveal those stereotyped images in full on specific examples and explanations of the causes of its occurrence and stability. National stereotypes, which are reflected in Hollywood films, are the subject of this study, but the well-known popularity of modern American culture in general, and Hollywood cinema in particular, significantly

expands the geography of the spread of the view of different nationalities presented in it. The role of American cinema in the modern world is difficult to overestimate, the ideas spread in it go far beyond the borders of the United States of America.

This work may be interesting and useful to researchers in the field of psychology, political science and sociology, film directors, university professors for using as a source for their lectures, and all those who are not indifferent to the topic of the influence of modern foreign cinema on a stereotyped attitude towards different nationalities – this is the *practical significance* of the presented research.

### Research questions

1. How American movies impact on shaping stereotyped vision of one nationality?
2. How stereotyped perception of this or that nationality impedes/encourages international relations?

### Literature review

With all the variety of works that somehow affect the problem of stereotypes, and with all the relevance of the topic of national stereotypes, there are almost no studies on the practical application of stereotypes in such a popular field as cinema today. As a material for research, the production of the film industry was not chosen by chance. It is certainly necessary to note the informational and educational role of cinema, which forms ideas about the surrounding world in general and other peoples in particular. From the point of view of the theory of stereotypes, cinema is of particular interest as a source of embodiment of national images, and plays a dual role: reflecting the most superficial national ideas most fully, it simultaneously and most actively contributes to their dissemination. But here we will present some of the most interesting and outstanding works that despite their exclusiveness nevertheless have some shortcomings.

The materials used in the article can be divided into two categories: scientific articles and works, the subject of research of which are stereotypes, and essays by entertainment, political and social specialists, in which certain paintings are evaluated and analyzed from an artistic point of view.

The founder of the doctrine of stereotypes is the American sociologist *Walter Lippman*, who first introduced the concept into scientific terminology

in 1922 (Липпман, 2004). According to him, in addition to saving efforts, stereotype systems can serve as the core of our personal tradition, a way to protect our position in society. This is a picture of a possible world to which we have adapted. That is the great theory I do agree with. But let's say the experience comes into a total contradiction with the stereotype. What is then? If an individual has already lost a certain flexibility or it is extremely inconvenient for him to change his stereotypes due to some strong interest, he can ignore this contradiction and consider it an exception confirming the rule, or question the testimony, or find some mistake, and then forget about this event. So, here assumption comes to my mind that some people like to be affected by stereotypes, they like the picture they have already drawn in their minds no matter if it corresponds to reality. But if he has not lost his curiosity or the ability to think, then the innovation integrates into the already existing picture of the world and changes it.

One of the first methods of studying stereotypes was proposed by *D. Katz and K. Breiley* in the 30s of the last century. In their study, they proposed the most outstanding 84 traits for 10 different ethnic groups: white Americans, Blacks, Chinese, English, Germans, Italians, Irish, Japanese, Jews and Turks (Стефаненко, 2013). After the initial selection, the subjects were asked to return to the 10 lists they had compiled and note the five qualities that are most typical for the members of each group. Considering only these five qualities, Katz and Breiley identified 12 traits most often attributed to each nation. The survey was quite complex and comprehensive; however, it didn't mention anything about the factors influencing to the creation of those traits in the minds of different nationalities.

The study of the characteristics of national stereotypes, according to *G.U. Ktsoeva*, involves identifying typical reactions to national objects, analyzing the nature and specifics of a stable attitude towards representatives of another nationality (Ктsoева, 2013). According to her, the human being has a tendency to create a certain attitude of attraction (sympathy, interest), repulsion (dislike, antipathy) or indifference to representatives of another national group even with the initial knowledge about the national object of interest. One of the main assumptions of her work is the fact that among the many national stereotypes functioning in the public consciousness, a huge number of them are negative, since they were obtained earlier from unsuccessful communication and relate to individual

personalities, individual «negative» qualities of representatives of different ethnic groups. Such prejudice undoubtedly has an impact on the relationship between representatives of different nationalities and can generate a conflict situation if we are talking about an emotionally hostile tone and a general negative attitude towards this national group. But here is one thing we found contestable. The author Ktsoeva had mostly considered national stereotypes through the negative prism of view leaving no space for its positive sides.

In domestic and foreign studies, researchers such as *Buzoyeva M.* denote the negative national stereotype by the term prejudice (Бюзоева, 2009). The author believes that prejudices contain only particular negative characteristics of a foreign group, whereas a national stereotype (that is not always negative) presupposes a negative global assessment of the nation as a whole and affects specific ethno-cultural features of the stereotyped community.

Once again, a huge gap in the research works of the authors mentioned above is consideration of national stereotypes only from the negative perspective. According to the author, functioning of national stereotypes at the level of everyday consciousness carries both negative and positive aspects. The negative aspect is manifested in the following: national stereotypes act as a barrier to unhindered interethnic communication, they complicate mutual understanding between nations, divide them and contribute to the emergence of friction between them, and an emotionally aggravated attitude to their language and cultural peculiarities. The positive point is that stereotypes actively contribute to the preservation of the spiritual culture of nations, regardless of the area of settlement.

As to the cinema's involvement in shaping the stereotyped perception of different ethnic groups, we would like to especially highlight the works of such western researchers like Pells R. (Pells, 2012), Alford M. (Alford, 2017), Fattor E. M. (Fattor, 2014), Secker T. (Alford, Secker, 2017). The main characteristics of their works are the statements that Hollywood produces the movies that create mainly the positive image of the US outside its boundaries, promoting its own ideology and values mostly neglecting/wrongly reflecting the national features of other ethnicities. Their main focus was concentrated on American movie production in the context of a soft power. The concept of a biased perception of

different ethnic minorities were barely mentioned. But the reason why we have highlighted specifically these authors is that we highly appreciated the objectivity and impartiality of their attitude towards the issue.

To summarize this section, the authors of this article would like to once again mention the fact that despite a large number of works that deals with ethnic stereotypes concept and cinema production's role in social and political discourses, there is still no comprehensive research work that would deal with the issue comprehensively. That is why it is still pending a more deep analysis.

### Problem Statement

Hollywood is one of the most famous American stations of productions and it can to a great extent be an influencer. Many films that were produced in Hollywood can present a bunch of stereotypes of other cultures. Nonetheless, the great quantity of investigations that show a movie analysis mostly focus on the general stereotypes reflected in movies or on stereotypes about either Muslims or Blacks. There is only limited handling of stereotypes linked to European or Asian countries. The authors attempt to investigate stereotypes presented in Hollywood films comprehensively.

Ever since cinema has established itself as an information source, it has been this or that way used as a distributor of stereotypes. However, in this article the authors are going to consider those stereotypes that the cinematograph of the countries has developed from the viewer by releasing their films for wide distribution. So, the main motivation of writing this article was to prove the idea that the national stereotypes reflected in the American movies has a very huge impact on the mass consciousness both inside and outside of the US, which not always corresponds to objective reality.

Taking that into account, we have set up the main goal of this article – showing to what extent national stereotypes shaped by American cinema has an effect on different nationalities' perception both inside and outside of US borders.

The objectives were determined according to the goal:

- to identify the concept of «national stereotype»;
- to determine the role of cinema in the dissemination of stereotypes;
- to investigate the positive/negative impact of stereotypes on the perception of one national group.

## Methods and Materials

Of course, as in the study of any other socio-psychological and political phenomenon, there is still no universal method that allows us to identify all the components of ethnic stereotypes, all their characteristics. Each methodological tool has its advantages and disadvantages. Currently, much attention is paid to psych semantic methods that allow us to obtain a quantitative measurement of the components of the image of a particular ethnic group, which means that we can approach its proper sociological and political study.

Basing on the above, following research *methods* were used in the work:

- *theoretical*: abstraction, review of literature and cinematic sources on the topic under study, analysis and synthesis of data, their classification, forecasting, deduction, induction, statistical, concretization.

- *empirical*: observation, questionnaire survey, interview.

The main *subject* of research is the group of people consisting of representatives of different nationalities.

To carry out the questionnaire survey, the authors have selected 200 people on the basis of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, including White and Black American visiting international students, Korean, Chinese, Tajik, Afghani, Irani, Russian, and Kazakh students. All students participated voluntarily in the study. The ratio of men and women is 50% of men and 50% of women. Age category of respondents varies from 18 to 25. The reason of choosing this age category is quite simple: mostly

the youth in their 20<sup>th</sup> are into watching films and they are most likely to be affected by them.

Qualitative interviews were also used by the author in this research. The purpose of these interviews was to prove more validity of the research based on the results of the previous survey. There were 30 interview participants. To give more accurate information regarding interview process, we would like to first of all mention the fact that the interview participants were 30 young people aged between 18-25. Among them there were 100% of Non-American nations' representatives from the list of survey respondents that had a desire to be involved in further research. The reason of such a ratio is that the author wanted to investigate specifically the way other nationalities perceive their own and other nationalities' image and to what extent they agree with them.

Each interview lasted around 30 minutes on average. The in-depth interview consisted of 10 main questions, the goal of which was to reveal the level of American movies effect on the people's minds, how different nationalities are reflected there and how the things are going on in reality, to what extent are those stereotypes valid and corresponding to reality, and how do those stereotypes impact on intercultural communication.

Table 1 shows the 10 standard questions that were used in all the interviews. The respondents and participants were fully notified about the research, and all the necessary consent to take part was received. By using mixed research methods with participants of different nationalities, a more objective and accurate analysis of the topic under research could be conducted.

**Table 1** – Interview basic questions and goals

№	Question	Goal
1	To what extent people's minds are exposed to get influenced by the media production?	To find out how media production is enshrined in our everyday lives which implies a logical assumption that it can't help effecting our minds
2	How do you think: are all the portrayals of non-American nations in their movies fully corresponding to reality?	To reveal the level of people's trust in what they watch, and their ability to reasonably analyze and select information for perception
3	Have you ever noticed a tendency of a stereotyped reflection in a specific movie genre? Or is it quite popular in any American movie genre?	To reveal the possibility of an impact on a certain group of people that are interested in a definite movie genre
4	What are the features of your nationality's representation in Hollywood production movies specifically? Have you noticed any regarding the other ones?	To assess specificity of different ethnicities' perception of their own/other cultures reflected in American production movies, to reveal whether they consider it stereotyped



*Continuation of the table*

№	Question	Goal
5	Does those specific features correspond to reality? If yes, which ones? If no, which ones?	To analyze whether they consider those ethnic images in movies realistic or totally not corresponding to the real state of affairs
6	By any chance, do these stereotyped movies have an effect on your mind personally and on mass consciousness perception? Do you consider it from a negative or positive side? Could you please expand your response?	To study the opinions on the respondents' general attitude towards stereotyped shaping of other nationalities, whether they are mostly negative or positive
7	Have you ever had an experience of communicating with the foreign person for the first time? Did your «stereotyped/non-stereotyped perception» by any means impede or, by contrast, encourage your conversation?	To assess if the «general stereotyped picture» of one nation's representative shaped by the movies by any means had advantages or disadvantages during the direct communication in practice
8	Could you please express your opinion and any ideas on the reason why do Americans mostly shape foreign images in their movies not always correct? Do you think it is happening accidentally or purposefully?	To analyze whether people consider or not consider that Americans movie producers show other ethnicities in a stereotyped and superficially by purpose, i.e as a part of their public diplomacy.
9	How do you think: is a movie industry considered to be a vital part of international relations?	To get the opinions on their attitude towards movies production i.e., whether they consider the movies serious enough to be the part of public international relations or do they just watch them without any comprehensive reasoning as a means of entertainment
10	In your opinion, does American movie industry need to kind of reconsider its «movie policy» and not label other nationalities? Maybe you could say a few words of a possible recommendation of how to tackle the issue (if you consider it to be an issue)?	To get the opinions and recommendations on reforming both the American movie industry and people's minds' level of exposure to various unproved and superficial things shown in what they watch

## Results

The main assumption on the initial stage of this research was that Hollywood movie industry is convincing and widespread. Development of digital technology has made access to any media content a matter of several seconds that is available 24/7. According to the data, the rise of «reality television» has turned cultural images from being just a fiction into very realistic reflections of society.

The results of the questionnaire showed that 53% consider the reflection of racial and ethnic stereotypes in the Hollywood movies as just presenting how the things and people «truly are» and therefore these cultural ethnic images are mostly seen as quite real and unquestionable. 40% of respondents said that actually in lots of American movies the ethnic minorities images are mostly presented in a stereotyped way which not always is corresponding to reality. 7% didn't notice any stereotyped reflection of different nationalities because they simply watch the movies not paying attention to that kind of details.

Ethnic stereotypes in the movies actually differ depending on ethnic/racial groups but at the same time, there are some similar features that unite all of

them. As the research showed, the core stereotypes of African people, Russians, representatives of Muslim states, Chinese and Koreans are mainly about racialized, classed, and sexist notions regarding their sociability, intelligence, reliability, and socio-economic standing. What it means is that these racial/ethnic groups are persistently represented in the movies as violent, unintelligent, dishonest, and consistently poor. Here is quite a sharp statement in one of the interviews:

By representing ethnic minorities through stereotypes that are in most of the cases negative, here comes the question whether Americans consider these people deserving a right to the societal resources. (Female, Russian, 24 years)

### *Asian representation in American movies*

Before starting this research, we had a background knowledge regarding Asian representation in American movies. So, according to data, Asians are more likely to be represented in science-fiction and drama, and less likely to be seen in comedies and reality shows (Nielsen, 2020).

As survey revealed, when Asians are given roles in Hollywood, they are often stereotyped. This was the response of 90% respondents of Asian (Non-American) origin. Most of the men are out

of masculinity and women are unfairly painted as a «china doll» even though it can be a Korean or Japanese woman.

75% of Asian respondents (of them 45% of Chinese, 50% of Koreans and 5% of Japanese) said that most of Asian representatives are labeled as nerds, who always wear glasses and have a terrible accent, or as masters and killers. As a result of the interviews with Asian representatives, here we could also see the dissatisfaction with their representation in American movies:

This stereotyping system that shows Asians as always smart guys, hardworking, and ambitious, has more harmful than positive effects. It frames Asians into an «othered» role, considering them as passive foreigners without special character. (Female, Korean, 21 y.o)

I don't really like Chinese representation in American movies. Most of the images presented there are stereotyped. And these stereotypes do not just stay on screen, but directly impact on how Asians are perceived all around the globe, and it has disastrous cultural and social consequences. That makes me feel inferiority for my nation. (Male, Chinese, 21 years)

I hate it when Indians in the American movies are depicted as having «funny Indian» and grammatically incorrect accents. I think the reason of this is racial ignorance. I want them know that not all Indians have that terrible accent. By the way, not all Indians are brown skinned, huh. (Female, Indian, 26 years)

Hollywood has a habit of casting any Asian actor in any Asian role. A Korean actor may portray a Japanese character, and vice versa. This creates an assumption that Asia is one country with interchangeable cultures. But it is not like that. Asia is made up of many countries, each with their own different culture and traditions. (Male, Japanese, 25 years)

As a result of research, the authors have made several assumptions. First of all, most of the Asians depicted in American movies are presented in a stereotyped way. Second, Asians themselves, both living in America and outside of it, don't really like their image in American production movies. Most of the things shown in movies are not corresponding to reality and shows a very superficial knowledge of Americans about Asians.

### ***Black/African American Representation in American movies***

When it comes to the Black people representation, there are both positive and negative stereotypes

existing in Hollywood. When Black people are portrayed as good in the movies, it's usually about the roles like for example Michael Clarke Duncan's character in «The Green Mile.» The main feature of those characters are as a rule – reasonable and wise Black men with zero level of personal desires to improve their position in life. Instead, these characters usually operate to help White characters solve their problems (Dixon, 2006).

The mammy image and more spread Black best friend stereotypes are operating in almost 70% of all the movies with Black people involvement (Fujioka, 2005). Those sustainable images are rooted to the enslavement period when mammies conventionally took care of White families, considering the lives of their White lords a highest value (more than their own). 45% of Black respondents consider this fact to be racist and humiliating because the things are not like that anymore.

The situation is kind of different with the concept of the «Black best friend». Their main function in most of the movies is mostly to help their White friend. These stereotypes are perceived as half positive and half negative. Why positive? Because they mostly are represented in a good light. Why negative? Because, some of the respondents consider that this trend of portraying Black people as friends of the White ones (that are usually the main characters) puts them in a minor position which also implies a racist notion.

I have no idea why Black people are always portrayed as having extra weight, with zero intelligence, without any high moral standards. Because that is totally untrue. But I think that this tendency of depicting black people in such a stereotyped way is outliving itself and currently I have noticed new trends where Black people are shown in the movies in a way equal to that of Whites. And I really hope it will succeed in representing our ethnic features in a new positive way. (Male, African American, 26 y.o)

Black people as a matter of rule, are overrepresented as violent perpetrators and underrepresented as victims in news. You could think that this is a racist myth that doesn't exist but it does. And it is a fact. (Female, African American, 25 y.o)

They always depict us with guns in most of their movies, very muscular, aggressive and violent. But that was a reality about 20 years ago. Nowadays I can see positive shifts in American movie industry where they don't label Blacks to be the thugs or drug dealers and I do really like it. (Male, African American, 20 y.o)

For many years, black movies and television shows have been showing the black culture in a wrong way. A great part of what constitutes black culture is mainly rap music, crime, gang violence, drug dealing and comedies about the stereotypical black family or black person (Ward, 2004). As a matter of fact, in television and film, characters from minor racial and ethnic groups often are presented very superficially, and their scenarios in most of the cases have cliché narratives (Tukachinsky, Mastro & Yarchi, 2017). The nature of these depictions consolidates stereotypes and makes us perceive them as something that is real. For example, black men and boys are more likely to be shown in a bad light in both news and TV shows. A lot of media representations of black men are adhered to the criminal and poor context. And what is more interesting, the only positive depictions of Black people are framed by the sphere of sports and music. According to the data collected during the survey, 70% of all the Black respondents share these opinions. These representations create certain frames in the perception of Black potential.

According to the data collected from the interviews, nearly 50% of Blacks were not satisfied with how their culture is being shown in media production. 30% stated that it was quite popular to depict Blacks in a stereotyped way like several decades ago but for now, the things are about to change, they do believe that the American movie industry is on a new reforming way to representing racial and ethnic minorities objectively.

#### ***Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim Representation in American movies***

Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim people are very often not differentiated in the movies and media. It means that this kind of depiction doesn't express a diverse religion and many different ethnicities features (Trevino, Kanso & Nelson, 2010). So, let's make it clear: Arabs are people from Middle Eastern region who are not necessarily Muslims, they can just choose any faith they want while Muslims are a specific group of people who only have the Islamic faith. Many people still don't know whether Arabs and Muslims are the same ethnic group, because according to what Hollywood often represents is that all Muslims are Arabs and all Arabs are Muslims (Saleem & Ramasubramanian, 2019).

What the research shows us is Muslim, middle eastern and Arab stereotypes include mostly the focus on: violence, terrorism, extremism, religious fundamentalism. What is more interesting is the way those depictions influence people's minds. Table

2 presents the difference in the perception of those stereotypes by the Middle Eastern, Muslim and Arab people themselves and the people of different nationalities (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017).

**Table 2** – Effect of media representation on people

For the Arab, Muslim and Middle Eastern audiences	For others
A great desire to improve the status of their ethnic group and prove it is depicted wrong	Negative prejudice and fear
Distrust in the U.S. government	Stereotyping about violence and aggression
Decreased desire to be accepted by Americans	Encouraging military acts in Muslim countries
Quite possible that they won't want to interact with Americans	Continuing to support policies against Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim Americans

As a result of this part of research, there could be set up an obvious assumption: American movie industry has a lot to do with the accuracy of cultural diversity representation. According to the data saved in the process of survey, only 20% were satisfied with how their culture is being shown in a strong media instrument which is called a movie. So, having collected all these data, let's move to the most important part of this research – analysis of data collected.

#### **Discussion**

The research has shown that Hollywood is responsible for shaping the point of view of people. And since human beings are biologically prone to get exposed to stereotyped thinking, it is very uneasy to change people's point of view. Therefore, Hollywood writers and directors should have avoided ethnic stereotypes but they didn't really succeed. So, let's discuss what is coming out what we have collected.

Because of the slave heritage and background in the United States and constant discrimination against African Americans during a long period of history, movie industry was representing Blacks in a derogatory way. African American roles in movies were not completely realistic (Бобнева, 2008). African Americans have often been shown in unpleasant ways; this includes describing African

Americans as being abnormal, cruel, unintelligent, or just playing any comic role. But it needs to be noted that even though some modern movies are basing on long-held stereotypes, there is still optimism in the minds and hearts of African Americans that that the industry is about to stop relying on stereotypes of African Americans for making movies and television shows. However, this demands a special attention on the part of filmmakers to depict the complexity of Black culture.

The stereotyping of Asian-Americans in Hollywood has formed perception of Asian-Americans not only in entertainment industry, but also in society. Hollywood goes on depriving Asians of comprehensive characters. As soon as there exist Asians who implement characteristics seen in the media, like soft-spoken or intelligent prone to the science, it is hazardous to perceive this as the only Asian identity; the Asian-American population today is much more diverse (Barnes, 2008). But despite these stereotypes and the lack of representation of Asians in film, people are moving forward. Hollywood is slowly making a progress towards casting ethnically right actors for Asian roles (Adaptation of *Mulan*) (Kawai, 2005). Other films are also beginning to break down boundaries.

These performances are vital in the process of making the American movies more diverse. Nevertheless, it doesn't make Hollywood's racism justified by continuing to cast white actors in yellowface. Even though the steps are quite small, but still the movie industry continues to make steps forward in the right direction.

## Conclusion

This paper has addressed but one: reveal how Hollywood and movie industry in general effects people's minds, and international relations.

The first and primary goal of this thesis project was to identify the concept of «national stereotype». As this paper shows, national stereotypes are integral elements of national consciousness and self-consciousness, represent a solid attitude, under the influence of which the information recorded by a person is accepted or rejected. National attitudes focus people's beliefs, views, and opinions about the history and modernity of the national community and interaction with other communities, groups, and peoples. The national stereotypes functioning in everyday consciousness embody a specific reflection of values, attitude to the object, that is, its average perception. In other words, if «we take the

value as the norm, then the national stereotype will be the norm of attitude to the norm, that is, the norm squared» (Macadam, 2008). Being dependent on value orientations, national stereotypes follow from national values and express them in a schematic form.

The second goal of the paper was to determine the role of cinema in the dissemination of national stereotypes. According to the research results, movies are an inalienable part of 70% of respondents' everyday lives. Stereotyped depiction of cultural groups in there is noticed with a high range. The ethnic group with the highest level of dissatisfaction with their media representation are considered to be Muslims and Arabs. And it is not unjustified. The thing is that American movie industry has been producing the films with the participation of Muslims and Arabs in most of the cases representing them as terrorists, extremists, abusers, religious fanatics. The negative depiction of a national group even in movies and even if it is a comedy genre, it is definitely fraught with the worsening of that national group's image. It leads to the intercultural conflict and misunderstanding, and creates a prejudiced opinion in advance.

The third goal in the beginning of this research was to investigate the positive/negative impact of stereotypes on the perception of one national group. So, as a result, ethnic stereotypes are a type of social stereotypes, namely those that describe members of ethnic groups, are attributed to them or associated with them. To this day, according to the research, ethnic stereotypes are very widely regarded as an exceptionally negative phenomenon. This is largely due to the fact that negative stereotypes of discriminated ethnic minorities have been studied most often in world science.

To get this research paper finished, we would like to express some advisory and recommendary assumptions both for filmmakers and common people of various national groups. In an ever more racially diverse world, Hollywood's ability to include different racial and ethnic groups is vital. Industry leaders must take responsibility for diversity problems, and they should manage them in a proper non-stereotyped way. What is to common people, we suggest people not to be a sponge that absorbs literally everything it sees. Sometimes, what we see is not real. That is why, before letting the minds to be exposed to stereotyped and superficial thinking, people are better to reasonably think and not to make hasty conclusions regarding this or that national group.

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МРНТИ 06.51.25

<https://doi.org/10.26577/IRILJ.2022.v97.i1.04>**Г.С. Байкушикова<sup>ORCID</sup>, Р.Е. Уткелбай\*<sup>ORCID</sup>**

Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, Казахстан, г. Алматы

\*e-mail: U.Rysbek@gmail.com

## **ТОРГОВАЯ ВОЙНА И ПАНДЕМИЯ COVID-19 КАК ФАКТОР ДЕГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИИ**

В статье анализируется влияние пандемии COVID-19 и торговых войн на глобальную экономическую интеграцию. Проанализировав экономические показатели последних лет, в статье делается попытка проследить тенденцию к деглобализации, обусловленной глобальными экономическими кризисами и экономическими противоречиями, такими как торговая война между США и Китаем. Обеспечение национальной безопасности и обеспокоенность общественным здоровьем дает новые основания для протекционизма, делать упор на развитие внутренних ресурсов.

В данной статье рассматриваются несколько этапов мировой экономической интеграции, и выделяется отдельный исторический этап – замедление темпов экономического роста, так называемый период слобализации. Делается попытка дать определение деглобализации. Деглобализация это не новая концепция, скорее является мегатрендом. Признаки деглобализации, измеряемые замедлением торговли и инвестиций, и уменьшение глобальных производственно-сбытовых цепочек, начали проявляться уже в 2008 году. И эта тенденция, ускорилась из-за стремления США сдерживать Китай в контексте стратегической конкуренции между ними. В статье выделяется еще один важный фактор, способствующий деглобализации – COVID-19.

В целом статье делается вывод, о том, что еще слишком рано утверждать о глубине и устойчивости данного мегатренда – деглобализации. Это не будет означать окончания глобализации – процесса, который достиг исторически высокого уровня. Но глобализация может быть, по крайней мере частично обращена вспять.

**Ключевые слова:** деглобализация, слобализация, торговые противоречия, торговая война, США, Китай, пандемия COVID-19.

G. Baikushikova, R. Utkelbay\*

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Kazakhstan, Almaty

\*e-mail: U.Rysbek@gmail.com

### **Trade war and COVID-19 pandemic as a deglobalization factor**

The article analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and trade wars on global economic integration. Having analyzed the economic indicators of recent years, the article attempts to trace the trend towards deglobalization caused by global economic crises and economic contradictions, such as the trade war between the United States and China. Ensuring national security and concern for public health gives new grounds for protectionism, to focus on the development of domestic resources.

This article examines several stages of world economic integration, and highlights a separate historical stage – a slowdown in economic growth, the so-called period of slowbalization. An attempt is made to define deglobalization. Deglobalization is not a new concept, but rather a megatrend. Signs of deglobalization, measured by a slowdown in trade and investment, and a shrinking global value chain, began to appear as early as 2008. And this trend has accelerated due to the desire of the United States to contain China in the context of strategic competition between them. The article highlights another important factor contributing to deglobalization – COVID-19.

In general, the article concludes that it is too early to assert about the depth and sustainability of this megatrend – deglobalization. This will not mean the end of globalization, a process that has reached a historically high level. But globalization can be at least partially reversed.

**Key words:** deglobalization, slowbalization, trade contradictions, trade war, USA, China, COVID-19 pandemic.

Г.С. Байкушикова, Р.Е. Уткелбай\*

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ Ұлттық Университеті, Қазақстан, Алматы қ.

\*e-mail: U.Rysbek@gmail.com

### Сауда соғысы және COVID-19 пандемиясы дежаһандану факторы ретінде

Мақалада COVID-19 пандемиясының және сауда соғыстарының жаһандық экономикалық интеграцияға әсері талданады. Мақалада автор соңғы жылдардағы экономикалық көрсеткіштерді талдай келе, АҚШ пен Қытай арасындағы сауда соғысы сияқты жаһандық экономикалық дағдарыстар мен экономикалық қайшылықтар тудырған жаһандану үрдісін бақылауға тырысқан. Ұлттық қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз ету және қоғамдық денсаулыққа алаңдаушылық протекционизмге жаңа негіз береді, ішкі ресурстарды дамытуға баса назар аударады.

Бұл мақалада әлемдік экономикалық интеграцияның бірнеше кезеңдері қарастырылып, жеке тарихи кезең – экономикалық өсудің баяулауы, слобализация кезеңі деп аталатын кезең көрсетіледі. Деглобализация анықтамасына түсінік берілген. Деглобализация бұл жаңа тұжырымдама емес, керісінше мегатренд. Сауда мен инвестициялардың баяулауымен өлшенетін деглобализацияның белгілері және жаһандық сату тізбегінің төмендеуі 2008 жылы байқала бастады. Бұл үрдіс АҚШ-тың Қытайды олардың арасындағы стратегиялық бәсекелестік жағдайында ұстауға деген ұмтылысына байланысты жеделдеді. Мақалада жаһандануға ықпал ететін тағы бір маңызды фактор – COVID-19 ерекшеленеді.

Жалпы, мақалада бұл мегатренд – деглобализацияның тереңдігі мен тұрақтылығы туралы айту әлі ерте деп қорытындыланады. Бұл тарихи жоғары деңгейге жеткен – жаһандану үдерісінің аяқталуын білдірмейді. Бірақ жаһандану кем дегенде ішінара кері қайтарылуы мүмкін.

**Түйін сөздер:** дежаһандану, слобализация, сауда қайшылықтары, сауда соғысы, АҚШ, Қытай, COVID-19 пандемиясы.

#### Введение

Торговые войны и пандемия COVID-19 заставляют мировую экономику отходить от глобальной экономической интеграции. В настоящее время политики и ведущие представители деловых кругов задаются вопросом не слишком ли растянуты глобальные производственно-сбытовые цепочки. В условиях неопределенности альянсов и отсутствия международного сотрудничества они также задаются вопросом о том, не следует ли им уменьшить свою экономическую взаимозависимость. Обеспокоенность национальной безопасностью и общественным здоровьем дает новые основания для протекционизма, особенно в том, что касается медицинского инвентаря и продовольствия, и делают упор на внутренние источники поставок.

Это не будет означать окончания глобализации – процесса, который достиг исторически высокого уровня. Но глобализация может быть обращена вспять, по крайней мере частично. Мировой финансовый кризис 2008-2010 годов был историческим поворотным моментом в глобальной экономической интеграции. Теперь, в ответ на текущий экономический кризис и кризис в области здравоохранения, политики, похоже, готовы предпринять целенаправленные шаги, чтобы усилить движение деглобализации.

Эти шаги угрожают замедлить или обратить вспять экономический рост, вызванный глобализацией. Хуже того, новые ограничения на торговлю могут распространиться и нанести ущерб, на устранение которого могут потребоваться десятилетия.

#### Литературный обзор

История показывает, что в мировой экономике существует циклический феномен между глобализацией и деглобализацией. Сторонники свободной торговли продвигают международную торговлю и деловую активность, в то время как противники хотят защитить активы и безопасность от проблем или рисков глобализации. Ключевой вопрос исследования заключается в том, приведут ли недавние глобальные потрясения к деглобализации, и чем отличается этот феномен от 1930-х и 2008 годов.

Глобализация и деглобализация на протяжении всей истории имели циклический феномен. Джонс Ж. (2005) указывает, что первая глобальная экономика была в период с 1840 по 1929 год. Затем Великая депрессия и Первая мировая война вызвали первую деглобализацию с 1929 по 1979 год. В течение этого периода мир пережил Вторую мировую войну, западные страны работали над тем чтобы устранить торговые барьеры.

ры, и многие страны стали членами ВТО. Вторая глобализованная экономика последовала за 1979 годом и продолжалась до глобального финансового кризиса в 2008 году. Недоверие к финансовым системам и глобальным компаниям заставляло страны беспокоиться о неравенстве и разнице в доходах. Несмотря на то, что международная торговля способствовала росту экономики, влиятельные люди, а также малые и средние предприятия считали, что им платят несправедливо. Это привлекло внимание общественности, а также политиков, и кризис создал новую модель деглобализации.

Уолден Белло (2005) в своей работе «Деглобализация – идеи для новой мировой экономики» впервые использовал термин «деглобализация». Согласно Белло деглобализация имеет 14 характеристик: (1) производство для внутреннего рынка; (2) субсидии на национальном уровне; (3) сильная торговая политика; (4) промышленная политика, включая субсидии, тарифы и торговлю для укрепления производственного сектора; (5) отложенные меры справедливого перераспределения доходов; (6) снижение внимания к росту, но с упором на повышение качества жизни; (7) энергетические и транспортные системы, преобразованные в децентрализованные системы, основанные на возобновляемых источниках; (8) поддержание здорового баланса между пропускной способностью страны и численностью ее населения; (9) экологически безопасные технологии; (10) гендерная линза для обеспечения гендерного равенства; (11) стратегические экономические решения рынку или технократам; (12) мониторинг гражданского общества и надзор за частным сектором и государством, а также процесс, который должен быть институционализирован; (13) имущественный комплекс, преобразованный в смешанную экономику; и (14) централизованные глобальные институты заменены региональными институтами.

Белло не считает деглобализацию постоянным явлением, поскольку интеграционные процессы в 2005 году были на пике, но он предлагает деглобализацию как процесс, который полностью изменит существующую модель управления мировой экономикой.

Однако некоторые исследования рассматривают возможность того, что экономическая глобализация является временным процессом: Джеймс (2017). Современные тенденции к сни-

жению в международной экономике исследовали Константиnescу, Маттоо и Рута (2015), Льюис и Монарх (2016). Эти авторы приходят к выводу, что спад международной торговли не может быть объяснен циклическими экономическими факторами. Хотя эти исследования не являются преобладающим направлением в мировой экономике, в то же время, они являются важной отправной точкой для этого исследования, поскольку надежно устраняют многие явления, которые потенциально могут привести к временному сокращению объема внешней торговли.

Замедляющие тенденции в международной торговле, инвестициях и производстве, являются индикаторами того, что направление глобализации меняется и ведет к значительной трансформации международного экономического порядка, которую некоторые исследователи называют деглобализацией.

### Результаты и обсуждение

Глобализация включает в себя множество различных элементов: трансграничные потоки торговли, инвестиции, данные, знания и технологии, люди, включая рабочие силы, туристы и студенты.

Глобальная торговля, измеряемая отношением мирового экспорта к мировому ВВП, является разумным показателем экономической интеграции.

На рисунке 1 показаны пять периодов современной глобализации.

В первый период с 1870 по 1914 год экономическая интеграция усилилась благодаря судоходству и другим достижениям, которые позволили более дешево перемещать больше товаров между рынками (Kevin O'Rourke, Jeffrey G. Williamson, 1999).

Во второй период, с начала Первой мировой войны в 1914 году и до окончания Второй мировой войны в 1945 году, волна глобализации была прервана. Первая мировая война вызвала длительные экономические потрясения, в том числе пандемия испанского гриппа в 1918 году, денежная нестабильность в начале 1920-х годов, новые иммиграционные ограничения, Великая депрессия, начавшаяся в 1929 году, и усиление протекционизма в 1930-х годах для защиты внутренней экономики. Этот порядок снизил интеграцию, и мировая экономика пострадала (Harold James, 2001 and Douglas A. Irwin, 2012).





Рисунок 1 – Глобализация с 1870 до 2020 года

Экономическая интеграция восстановилась в третьем периоде, после Второй мировой войны. Новая волна глобализации была основана на основах недавно созданных международных организаций, призванных обеспечить экономическое сотрудничество между странами. Кульминационным моментом стало подписание в 1947 году Генерального соглашения по тарифам и торговле (ГАТТ), что позволило странам снова открыть свою экономику для торговли и инвестиций. Эти шаги помогли вступить в золотой век роста.

Тем не менее, географический охват этого третьего этапа, который ограничивается Соединенными Штатами, Западной Европой, Японией и несколькими другими странами, ограничивает то, насколько далеко может зайти мировая экономическая интеграция.

Советский блок и Китай были не рыночными экономиками, которые не участвовали по политическим и экономическим причинам. Развивающиеся страны Африки, Латинской Южной Азии выбрали свой собственный путь импортозамещения и остались относительно изолированными.

В четвертый период, с 80-х годов до финансового кризиса 2008 года, экономическая интеграция достигла беспрецедентного в мировой истории масштаба. Во главе с Китаем и Индией

развивающиеся страны начали устранять торговые барьеры.

Советский блок в Восточной Европе двинулся к демократии и экономической либерализации с падением Берлинской стены в 1989 году, за которым последовал распад Советского Союза в 1991 году.

Технологические изменения – использование контейнеров для морских перевозок и совершенствование информационных и коммуникационных технологий – также способствовали интеграции и привели к созданию глобальных цепочек поставок. Темпы роста мировой экономики были высокими, а масштабы бедности в мире значительно сократились.

#### **Слоубализация**

Четвертая эпоха глобализации достигла своего пика в 2008 году. Как видно из приведенной выше диаграммы, после Глобального мирового финансового кризиса соотношение мировой торговли к ВВП снизилось. Мировая торговля в 2010 году оправилась от резкого удара в 2009 году, но с тех пор она пошла на убыль. Сейчас мы находимся в пятом историческом периоде, который иногда называют «слоубализацией» (замедление темпов роста).

Хотя в последние десятилетия торговля, как правило, росла более быстрыми темпами, чем

мировое производство, этого больше не происходит. Вместо этого в последние годы темпы роста торговли были аномально низкими. Объем мировой торговли фактически сократился в 2019 году, хотя мировая экономика росла довольно стабильно.

Существует целый ряд факторов. Рост глобальных производственно-сбытовых цепочек – распространение сетей поставок между странами – стабилизировался.

Осуществление программы реформ зашло в тупик во всем мире. Под руководством президента Си Цзиньпина Китай начал проводить политику, направленную на содействие развитию ведущих отраслей промышленности на местном уровне (инициатива, Сделано в Китае 2025 (MIS 2025), от которой отказались официально, но не на практике). Согласно плану, Китай должен превратиться из поставщика дешевых товаров в производителя высоких технологий. Торговая война с США сильно повлияла на китайскую экономику, которая ориентирована на экспорт. Кроме того, спад в глобальной экономике из-за пандемии коронавируса также не способствовал дальнейшей торговой экспансии КНР на мировом рынке. Теперь же Пекин пытается подстроиться под новые условия. В ближайшее время Китай намерен кардинально переориентировать экономику страны, а именно – снизить зависимость от экспорта и взамен делать ставку на стимуляцию внутреннего спроса на китайские продукты и услуги (Концепция «внутренней циркуляции»).

При президенте Дональде Трампе Соединенные Штаты приняли политику «Первая Америка», отказавшись от либерализации торговли (выход из Транстихоокеанского партнерства) и двигаясь в направлении протекционизма. С позиции национальной безопасности администрация Трампа ввела тарифы на импорт стали и алюминия, что привело к ответным мерам и распространению торговых барьеров в других местах.

Соединенные Штаты также начали торговую войну с Китаем из-за несправедливой торговой практики, значительно сократив двустороннюю торговлю. Эксперты полагают, что данные действия сигнализируют о замедлении процессов глобализации, ускорение тенденции к деглобализации.

Но теперь американской и глобальной экономике грозит замедление, а в ВТО больше не работает механизм регулирования торговых

споров. В мировую экономику вернулась геополитика и борьба за технологическое лидерство, что ведет к ее деглобализации.

Следует пояснить, что подразумевается под деглобализацией. Среди многочисленных определений, в данной статье рассматривается узкая точка зрения, связанная с экономическими факторами, в частности, тенденция, связанная с уменьшением количества обменов, будь то торговля, инвестиции, технологии или перемещение людей. Однако следует отметить, что деглобализация не означает экономическое разделение, сокращение экономических связей, и, следовательно, их взаимозависимости. Тем не менее, мы рассматриваем, происходит ли и насколько быстро происходит разъединение экономик США и Китая, учитывая их растущую стратегическую конкуренцию (García-Herrero, A., 2018).

Между тем в экономической литературе нет четкого консенсуса относительно плюсов и минусов глобализации. Традиционный аргумент в пользу глобализации со времен Адама Смита – это усиление конкуренции и повышение эффективности за счет специализации.

В последнее время глобализация ассоциируется с более быстрым экономическим ростом и сокращением бедности. Хан и Рискин утверждают, что сокращение бедности в Китае может быть связано, например, с открытием его экономики (Khan, A.R., C. Riskin, 2001). К числу других позитивных последствий относится экономия за счет эффекта масштаба и масштабов, которая может привести к снижению издержек и цен (Rogoff, K., 2003; Intriligator, M., 2004).

С 2008 года экономическая литература по глобализации была менее позитивной. Хиллебранд, например, утверждал, что протекционизм может улучшить равенство доходов в некоторых странах, хотя он по-прежнему считал, что отступление от глобализации приведет к глубоким негативным последствиям для мировой экономики (Hillebrand, E.E., 2010). Еще до глобального финансового кризиса была поставлена под сомнение экономическая основа глобализации, а именно связь между торговлей и ростом. Родригес и Родрик утверждали, что эмпирические данные о взаимосвязи торговли и роста далеки от окончательного. Дэни Родрик выдвинул концепцию «парадокса глобализации», согласно которой глобализация не сможет сосуществовать с демократией и национальным самоопределением (Dani Rodrik (2011)). Другими словами, чрезмерная власть правительства вызовет про-

текционизм, а чрезмерная свобода рынка вызов экономическую нестабильность. Парадокс глобализации, кажется, стал более заметным в последнее время благодаря увеличению количества торговых споров и реакции правительства на серьезные потрясения, включая COVID-19. Однако, есть исследования в которых указывается, что нет достаточных систематических доказательств, указывающих на то, что мировая экономика вступила в эру деглобализации, но признают, что глобализация продолжается гораздо более медленными темпами.

Замедление мировых торговых потоков стало очевидным после мирового финансового кризиса. Во время мирового финансового кризиса 2008 года движение товаров резко сократилось, однако в целом ожидалось, что в дальнейшем торговля будет продолжать расти теми же темпами, что и до кризиса. Но, этого не произошло. Объем мировой торговли вырос в среднем на 2,7 процента с 2009 по 2018 год, что намного ниже, чем средний рост на 12,6 процента до глобального финансового кризиса. Снижение также заметно по объемам торговли, по которым темпы роста даже стали отрицательными. Между тем, мировая торговля услугами рухнула в 2008 году и не вернулась к уровню, существовавшему до глобального финансового кризиса, несмотря на некоторое умеренное восстановление.

Тенденция к деглобализации явно усилилась с 2019 года, что привело к краху торговых потоков на пике пандемии COVID-19. Объем торговли товарами снизился на 0,1 процента в 2019 году по сравнению с ростом на 2,9 процента в 2018 году. Рост мирового ВВП замедлился до 2,3 процента по сравнению с 2,9 процента в 2018 году. Признаки спада торговли были очевидны в январе 2020 года, при этом в большинстве крупных экономик наблюдались негативные тенденции. Тем не менее, наиболее резкое падение международной торговли произошло во втором квартале 2020 года, когда объем мировой торговли товарами упал более чем на 20 процентов по сравнению с тем же кварталом 2019 года (Key statistics and trends in International Trade, 2020). Влияние COVID-19 на международную торговлю усиливает нестабильность, которая наблюдается в течение последнего десятилетия.

Хотя пандемия является исключительным событием, и непосредственные последствия падения производства и спроса в результате блокирования рынков должны носить временный характер, а процесс восстановления уже начал-

ся, рассчитывать на быстрый рост торговых потоков нет.

Так же, одной из причин замедления торговли перед пандемией была торговая война между США и Китаем и, как следствие, сокращение торговых потоков между ними после ряда протекционистских мер «око за око». Исторический опыт показывает, что, когда одни страны начинают ограничивать торговлю важнейшими товарами, другие, скорее всего, последуют их примеру.

Опыт также свидетельствует о том, что страх толкает страны к замкнутости. Многие страны в настоящее время переосмысливают торговую зависимость. Фил Хоган, комиссар Европейского Союза по торговле, заявил: «Мы должны подумать о том, как обеспечить стратегическую автономию ЕС». Премьер-министр Австралии Скотт Моррисон заявил парламенту: «Открытая торговля была основной частью нашего процветания на протяжении веков. Но в равной степени мы должны внимательно относиться и к нашему внутреннему экономическому суверенитету». Япония также начала исследовать, как изменить зависимость цепочки поставок от Китая и производить больше у себя. Внутренний поворот конечно не означает конец глобализации, а лишь частичный поворот вспять. Однако устранить полностью нанесенный в результате этого ущерб, вероятно будет долго и сложно.

Таким образом, замедление тенденций глобализации более заметно на примере торговли и глобальных производственно-сбытовых цепочек, которые сокращались и фрагментировались после мирового финансового кризиса и пандемии.

Кроме того, снижение мирового объема торговли услугами так же заметно в секторе туристических услуг, где в 2019 году наблюдался снижение туристического потока. Тем не менее, перемещение людей до 2019 года росло в форме долгосрочной миграции, хотя и более медленными темпами. Устойчивость этого положения может быть поставлена под сомнение в результате ужесточения ограничений на передвижение рабочей силы, обусловленных иммиграционным контролем. Например, число отказов в визах на въезд в США быстро выросла, и эта тенденция особенно очевидна для азиатских стран, включая Китай и Индию. Противоречие США и Китая усугубили данный эффект, переместившись в область международного обмена людьми. Сообщается, что США аннулировали

визы для большого числа китайских студентов и исследователей, ссылаясь на потенциальную угрозу безопасности. Таким образом, противоречье между США и Китаем в плане обмена людьми становится реальностью и является фактором в плане деглобализации международной мобильности.

Наблюдается также рост краткосрочных перемещений. Однако то, что долгое время воспринималось как бум в международной мобильности, до COVID-19, на самом деле несколько неточно. Некоторые потоки людей начали замедляться до COVID-19, и число краткосрочных посетителей заметно снизилось после 2017 года. Конечно, количество международных рейсов сократилось в 2020 году из-за глобальных ограничений на передвижение, связанных с COVID-19.

Тенденции, выходящие за рамки пандемии, могут означать, что международная мобильность не возвращается к прежним уровням. Обеспеченность по поводу воздействия поездок на здоровье людей и окружающую среду, по всей видимости, приведет к изменению структуры индустрии туризма. Это особенно касается деловых поездок.

### Заключение

В результате проведенного анализа, можно сделать выводы, что с точки зрения социальной глобализации мир остается еще больше взаимозависимым, чем когда-либо, благодаря широко-

му использованию цифровых технологий. Однако после глобального финансового кризиса 2008 года наблюдается тенденция к снижению экономической интеграции.

Замедление мировой торговли, вызванное финансовым кризисом, усугубилось протекционистской политикой в последние годы. Кризис вызванный пандемией COVID-19, который привел к экономическому коллапсу, побудил некоторые страны предпринять целенаправленные шаги в направлении деглобализации. Хотя нынешняя тенденция вряд ли положит конец глобализации, некоторые утверждают, что «глобализацию можно обратить вспять, по крайней мере частично».

Многие из ключевых факторов глобализации – судоходство, данные и потоки капитала, наше понимание сравнительных преимуществ и эффект масштаба – никуда не денутся. Но глобализация изменится благодаря сочетанию изменений в настроениях населения, государственной политике и корпоративных практиках. Но было бы глупо заменять глобализацию тем же изоляционизмом и протекционизмом, который раньше приводил к обнищанию наций. Характер следующей фазы глобализации – и точные контуры более избирательной модели трансграничного взаимодействия и взаимозависимости после пандемии – будут более серьезным вопросом, против которого будут разыгрываться многие из наиболее важных политических дебатов ближайших лет.

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**Md Golam Hafiz** HOPE Foundation for Women and Children of Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Cox's Bazar  
e-mail: mghafiz.bd@gmail.com

## **MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC BELONGING: BANGLADESHI MIGRANTS IN SOUTH KOREA**

This study aims to examine migration, remittances, and transnational economic belonging of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea. This study conducted the total 310 survey questionnaires on Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea from March 2016 to August 2016 in manufacturing factories, halal restaurants, halal grocery stores, and mosques of Bangladeshi migrants populated areas in South Korea and collected data is analyzed by SPSS Statistics 21.0. The results show that Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea have strong transnational economic belong and they prefer to send remittances for livelihood activities to their homeland rather than financial activities for future wellbeing. The highest degree of transnational economic belonging was found in taking care of families who stay in their homeland since most of the Bangladeshi migrants migrate to South Korea for livelihood struggle of their family in past and the lowest degree of transnational economic belonging was found in investment in their homeland for future wellbeing since they stay in South Korea for certain short period and expenses much of their earning money for their livelihood needs of their family at homeland. Transnational economic belonging to the homeland varies more by present occupation, visa status, and reason for migration, while labor migrants who hold E9 visas and migrants who migrated for economic reasons show stronger transnational economic belonging. This study suggests subsequent studies of transnational belonging based on various migrant groups and socio-demographic factors.

**Key words:** Bangladesh, economic belonging, homeland, migrant, remittance, South Korea.

МД Голам Хавиз

HOPE Бангладеш әйелдері мен балалары қоры, Бангладеш, Кокс-Базар қ.  
e-mail: mghafiz.bd@gmail.com

### **Көші-қон, ақша аударымдары және трансұлттық экономикалық тиістілігі: Оңтүстік Кореядағы бангладештік мигранттар**

Бұл зерттеу Оңтүстік Кореядағы Бангладеш мигранттарының көші-қон, ақша аударымдарын және трансұлттық экономикалық тиістілігін зерттеуге бағытталған. Бұл зерттеуде 2016 жылдың наурызынан 2016 жылдың тамызына дейін өндіріс орындарында, халал мейрамханаларда, халал азық-түлік дүкендерінде және Оңтүстік Кореядағы Бангладеш мигранттары тұратын аудандардағы мешіттерде Бангладеш мигранттары туралы жалпы 310 сауалнама жүргізді және жиналған мәліметтер SPSS Statistics 21.0 көмегімен талданды. Нәтижелер көрсеткендей, Оңтүстік Кореядағы бангладештік мигранттар күшті трансұлттық экономикалық тиістілікке ие және болашақ әл-ауқаты үшін қаржылық іс-әрекетке жұмсамай, ақша аударымдарын отанына қайтаруды жөн көреді.

Трансұлттық экономикалық тиістіліктің ең жоғары деңгейі елінде қалған отбасыларына қамқорлық жасаумен сипатталады, өйткені Бангладештік мигранттардың көпшілігі өткен уақытта өз отбасының өмір сүруі үшін күресу мақсатында Оңтүстік Кореяға қоныс аударды, ал трансұлттық экономикалық мүшеліктің ең төменгі деңгейі болашақ әл-ауқат үшін өз отанына салынған инвестициялардан табылды, өйткені олар Оңтүстік Кореяда белгілі бір қысқа мерзім ішінде қалады және тапқан ақшаларының көп бөлігін өз отбасының үйдегі өмірлік қажеттіліктеріне жұмсайды. Отанына трансұлттық экономикалық тиістілік қазіргі кәсібіне, виза мәртебесіне және көші-қон себебіне байланысты аса ерекшеленеді, ал E9 визасы бар еңбек мигранттары мен экономикалық себептермен көшіп келген мигранттар барынша мықты трансұлттық экономикалық тиістілікті көрсетеді. Бұл зерттеу болашақта мигранттардың әртүрлі топтары мен әлеуметтік-демографиялық факторларға негізделген трансұлттық тиістілікті зерттеуді ұсынады.

**Түйін сөздер:** Бангладеш, экономикалық тиістілігі, отаны, мигрант, ақша аударымдары, Оңтүстік Корея.

МД Голам Хавиз

Фонд HOPE для женщин и детей Бангладеша, Бангладеш, г. Кокс-Базар  
e-mail: mghafiz.bd@gmail.com

### **Миграция, денежные переводы и транснациональная экономическая принадлежность: бангладешские мигранты в Южной Корее**

Данное исследование направлено на изучение миграции, денежных переводов и транснациональной экономической принадлежности бангладешских мигрантов в Южной Корее. В этом исследовании было проведено в общей сложности 310 опросных анкет о бангладешских мигрантах в Южной Корее с марта 2016 г. по август 2016 г. на производственных предприятиях, халяльных ресторанах, халяльных продуктовых магазинах и мечетях в районах, населенных бангладешскими мигрантами в Южной Корее, и собранные данные анализируются с помощью SPSS Statistics 21.0. Результаты показывают, что бангладешские мигранты в Южной Корее имеют сильную транснациональную экономическую принадлежность, и они предпочитают отправлять денежные переводы на родину для получения средств к существованию, а не для финансовой деятельности для будущего благополучия. Самая высокая степень транснациональной экономической принадлежности была обнаружена в заботе о семьях, которые остаются на родине, поскольку большинство бангладешских мигрантов мигрируют в Южную Корею для борьбы за средства к существованию своей семьи в прошлом, а самая низкая степень транснациональной экономической принадлежности была обнаружена в инвестициях в свою родину для будущего благополучия, поскольку они остаются в Южной Корее в течение определенного короткого периода и тратят большую часть своих заработанных денег на жизненные потребности своей семьи на родине. Транснациональная экономическая принадлежность к родине больше различается в зависимости от нынешнего занятия, визового статуса и причины миграции, в то время как трудовые мигранты, имеющие визы E9, и мигранты, мигрировавшие по экономическим причинам, демонстрируют более сильную транснациональную экономическую принадлежность. Это исследование предлагает в последующем изучить транснациональную принадлежность на основе различных групп мигрантов и социально-демографических факторов.

**Ключевые слова:** Бангладеш, экономическая принадлежность, родина, мигрант, денежные переводы, Южная Корея.

## **Introduction**

International migration has increased significantly in recent decades all over the world due to the substantial progress of economic globalization and advanced communication. It has made a significant change on society, culture, politics, and economics in the world that presents new ways of belonging which exceed physical and virtual boundaries. The attachment of migrants to their host country raises questions of their transnational belonging to their homeland since their integration in host society automatically coincides with decreasing orientations towards the society of origin (De Haas, 2005).

Belonging provides a deeper understanding of migrants' perspectives on their affiliations in their host societies and illuminates the processes of cross-border connections and multi-scaled attachments to their homeland. Remittances by migrants' to their families in homeland are most common cross-border attachments that generate and expose a sense of belonging at their homeland. Migrants can be seen as acting altruistically, sending money to families back in their homelands to increase the

welfare of family members and financial security for their future (Crentsil, 2012). The socio-economic conditions and socio-cultural traditions within kin in the societies where the migrants originally come from are play very significant role in the process of transnational belonging of migrants. Remittance is a highly-valued cultural belief and away of sharing and distributing resources to maintain a bond with one's kinship group in Bangladeshi societies. Migrants are not merely send remittances but also take responsible their family members and relatives who stay at homeland that indeed has a huge impact on the self-imagination, sense of belonging and economic prospects. Furthermore, engage with the family and friends in homeland also allow the migrants to identify with their roots as adherents to, and followers of, and the traditional values of homeland.

The total number of international migrants reached 258 million in 2017, up from 173 million in 2000—an increase of 49% (United Nations [UN], 2017). Migrants comprised 3.4% of the total population in 2017 (UN, 2017). Bangladesh is the fifth largest emigrant country in the world, with 7.5 million people living outside the country's borders

(UN, 2017). A total of 15,983 Bangladeshi migrants live in South Korea, among whom 10,533 migrants are laborers (Ministry of Justice, 2018). Though the number of migrants is not large compared to the numbers of migrants from China, Vietnam, or Philippines, migrants from Bangladesh are flowing steadily to South Korea every year. Over more than 20 years of significant migration from Bangladesh to South Korea, the purposes and types of Bangladeshi migrants have diversified. In the early 1990s, South Korea implemented the industrial trainee system and began to employ people from different Asian countries, including Bangladesh. Since 2000, the composition of migrants has become increasingly diverse due to the formation of new groups of migrants, including investors, students, professionals, and family members. Despite the diversified types and vigorous activities of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea, only a small number of studies have been conducted on this topic. The increasing interconnectedness of migrants has changed their ways of life, and that raises interesting questions about the relationship of migrants with their homeland. Research on different migrants' cases is important for understanding the ways and level of migrants interact with their homeland, which relates to their perceptions of belonging.

The main objective of this study is to explore transnational belonging of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea through remittances. To find out the objective, I examine the concept of transnational belonging, socio-demographic characteristics of Bangladeshi migrants, and remittances by Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea with quantitative method that discloses the migrants as subjects placed in specific social-economic and cultural conditions presenting particular images based on belonging of their homeland. This article thus focuses on the economic connections of migrants to their homelands by remittances called transnational economic belonging. Remittances become the context through which migrants create and enable belonging in the places of origin.

### **Transnational Economic Belonging**

This study is about to describe how Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea practices transnational belonging in terms of economic activities at homeland through remittances. Though studies on transnational belonging of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea are not rich as an academic field but scholars have focused earlier studies on transnational

belong of migrants based on western countries where migrants have been living for longtime. The notion of belonging is an emotional feeling by an individual that can be social, imagined, and sensual-material (Antonsich, 2010). It pertains to emotional attachment, feeling at home and feeling safe (Yuval-Davis, et al., 2006). It is the human emotional need and people tend to have desire to belong whether it is family, friends, homeland, or something else. This desire is so universal that the need to belong is found across all cultures and different types of people (Baumeister and Leary, 1995: 499). Belonging is an attachment with a specific group, belief, and nation that brings feelings of inclusion in a particular group, ethnic, nation etc. Every human requires belonging to meet the needs resulting from avoidance of loneliness and mental stress and it is a natural desire to belong. Belonging is a personal, intimate feeling of being at home in a place (Antonsich, 2010). Migrants have very strong feelings and connections to their homeland (Glorius and Friedrich, 2006). The common form of expression of the sense of belonging of migrants to their homeland is based on personal and particular connections. The attachment is to particular locations, people, and associated memories that thus have come to represent the country (Erkmen, 2015). Though migrants have been living in host land and engage in different ways in their everyday life but emotional and material attachment and dependability characterize narratives about migrants' feelings towards their homeland. Belonging relates to specific geographic and symbolic spatial localities and territories with familiarity, comfort, and security (Antonsich, 2010). It allows an affective dimension – not just being, but longing (Probyn, 1996). It is a sentiment involving feelings of closeness, affection, and pride in one's country (Erkmen, 2015). Notions of belonging to places are linked to social relations, whether these are of the past, in the present, or imagined (Mand, 2010). Transnational belonging refers to feelings of being at home that cross the borders of nation-states. The sense of transnational belonging at home arises through transnational networks or practices that occur outside of the country.

Transnational migrants have multi-positioned social, symbolic, and material ties to different locales on account of their migratory journeys: already-existing ties binding them to their homelands and new ties forming to bind them to their new place of residence. Transnational economic belonging is for making a safe and stable economic condition for the individual and her/his family in their homeland by



sending remittances. The importance of remittances to the economic well-being of immigrant workers, their households, and their sending communities is undeniable (World Bank, 2006). The connections over time created through remittance practices to return funds to their households are about more than economics. The remittances and the goods and services sent by migrants create strong, long-lasting transnational bonds (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). Transnational economic wellbeing practices and identifications serve emotional needs and feelings of transnational belonging (De Bree, et al., 2010). Remittances express migrants' long-distance social ties of solidarity, reciprocity, and responsibility that link them with their kin and friends across national borders (Guarnizo, 2003). Transnational moralities are based on transnational attachments, such as a sense of obligation towards the family, community or whichever social group they have left behind, and are maintained through remittances (Carling, 2008). Migrants belong to their homelands through the acts of sending remittances to support their families, buying land, making investments, and establishing businesses in the home country (Malesevic, 2012). The total household income increases in the presence of remittances which leads to an increase in the household and improves the living standard. The money that migrants transfers to their countries of origin as remittances, beyond sustaining migrants' household income, represents the surest lifeline for many developing nations from where migrants come (Kosse and Vermeulen, 2014). Remittances are an important factor of the local economy that helps individuals as an improvement in the earning capacity of a migrant home country. They are also more stable and reliable form of foreign exchange earnings in developing countries.

Bangladeshi migrants started to migrate to western countries longtime ago. Therefore migration in Asian countries started in recent decades comparatively. Hence the literature regarding Bangladeshi migrants is mainly based on western countries and focuses on transnational cultural and economic belonging. Settled immigrant workers who hold reasonably steady jobs often earn more money and earn that money more consistently than do new, less settled immigrants (Hernandez and Coutin, 2006, Portes 2007), which often translates to more consistent and larger remittances. Migrants' ties are expressed by sending remittances such as money, gifts, and gold to their families in Bangladesh,

particularly for special occasions and weddings, due to moral responsibility, religious duty and cultural tradition (Stevanovic, 2012); they also send remittances to develop their family lifestyles back home regarding food, living, and clothing (Rahman, et al., 2014) and through investment in various sectors of their natal villages or towns (Morad and Gombac, 2015). Migrants maintain transnational economic belonging through buying land and building houses, and through the significance of kinship as well as providing materiality in the context of displacement (Mand, 2010). Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea send remittances to their home country that is major source of livelihood for their families and that provide hope for their future lives in their home country (Lim, 2010). They send remittances at homeland to support their families and friends who stay behind in their homeland, as ties of solidarity, reciprocity, and responsibility as well as to make financial efforts for their future safety. Remittances reflect and build the social status of the sender as funds flow to support not just family, but also community, local government, development, and traditional practices as well as celebrations (Ali, 2007; Cohen, 2004; and Suzuki 2006). Therefore, this paper analyzes transnational economic belonging in depth formed by Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea.

### **Bangladeshi Migrants in South Korea and Remittances**

Bangladesh is the fifth largest emigrant country in the world, with 7.5 million people living outside the country's borders (UN, 2017). They are categorized as low-skilled (51.87%), semi-skilled (15.28%), skilled (32.68%) and professional (0.17%) (International Organization of Migration, Bangladesh, 2018). Two types of voluntary international migration from Bangladesh have been taking place. One type of migrants moves to the industrialized West and Oceania as permanent resident, family reunification, professional, or student. These countries are considered as having high wages, good working environments, human rights, and possibilities to be citizen of host country. Another type of migrant moves to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and North African countries as unskilled or semi-skilled contract migrant worker and faces comparatively low wages and poor working environment.

**Table 1** – Overseas employment flow from Bangladesh Source: <http://www.bmet.gov.bd>

Year	Total Employment	Employment in South Korea
2015	555,881	2359
2016	757,731	1980
2017	1,008,525	1829
2018	734,181	2287
2019	700,159	1647

South Korea experienced a severe unskilled laborer shortage in small and medium sized industries in the late 1980s. Therefore South Korea became a destination for migrant laborers of some Asian countries including Bangladesh. To ease the labor shortage in the manufacturing industries, the South Korean Government introduced a labor import scheme known as the «Foreigners Industrial Training Programme (FITP)» in 1991 and the FITP was expanded in 1993 (Fee and Rahman, 2011). Migrants came as transient worker and they were forced to return home at the end of the contract. As a result, in the early 1990s, the country hosted thousands of irregular and regular migrants from different parts of Asia. However, by 2003, a public consensus grew on favor of migrant labor that helped to introduce «the Act Concerning the Employment of Permit for Migrant Workers» in 2003 and the guest worker system for migrant workers entered into effect on 17 August 2004 (Yoo, 2004). In 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the governments of Bangladesh and South Korea on the transmission of labor following the introduction of the Employment Permit System (EPS). In EPS recruiting system, some countries have specific quota of labor and the number also depends on the selection of laborer by owners of the companies. During time being, the composition of migrants from Bangladesh has become increasingly diverse due to the formation of new groups of migrants, including investors, students, professionals, and family members since 2000s. A total of 15,983 Bangladeshi migrants live in South Korea, among whom 10,533 migrants are laborers (South Korea immigration report, 2018). Though the number of migrants is not large compared to the numbers of migrants from China or Vietnam, South Korea is prospective destination for Bangladeshi migrants.

Bangladeshi migrants sent remittances 12769.45 million US dollars in 2018-19 and

migrants from South Korea sent remittances 80.65 million US dollars in 2018-19. It is a significant part of migrants' lives provide a huge context for considering the sense of belonging at home land of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea. Migration and remittances home have long been features of Bangladesh. Many empirical studies exist on migration and remittances back to migrants' households in Bangladesh. Remittances represent a substantial flow of financial resources. International remittances to relatives through whatever means by migrants living and working outside of their origin countries have indeed become one of the key issues in economic development (Adams, 2008). In examining Bangladeshi migrants' attachments and sense of belonging based on remittances to their homeland it is necessary to consider the culture and ideology of sharing in Bangladesh, which also calls forth notions of kinship. Most of the Bangladeshi migrants remit to parents and/ or brothers.

**Table 2** – Remittance flow of Bangladeshi migrants. Source: <https://www.bb.org.bd/econdata/wagermidtl.php>

Year	Total (USD in millions)	South Korea (USD in millions)
2016-17	12769.45	80.65
2017-18	12769.45	80.65
2018-19	12769.45	80.65

## Research Methods and Design

### Operational Variables

Transnational belonging of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea is based on feelings according to the strength of attachment to and composition of various symbolic and material entities. Therefore, different results are produced depending on the degree and configuration of transnational belonging. Transnational economic belonging is an attachment related to economic activities that brings feelings of inclusion in a particular belief, group, ethnic, nation etc. It refers to making a safe and stable material economic condition for the individual and her/his family in their homeland sending remittances. It is divided into transnational economic (livelihood) belonging and transnational economic (finance) belonging. Transnational economic livelihood belonging is to work for the basic necessities of life such as food, water, shelter, clothing, etc. for their bosom people at homeland. Transnational

economic financial belonging is to work for investment of assets and liabilities over time under conditions of different degrees of uncertainty and risk for their future economic wellbeing. In this study, I apply a total of 8 items to measure transnational economic belonging on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 points ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. In this study, the items to measure transnational economic belonging are as follows: «I support my family members in Bangladesh,» «I bear education expenses of my family members in Bangladesh,» «I bear medical expenses of my family members in Bangladesh,» «I help financially in community activities in Bangladesh,» «I buy land in Bangladesh,» «I invest in building houses in Bangladesh,» «I invest in business in Bangladesh,» and «I save money in Bangladesh.»

### Research Methods

This was a quantitative study based on SPSS 23.0. The total 310 survey questionnaires conducted during six months from March 2016 to August 2016 in different areas in Korea populated with Bangladeshi migrants including Gyeonggi-do (Ansan, Paju, Uijeonbu, Sanguri, and Khwangju), Seoul, Incheon, Gwangju, Busan, Daegu, Ulsan, Gimhae, and Jinju. The survey questionnaire was written in two languages: English and Bengali. The author visited manufacturing factories, Bangladeshi restaurants, halal grocery stores, and mosques for collecting data doing survey. The main target group in this study is laborers, since most of the Bangladeshi migrants in Korea are laborers. Other groups include migrant groups with future potential to grow in numbers: students, professionals and businessmen. In this study, transnational economic belonging determines 2 factors with 7 items among 8 items. The significance value of Bartlett's sphere test is .000. Cronbach's Alpha coefficients are above .817, showing desirable internal consistency and credibility of the factorial scale.

**Table 3** – Reliability Analysis of Measurement Variables

Concept	Variable	Item	Cronbach's Alpha
Transnational Economic Belonging	Economic (livelihood) belonging	3	.817
	Economic (finance) belonging	4	.868

### Results

#### *Socio-demographic Characteristics of Migrants*

The socio-demographic characteristics of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea who participated in this study show in Table 4. The age of the most of the migrants is between 20-40 years and 45.2% (total 140 migrants) is under 30 years old and 45.2% (total 140 migrants) is between 30-39 years. The highest percentage response was less than 3 years that is 45.5% (total 141 migrants) regarding the length of time migrants had lived in South Korea, 23.5% (73 migrants) had lived in South Korea for 3-4 years, and 21.0% (total 96 migrants) had lived in South Korea for more than 4 years. With respect to gender, 97.1% (total 301 migrants) were men and only 2.9% (total only 9 migrants) were women. The proportion of male migrants was significantly higher since Bangladeshi females were restricted to migrate abroad because of Bangladeshi culture, as doing so would result in the loss of honor in the eyes of Bangladeshi society and the government of Bangladesh withdrew its restrictions on the migration of semi-and low-skilled women in 2003 but female migration is still only 2-4% of the total migration. In a Muslim male-dominated society, women's travelling to another country depends on the male elders of the family. However, this situation is gradually changing. The number of married and unmarried migrants surveyed was almost the same, with 51.6% (total 160 migrants) married and 48.4% (total 150 migrants) unmarried. In this study, 92.3% (total 286 migrants) were Muslim, and 7.7% (total 24 migrants) were Hindu, reflecting the Muslim dominant society of Bangladesh where 88% of the total population is Muslim and the second highest religion, Hindu, accounts for only 8%.

The education status of surveyed Bangladeshi migrants in Korea found 24.2% (total 75 migrants) had less than higher secondary education, 28.1% (total 87 migrants) had completed higher secondary education, 28.1% (total 87 migrants) had achieved a bachelor's degree and 19.7% (total 61 migrants) had achieved a master's degree, showing that most of the migrants are educated. A total of 73.2% (total 227 migrants) are laborers and the remaining 26.8% (total 83 migrants) included students, professionals, and businessmen. As a result, 70.6% (total 219 migrants) hold an E9 non-professional employment visa. Looking at migrants' occupations in Bangladesh, 24.8% (total 77 migrants) were private employees, 34.2%

(total 106 migrants) were students, and 25.2% (total 78 migrants) were businessmen, showing the diversification of the professional backgrounds of migrants. Bangladesh is a developing country with a huge population where jobs are not available

resulted 73.2% (total 227 migrants) migrated to South Korea for economic reasons. Since the area most populated with Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea is the capital area, accordingly 57.74% (total 179 migrants) were found to live there.

**Table 4** – Socio-demographic Characteristics of Migrants (N=310)

Division	Content	Frequency	Ratio (%)
Age	Less than 30	140	45.2
	30-39	140	45.2
	More than 39	30	9.6
Duration in Korea	Less than 3 years	141	45.5
	3 years-4years	73	23.5
	More than 4 years	96	31.0
Gender	Male	301	97.1
	Female	9	2.9
Marital status	Married	160	51.6
	Unmarried	150	48.4
Religion	Islam	286	92.3
	Hinduism	24	7.7
Education	Below HSC	75	24.2
	HSC pass	87	28.1
	Bachelor pass	87	28.1
	Masters pass	61	19.7
Present occupation	Labor	227	73.2
	Others	83	26.8
Visa status	E9(Labor)	219	70.6
	Others	91	29.4
Occupation in Bangladesh	Private employee	77	24.8
	Student	106	34.2
	Businessman	78	25.2
	Others	49	15.8
Reason for migration	Economic	227	73.2
	Others	83	26.8
Living area	Capital area	179	57.74
	Others	131	42.26

#### *Transnational Economic Belonging*

The results of the table 5 illustrate the analysis results of transnational economic belonging of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea. The results showed that the higher scale of transnational economic belonging of Bangladeshi migrants was in transnational economic (livelihood) belonging (4.33) and lower scale was transnational economic (finance) belonging (3.79). The results prove that Bangladeshi migrants have strong transnational

economic (livelihood) belonging to their homeland while transnational economic (finance) belonging to their homeland is medium. Among the items of transnational economic (livelihood) belonging, taking care of family in Bangladesh was highest at 4.39( $\pm 0.862$ ) and supporting study was lowest at 4.27( $\pm 0.974$ ). Among the items of transnational economic (finance) belonging, saving money in Bangladesh was highest at 4.09( $\pm 1.033$ ) and investing in business in Bangladesh was lowest at 3.67( $\pm 1.218$ ).

**Table 5** – Analysis of Transnational Economic Belonging (N = 310)

Measured items		Average	Standard deviation
Economic (livelihood) Belonging	Family Take care	4.39	.862
	Family Study	4.27	.974
	Family Treatment	4.34	.877
Total		4.33	.855
Economic (finance) Belonging	Buy Land	3.68	1.211
	House	3.72	1.213
	Investment	3.67	1.218
	Saving	4.09	1.033
Total		3.79	.991

### Differences in Transnational Economic Belonging

#### *Transnational economic (livelihood) belonging*

The results of the table 6 show a significant difference in the transnational economic (livelihood) belonging in terms of present occupation  $t(p) = 7.172(.000)$ ,  $p < .05$ ; visa status  $t(p) = 7.494(.000)$ ,  $p < .05$ ; occupation in Bangladesh  $F = 9.428(.000)$ ,  $p < .05$ ; reason for migration  $t(p) = 6.860(.000)$ ,  $p < .05$ ; and

residential area  $t(p) = 2.278(.023)$ ,  $p < .05$ . Labor E9 (non-professional employment) migrants showed stronger economic (livelihood) belonging than other migrants. The economic (livelihood) belonging was the strongest among those who did business in Bangladesh, followed by others and private employees. Students showed the lowest economic (livelihood) belonging. Migrants who migrated for economic reasons and migrants who live in the capital area showed stronger economic (livelihood) belonging than others.

**Table 6** – Analysis of the differences in transnational economic (livelihood) belonging

Variable	Division	Frequency	Average	Standard Deviation	t(p)	F(p)	Scheffe Test
Age	Less than 30 years	140	4.2881	.93533		2.401 (.092)	
	30 years -39 years	140	4.3095	.81123			
	More than 39 years	30	4.6556	.57056			
Duration in Korea	Less than 3 years	141	4.4066	.83580		1.736 (.178)	
	3-4 years	73	4.1781	.89595			
	More than 4 years	96	4.3438	.84529			
Marital Status	Unmarried	160	4.3021	.85887	-.664 (.507)		
	Married	150	4.3667	.85290			
Education	Below high school	75	4.3265	.92669		.164 (.957)	
	High school pass	89	4.3933	.80177			
	Bachelor pass	87	4.2950	.81875			
	Masters pass	61	4.3169	.90763			
Present Occupation	Labor	227	4.5286	.69309	7.172 (.000)		
	Others	83	3.7992	1.01871			
Visa status	E9	219	4.5495	.62968	7.494 (.000)		
	Others	91	3.8132	1.07865			

Continuation of the table

Variable	Division	Frequency	Average	Standard Deviation	t(p)	F(p)	Scheffe Test
Occupation in Bangladesh	Private employee	77	4.2294	.88235		9.428 (.000)	a>b a<d d<c
	Student	106	4.0692	.99917			
	Businessman	78	4.6752	.59087			
	Others	49	4.5238	.57735			
Reason of migration	Economic	227	4.5213	.67975	6.860 (.000)		
	Others	83	3.8193	1.05705			
Living area	Capital area	179	4.4171	.76832	2.027 (.044)		
	Others	131	4.2188	.95252			

*Transnational economic (financial) belonging*

The analysis results of the table 7 show significance differences in terms of present occupation  $t(p) = 6.022(.000)$ ,  $p < .05$ ; visa status  $t(p) = 5.267(.000)$ ,  $p < .05$ ; occupation in Bangladesh  $F = 4.613(.004)$ ,  $p < .05$ ; and reason for migration  $t(p) = 5.273(.000)$ ,  $p < .05$ . Labor E9 (non-professional employment) migrants show stronger economic

(financial) sense of belonging than other migrants. In terms of occupation in Bangladesh, economic (finance) belonging is the strongest among others, followed by businessmen and private employees. Students showed the lowest economic (financial) affiliation. Migrants who migrated for economic reasons show stronger economic (financial) belonging than others.

**Table 7** – Analysis of the differences in transnational economic (financial) belonging

Variable	Division	Frequency	Average	Standard Deviation	t(p)	F(p)	Scheffe Test
Age	Less than 30 years	140	3.7143	1.05921		1.357 (.259)	
	30 years -39 years	140	3.8143	.95651			
	More than 39 years	30	4.0333	.78711			
Duration in Korea	Less than 3 years	141	3.7801	.95780		.059 (.942)	
	3-4 years	73	3.8253	.98309			
	More than 4 years	96	3.7786	1.05436			
Marital Status	Unmarried	160	3.6828	1.01123	-1.981 (.48)		
	Married	150	3.9050	.96005			
Education	Below high school	75	3.6684	.92897		1.175 (.322)	
	High school pass	89	3.8876	.97118			
	Bachelor pass	87	3.9052	.96391			
	Masters pass	61	3.6434	1.06894			
Present Occupation	Labor	227	3.9846	.86525	6.022 (.000)		
	Others	83	3.2590	1.11834			
Visa status	E9	219	3.9737	.87632	5.267 (.000)		
	Others	91	3.3489	1.11173			
Occupation in Bangladesh	Private employee	77	3.7468	.98550		4.613 (.004)	a>b a<c c<d
	Student	106	3.5566	1.06697			
	Businessman	78	3.9423	.90536			
	Others	49	4.1224	.84336			

*Continuation of the table*

Variable	Division	Frequency	Average	Standard Deviation	t(p)	F(p)	Scheffe Test
Reason of migration	Economic	227	3.9626	.86617	5.273 (.000)		
	Others	83	3.3193	1.15315			
Living area	Capital area	179	3.8520	.90784	1.281 (.201)		
	Others	131	3.7061	1.09346			

## Discussion

Migrants have very strong feelings for and connections to their homelands (Glorius and Friedrich, 2006). Remittance practices are the outcomes of cultural traditions and social practices Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea. It is symbol of belonging at homeland of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea that is a sentiment and exists as feelings of closeness, affection, and pride. Migrants belong at home through sending remittances supporting their families, buying land, making investments, and establishing businesses in their home country (Malešević, 2012).

The highest degrees of transnational economic belonging were found in taking care of families who stay in their homeland since most of the Bangladeshi migrants migrate to South Korea for livelihood struggle of their family and the lowest degrees of transnational economic belonging were found in investment in their homeland for future wellbeing since they stay in South Korea for certain short period and expenses much money for their livelihood needs of their family to their homeland. Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea send remittances to their homeland to support the livelihood of their families and relatives who stay behind in their homeland, as ties of harmony and responsibility as well as to make financial efforts for their future wellbeing. The economics of remittance are important to sending countries for supporting trade and national investments (De Haas, 2005; Skeldon, 2008), but outcomes of remittances are rooted in migration and founded in the connections of movers with their sending households and destination communities (Guarnizo 2003; Massey; Akresh 2006). Remittances are one of the top sources of investment capital (Landolt 2001) supporting national governments and local development and countering declines in direct foreign aid during economic crises (Buch and Kuckulenz, 2010; Lianos and Cavounidis, 2010).

Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea prefer to send remittances to provide the basic needs

livelihood belonging of their family at homeland rather than to make assets financial belonging for the future wellbeing since most of the migrants from Bangladesh migrate to another country for economic reason. Bangladesh is a developing country where many of the people struggle every day for their livelihood needs. So Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea leave their homeland for economic reasons and send remittances to their homeland to support their basic necessities such as food, cloth, education, medical expenses of their families. Remittances provide the opportunity including food, education and better health care (Gamburd, 2008). Their dream is to change economic condition of their family from everyday needs to future wellbeing by sending remittances. Migrants who do remit are not driven by an inchoate force to act; rather, they remit because they choose to do so (Mora and Taylor, 2006). Therefore, remittances are invested locally and informal economic growth open new opportunities. Human capital expands by immigrant workers to rethink familial organization, economic life, and political opportunities (Brown and Poirine, 2005). Remittances, particularly large remittances, create opportunities and support local development schemes and investments; yet many migrants cannot afford to return large sums to their homes (Adams, 2008). On the other side, remittances can displace local incomes and increase local inequalities, drive consumptive spending, and inflate prices, among other things (Vertovec, 2009). Though most of the Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea are laborers who stay for a short time – four years ten months – in comparison with western countries where many migrants have settled for a long time, this does not make any difference to migrants' sense of economic belonging to their homeland. They all practice strong transnational belonging at their homeland. Belonging to one's homeland is common and universal for human beings.

There are some differences in transnational economic belonging of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea to their homeland depending on present

occupation, visa status, occupation in Bangladesh, reason for migration, and living area, but there are no differences depending on age, duration in South Korea, marital status and education. Bangladeshi labor migrants holding E9 visa have stronger transnational economic (livelihood) belonging and transnational economic (finance) belonging than other Bangladeshi migrants. According to South Korean labor recruiting system, Korean companies select their labors from their chosen countries. Then company owner sends an agreement and other necessary documents to the labor at their home country. Labor signs it and sends it back to company owner before entering in South Korea. Therefore, after entering in South Korea, they attend in a short training. Then they join in company and start work directly. As a result, they do not need to expense time to search job and can earn money without delay. The wages and welfare rights in South Korea are also good to compare with other Asian countries since South Korea is a developed country and maintain OECD standard system. In addition, migrants have to spend a small amount of their money from their standard wages since they live alone here. In many cases, company owners provide food and house for labor migrants. Hence they can support their family and relatives easily who have stayed behind in their homeland and then can accumulate wealth for their future wellbeing in their home country. Remittances are of fundamental importance to many migrant sending households as they cope with poor local economies, limited job markets, and low wages (Suro, et al., 2002). Migrants who were businessmen in Bangladesh have stronger economic (livelihood) belonging and economic (finance) belonging. Businessmen were rich in Bangladesh compare to other migrants. So they had certain amount of money that helped them to maintain support to their family members and friends. In a good economic condition in South Korea, they can maintain easily their past practices to support their family and relatives. Beside, their business experiences in their homeland also help them to engage in financial activities for their future wellbeing in home country. Migrants who were students in Bangladesh maintain less support of livelihood and financial belonging since they are very young, they expenses some money from their wages for enjoying their life in Korea such as shopping, travelling, drinking etc. Migrants who migrate for economic reasons have more economic livelihood belonging and economic financial belonging than others migrants. Most of the migrants from a developing country like Bangladesh migrate

for economic reason. They struggled economically in the past in their homeland, which make them more depressed but responsible. They understand better the livelihood needs of their family in their homeland and financial wellbeing for their future than others migrants. Therefore, after coming in South Korea, they earn good amount of money in every month and send remittances to their homeland that helps surprisingly to local economies as the members of sending households improve their households; spend on education, health care, and rituals; engage in local politics; and invest in small business (Adams, 2009). Migrants who work in metropolitan areas be paid more wages in compare with rural area that helps them to support more in their home country than other migrants.

### Conclusion

Bangladeshi migrants have very strong feelings for and connections to their homelands and remittance practices through sending remittances for supporting their families, buying land, making investments, and establishing businesses in their home country are the outcomes. The highest degrees of transnational economic belonging is in taking care of families who stay in their homeland since migrants migrate for livelihood struggle of their family and the lowest degrees of transnational economic belonging is in investment in their homeland for future wellbeing since they stay for certain short period and expenses much money for their livelihood needs of their family to their homeland. Bangladesh is a developing country where many of the people struggle every day for their livelihood needs. So Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea leave their homeland for economic reasons and send remittances to their homeland to support their basic necessities such as food, cloth, education, medical expenses of their families. Though most of the Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea are laborers who stay for a short time – four years ten months – in comparison with western countries where many migrants have settled for a long time, this does not make any difference to migrants' sense of economic belonging to their homeland. They all practice strong transnational belonging at their homeland. Belonging to one's homeland is common and universal for human beings.

There are some differences in transnational economic belonging of migrants to their homeland depending on present occupation, visa status,



occupation in Bangladesh, reason for migration, and living area, but there are no differences depending on age, duration in South Korea, marital status and education. Bangladeshi labor migrants holding E9 visa have stronger transnational economic (livelihood) belonging and transnational economic (finance) belonging than other Bangladeshi migrants. The wages and welfare rights of labor migrants in South Korea are also good to compare with other Asian countries since South Korea is a developed country and maintain OECD standard system. Hence they can support their family and relatives easily who have stayed behind in their homeland and then can accumulate wealth for their future wellbeing in their home country. Migrants who were businessmen in Bangladesh have stronger economic (livelihood) belonging and economic (finance) belonging. Businessmen were rich in Bangladesh compare to other migrants so they helped to support to their family members and friends. In a good economic condition in South Korea, they can maintain easily their past practices to support their family and relatives. Beside, their business experiences in their homeland also help them to engage in financial activities for their future wellbeing in home country. Migrants who were students in Bangladesh maintain less support of livelihood and financial belonging since they earn small amount of wages. Migrants who migrate for

economic reasons have more economic livelihood belonging and economic financial belonging than others migrants. Most of the migrants from a developing country like Bangladesh migrate for economic reason. They understand better the livelihood needs of their family in their homeland and financial wellbeing for their future than others migrants. Migrants who work in metropolitan areas be paid more wages in compare with rural area that helps them to support more in their home country than other migrants.

This study has limitations in generalizing migrants as subject since laborers the target group of this study that does not show the overall situation of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea. In addition, religious and gender groups are not statistically significant in analyzing the differences of transnational economic belonging since the inter-group differences are so high. As mentioned, transnational economic belonging of migrants can vary according to various socio-demographical characteristics and migrant groups, so subsequent studies of various migrant groups sampling based on socio-demographic factors are necessary to understand in depth of transnational economic belonging of Bangladeshi migrants in South Korea. Therefore, to understand in depth of transnational belonging subsequent studies of various kinds belonging are also important.

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2-бөлім  
**АЙМАҚТАНУДЫҢ  
ӨЗЕКТІ МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ**

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Section 2  
**CONTEMPORARY ISSUES  
OF REGIONAL STUDIES**

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Раздел 2  
**АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ  
РЕГИОНОВЕДЕНИЯ**

**A. Bakhtiyarova<sup>1\*</sup>, Seyit Ali Avcu<sup>2</sup>**<sup>1</sup>L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Kazakhstan, Nur-Sultan<sup>2</sup>Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Turkey, Ankara

\*e-mail: bakhtiyarova\_aj@mail.ru

## MIDDLE POWER BEHAVIOR DURING THE TRANSITION IN WORLD ORDER: THE CASE OF KAZAKHSTAN

While the global prominence of China has become indisputable, and Russia challenges the liberal world order because of geopolitical and historical necessities, the Western world is striving in every way to strengthen the liberal system through the economic, military and democratic institutions. This gives reason to believe that the world order is currently experiencing a deep crisis and transformation in a post-pandemic period. What scientists agree on is that the main issue of the modern international relations is the suspense of the future scenario and the positions of the actors within it.

However, it is beyond argument that the rise of multilateralism in world politics comes with the activation of middle power's diplomacy that is becoming more prominent. The diversity of middle power countries is explained by the fact that the current multipolar system has discouraged unilateralism, conferring the possibility for middle powers to have a voice and push for a negotiated resolution. Currently, in the world scientific environment, middle power states are considered in two categories: traditional middle powers, such as South Korea and Japan, and rising middle power states.

In this paper, we examine the middle power behavior during the world order transition by comparatively analyzing Kazakhstan's behavior with the rising and traditional mid-power states on the basis of empirical data. Kazakhstan might help to decrease the tension between the liberal world and the illiberal world by contributing to the mediation efforts.

**Key words:** new world order, liberal order, multipolar system, middle power.

**Ә.Ж. Бахтиярова<sup>1\*</sup>, Сейит Али Авджу<sup>2</sup>**<sup>1</sup>Л.Н. Гумилев атындағы Еуразия Ұлттық Университеті, Қазақстан, Нұр-Сұлтан қ.<sup>2</sup>Анкара Йылдырым Баязид университеті, Түркия, Анкара қ.

\*e-mail: bakhtiyarova\_aj@mail.ru

## Әлемдік тәртіптің трансформациясы кезіндегі орта державаның мінез-құлқы: Қазақстан мысалында

Қытайдың жаһандық ықпалы даусыз болып, Ресей геосаяси және тарихи қажеттіліктерге байланысты либералды әлемдік тәртіпке қарсылық білдірсе де, Батыс әлемі либералды жүйені экономикалық, әскери және демократиялық институттар арқылы нығайтуын жалғастырып келеді. Мұндай ахуал пандемиядан кейінгі кезеңде терең дағдарыстағы әлемдік тәртіптің еселеп күрделенуіне негіз болып отыр.

Қазіргі халықаралық қатынастардың басты проблемасы әлемдік саясаттың болашақ сценарийінің белгісіздігі және ондағы мемлекеттердің ұстанымдары мен позициясының анық емес екендігінде. Алайда, әлемдік саясатты бойлаған көпполярлық орта державалар санатына енетін мемлекеттер дипломатиясының жандануына әкеліп отыр. Қазіргі таңда әлемдік ғылыми ортада орта деңгейлі мемлекеттер екі категорияда қарастырылған: дәстүрлі ұғымдағы Оңтүстік Корея және Жапон мемлекеттері сынды орта державалар және де жаңа әлемдік қарқынмен дамып келе жатқан орта деңгейлі мемлекеттер.

Бұл мақалада біз әлемдік тәртіптің трансформациясы кезіндегі дамып келе жатқан орта державаның мінез-құлқын Қазақстанның әлемдік сахнадағы саясатын мысалға ала отырып эмпирикалық деректер негізінде салыстырмалы түрде зерттейміз. Қазақстан медиатор ретінде либералдық әлем мен либералдық емес әлем арасындағы шиеленісті төмендетуге мүмкіншілігі бар деген тұжырымдаманы ғылыми тұрғыда анықтаймыз.

**Түйін сөздер:** жаңа әлемдік тәртіп, либералды тәртіп, көпполярлы жүйе, орта держава.

А.Ж. Бахтиярова<sup>1\*</sup>, Сейит Али Авджу<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Евразийский национальный университет им. Л.Н. Гумилева, Казахстан, г. Нур-Султан

<sup>2</sup>Анкара Йылдырым Баязид Университет, Турция, г. Анкара

\*e-mail: bakhtiyarova\_aj@mail.ru

### **Поведение средней державы во время трансформации мирового порядка: на примере Казахстана**

В то время как глобальное влияние Китая стало неоспоримым, а Россия бросает вызов либеральному мировому порядку из-за геополитических и исторических потребностей, Западный мир всеми силами стремится укрепить либеральную систему с помощью экономических, военных и демократических институтов. Это дает основания полагать, что мировой порядок в настоящее время переживает глубокий кризис и трансформацию в пост-пандемический период. В чем ученые сходятся во мнении, так это в том, что главной проблемой современных международных отношений является неопределенность будущего сценария и позиций действующих акторов в нем.

Однако бесспорно, что рост многополярности в мировой политике способствует активизации дипломатии средней державы, которая становится все более заметной. В настоящее время в мировой научной среде государства среднего уровня рассматриваются в двух категориях: средние державы в традиционном понимании, такие как Южная Корея и Япония, и развивающиеся государства среднего звена.

В этой статье мы исследуем поведение средней державы в период трансформации мирового порядка путем сравнительного анализа поведения Казахстана с растущими и традиционными государствами средней державы на основе эмпирических данных. Казахстан мог бы помочь снизить напряженность между либеральным миром и нелиберальным миром, внося свой вклад в посреднические усилия.

**Ключевые слова:** новый мировой порядок, либеральный порядок, многополярная система, средняя держава.

## **Introduction**

Surrounded by two great powers Kazakhstan has followed its own unique and thorny path of transformation. In the early 1990s, facing the unknown, the country set a course for multipolarity because of its bordering Russia to the north, China to the East, and other developing countries around itself. Once former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the official visit to the country noted: «Kazakhstan has been a regional leader since its earliest days of independence» (Condoleezza Rice, 2005). After gaining independence, being on the verge of geopolitical chaos, and being a small country, Kazakhstan has become a rising middle power that increasingly strived for being visible in the worldwide policy. But on the other hand, natural resources have been the engine of these changes and became the central issue of powers' Great Games. Over the last decade, the term new «Great Game» has acquired a meaning of interaction between the United States, Russia, and China for power and influence in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. However, in the case where several great powers jockey for influence, the authority of any one state is weakening. This phenomenon is named the «multiple principals» problem, as organizational

theorists assert. Hereby, the presence of several dominant figures assists less powerful actors to wriggle out of an obligation to anyone power, weakening the control of these more powerful actors (Voorn, Genugten, Thiel, 2019).

Considering the aforementioned, we've faced the question of what changes we are experiencing today in international affairs? In recent times scholars agree that the system of international relations undergoes a crisis. This is why it has been growing interest in rethinking the global world order as well as positioning of countries within it, mainly Kazakhstan as a leading country in Central Asia. In this paper, we examine the middle power behavior during the transition in world order by analyzing Kazakhstan's behavior during the last decade.

## **The theoretical and methodological basis of the research**

The theoretical and methodological basis of the research is based on the basic provisions of the school of political neorealism by Kenneth Waltz, another ideological basis is the theory of offensive realism by John Mearsheimer. Although these schools have developed in the papers of various authors, they imply one motive: the conquest of

an increasingly powerful and dominant position in the world arena. But how is this possible in a new reality, when the existing liberal order is undergoing a deep transformation? This is becoming the central problematic issue faced by the entire world scientific community.

In order to prove our hypothesis in terms of Kazakhstan's position in a worldwide view, we essentially used a method of comparative analysis through the exploring of similarities and differences in the behavior of actors as well as studying the variables, indeed.

As a way to achieve our goal, the paper is constructed as follows. First, we will begin with the literature review on the nature of the new world order; second, we will explore the middle power behavior during the transition in World System; third, we will analyze the choices of Kazakhstan in new world order; in conclusion, we will analyze the foreign policy of Kazakhstan and try to define the perspectives of its relations with great and regional powers, considering all the benefits and threats.

### **Literature review: the nature of the new world order**

Despite Western democracies strive to overcome multipolarity and maintain a hegemonic position in the modern world, they will no longer be able to oppose the peep of the dawn of new world order that is similar to economically and ideologically diverse. Although the United States was the most powerful state by the end of the Second World War as well as dominated after the disruption of the bipolar system, now other great powers are emerging that reflected restructuring of world order.

One of the key features of transforming world order is the deep economic and cultural interdependence that helps other countries to become more powerful, thus, it has caused the undermining of unipolarity and weakening of the liberal order. According to a leading scholar John Mearsheimer, the rejection of western liberal values by the fast-


growing China, and the resumption of Russian power has ended the unipolar era (Mearsheimer, 2019: 8).

Emerging of a multipolar system is accompanied by a geopolitical confrontation and a fierce competition for power. This is the reality that great powers face today. An accurate description of the current world order is given by Henry Kissinger who argues that several decades later after the collapse of the Soviet system, the United States is in less of a position to insist on the immediate realization of all its desires because other actors have grown into great power status. It seems as the US can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it (Kissinger, 1994: 19).

What is more interesting, today's multipolar world seems contradictory: on one hand, the clash of civilizations provokes fragmentation of the world; on the other hand, the process of globalization is blurring borders. Hence, all of the major powers still care about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power in the foreseeable future. This implies the need to rethink all existing paradigms to define the world order we are living in.

In his work «World Order», Henry Kissinger defined the unfolding situation on the world stage as a threat in the face of all mankind. He emphasized that we are living in a historical period when there is a stubborn, at times almost desperate pursuit of a concept of world order that eludes common understanding. He was preoccupied with the question of whether we are entering a new period when the future will be determined by forces that do not recognize any restrictions or any order at all? And how can we define the position of every actor within the new world order (Henry Kissinger, 2015: 8-9)?

According to Mazarr *et al*, the order can be understood as either an input that can affect state behavior or an outcome of a stable and predictable position of affairs between states, as opposed to disorder or a state of war and violence as seen in Figure 1 (Mazarr, Priebe, Radin, Cevallos, 2016: 9).



**Figure 1** – Input and output of world order

Initially, the concept of «world order» was formed in Europe after thirty years of bloodshed in 1618-1648. After long religious strife and complete exhaustion, the warring countries got around the table in Westphalia to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. As a result, the Peace of Westphalia was achieved in 1648, ending the European wars and remained in history as a religious, territorial, and political settlement. This historical period in Europe seems close to describing the unfolding situation in modern international relations: a variety of political units, adherence to contradictory principles, ideological views, within which all actors are trying to find some «neutral» rules governing behavior and mitigating conflicts. This statement gives reason to believe that the Peace of Westphalia brings us closer to understanding today's reality, where states recognize each other's sovereignty and proclaim refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of independent states.

Nevertheless, how in practice the pursuit of the national interests of individual countries often goes beyond the proclaimed rules of international law as seen in the Ukrainian and Syrian crises. As an obvious example, the bifurcation point in Russian-West rivalry was the Crimean crisis in terms of which this stagnation was blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression, although it would be biased to blame only Russia for this crisis as Mearsheimer argues (Mearsheimer, 2014: 77). The West's desire to withdraw Ukraine from Russia's footprint, the expansion of NATO to the East has increasingly strained bilateral relations, having entered a new stage of development. This competition is asymmetrical and very unequal.

In global politics, the rivalry of great powers is not a new phenomenon, although in modern realities it requires a rethinking of all paradigms and an analysis of the fundamental concepts of the world order. History makes clear that great powers encountering often leads to global conflicts. Preventing this way out requires recognizing that liberal order cannot furnish global sustainability.

Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan argue that the global concert of major powers can stabilize an explosive situation that means a consolidated approach of leading countries in a way of peacekeeping. Therein, political inclusivity and procedural informality are the key characteristics of the emerging global landscape that could cover all the major powers in an informal platform as a consultative body. To be precise, inclusivity means the ability of influential states to negotiate

regardless of their regime type for avoiding destructive, especially violent, conflicts. In that way, great powers separate ideological differences over domestic governance from issues of international relations. The distinguishing feature of such a platform from the United Nations or other global actors is its informality. Official bodies are often stagnating due to disputes between veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council. In contrast, an informal platform secures a private venue with a higher probability of consensus building. By providing a tool for sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences (Haass, Kupchan, 2021).

In doing so, a global concert would cover the states that together represent almost 70 percent of global GDP and there are six such governments: the United States, China, Japan, Russia, India, and the European Union. We must admit that these major countries will be guided by realist principles implying hierarchy, state identity, and national interests. It means imminent discrepancy between powers, for this reason, the great powers keep options open for taking unilateral action in any way. Nevertheless, a global concert makes fruitful dialogue possible, and a new mechanism of world order devoted to great-power diplomacy could make this friction more controlled. What is more important, a global concert would provide the right to free speech and actions when it comes to internal governing.

To sum up, the need for a global concert is driven by the necessity to flatten a negative attribute of current international relations. It would be dangerously naïve to rely on the existing order when pretensions between great powers are increasing and new threats are sweeping the world.

### **Middle power behavior during the transition in world order**

Although the world order is primarily shaped by the interaction between great powers, other states, especially middle powers influence the system by forming alliances with each other and great powers. In this section we explore the following questions: what is a middle power, what facts give us reason to believe that the state can be considered as a middle power country, what role they play during the transition in the world order? The concept of middle power is as old as modern international relations. It first emerged in Italy in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, where small states such as Venice and the took

intermediate positions between great powers, such as the Ottomans and the Habsburgs (Baç, 2017).

For determining the middle power concept, scholars attempted to distinguish between emerging and traditional middle power countries. Eduard Jordaan emphasized the main difference between emerging and traditional middle powers by their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioral discrepancy. In terms of constitutive differences, traditional middle powers are socially and economically stable, egalitarian, and not regionally

influential. Meanwhile, in terms of behavior, they express identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer concessions to pressures for global reform. Conversely emerging middle powers are semi-peripheral and new democratic governments that display regional influence and readiness to reform global issues. Emerging middle powers demonstrate their commitment to regional integration processes, but they strive to build up identities that are different from those of weak countries in the region as seen in Figure 2 (Jordaan, 2003).

Traditional Middle Powers		Rising Middle Powers
CONSTITUTIVE DIFFERENCES		
Democratic tradition	Stable social democracies	Relatively unstable, recently democratized with some very undemocratic aspects
Time of emergence as middle powers	During the Cold War	After the Cold War
Position in the world economy	Core	Semi-periphery
Domestic distribution of wealth	Very equal	Highly unequal
Regional influence	Low	High
Origins of perceived neutrality	Regional ambivalence and relative unimportance	Regional self-association and significance
BEHAVIORAL DIFFERENCES		
Regional orientation	Fairly low	Moderately high
Attitude to the regional integration and cooperation	Ambivalent	Eager (often assuming leadership role)
Nature of actions to effect deep global change	Appeasing and legitimizing	Reformist and legitimizing
Purpose of international identity construction	Distance from powerful in region	Distance from weak in the region

**Figure 2** – Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional middle powers.

The foreign policy of middle powers often centers on decreasing conflicts in the world by cooperating with other like-minded states in an attempt to arrive at a workable compromise, usually through multilateral channels and institutions (Nossal, Stubbs, 1997). They are adherents of the stabilization of the world order, whether in a period of hegemony or multipolarity.

The foreign policy of middle powers is based on the junction of realism and constructivism in

terms of international relations theory. Utilizing soft balancing stems from realistic principles to defend national interests and mitigate external threats while constructing conditions for maneuvering. Realists scholars argue that the middle power's intentions to create a dialogue platform between great powers are a kind of hedging strategy permitting one to maneuver for own safety. In perspective, if the United States and China would equally dominate in the world arena configuring the bipolar system,



then, unlike during the Cold war, the geopolitical confrontation of two great powers will not permeate all countries of the world because of the middle power diplomacy.

Most middle power countries have a conflict of interest with China in terms of trade and economic imbalance and its rapid military expansion. In this case, it is appropriate to assert the middle power has been hedging against ever-growing China's power, knowing the risk of acquisition. The strength of medium-size countries is manifested in establishing long-term relations with the United States in the framework of investment, cultural and educational projects, in other words, relying on American soft power, which in turn also penetrates these countries with the main goal of deterring China or Russia from spreading influence. American support is seen as an efficient instrument in a security issue for middle powers towards rising China.

The other view asserts that one of the key advantages of being a middle power state is in its middle-ranked position in a hierarchy of power: they do not bear much responsibility for critical issues on the agenda of world politics. Meanwhile, they can play the role of mediator or peacekeeper with the help of diplomacy. History reminds us the best example of the middle powers' efforts to mediate conflict of interests between the great powers (Chaewkang You). Put differently, making a balance against the politics of great powers aims not to replace the role of major countries, but to transform the logic of power politics in a way of effective multilateral cooperation (Chun, 2016: 26).

In the research paper published by the Hague Center for Strategic Studies, Oosterveld and Torossian state that the importance of middle powers depends on how power is disseminated in the international system. Middle powers are countries that actively work to maintain and promote international law and thereby contribute to stable world order. They have the ability and influence to achieve these goals, making them important spearheads of international order. The middle powers are exceptionally advantaged. On the one hand, based on their economic and military might, they should not do hard work or take on global responsibility, as great powers do. However, they have enough power and influence to be able to pursue a normative foreign policy in which they can advance not only their interests but those of the wider community or even the global community.

Finally, the label middle power is valuable because it gives a certain degree of uprightness and indicates the country's good standing in the international community.

Several main features can be used to differentiate the modern middle powers. The first is the government must have the authority to influence the world discussions during negotiating. Next is the level of integration of the state into world politics and economy. The third is the diplomatic reputation and political will to support the rights of civil society around the world.

Oosterveld and Torossian apply the *five percent doctrine* to separate the middle powers from the great powers. If a country wants to be a great state it must own a dominant portion of the world's economy and military forces. There are five countries such as the United States, the Russian Federation, China, Germany, and Japan which individually hold at least 5 percent and collectively 54.2 percent of the world's power. The United States, China, and Japan stand out based on the size of their GDP, armed forces, and population, while India moves into the category of great power because of the big population. Permanent membership of the UN Security Council makes France and the UK to be considered the 7th and 8th great powers. To differentiate middle powers from small countries, three indicators have been considered: GDP, population, and military potential. As a result, fifty countries fall into the list of «potential middle powers» including the Republic of Kazakhstan as seen the Figure 3 (Oosterveld, Torossian, 2019).

There is no agreement about the definition of small, middle, or greater powers among international relations scholars. It is generally agreed, however, that they behave differently in the international arena. Here we have three types of scholars' groups with a different understanding of this issue: i) the first group believes that the measurement of the smallness or greatness of the state becomes possible based on the specific parameters; ii) scholars assume that the small or great status of the states is determined by the will of the world community; iii) scientists believe that the powerfulness of a country is directly determined by its behavior in the international arena. To give a wide berth the further discussions on the adequacy of measurements, scientists classified states related to quantitative and relational criteria (Petar Kurecic *et al*, 2017).

	Insufficient FHI Score (Not Free) and UNDP Contribution	Insufficient FHI Score (Partly Free) and UNDP Contribution	Insufficient FHI Score (Not Free)	Insufficient FHI Score (Partly Free)	Insufficient UNDP Contributions	Meet all criteria
GreatPower			China Russia			USA France UK India Japan Germany
MiddlePower	Emerging					Established
	Algeria An- gola Iraq Kazakhstan Thailand Vietnam	Bangladesh Indonesia Malaysia Mo- rocco Nigeria Pakistan Sri Lanka	Egypt Saudi Ara- biaTurkey United Arab Emirates	Colombia Kuwait Mexi- co Philippines Ukraine	Czech Repub- licGreece Poland Portu- gal Romania South Africa	Argen- tina Australia Austria Bel- gium Brazil Canada Chile Denmark Finland Italy Netherlands Norway Peru South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland

Figure 3 – Middle Power and Great Power categories.

Therefore, scholars consider the types of international behavior stem from the classification. For instance, considering a country as a small state commonly means that this actor has no significant influence on worldwide policy and its opinion is ignored in global affairs. In turn, the middle power state, lying between small and big powers, is striving to become normative mediators and pursue compromise solutions in international disputes. These kinds of governments are proposed to expand their influence in regional and global governance. Middle power's diplomacy is focused on the foreign policy that demonstrates respect for international law, efforts to get together with like-minded actors for being a bridge between developed and developing states (Beeson, 2011).

#### **Kazakhstan as a middle power in new world order**

We have formed a middle power vision to research Kazakhstan's capability from the standpoint of diplomatic authority and its influence on the evolution of world politics. It was possible by analyzing Kazakhstan's initiatives since the independence and entering the world community, indeed.

Due to comprehensive analysis, we have identified three indicators substantiating the position

of Kazakhstan as a middle power state: i) diplomatic authority; ii) high integration into international communities; iii) providing humanitarian assistance to states in need. Despite Kazakhstan does not conform to the economic and military capacity as it can demonstrate great powers, the country contributes to peacekeeping in distant regions of the world (Nurshayeva, 2013).

*Diplomatic authority.* Kazakhstan has determined to involve world affairs peacefully. Back in 2014, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan Yeldar Idrissov made a confident statement in one of his interviews, thereby making it clear that Kazakhstan has reached a new level of development: «Kazakhstan's diplomacy has increased its potential and now we would like to extend its geographical influence and offer the world community Kazakhstan's experience to help solve global and regional issues» (Idrissov, 2014). In the world public perception, the government is already perceived as a serious and full-fledged participant of the world community. It was preceded by several initiatives to preserve peace and order in international affairs.

For instance, a round of Peace talks held in Astana, the capital of the country, in 2017 to conduct work toward a political resolution to the Syrian conflict once again showed the possibility of

Kazakhstan to act as a mediator in the world arena. This indicates the diplomatic authority of Kazakhstan led the countries to sit down at the negotiating table. Kazakhstan also pursued its national interests and attempted to improve its relations with Assad's leading international allies.

Hosting the OSCE summit in Kazakhstan in 2010 led the authoritative countries to combine their views on such dramatic issues as the Afghan crisis, nuclear non-proliferation all over the world, the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and so on. Powerful states and member countries of OSCE have met in Kazakhstani territory to combat regional and global threats. Despite being aligned with the powers, such as Russia and China that challenge the liberal world order, Kazakhstan has been acting like a liberal state in its international relations. These are some of the key cases that give reason to believe that Kazakhstan is quite a competent actor in Central Asia to call itself a middle power state.

#### *High integration into international communities.*

For the modern world, it is very important to have a set of generally accepted rules that do not allow one political unit to subordinate all the others. This becomes possible within institutions that set the general trend of development and peaceful coexistence. Realizing this, Kazakhstan has always confirmed its commitment to integration processes.

In terms of involving in international organizations, a part of the United Nations, Kazakhstan held a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2017-2018. It is a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and was the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. At the same time, Kazakhstan is a leading initiator of the Eurasian Economic Union, a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. It is an active participant in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace program. Kazakhstan founded the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) (Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, 2021).

*Providing Humanitarian Assistance to States in Need.* Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs created Kazakhstan Agency for International Development (KazAID), which geographical priorities covered the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan for promoting humanitarian assistance. Official development assistance is intended to contribute to the development of essential to life

sectors as healthcare and food security in recipient countries. It proves that Kazakhstan is transforming from a recipient of assistance to a regional donor. According to dates, over the last 20 years, Kazakhstan provided around 542 mln USD within official development assistance (KazAID, 2021).

Despite negative talks of skeptics that Kazakhstan does not need to provide humanitarian assistance to countries in need due to the presence of its problems inside the country, officials are convinced of the opposite. Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, Defense and Security of the Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan Maulen Ashimbaev stated: «It should be borne in mind that official development assistance is not a charity. This is a flexible foreign policy tool for achieving specific foreign policy goals. Many OECD countries pursue such a policy, so official development assistance needs to be engaged in a meaningful, thoughtful and tied to the priorities of foreign policy» (Baimanov, 2017). Thus, since the COVID-19 pandemic spread around the world, Kazakhstan has repeatedly initiated humanitarian assistance to partner countries such as Kyrgyzstan and India. Apart from that, Kazakhstan annually allocates funds for foreign citizens from Russia, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to study at higher educational institutions.

The status of Kazakhstan as a middle power state in the region was pronounced in the latest concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020-2030 years: «The main influence on the formation of foreign policy concepts of mid-power states is exerted by systemic factors (events and trends at the global and regional levels that are directly reflected in the foreign policy agenda)» (akorda, 2020). Striving to enter the top world thirty developed countries Kazakhstan has repeatedly served as a platform for peace negotiations; maintaining preventive diplomacy and effective conflict resolution mechanisms. Having collected all the fundamental factors that make it possible to consider Kazakhstan as a middle power state, we analyze how Kazakhstan will interact with the great powers in the foreseeable future in the next section.

### **Kazakhstan and Great powers**

The formation of a strong Kazakhstan would assist to restrict Chinese and Russian essential influence in the region. Kazakh authorities comprehending this challenge have employed primarily diplomatic initiatives. It helped Kazakhstan to turn on its

voice in the international arena and to get closer to powerful states. In this section, we consider bilateral relations of Kazakhstan with the United States, China, and Russia.

*Kazakhstan-US.* Most Western policymakers believe that the growing status of Kazakhstan in Central Asia has advanced American interests significantly. As Weitz stated: «Through its increasing economic engagement in Eurasia – which has involved both direct investment and trade as well as support for improving regional commercial and transportation infrastructure – Kazakhstan has helped transform Central Asia and the Caspian region into an «arc of opportunity» rather than an «arc of crisis» (Weitz, 2008: 123).

After the split of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has always been within the field of view of western diplomacy. The fact is the government was defined as an important factor in implementing the Eurasian strategy as a whole. Russia and China have a much greater influence on Kazakhstan than the United States. This is the reason why American policy should create a competitive advantage in its policy regarding the Kazakh vector. The United States should pay more attention to educational projects, environmental issues, health care, and freedom of the press. These are the components of effective «soft power» policy able to ensure long-term cooperation.

*Kazakhstan-Russia.* But the splicing of partnership with the West also has its lines: by deepening cooperation with American partners, Kazakhstan does not put in doubt its military-political obligations to Russia and the CSTO. As for the northern neighbor, the Russian vector remains the most important point of Kazakhstan's foreign economic policy. This is due to the territorial proximity, energy, and transportation interconnection, the presence of common historical memory, and a deep connection of cultural heritage.

Bilateral relations are developing within the integrational institution such as Eurasian Economic Union. Even though Kazakhstan once initiated the creation of a common market in Eurasian space, nowadays Kazakh elite worries about trade imbalance in relations with Russia: Kazakhstan's exports to Russia are decreasing, while imports from Russia are increasing. For example, in the first year of the EAEU's functioning, the volume of Kazakhstan's exports to the member countries of this union was at the level of \$4 billion 886.8 million, while imports in the opposite direction amounted to \$10 billion 885.4 million. Meanwhile, imports from Russia far exceeded the volume of Kazakhstan's

exports to this country, amounting respectively to \$10 billion 232.4 million against \$4 billion 343.4 million, resulting in an impressive negative trade balance with it in minus \$5 billion 889.0 million (Askarov, 2021).

As a result, bilateral trade relations moved into the negative zone. This is one of the aspects Kazakhstan's leadership should rethink because the deep economic dependence of the local market to Russia with all the negative consequences can lead to an imbalance in relations with other great or regional powers. For instance, Uzbekistan can be considered as a more appropriate object for American investments, because this country has observer status in Eurasian Economic Union and is less dependent on Russia.

Along with economic issues, there has been a possible threat for the Kazakh government triggered by the statements of state Duma deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov who outlined in one of his speeches about the non-existence of the Kazakh statehood. The majority of Kazakh society were peeved and have been still concerned, even though Russian officials assure their friendliness.

One another important issue in Kazakh-Russian relations is the language barrier for the Russian-speaking population. The dynamics of the domestic political processes have led to the change of guidelines and accents of the domestic political agenda: there is a trend to strengthen the role and place of the Kazakh language. This is a sovereign choice of Kazakhstan, but it also affects the Russian-speaking part of society. This is a trend that will also have an impact on relations between Russia and Kazakhstan.

*Kazakhstan-China.* The economic reforms initiated in a way of «socialism with Chinese specifics» at the end of the XX century gave a powerful impetus to China at the beginning of a new era, allowing the country to declare its ambitions on the Eurasian continent. And today we see how China actively explores the energy markets of neighboring countries, including Kazakhstan, diversifying continental transit routes to ensure energy security. Such behavior of the Eastern neighbor is also due to the geopolitical situation on the sea routes, where the presence of American naval forces compels China to find new ways of cooperation.

China is one of the five largest investors in Kazakhstan, accounting for 4.7 percent of the total investment in the Kazakhstani economy. In January-February of 2021, the trade turnover between China and Kazakhstan increased by 20 percent compared

to the same period in 2020, amounting to \$3.5 billion (Eurasian Bridge Kazakhstan, 2021). In addition to its economic relationship, Kazakhstan has become a reliable security partner for China over the past two decades, standing up to the three evil forces of separatism, extremism, and terrorism within Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As for the benefits for China from these bilateral relations, it is noteworthy to underline China's energy needs which are responded to by Kazakhstan's oil supplies.

In this point, it is important to understand that any government in certain initiatives primarily proceeds from its national interests, which inevitably leads to the emergence of external economic contradictions. For example, the commodity-heavy economy of Kazakhstan towards China makes it vulnerable and dependent. Therefore, today Kazakhstan has set a course to create a new model of economic development within the industrial and digital revolution. This means the exchange of scientific knowledge, the introduction of innovative technologies in production, the creation of land transit routes, etc. Thus, for two partners, the benefit lies in the development of new branches of cooperation that would allow the countries to coexist harmoniously.

As we see in the long term the Sino-Kazakh relations will continue to deepen due to several economic and political indicators. However, such a situation raises concerns as to the final determinants of Kazakhstan's foreign policy and whether official views reflect those of Kazakh society. If we consider this issue within neorealism it is abundantly clear that «middle power» states interacting with increasingly strong governments preferably choose a strategy of balance or in extreme cases – confrontation. Both of them are motivated by the same goal to provide greater security and the balancing theory has demonstrated today's Sino-Kazakh relations. The question of how the middle power state as the Republic of Kazakhstan could create relations with rising China leads to the inference that it will «be determined by the systemic distribution of capabilities rather than state-level characteristics such as the policy preferences of political elites» (Clarke, 2014: 142).

For cooperation between Russia and China in Central Asia, both countries have largely identical strategic and geopolitical interests. First, both sides are interested in countering the growth of non-traditional security threats. Secondly, Russia and China are not interested in strengthening the influence of a potentially hostile third force in the region. In strategic terms, Beijing considers the

post-Soviet space as a whole to be a fairly reliable rear for implementing its policy in the Asia-Pacific region (Laumulin, 2020: 291).

## Conclusion

Within the new world order, the U.S. will stay as a great power even though American policymakers have to rethink their foreign policy paradigm because of other powers' rising with equal ambitions. Nevertheless, the U.S. will continue to nurture a powerful core of Western democracies with broadly shared interests and values, even as it seeks pragmatic cooperation with strategic adversaries on matters like nuclear weapons, global warming, and pandemics. The United Nations would stay as the world dialogue platform even it is incredibly difficult to make real change. Instead of disarming, the U.S. would reconsolidate existing alliances like NATO and political frameworks like the G-7, trying to attract India to the field of its influence.

One of the key parameters of Kazakhstan's stability for the next decades is the Great powers' investments attracted for economic development. There are American, Chinese, and Russian investments in Kazakhstan. And this fact will not allow the great powers to shake the country from the inside, it is not economically profitable.

In perspective Kazakhstan will continue its multi-vector foreign policy because of, first, its geopolitical location between Russia and China without the ability to access the world's seas. Second, destabilization of situations around Russia, due to the Ukrainian crisis and sanctions, could influence on political commitments of Kazakhstan's foreign policy because of the rise of the national identity and negative discussions in mass media about the people's concerns for the northern territories of Kazakhstan, despite the assurance of officials about Russian's respect for the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan. Third, American soft power will make a big contribution to the level of education of Kazakhstan's youth and people's cultural self-perception, which can consequently impact on deformation of Kazakhstan's foreign policy leading to a more strict position than being a middle power state. Fourth, the level of the country's commitment to science, and economic readiness to meet all the modern challenges, the political will of the elite to solve critical issues outside the government, and the geopolitical situation based on the interests of the major powers will determine the future of Kazakhstan as a middle power state.

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IRSTI 11.25.91

<https://doi.org/10.26577/IRILJ.2022.v97.i1.07>**Mariya Erkan** 

Sakarya University, Turkey, Sakarya  
e-mail: mariya.erkan@outlook.com

## **A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE ON RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IN THE PUTIN ERA**

Russian regional activity in the Eastern Mediterranean represent a significant part of its global positioning. Reassuring itself as a great power capable of bringing loud voice into international affairs, Russia secures its national interests by building up its power capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean, which consequently influence the geopolitical balance of power in the region. However, against the background of Russia's economic weakness and political isolation, expressed in a decrease in its relative material capabilities, why does it continue to expand its participation in remote regions like the Eastern Mediterranean? What systemic and domestic factors are driving its foreign policy towards this region? How Moscow perceive the Eastern Mediterranean? Which strategy does Russia apply in maintaining its position in the region, and how it behaves vis-à-vis key regional actors? Taking neoclassical realism as a theoretical basis, this article aims to answer the above questions providing an analysis of systemic incentives and domestic (unit) level variables, which are instrumental in understanding Russian foreign policy behavior in the region (dependent variable), as well as globally. Focusing on the geographical area of Eastern Mediterranean, this article offers insights into Russia's interaction with this region and within it, its behavior pursuing its interests exposing areas of potential conflict and cooperation with relevant actors, and the patterns of Russia's interaction in regional balance of power. The significance of this study lies in the applying of a relatively new theoretical approach (neoclassical realism) to a specific geographical case (Eastern Mediterranean) in a certain time frame (Putin era) in the study of Russian foreign policy.

**Key words:** Russia, Eastern Mediterranean, neoclassical realism.

Мария Эрман

Сакарья университеті, Түркия, Сакарья қ.  
e-mail: mariya.erkan@outlook.com

### **Путин дәуіріндегі Шығыс Жерорта Теңізіндегі Ресейдің сыртқы саясатына неоклассикалық реалистік көзқарас**

Өзін халықаралық істерге дауыс көтере алатын ұлы держава ретінде сендіре отырып, Ресей Шығыс Жерорта теңізіндегі қуат мүмкіндіктерін арттыру арқылы өзінің ұлттық мүдделерін қамтамасыз етеді, бұл аймақтағы күштердің геосаяси тепе-теңдігіне әсер етеді. Алайда, Ресейдің салыстырмалы материалдық мүмкіндіктерінің төмендеуімен көрінетін экономикалық әлсіздігі мен саяси оқшаулануы аясында ол Шығыс Жерорта теңізі сияқты шалғай аймақтарға қатысуын кеңейтуді негізден жалғастыруда? Оның осы аймаққа қатысты сыртқы саясатын қандай жүйелі және ішкі факторлар итермелеп отыр? Мәскеу Шығыс Жерорта теңізін қалай қабылдайды? Ресей аймақтағы позициясын сақтау үшін қандай стратегияны қолданады және ол негізгі аймақтық субъектілерге қалай қарайды? Неоклассикалық реализмді теориялық негіз ретінде ала отырып, бұл мақала Ресейдің аймақтағы сыртқы саясатының мінез-құлқын (тәуелді айнымалы) түсінуге көмектесетін жүйелі ынталандырулар мен ішкі (бірлік) деңгейдегі айнымалыларды талдауды қамтамасыз ететін жоғарыда аталған сұрақтарға жауап беруге бағытталған. Шығыс Жерорта теңізінің географиялық аймағына назар аудара отырып, бұл мақала Ресейдің осы аймақпен және оның шеңберіндегі өзара әрекеттесуіне, оның мүдделерін көздейтін мінез-құлқына, ықтимал қақтығыстар мен тиісті субъектілермен ынтымақтастық аймақтарын әшкерелеуге және Ресейдің аймақтық күштер теңгеріміндегі өзара әрекеттесу үлгілеріне түсінік береді. . Бұл зерттеудің маңыздылығы Ресейдің сыртқы саясатын зерттеуде белгілі бір уақыт шеңберінде (Путин дәуірі) нақты географиялық жағдайға (Шығыс Жерорта теңізі) салыстырмалы түрде жаңа теориялық көзқарасты (неоклассикалық реализм) қолдануда жатыр.

**Түйін сөздер:** Ресей, Шығыс Жерорта теңізі, неоклассикалық реализм.

Мария Эрдан

Университет Сакарья, Турция, г. Сакарья  
e-mail: mariya.erkar@outlook.com

### Российская внешняя политика в Восточном Средиземноморье в эпоху Путина с перспективы неоклассического реализма

Утверждая себя в качестве великой державы, способной громко заявить о себе в международных делах, Россия защищает свои национальные интересы, наращивая свой силовой потенциал в Восточном Средиземноморье, что, следовательно, влияет на геополитический баланс сил в регионе. Однако на фоне экономической слабости и политической изоляции России, выражающейся в снижении ее относительных материальных возможностей, почему она продолжает расширять свое участие в отдаленных регионах, таких как Восточное Средиземноморье? Какие системные и внутренние факторы определяют ее внешнюю политику в отношении этого региона? Как Москва воспринимает Восточное Средиземноморье? Какую стратегию применяет Россия для сохранения своих позиций в регионе, и как она ведет себя по отношению к ключевым региональным акторам? Взяв за теоретическую основу неоклассический реализм, данная статья призвана ответить на вышеуказанные вопросы, предоставив анализ системных стимулов и переменных внутреннего (единичного) уровня, которые играют важную роль в понимании внешнеполитического поведения России в регионе (зависимая переменная), а также в глобальном масштабе. Сосредоточив внимание на географической зоне Восточного Средиземноморья, эта статья дает представление о взаимодействии России с этим регионом и внутри него, ее поведении, преследующем свои интересы, и выявляя области потенциального конфликта и сотрудничества с соответствующими акторами, а также о моделях взаимодействия России в региональном балансе сил. Значимость данного исследования заключается в применении относительно нового теоретического подхода (неоклассического реализма) к конкретному географическому случаю (Восточное Средиземноморье) в определенный период времени (эпоха Путина) в изучении внешней политики России.

**Ключевые слова:** Россия, Восточное Средиземноморье, неоклассический реализм.

#### Introduction

The global and comprehensive activity (diplomatic, military, and economic) of Russia is conditioned by a number of factors at the international and domestic levels. In modern conditions of transformation of the global international system, regional subsystems play an important role. Changes taking place at the regional level affect the dynamics of the global international system. Asserting itself as a great power, which is considered as such by other global actors, Russia seeks to project its power in different regions, from the Middle East to Latin America, in order to establish the world order according to its own vision.

With the coming to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000, there has been a gradual strengthening of Russia's position in the international arena, its greater engagement in the different regions and larger involvement in resolving of global issues. A window of opportunity opened at the regional level (events in the MENA region and the adjacent Mediterranean) and a favorable domestic environment led Moscow to seek to expand its interests abroad. One of the regions of such interest became the Eastern Mediterranean.

Back in 1999, Vladimir Putin, being the Prime Minister of Russia, declared the need to restore Russian military presence in the Mediterranean Sea (Lutterbeck, 2009: 393). This idea was reflected in the Russia's Maritime Doctrine of 2001 (Morskaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2020 goda<sup>2001</sup>), thereby designating the Mediterranean as a strategically important region for ensuring national interests. Since then, the Mediterranean has taken a firm place in Russia's foreign policy confirmed by the new edition of the 2015 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which sets the task of ensuring a sufficient naval presence of Russia in the region on a permanent basis (Morskaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2015). Drawing a historical parallel, it should be noted that in imperial times Russia maintained its permanent fleet in the Mediterranean Sea until 1917 (Zonova, 2015: 522).

Thus, since 2008, a major turning point in Russia's foreign policy after its involvement in Georgia, Moscow has become increasingly assertive gradually increasing its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. This becomes especially noticeable in the contrast to Russia's withdrawal from the region in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.



Russia has its stake in the Eastern Mediterranean that has significant implications for regional balance of power and policies of regional actors. The underlying causes of Russian policy in the Eastern Mediterranean are considered from neoclassical realist theory, taking in consideration systemic and domestic levels. The Type III neoclassical realism is chosen as the theoretical framework of this paper seeking to resolve the research puzzle of consistent Russia's assertiveness to exert its influence in remote regions as Eastern Mediterranean in spite of ambiguous international and domestic situation. This article argues that Russia's foreign policy behavior is mainly determined by the international system. But the way Moscow responds to the Eastern Mediterranean challenges is filtered through Russia's domestic elements. Neoclassical realist theory appears to be useful for understanding Russia's approach towards Eastern Mediterranean, as it examines both the international and domestic levels, as well as their interaction with each other.

### Material and Methods

The materials used for this study were obtained exclusively from open sources. Both primary (official documents) and secondary sources (scientific articles, monographs, books, research papers, reports) were used in the course of the research. As noted previously, the theoretical basis of this article is the neoclassical realist theory, which is used to analyze Russia's foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. The article follows the logic of developing a theoretical approach, analyzing the international environment (independent variable) and the impact of systemic stimuli on Russian policy responses (dependent variable), as well as the domestic environment (intervening variables), namely the leader image and the strategic culture of Russia, which have strong influence on the shaping of foreign policy decisions.

### Literature Review

Within the framework of this research, the literature review covers two areas, theoretical and empirical.

The theoretical underpinnings offered by Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell in their common work *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* purports to explain phenomena ranging from short-term crisis decision-making by individual states up to and including

broader patterns of international outcomes and structural change (Ripsman, 2016). This book was used as a main theoretical guideline in developing the question under investigation.

An addition to the book mentioned above was the article *Contemporary Realism and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation* written by Jacek Wiclawski, who analyzes Russian foreign policy from the perspective of the theory of contemporary realism. He observes the complex nature of the foreign activity of the Russian Federation using the framework of classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism. This article defines a broad range of international (systemic) and internal political variables of the foreign policy of Russia. The article notes the evolution of Russia's foreign activity after the end of the Cold War, as well as the growing importance of neoclassical realism as an explanatory tool in this regard (Wiclawski, 2011).

Moreover, by studying many sources on the issue under study, it is useful to read the works of junior scholars who can not only provide information, but also help to look at the situation from a different angle or give a new understanding of the phenomena. Thus, Julian Mark Reder's dissertation *The Medvedev Years: An Examination of the External Forces & Internal Dynamics Affecting the Kremlin's Foreign Policy Decisions*, although focusing on the period of the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, provides a reference to previous periods, including the presidency of Vladimir Putin. In the framework of this study, such points as the nature of forces and personal dynamics are of interest, since they ultimately determine the Kremlin's reaction to foreign policy issues. The author analyzes the key players involved in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy decisions (Reder, 2013). Another thesis written by James Adam Oswell is of interest for this research as an example of theoretical application to the particular case. Referring to structural realism and neoclassical realism, the author addressed to the case of the British strategy of appeasement in the 1930s to show how these theories explain the British strategy. Turning to the theory of neoclassical realism, he identified «particular ways in which domestic politics played an intervening role in impacting British power,» (Oswell, 2013: abstract) revealing the gap of structural realist analysis.

Mark R. Brawley's *Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A Neoclassical Realist View* gives theoretical overview of the concept of grand strategy. Although the focus is made on the political-

economic perspective, it completes the theoretical basis for this research. Author explores a theory of balance of power applying it to the historical examples, including the Soviet grand strategy in the 1980s that gives an important impetus for the further research of modern Russian grand strategy (Brawley, 2010).

In search of answers to questions how contemporary international system looks like, who are the modern great powers, and what role Russia plays in the international system, a number of articles by foreign and Russian researchers were studied. Thus, Richard Sakwa wrote about the international system and models of global order from the positions of liberal and conservative internationalism (Sakwa, 2019). Richard Haass analyzed possible responses to a disordered world (Haass, 2014). Among Russian researchers, the article of Igor Istomin is of interest, in which he compared the Russian official and expert foreign policy discourse on the example of the ratio of centers of power and principles of building relations between them (Istomin, 2016).

Another layer of sources is empirical, aimed at studying Russian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Among the huge variety of works devoted to Russian foreign policy and its relations with different regions (see, for example, Degterev, 2019; Gubaidullina, 2011), a rather modest number of works, relative to the total number, concerns the Eastern Mediterranean. As a rule, this region is considered either as part of the greater Mediterranean, or together with Europe or the Middle East, which has attracted the attention of scholars in the last decade. Among the available works, one can single out Marc Pierini's article about the actors involved in the region and their struggle for power (Pierini, 2020). Furthermore, he separately studied the issue of Russia's positioning in the region and the consequences it brings to NATO and Europe (Pierini, 2021).

Another article *Russia's Eastern Mediterranean Policy* written by Agnieszka Legucka gives a short but insightful review of Moscow's activity in the region, defining its goals and motives, as well as the areas of Russian national interests (Legucka, 2020).

Taylor Craig Cayce's master's thesis *Russian Military Basing in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean: The Central Component to the Regional Foreign Policy* describes Russian foreign policy toward Georgia, Ukraine and Syria and explains how regional military bases fit into it (Cayce, 2016). The important aspect that author reviewed in his work was the presence of military bases in

each of these regions, which, in their turn, were at stake during the conflicts with Russian engagement. The researcher maintained that one of the causes of Russia's activities was the threat of losing its power that was projected by the means of relevant military bases (Gudauta in Georgia, Sevastopol in Ukraine, and Tartus in Syria). As he observes, military bases represents a tool of spreading Russian influence in the Black Sea and Middle East (via the Eastern Mediterranean). Further, the thesis holds that these regions have strategic and geographic importance for Russia. Thus, this thesis gives another aspect of Russia's power projection in the Eastern Mediterranean that is of interest for current research.

The book *Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power* edited by Roger E. Kanet examines the increasing role of Russia in the world affairs (Kanet, 2007). Although this book is not new, it gives a deep insight into the concept of great power and Russia's self-perception of greatness. As such, it can be beneficial for the analysis of systemic level of Russian foreign policy. Another book of interest is *Russia in the Changing International System* edited by Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen. This work is valuable in terms of studying Russia's perception of a changing international system in the twenty-first century. The studies done by the authors allow the reader to evaluate motives and strategies of Russia in relation to a number of contemporary problems (Parlar Dal, 2020).

An additional source that broaden an understanding of Russian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is Igor Delanoë's article devoted to the return of Russia to the Mediterranean region. The author analyzes the contemporary policy of Russia in the region, but also presents a historical retrospective in his research. In particular, he gives an idea of the traditional historical view about Russian defensive position (Delanoë, 2014).

As such, it is apparent that Russia's foreign policy has come under scrutiny from different aspects of many researchers. However, the Eastern Mediterranean seems understudied and deserves special attention, which this study is aimed to.

## Results and Discussion

### *The International Level: Power Distribution and Foreign Policy Behavior*

Considering Eastern Mediterranean as a regional subsystem, one can see that it reflects the global arena presenting its mini projection but adding some regional actors. This is explained

by the interdependence of global and regional fluctuations as mutually influencing components of one whole, that is, the regional subsystem is a part of the global international system. Indeed, the Eastern Mediterranean is part of the Mediterranean region, which is adjacent to Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, which can be considered as separate subsystems, and which also provides the opportunity to enter the World Ocean.

Russia's presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is opposed to the active actions of the United States and its Western allies in the face of the European Union in the region. Moreover, the last decade has been marked by the increasing activity of both regional (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey) and global actors (China). The discovered reserves of energy resources in recent years are of strategic importance and can affect the distribution of power both in the region and undermine Russia's position in the international arena. Therefore, controlling its extraction and transportation in the region allows Moscow to keep dominant position in the supply of energy resources to Europe. Another important aspect of Russian interest in the region is security. Before considering these factors, it is worth paying special attention to the structural modifiers that play a role in shaping Russian foreign policy towards Eastern Mediterranean.

Russia's geographic location relative to the Eastern Mediterranean region has predetermined its policy for centuries. The vast territory of Russia has no access to warm seas, which naturally impeded its trade and economic development, as a result of which Russia has historically sought to find a way to the shores of warm seas expanding its defensive territory to the south. The events of the Arab Spring provided an opportunity to strengthen Russian position in the region, which culminated in Russia's engagement into the Syrian Civil War. Providing significant military and diplomatic support to the Assad regime, Russia got under its control the naval base in Tartus, the strategic port of Latakia and the Khmeimim air base in Syria, which allow Moscow to project its influence and power not only in the Middle East, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Two of these military bases, namely a naval base in Tartus and an air base in Khmeimim ensure Russia's presence in the region in the extended time frame for 49 years (long-term) starting from 2017 (Legucka, 2020: 2). This region is a «south key» to open the «door» to the World Ocean and project Russian power globally. Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean, which is located at the intersection

of the Middle East, Europe and North Africa and provides access to the World Ocean, is an important communications and transmission route, thereby, representing a strategically significant region for Russia in terms of projecting its influence and power.

Another structural modifier that affects the way actors interact and behave towards each other is the offense-defense balance in military technologies, which intensifies the security dilemma in the relevant region. Russia got access to naval and air facilities in Syria that has expanded its operational capabilities throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as beyond. Thus, for example, a naval base in Tartus has the potential to accommodate eleven warships.

As Russia's case shows, its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean are largely built on the perception of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union and NATO, and their immediate proximity to the borders of Russia, thereby exacerbating the feeling of a «besieged fortress» (Delanoë, 2014:24). Thus, Russia's presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is primarily conditioned by its national security requirements. Nevertheless, the consistent development of the European Union in the process of enlargement has institutionally complicated its foreign policy decision making, which impeded the European Council «to reach a clear consensus on the EU's policy in Syria, Libya, or Turkey» (Pierini, 2020: 104). Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2020 has created uncertainty and further distracted the European Union from the Eastern Mediterranean affairs (Pierini, 2020: 104). Furthermore, there has been a relative weakening of the US role in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, which led to a power vacuum (Dalay, 2021: 1). This, in its turn, contributed to the opening of a window of opportunity for other actors, and, as a consequence, led to Moscow's decisive actions in this region. As noted by Dario Cristiani, Russia's approach is «exploiting strategic vacuums,» (Cristiani, 2020: 2) which is recently being traced in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to claim that Washington is completely leaving the Eastern Mediterranean, reorienting itself to the Asia-Pacific region. As the former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted, the ratio of American naval power between the Pacific and the Atlantic would change by 60/40, in contrast to the previous 50/50 (Perlez, 2012). Despite this shift, the Eastern Mediterranean remains a strategically important region for the United States, allowing it to project its power. This

region is a kind of 'springboard' for exerting US influence in a number of directions, mainly in Africa and deep into Eurasia, reaching Central Asia, which is of interest to Washington in the geo-political confrontation with China above all (Nopens, 2013: 3-4). These were external systemic incentives, which influenced Russia to tailor its foreign policy in accordance with the circumstances designed by the international system.

Russian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is also closely linked to its Middle Eastern policy, as its posture in the Eastern Mediterranean is intended to preserve its gains in Syria. Thus, Russia's policy in the region is dictated by a defensive position and a simultaneous desire to assert itself as a great power within the international system, a power, which is capable to transform the existing rules of the world order. However, there is another point of view. Some researchers believe that the main driver for Russia's activity in the region is not its desire to establish itself as a great power due to the lack of the necessary means for this, but the pragmatic task of ensuring the security of its southern flank in the event of a possible conflict with NATO (Rumer, 2021: 1).

As it was mentioned above, the Arab Spring and subsequent events in Libya and Syria provided Russia with opportunities to expand its participation in the region. Representing itself as a great power and being at the same time an external actor in the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia took its place in the complex equilibrium of interests of external and regional actors. It has managed to forge relations with all the key regional powers.

The power structure of the Eastern Mediterranean is characterized by the involvement of major powers (China, European Union, Russia and the United States), regional powers with direct access to the Mediterranean (Israel and Turkey), and Middle Eastern regional powers (Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia). In addition, there is a de facto divided Cyprus that is facing off against Turkish pressure. In their dispute over energy resources, Russia also plays an important role, influencing the balance of power. Kremlin seizes every opportunity to exert its influence on any crisis situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which would make it possible to freeze competitive projects for the extraction of energy resources and their transportation to Europe continuing to keep a dominant position in the supply of energy resources. Indeed, the destabilized situation in the Eastern Mediterranean causes concern in the ranks of the EU and NATO,

thereby distracting them directly from Russia itself. For example, Russia has offered its mediation services between Cyprus and Greece with Turkey on the maritime delimitation and division of Eastern Mediterranean energy resources accordingly, which could potentially expand its influence on the southern borders of the EU and NATO taking in consideration their indispensable geopolitical significance for Western allies' positioning in the region. In addition, by doing so, it would displace Germany, which is the preferred intermediary in this dispute (Madeira, 2020). Another leverage of Russia's influence on the extraction and supply of energy resources is its striving to participate in regional energy projects. For example, in 2017, a 30% stake in the Egyptian Zohr gas field, which is the largest gas field in the Mediterranean Sea, was acquired by the Russian state-owned company Rosneft (Rosneft Information Division, 2017). Besides that, other Russian companies got energy contracts in Libya and Syria (Legucka, 2020: 2).

Russia used its military position in the Eastern Mediterranean to strike at ISIS positions in Syria, thereby demonstrating its power and establishing itself once again as a great power in the transforming international system. The United States acted similarly during the Gulf Wars, striking Iraq with long-range missiles deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, Russia is leaning more towards internal balancing, rearming its forces and emulating the successful security behavior and the military practice of its rival. Vladimir Putin, expressing his sympathy to the foreign policy of Imperial Russia, is guided by Alexander III principle that «Russia has only two allies - its army and its navy.»

#### *The Domestic Level: Variables Constraining Foreign Policy*

The difference between neoclassical realism and earlier versions of realism is its taking into account a number of domestic factors that affect the likelihood and form of the state's response to certain international systemic imperatives. Type III neoclassical realist theory considers four categories of intervening variables, namely leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations and domestic institutions (Ripsman, 2016: 58-59).

It is apparent that the figure of Vladimir Putin in power plays an important role in the activation of Moscow on its southern flank. This is especially true in contrast to the foreign policy course pursued by the previous President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, when Russia withdrew from a number of regions, including

the Eastern Mediterranean, and focused its attention mainly on the western direction. Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin stepped up its efforts to return from abandoned regions and develop new ties and directions. As mentioned earlier, from the very beginning of his tenure in power, he declared the need to strengthen Russia's military presence in the Mediterranean. His assertive foreign policy in the region serves as a justification of its imperial nature for the Russian society, as well as provides access to profitable agreements, including energy and military sectors, for his close teammates (i.e. Gennady Timchenko and Yevgeny Prigozhin) (Legucka, 2020: 1). As is known, one of the continuities of the Soviet period in the shaping of modern Russian foreign policy is its 'over-centralization' and the role of personal ties within the circle of political elites (Chernyshev, 2014: 19).

The place of the Eastern Mediterranean in Russian strategic culture is mainly seen as a part of the larger Mediterranean region, which is adjacent to Europe. Therefore, Russian Eastern Mediterranean policy is inextricably linked with Moscow's foreign policy towards Europe. However, the events taking place in the Middle East over the past decade have given even more weight to the Eastern Mediterranean in the foreign policy of many states, including Russia. Back in 1996, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, the famous Arabist Yevgeny Primakov, noted the importance of this region for Russia as providing direct access to the strategically important region of the Middle East (Delanoë, 2014: 28). At that time, the degree of significance was determined by the instability of the southern borders of Russia itself. Today, the threat comes directly from the Middle East region and threatens to revive the separatist and extremist sentiments of the so-called «soft underbelly» of Russia. This term was used by Primakov to designate Russian southern flank (Kreutz, 2007: 11). What is more, the so-called concept of the «Greater Mediterranean» in Russia's strategy towards the region, reflected in the Memorandum on Russian Policy in the Mediterranean of 1995 (Memorandum o politike Rossii v Sredizemnomor'ye, 1995), implies partnership relations between the countries of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which shows its strategic importance as one of the parts (subsystem) of a single whole (international system).

As for the perception of the need for Russia's presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is due to the fact that Russian elites, like Russian society as a whole, perceive the idea of Russia's greatness and do not agree only on defining its role as a regional power (Lukyanov, 2016: 34). Thus, Russia's presence in the Eastern Mediterranean meets its national interests in ensuring economic interests, primarily in the energy sector, and security. The weak economic and political situation is certainly a limiting factor. The budget allocated for the military maintenance of Russian troops and foreign military bases could be distributed to solve domestic socio-economic problems, and this causes discontent in society. However, the perception of systemic incentives through the prism of the leader, as well as the established strategic culture, make their own adjustments to Moscow's foreign policy decisions.

### Conclusion

Russian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean has become assertive in the Putin era. This is due to Russia's geopolitical, economic and military interests both in the region itself and in other regions adjacent to it. A number of systemic factors, such as American declining role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, regional rivalries, disputes over maritime delimitation and energy resources, inconsistent Western policy, and the outbreak of military conflicts open up opportunities for Russia to strengthen its position in the region and exercise its influence. Together with systemic factors (independent variable), domestic factors (intervening variables) such as leader image and strategic culture play an important role in how the Kremlin processes and responds to systemic pressures. For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has been consistently expanding the scope of cooperation with remote regions and deepening it in various areas, from trade and economic to military issues.

Moscow perceives the Eastern Mediterranean as its southern flank and strategically important region located at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and providing access to the open ocean. Russia's strategy in the region is aimed at ensuring security and preventing the spread of influence of other actors in the international system. It maintains the balance of power in the region.

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K. Makhanov<sup>1</sup>, A. Amirbek<sup>2\*</sup>, A. Anuarbekuly<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Eurasian Research Institute, Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International  
Kazakh-Turkish University, Kazakhstan, Almaty

<sup>2</sup>Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Kazakh-Turkish University, Kazakhstan, Turkestan

<sup>3</sup>Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Turkey, Ankara

\*e-mail: aidarbek.amirbek@ayu.edu.kz

## ANALYSIS OF THE «ASSOCIATED TRIO» AS A BACKFIRE EFFECT OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY OF NEAR ABROAD

The attempts of the European Union (EU) to engage its eastern neighbors into the European integration after the last eastward expansion in 2007 were found to be largely unsuccessful. The sensitivity of the issue for Russia and the failure of the EU's eastern neighbors to carry out necessary reforms were among the main reasons that impeded the progress in the European integration of these states. However, on May 17, 2021, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have come up with a new initiative aimed at revitalizing the European agenda through enhancing mutual cooperation and coordination in issues of common interest related to European integration. The study argues that by counterposing itself to the West and attempting to retain its old paradigm of its area of geopolitical influence in the «near abroad» Russia has greatly contributed to the cooperation between Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine and the establishment of the «Associated Trio» format. As a result of similar interventions to these states jeopardizing their security, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have developed a strong common anti-Russian agenda, which served as one of the driving forces in their European aspirations. At the same time, the mobilization of the three members of the new initiative was made possible thanks to democratization and reforms imposed from the outside and pushed from inside.

**Key words:** Associated Trio, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, European integration.

Қ. Маханов<sup>1</sup>, А. Амирбек<sup>2\*</sup>, А. Ануарбекұлы<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Еуразия ғылыми-зерттеу институты, Қожа Ахмет Ясауи атындағы  
Халықаралық қазақ-түрік университеті, Қазақстан, Алматы қ.

<sup>2</sup>Қожа Ахмет Ясауи атындағы Халықаралық қазақ-түрік университеті, Қазақстан, Түркістан қ.

<sup>3</sup>Анкара Хаджи Байрам Вели университеті, Түркия, Анкара қ.

\*e-mail: aidarbek.amirbek@ayu.edu.kz

### «Ассоциативтік трионың» Ресейдің жақын шетелдегі сыртқы саясатына кері әсерін талдау

Еуропалық Одақтың (ЕО) 2007 жылы шығысқа қарай соңғы кеңеюінен кейін шығыстағы көршілерін белсенді еуропалық интеграцияға тарту әрекеттері негізінен сәтсіз аяқталған болатын. Бұл мәселенің Ресей үшін сезімталдығы және ЕО-ның шығыстағы көршілерінің қажетті реформаларды жүргізе алмауы осы мемлекеттердің еуропалық интеграциясындағы ілгерілеуді тежейтін негізгі себептердің бірі болды. Алайда 2021 жылдың 17 мамырында Грузия, Молдова және Украина еуропалық интеграцияға қатысты ортақ мүдделі мәселелер бойынша өзара ынтымақтастық пен үйлестіруді күшейту арқылы еуропалық бастаманы жандандыруға бағытталған жаңа бастама көтерді. Бұл мақалада Батысқа қарсы тұру және өзінің «жақын шетелдегі» геосаяси ықпалының ескі парадигмасын сақтауға тырысу арқылы Ресей елі Грузия, Молдова және Украина арасындағы ынтымақтастыққа және «Ассоциативтік трионы» құруға үлкен үлес қосқаны зерттеледі. Осы мемлекеттердің ісіне өрескел араласу мен олардың қауіпсіздігіне қатер төндіруі нәтижесінде Грузия, Молдова және Украинаның еуропалық ұмтылыстарында қозғаушы күштердің бірі болатын ортақ ресеймен текетірістің бастамасын әзірледі. Бұл ретте жаңа бастамаға үш елдің қатысуы сырттан және іштен итермелеген демократияландыру мен реформалардың жүзеге асыру факторлары арқасында мүмкін болды.

**Түйін сөздер:** Ассоциативтік трио, Грузия, Молдова, Украина, Ресей, еуропалық интеграция.

Қ. Маханов<sup>1</sup>, А. Амирбек<sup>2\*</sup>, А. Ануарбекұлы<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Евразийский научно-исследовательский институт, Международный казахско-турецкий университет имени Х.А.Ясави, Казахстан, г.Алматы

<sup>2</sup>Международный казахско-турецкий университет имени Х.А.Ясави, Казахстан, г.Туркестан

<sup>3</sup>Анкара Хаджи Байрам Вели университет, Турция, г. Анкара

\*e-mail: aidarbek.amirbek@ayu.edu.kz

### **Анализ «Ассоциированной тройки» как обратного эффекта внешней политики России в отношении ближнего зарубежья**

Попытки Европейского Союза (ЕС) привлечь своих восточных соседей в активную Европейскую интеграцию после последнего расширения Евросоюза на восток в 2007 году оказались в значительной степени безуспешными. Чувствительность этого вопроса для России и неспособность восточных соседей ЕС провести необходимые реформы были одними из основных причин, препятствующих прогрессу в европейской интеграции этих государств. Однако 17 мая 2021 года Грузия, Молдова и Украина выступили с новой инициативой, направленной на оживление европейской повестки за счет усиления взаимного сотрудничества и координации в вопросах, представляющих общий интерес, связанных с европейской интеграцией. В статье утверждается, что, противопоставляя себя Западу и пытаясь сохранить свою старую парадигму своего геополитического влияния в своем «ближнем зарубежье», Россия внесла большой вклад в сотрудничество между Грузией, Молдовой и Украиной и создание «Ассоциативного трио». В результате грубого вмешательства в дела этих государств, ставящего под угрозу их безопасность, Грузия, Молдова и Украина разработали общую антироссийскую повестку дня, которая послужила одной из движущих сил в их европейских устремлениях. В то же время мобилизация трех участников новой инициативы стала возможной благодаря демократизации и реформам, мотивированным извне и проталкиваемым изнутри.

**Ключевые слова:** Ассоциативное трио, Грузия, Молдова, Украина, Россия, европейская интеграция.

## **Introduction**

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are known to be members of the «Associated Trio», which is a special cooperation format within the framework of the Eastern Partnership leading to a full membership in the EU. The initiative was officially launched on May 17, 2021 in Kiev when the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signed a joint memorandum committing to the prospect of accession to the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2021) The new format is designed to function in accordance with the general Eastern Partnership framework and is aimed at enhancing European integration.

Without any doubt, the initiation of the «Associated Trio» format was viewed by the majority in all three countries as a great achievement because among all members of the Eastern Partnership, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were the most successful ones in many ways when it comes to the fulfillment of their commitments regarding the European integration. Therefore, the official approval of the Trio format by the EU was also understood by the three countries as a recognition of their efforts. At the same time, perhaps there was another factor that probably helped Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

consolidate their efforts encouraging them to take further steps on their path of European integration, which is Russia. Among other things, security is one of the top priorities that Trio members seek to ensure within the European integration project. In light of the events of the past several years, Russia is obviously viewed in this context as the main source of threat and regional instability. It is interesting to note however that by intending to protect its area of influence Russia has also greatly contributed to the formation of the Trio format as it is.

## **Background Information and Literature Review**

The «Associated Trio» is a fairly new topic and it is understudied in the academic field. However, the initiative could be viewed within the conceptual framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched in 2004, Eastern Partnership initiative of 2009 and a larger process of the EU’s eastward enlargement.

Since recent EU enlargement waves, the question whether the borders of the EU and NATO should be extending further remains open. Little by little it is becoming a common consensus that arrangements short of membership is a good



option for incorporation of these states into the EuroAtlantic integration process (Dangerfield 2011: 2). The development of the EU’s ENP has certainly inesified the management or resolution of the unresolved and frozen conflicts in the Post-Soviet space, although it was not intended neither capable to properly manage the process (Sasse, 2009). After EU’s failures to reload the ENP in 2011 and 2015, in response to challenges in the neighbourhood, the expectation of Europe’s eastern partners from the ENP declined (Dekanozishvili, 2020). Hence, the limited capacity of European initiatives in resolving conflicts in the Former Soviet Union has caused a serious reputational crisis of the European institutions in the eyes of partners. This was especially true for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, who had conflicts with Russia and were critical points in terms of regional security, which also became a major obstacle in their European integration.

Failure of the European initiatives and little progress in democratization and reforms as well impediments of Russia to European aspiration of its neighbors prompted Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to come up with a new initiative of the «Associated Trio». Unlike previous attempts of the EU to encourage its eastern partners, the «Associated Trio» was largely a self-generated initiative approved and hailed by the European administrations. The new format emphasizes the aspirations of the Associated Trio countries to become members of the European Union and serves as a platform for enhanced cooperation and dialogue between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the three EU Associate Partners (Ministry of Foreign affairs of Ukraine, 2021).

A number of studies emphasize the leading role of internal development processes in a successful accomplishment of European integration. Strong political competition is the primary factor for creating internal pressures for reform (Sasse, 2012). The top-down Europeanization was found to be dependent on whether parties in question are in power or in opposition and whether they are more pro-European or more pro-Russian (Cianciara, 2015). It was also found that when choosing between West (European integration) and East (Eurasian integration), more successful individuals are more likely to be Westernizers and losers more likely to be Easternizers or Isolationists (Torres-Adán, 2021).

The deteriorating security threats by Russia directly affecting Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk in Ukraine have also shown the

weakness of the EU’s security approach through democracy (Nilsson & Silander, 2016: 44). As a matter of fact, the initiatives proposed by the EU before 2015 did not contribute to the improvement of security to its eastern partners nor improved the EU-Russia relations. Eventually, internal political mechanisms, stability of newly created democratic institutions and orientations in foreign relations have determined further actions of the EU’s eastern partners. Although the EU welcomed the European Aspirations of its eastern partners, it was not interested in the deterioration of its relations with Russia. In fact, in certain issues, like for instance supply of natural gas, the EU was in a vulnerable situation and confrontations between Ukraine and Russia had certain negative effects on the EU members (Sonmez, 2021). Direct threats posed by Russia, relatively strong democratic institutions and a strongly anti-Russian agenda in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were the key factors that stimulated these countries to come up with a new self-generated format of cooperation aimed at accelerating the process of European integration. This paper analyses the underlying factors and mechanism in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine that determined their choice of the «Associated Trio» as well as the role of Russia in molding this format.

## Methodology

This article is based on qualitative analysis of different data from official sources mainly about the relations between the Trio members, the EU and Russia. The logic behind the analysis is to show how indicators of real economic cooperation between the countries evolve over the last several years. We presuppose that *de facto* integration priorities between countries are well reflected through the change in cooperation schemes between them regardless of formal commitments. However, the study is also based on assessment of formal documents and statements by the officials. The paper makes use of information on internal political changes in the countries of the «Associated Trio» and shows how legal mechanisms and recently created and relatively weak democratic institutions in these countries prompted their governments to set the pro-European agenda as one of the top priorities.

### *The Choice between East and West*

Russia has turned towards resuscitating many elements of the Soviet and Tsarist imperial paradigm of foreign and domestic policy since Vladimir Putin took the presidential office in

2000. It quickly renounced its commitments to democratization and incorporation into the western world and decided to keep the Post-Soviet republics within its sphere of influence to safeguard its geopolitical interests (Rezvani, 2020). Initially this was accomplished mainly through creating regional cooperation organizations (e.g. Eurasian Economic Community, SCO), diplomacy, economic ties etc. However, as soon as Russia felt that it could not withhold pro-European ambitions, it switched to a more interventionist and aggressive approach. Russia especially painfully reacted to the NATO and European Union (EU) enlargements at the expense of what it considered as its (former) sphere of influence. Ethnic cleavages and frozen territorial conflicts were the most preferred pretexts for intervention like in case of the five day Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, which was largely a reaction to Georgia’s clear and ambitious pro-western political stance.

The motivations of Russia to keep its the Post-Soviet space under its control have become evident during after the invasion to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Such desperate actions followed after the Maidan revolution in Ukraine when protests erupted in response to president Yanukovich’s refusal to sign an agreement on political association and free trade with the EU. The harsh reaction of Ukrainians to holt the formal procedures of European integration made it clear that the European choice was indeed essentially important for the Ukrainian people. President Viktor Yanukovich barely escaped from protesters and had to flee quickly to Russia while the occupied eastern territories of Ukraine and Crimea remain under illegal *de facto* control of Russia. 2014 thus became a major turning point in the Russo-Ukrainian relations when Ukraine’s European choice became irreversible while Russia firmly anchored in antagonism to the West.

Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, Moldova has applied a more delicate approach in following the European integration. Moreover, Moldova has long been a swing country when it comes to the choice between East and West. Due to the significant number of supporters of both options, it was no earlier than 2020 when Moldova clearly opted for pursuing European integration. The victory of the current president Maia Sandu in November 2020 became a clear sign of the public approval of the European choice. However, there are a number of factors that make Russia not react as harshly as it

did in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. Firstly, Moldova does not share borders with Russia and is not strategically important to Russia as Ukraine. Secondly, although Moldova openly declares the European future as one of the top priorities for itself, it does not insist on membership in NATO. In fact neutrality is stipulated in its constitution. Thirdly, Moldova does not defiantly renounce its ties with Russia and takes part in regional cooperation schemes like for instance the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) At the same time, being perhaps the most successful country among the Eastern Partnership members in terms of democratization, Moldova actively promotes the Trio format since recently. However, it is true that Moldova’s ties with Russia are getting more declarative and nominal.

Georgia, on the other hand, has *de facto* renounced its membership in the CIS quickly after the military conflict with Russia. On August 18, 2009 it officially abandoned the CIS (Cisstat.com, 2009) On November 9, 2016, a bill on Ukraine’s withdrawal from the CIS was submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament. On August 8, 2018 Ukraine closed a representative office under the statutory bodies of the CIS (Glavcom.ua, 2018). However, the organization is being very reluctant to recognize the non-membership of Ukraine.

#### *The Russian Factor*

There are a number of common features that helped Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine form a common framework to address their European aspirations. Firstly, in spite of little success achieved in democratic reforms and building good governance by the recommendations of the EU, the three countries have made much more progress in this regard compared to other members of the Eastern Partnership. For instance, Ukraine and Moldova have become the two most democratic countries among the Former Soviet states according to a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2020). In 2021, Georgia became the leading country among Post-Soviet countries in terms of the freedom of press (Reporters Without Borders, 2021). Active civil societies and democratic institutions prevented the establishment of dictatorships. Secondly, all three countries have currently active or frozen territorial conflicts with Russia, which are also the critical points of regional security. These are Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk in Ukraine. Thirdly, several years of hybrid pressure of Russia


on Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine expressed in many ways has greatly helped these countries develop antagonism to ideas and values imposed by Russia and form a common vision of the future that resonated well with the scope of European integration.

Unlike other members of the Eastern partnership, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have mainly reduced their cooperation with Russia. For


instance, throughout 2011-2020 the combined trade of the Trio countries has dropped from \$50.7 billion to \$9.4 billion. As a result, the share of Russia in the combined foreign trade of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine decreased fourfold from 30.3 to 7.7 billion (Comtrade, 2020). At the same time, the three countries have favoured trade cooperation with Europe, which happened to a large extent at the expense of trade with Russia.



**Figure 1** – Trade between Trio countries and Russia  
Source: UN Comtrade, 2020



**Figure 2** – Share of Russia in external trade of Trio countries  
Source: UN Comtrade, 2020



**Figure 3** – Share of EU in external trade of Trio countries  
Source: UN Comtrade

Pro-European sentiments are also quite widespread in societies of other Eastern Partners. For example, a recent survey conducted within the framework of the Eastern Partnership EU has revealed that more than a half (53%) of Armenians were positive about the EU, compared to 44% in 2016. The number of people with a negative perception of the EU was only 9%. 60% of Armenians trusted the EU, while the share of those who trusted the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was at 51%. 84% of Belarusians were either positive or neutral about the EU, and only 12% had a negative opinion about it. 45% of Belarusians trusted the EU, which is more than those who trusted EAEU (39%). In Azerbaijan, 46% of people had a positive attitude towards the EU and only 8% of the population had a negative attitude towards the EU. More importantly, 75% of Azerbaijanis associate their personal values with the EU, such as: «peace, security and stability», «honesty and transparency», «economic prosperity», «freedom of speech», «human rights»; «rule of law» and others (EU Neighbors, 2020). Generally, public opinion towards the EU is positive in all countries of the Eastern Partnership and the share of people supporting European values is increasing. However, due to the lack of democratic institutions in Belarus and Azerbaijan, pro-European views are underrepresented in the governments of these countries. The case of Armenia could be considered as an exception. Due to its complicated geopolitical

situation and reliance on Russia in vitally important issues of security, Armenia has much less space for political maneuvering to address pro-European ambitions.

Practically in all nationwide electoral campaigns after 2014 the topic of Russia and European integration was the main one. Foreign policy issues were way more important than internal issues. For example, the presidential campaign of 2020 in Moldova could be viewed as an illustrative case showing the critical importance of Moldova’s choice between Russia and the EU in the public opinion. Maia Sandu, who represented pro-European political forces, received 57.72% of the vote, defeating her principal opponent Igor Dodon, who advocated closer ties with Russia and the EAEU. It is also worth mentioning that external voting played an important role in determining the outcome of the elections in Moldova. As it is known, a very significant share of Moldovan citizens work abroad and they mostly voted for the candidate representing the European choice for Moldova (Central Electoral Committee of Moldova, 2020). Similarly, a clear pro-European agenda greatly contributed to the victory of the current president of Georgia Salome Zurbishvili in 2018 securing her 59.52% of the votes (Election Administration of Georgia, 2018). The same trends are present in the legislative bodies of the three Trio countries. Generally, it could be stated that any political agendas advocating stronger alliances

with Russia are becoming extremely unpopular in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

In many ways the «Associated Trio» is a unique format for cooperation. Firstly, it has come to be as a consequence of negative events and failures, which is rather peculiar. The members of the format came short of fulfilling the recommendations and requirements of the European institutions regarding the democratization, institutional, economic and administrative reforms, establishment of good governance etc. Secondly, the formation of the Trio framework was accomplished under extremely tough circumstances that Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine could not control and overcome. Despite being formally recognized by all as independent states, Russia turned to extreme and non-conventional methods in safeguarding its sphere of influence. The members of the format were very limited in their actions due to tremendous forces applied from outside. Thirdly, the three countries manage to pursue their goals despite tough challenges. All three members have current or frozen conflicts and territorial disputes with Russia, which could be used as an instrument of pressure by Moscow. Hence, the security and success of the Trio project is constantly jeopardized. Fourthly, «Associated Trio» is the first cooperation scheme in the Post-Soviet space that is not initiated and approved by the Kremlin. Russia played the central role in all other regional organizations and cooperation frameworks and it was difficult to carry out regional initiatives for Former Soviet states without the benevolence of Moscow. In this light, it could be said that further development of the «Associated Trio» initiative between Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine will entail further confrontation between the Trio members with Russia. Moreover, the EU will have more reasons to stay reluctant towards endorsing the future accession of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to the EU. Hence, it could be said that the three countries have burnt their bridges by launching the Trio initiative and have no better option than to continue their European integration with consistency and perseverance.

## Conclusion

Regardless of its final result, the «Associated Trio» initiative between Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine is certainly a positive sign that shows the capacity of its members to formulate common policy priorities and determination in pursuing their goals. In spite of limited progress made in conducting reforms, some hesitant position of the EU and enormous pressure from Russia, the members of the Trio seem to be fully committed to succeed in European integration. Moreover, Our analysis shows that the actions of Russia countering the European aspirations of the Trio, including the military conflicts, have led to an opposite result adding solidarity and determination in their quest for European future. Similar aggressive methods applied by Russia to safeguard its area political influence have motivated the three countries to withstand a shared tragedy by uniting their efforts under a common framework. Our findings confirm previous studies that emphasize Russia’s role as a promoter of pro-Western orientation and democratization of Georgia, Ukraine (Delcour and Wolchuk, 2014) and Moldova rather than a counteracting force.

The choice of the «Associated Trio» and determination towards European integration became possible thanks to democratic mechanisms that these three countries managed to develop under conditions of coercive threat from Russia. Over the last decade, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine underwent a process of gradual realignment towards European integration by intensifying cooperation in a comprehensive manner. At the same time, the three countries have been weakening their ties with Russia. Pro-European sentiments are also strong in other members of the Eastern Partnership (Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia). However, due to lack of democratic institutions and strong reliance on Russia, the desires of the people in these countries currently cannot be addressed politically. In this light, the success of the unique experience of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine can potentially become an inspiring factor and produce a strong spillover effect among the rest of the eastern neighbors of the EU.

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FTAMP 11.09.91

<https://doi.org/10.26577/irilj.2022.v97.i1.10>**Кутлук Қаған Сүмер** Стамбул университеті, Түркия, Стамбул қ.  
e-mail: kutluk@istanbul.edu.tr

## **АУЫР ЖҮКПЕН ҰЗАҚ САПАРҒА ШЫҒУ: ҚЫРЫМДАҒЫ ЖӘДИДШІЛІК ЖӘНЕ ҰЛТТЫҚ ҚОЗҒАЛЫС**

Бұл зерттеуде Бақшасарайдан басталып, кейін түріктер мекендеген әр жерге тараған Қырым жәдидшілерінің мұраттары туралы сөз етуге тырысамыз. Жәдидшілік пен жәдидшілер туралы сөз қозғау үшін жәдидшіліктің бастаушыларының бірі, ұлы түрік ұлтшылы Исмаил Гаспыралыны айта кеткен жөн. Исмаил Гаспыралы осы ұғымға атау берген Усұль-и Жәдит мектептерінің негізін қалаушы және қорғаушысы. Жәдидшілер туралы жазылған еңбектер Исмаил Гаспыралдың шығармалары десек қателеспейміз. Ұлттық қозғалысты зерттеу қазіргі саяси ғылымының өзекті бағыты болып табылады. Ұлттық интеллигенцияның Ресей империясы аумағында мәдени бірегейлікті сақтау жөніндегі қызметі қазақстандық отандық ғылымда да тікелей маңызға ие. Жәдидшілік идеялары Қырымда ғана емес, Қазақстанда да кең танымал болды. Исмаил Гаспыралы қызметі Ресей империясының бүкіл аумағында ұлттық қозғалыстың жандануының катализаторы болды деп айтуға толық негіз бар. Тәуелсіздік соғысы жалғасып жатқан кезде дипломатиялық байланыстар жасау үшін 1921 жылы 17 қаңтарда Бұхара Халық Республикасынан делегация Анкараға келді. Делегация Мұстафа Кемалға үш алтын кестелі қылыш пен Темірге тиесілі Құранды сыйға тартты. Жәдидизм жаңа Түркия Республикасының құрылу кезеңінде негізгі философиясы болды.

**Түйін сөздер:** жәдидшілік, ислам, пантүранизм, Қырым, ұлтшылдық.

Kutluk Kağan Sümer

Istanbul University, Turkey, Istanbul  
e-mail: kutluk@istanbul.edu.tr

### **Long-distance trips with heavy loads: jadidism and the national movement in Crimea**

In this study, we will try to tell about the ideals of the Crimean Jadids, which began in Bakhcheraï, and then spread throughout the place inhabited by Turks. Speaking of Jadidism and Jadidists, one of the pioneers of Jadidism, the great Turkish nationalist Ismail *Gaspıralı*, should be noted. Ismail *Gaspıralı* is the founder and defender of the Usul-i Jadit schools, which gave the name to this concept. The works written about the Jadids are the works of Ismail *Gaspıralı*.

The study of the national movement is an actual direction of modern political science. The activity of the national intelligentsia to preserve cultural identity on the territory of the Russian Empire is of direct importance in Kazakhstan's domestic science. The ideas of Jadidism were popular not only in Crimea, but also enjoyed wide popularity in Kazakhstan. The activity of Ismail *Gaspıralı* became a kind of catalyst for the activation of the national movement throughout the Russian Empire. On January 17, 1921, a delegation of the People's Republic of Bukhara arrived in Ankara to establish diplomatic relations during the Liberation War. The delegation presented Mustafa Kemal with three gold-embroidered swords and an iron Koran. Jadidism was the main philosophy of the new Turkish Republic.

**Key words:** Jadidism, Islam, Panturanism, Crimea, Nationalism.

Кутлук Каған Сүмер

Стамбульский университет, Турция, г. Стамбул  
e-mail: kutluk@istanbul.edu.tr

### **Дальние поездки с тяжелым грузом: джадидизм и национальное движение в Крыму**

В этом исследовании мы постараемся рассказать об идеалах крымских джадидов, которые начинались в Бахчерае, а затем распространились по всему населенному турками месту. Говоря о джадидизме и джадидистах, следует отметить одного из пионеров джадидизма, великого турецкого националиста Исмаила Гаспринского. Исмаил Гаспринский является основателем и защитником школ Усұль-и Джадида, которые дали название этому понятию. Произведения,

написанные о джадидах, являются произведениями Исмаила Гаспринского. Изучение национального движения является актуальным направлением современной политической науки. Деятельность национальной интеллигенции по сохранению культурного своеобразия на территории Российской империи имеет непосредственное значение и в казахстанской отечественной науке. Идеи джадидизма были популярны не только в Крыму, но и пользовались широкой популярностью и Казахстане. Деятельность Исмаила Гаспринского стала своеобразным катализатором активизации национального движения на всей территории Российской империи. 17 января 1921 года в Анкару прибыла делегация Бухарской Народной Республики для установления дипломатических отношений в период Освободительной войны. Делегация подарила Мустафе Кемалю три шитых золотом мечи и железный Коран. Джадидизм был основной философией новой Турецкой Республики.

**Ключевые слова:** джадидизм, ислам, пантурсанизм, Крым, национализм.

## Кіріспе

Исмаил Гаспыралы 1851 жылы 20 наурызда (ескі есеппен 8) Бақшасарай маңындағы Авжықойде дүниеге келген. Анасы Фатма Сұлтан тамыры кеңге таралған атақты әулетінің қызы болған. Әкесі Мұстафа Алиоғлу Гаспыралы патша әскері болып одан әрі лейтенанты шенінен зейнеткерлікке шыққан. Осы кезде Исмаил Гаспыралы Задеган қаласының өкілі болды.

Оқуын жергілікті мұсылман мектебінде бастаған Исмаил Гаспыралы оқуын орыс мектебі Ақмесжит ерлер гимназиясында жалғастырды. Одан кейін алдымен Воронежде, кейін Мәскеуде Әскери академияға оқуға түскен. Мәскеуде әскери білім алған жылдары орыс зиялыларының өмірін, сол кезеңдегі зиялыларын жақынан білуге мүмкіндік алды. Кездескен орыс зиялыларына терең құрметпен, сол жылдардағы Мәскеудің түрікке қарсы саясаты және Славяндық атмосфера оның бойындағы ұлттық сезімдерді оятты.

Сонымен қатар, жалғасып жатқан Крит көтеріліске шыққан грек көтерілісшілеріне қарсы соғысқан Османлы сарбаздарына қосылу ниетімен досы литвалық Мұстафа Давидовичпен Түркияға жасырын түрде бірге өтпек болған, Одессада патшалыққа қарсы шыққандығы үшін тұтқынға алынды. Әскери қызметі осылай аяқталды. Гаспыралы 1868 жылы Бақшасарайға оралғанда, атақты Зинжирлі медресесінде орыс тілінен сабақ береді. Осы қызмет барысында ол өзін орыс әдеби және ол өзінің философиялық шығармаларын оқуға арнады. 1872 жылы Қырымнан кеткен Исмаил Гаспыралы Стамбул, Вена, Мюнхен, Штутгарт арқылы Парижге барды. Мұнда өткізген екі жыл ішінде атақты орыс жазушысы әртүрлі іс-шараларға қатысып, соның ішінде Иван Тургеневке көмектесті. Ол еңбекпен күн көрді (Кирилли 2001). 1874 жылы Османлы

офицері болу арман қиялымен өз қалауымен Стамбулға келді. Түрік Әскери академиясына түсу үшін үлкен талпыныс көрсетті, бірақ Ресей елшісі Игнатъев мұны білді және Недим пашаға ықпалын пайдаланып, оның мектепке қабылдануына кедергі жасады. Ақырында Ыстамбұлдағы Әскери академияға түсуді бір жыл бойы бекер күткен Исмаил мырза Қырымға оралды. Ыстамбұлда жүргенде, Петербург пен Мәскеуде орыс тілді газеттерде шығыс өмірін суреттейтін саяси емес мақалалар жазды және жариялап отырды (Тоган, 1965).

Ол 1878 жылы Бахшасарай вице-мэрі болып сайланды, ал келесі жылы муниципалитеттің мэрі болды. Одан әрі ол президент болып тағайындалды және бұл қызметте 1884 жылға дейін жұмыс атқарды. Ол Қырымда және әртүрлі елдерде өмір сүріп жатқан басқа қырым татарларынан өте ерекшеленді. Көптеген тәжірибе жинақтады. Бөтен үстемдікте өмір сүрген түрік халықтары мен хабар тарату арқылы мұсылмандарды оятты. Бірінші рет Ақмесжитте орыстың «Таврида» басылды кейін трактат ретінде «Русский ислам» (Русское мусульманство) газетінде жарық көрген.

Ол сонымен қатар бірқатар басылымдар жазды. Бұл мақалаларда «Ресей және оның мұсылмандық субъектілері арасындағы қатынастарға сілтеме жасай отырып Ресей православиелік христиан мемлекеті, сонымен бірге мұсылмандардың мемлекеті деп санаудың дұрыс болатынын алға тартты» (Кирилли 2001). Исмаил Гаспыралының пікірінше, империяның бұл екі негізгі элементі бірін-бірі жақсы білуі керек және білім жүйесінен, ғылымнан айырылған мұсылмандардың бұған жетуіне орыстар кедергі болмауы керек еді (Кирилли, 2001).

- (Мұсылмандардың саны соншалықты көп болғандықтан Ресей оны православиелік



христиан мемлекеті де, мұсылман мемлекеті де санау дұрыс болар еді деп тұжырымдады.)

### Зерттеу әдістері

1883 жылы ол өзінің «Тержуман» атты газетін шығаруға рұқсат алды. Газеттің орысша атауы «Переводчик» болды және оның орысша бөліктері алғашқы сандарында көбірек орын алған. Ол газеттің Ресей мұсылман қауымы арасында Батыс өркениетін таратуда аудармашы рөлін атқаруы керектігін түсіндірді. Түрік бөлігі бірте-бірте кеңейіп, маңызы арта түсті. 1890 жылы Тержуман «саясат, білім және әдебиет туралы ұлттық газет» болды. 1905 жылдан кейін Терджуман-и Ахвал-и Заман атауын алып, газеттің тақырыбына «Тіл және идея ынтымақтастығы» ұраны берілді. Ақырында, орыс бөлігінен мүлдем бас тартып, газет Ресей империясындағы мұсылман қоғамының мақсаты мен ой-пікірлерінің аудармашысы болды. Қазан, Кавказ, Түркістан және Сібірде тұратын барлық түріктер Терджуманды ұлттық мұраттарын кеңінен тарататын газет ретінде қабылдады (Тоған, 1965).

Исмаил мырза өнеркәсіпші Акчурин әулеті мен Қазан дворяндарының өкілі Зехра Ханымға үйленіп, оның Қазан түріктерімен байланысы осы неке арқасында нығая түсті. Зеки Велиди Тоғанның хабарлауынша, Исмаил бейдің Әзірбайжан түрік жазушылары Хасан Бей Меликов, Үнсизаде, Топчубашы және басқаларымен үнемі байланыста болған (Тоған, 1965).

Онымен бірге Мәскеу әскери орта мектебінде бірге оқыған литвалық мұсылман Мұстафа Давидович әйгілі дезертирлік істе бірге болған, кейін Бақшасарайға қоныстанып, 25 жыл мэр қызметін атқарып, Ресей мұсылмандары үшін бастауыш мектептер құрған. Исмаил Бей ең көп айналысатын оқулықтар шығару сияқты барлық істеріне көмектесті. Исмаил Бей Бақшасарайда және басқа жерлерде мұғалімдер курстарын ашу арқылы заманауи оқыту әдістерін құруды және Ресей мұсылман қауымында мұндай мектептердің ашылуын қамтамасыз етуді қалады (Тоған, 1965).

Ол осы қоғамның әр жерін, соның ішінде Ташкент, Бұхара, Сібірді өзі аралады. Ақырында ол өзінің баспаханасын құрып, «Ходжа-и Сибян», «Малумат-и Нафия» және басқа да бастауыш мектептерге арнап шығарған шығармаларын өз баспаханасында басып шығарды (Тоған, 1965).

1905 жылғы революциядан кейін, әсіресе «әдеби тіл» және оқыту мәселелерді шешуге арналған бағдарламасы болды. Бұл жоспар алғашқы үш жылда бастауыш мектептегі білім беруде жергілікті түрік диалектілерін қолданды ұсынды, кейінірек «Түркі әлемінің ортақ әдеби тілі» бүкіл түркі әлемінде оқыту тілі болады. Оның «Түркі әлемінің ортақ әдеби тілі» деген бастапқы идеясы негізінен татар тіліне осман түрікін қосу болды, бірақ онымен жұмыс істегендердің ықпалымен осман тілінің бұл тілдегі ықпалы күшейіп, қарапайым осман тілі пайда болды. Яғни, Ресейде тұратын мұсылмандардың түсінетін тілінде (Тоған, 1965).

Исмаил бей исламды түріктердің болмысын қорғау үшін пайдалы деп санағанымен, «Қалта Құраннан» басқа діни басылымдарға көп орын бермеген. 1905 жылғы төңкерістен кейін Қазан мен Бакуде байқала бастаған коммунизм мен социализмнің қарама-қарсы нәтижелерін көріп, шашыраңқы саяси жағдайды көрді.

Ол осы қозғалыстардан, әсіресе, олардың құрылуына қарсы шыққан, тек орыс социалистік партияларына ғана адалдықты талап еткен, орыс тілін әдеби тіл ретінде таңуға талпыныс жасаған басылымдардан қорқа бастады (Тоған, 1965). Терджуманда «Иштиракийюн» деген атпен жариялаған мақалалар топтамасында оңай көрінетіндей оңға қарай жылжып, Ислам халықтары арасында мәдени бірлік құру туралы ойлана бастады. Осы мақсатта ол 1907 жылы Мысырда жалпы мұсылман съезін шақырмақ болды. Ол өзі Мысырға барды, тіпті Абдулла Таймаспен бірге «Ен-Нахда» атты араб газетін шығарды.

Ол тіпті Үндістанға сапар жасады, бірақ бұл әрекеттер Исмаил Бей күткен нәтиже бермеген кезде Бақшасарайдағы бұрынғы қызметіне қайта оралды (Тоған, 1965).

Өз күш-жігерінің оң нәтижесін көрген Исмаил Бей өмірінің соңғы жылдарында батыстандыруды Ресейдегі мұсылмандар мен басқа түркілер үшін рухани суицид ретінде қарастырған экстремистік ағымдарға қарсы күресті. (Тоған, 1965).

Исмаил бей өмірден озып оның жерлеу рәсімі түрік әлемі зиялыларының құрылтайы іспетті. Жаназаға Түрік әлемінің түкпір-түкпірінен зиялы қауым өкілдері қатысты. Тіпті жәдид мектебін бітіріп, кейін Әзірбайжан Кеңесінің басшысы болған Нариман Нариманов осында сөз сөйледі. Одан кейін Түркістандық жәдидшілердің көсемі Махмудхожа Бехбуди, өзбек әдебиетінің көрнекті өкілі Хамза және

басқалар өз ойларын ортаға салды (Нагаев, 1994).

Исмаил Бей Гаспыралы түрік әлемін аралап, Терджұман газетінде де, усуль-и цидит мектептерінде де жұмыс істеген. Осы уақыт ішінде ол көптеген түрік зиялыларымен араласты. Бұл сапарлар да, Терджұман газеті мен Усуль-и Жәдит мектептері мыңдаған түрік ұлтшыл зиялыларын түрік әлеміне оқытты. Әйгілі «Саясаттың үш стилі» кітабының авторы, Ататүріктің жақын досы, Түркия Республикасының негізін салушылардың бірі Проф. Dr. Юсуф Акчура әйелінің әрі туысы, әрі қаламдас досы болды.

- Исмаил Бей Гаспыралы түрік әлемін аралап Терджұман газетімен де, Усуль-и Жәдит мектептерінде де жұмыс істеді.

#### *Жәдидшілік*

Бұл сөзбе-сөз жаңалық дегенді білдіреді. Жәдитизм деп аталатын реформалық қозғалыс 19 ғасырдың екінші жартысында тіл, білім және дін салаларындағы жаңашылдық қозғалыс ретінде басталды. Осы қозғалыстың жетекшілері болған Әбділнасыр Курсави (1770-1814), Шихабеддин Меркани (1815-1889), Абдулкайюм. Насири (1824-1907) мен Хусейн Фейижаниді (1826-1866) санауға болады. Бұл қозғалыс Ресейдегі түркі халықтарында орын алған экономикалық өзгерістердің нәтижесінде қайта жанданған ояну және жаңашылдық қозғалысы. Кейін Усуль-и Жәдит қозғалысы түрік әлеміне таралу жолдарын іздеді (Девлет, 1990).

Реформизм қозғалысын 1884 жылы Исмаил Гаспыралы жеке өзі бастады. Ол алғаш ашқан Жәдит мектебімен қарқын алды. Көп ұзамай бұл қозғалыс Түркістанда 1901 жылы Мүневер қари Ташкентте алғашқы Усуль-и Жәдит мектебін ашқаннан кейін тарай бастады. Екі жылдан кейін Махмұд Қожа Бехбуди Самарқандта жаңа әдіспен білім беретін бастауыш мектеп ашуға қол жеткізді. Түркістан зиялыларының көпшілігі қолдаған жәдитизм ең алдымен мәдени жаңалық болды.

Ол саяси қозғалыс ретінде пайда болып, кейін Түркістан халқының ортақ құндылықтарын құрайтын ислам-түрік тақырыптарын біріктіру нәтижесінде өзінің саяси және мәдени аспектілерінен асып түсетін жаңашыл қозғалысқа айналды. Жәдидшілдік қозғалысы 1890 жылдардағы Түркістандағы жаңару қозғалысы болды, бұхарлық Ибрахим қари Абдуллашидтің еңбегімен; Бұл да ұлттық тәуелсіздік үшін күреске айналды. Жәдидшілдіктегі бірінші ны-

сана ұлттық оқу орындарын еуропалықтандыру болды. Осы себепті Исмаил Бей шығармаларынан әсер алып, еуропалық үлгіде білім беру мақсатында XX. Ғасырдың алғашқы жылдары Ферғана мен Самарқанда Усуль-и Жәдит мектептері ашыла бастады. Кейіннен бұл мектептер Түркістанға тарады. Жәдидшілер 1906 жылдан бастап өз идеяларын кеңінен тарату мақсатында түрлі газет-журналдар шығарып, түрлі бірлестіктермен ұйымдасып, Түркістанды дамыту үшін саяси күрес жүргізді.

Бұл қозғалыс алдымен білім саласына жаңалықтар енгізуді көздеді. Татар мектептерінде жаңа оқу әдісін қабылдау мәселесі талқылануымен ескі әдісті жақтаған «көнешілер» мен жаңа әдісті жақтаған «жәдидшілер» арасында күрес басталды. Бұл жаңа әдісті жақтайтын қозғалыс осы себепті «Усуль-и Жәдит» деп аталды. Ландау, жәдидшілдіктің панславянизмнен көптеген стратегиялар мен концепцияларды алатынын және бұл қозғалыста татарлардың маңызды орын алатынын айтып, Ресей әкімшілігінің көптеген қауымдарды татарларды христиандандыру және орыстандыру саясатын жүргізі отырды. Алайда Жәдидшілер панисламизмнен гөрі түрікшілдікті ойлады. Дегенмен, Ландау жәдидшілерде панисламистерден гөрі түркішілік болғанын да айтады (Landau, 1995).

Түрік ұлттық санасының дамуында өте маңызды орын алатын түрік ұлтшылдығы идеясын екі үлкен топ тұжырымдап, таратқан. Бұлардың біріншісі Османлы зиялылары болса, екіншісі Осман империясына Ресейден келген зиялылар. Орыс патшасы Ресей мұсылмандары қозғалысын басып-жаншығаннан кейін Түркияға Қырым, Татар, Әзірбайжан зиялыларының бір тобы келді.

1908 жылғы төңкерістен бірнеше ай өткен соң Юсуф Акчура, Ахмет Ағаоглу, Әбдіррешид Ибраимов, Хусейнзаде Әли, Аяз Исаки, Халим, Констант сияқты зиялылар кездеседі. Осы зиялылар Стамбулда түрлі ұлтшыл ұйымдар құрды (Узун, 2001)

- Түрік ұлттық санасының дамуында өте маңызды орын алатын түрік ұлтшылдығы идеясын екі үлкен топ тұжырымдап таратты. Бұлардың біріншісі Османлы зиялылары болса, екіншісі Осман империясына Ресейден келген зиялылар.

#### *Негізден Жәдит мектептері?*

Дамыған елдермен салыстырғанда артта қалған Түркістан мұсылмандарының басын қосып, мектептер мен медреселерді жаңартқысы

келген Исмаил Гаспыралы халық ағарту ісіне алғашқы қадам жасады. Қазіргі әлем жағдайына сай мұсылман қоғамы бастауыш мектептен (мектеп) басталуы керек. Исмаил Гаспыралы түркістандық мұсылман ғалымдары Курсави, Меркани, Бұхара әмірі Мұзаффереддин және Бұхарада білім алған ислам ғұламаларынан тәжірибе жинақтады, бұл қажеттілікті жұртшылыққа ауызша ғана түсіндіру қиын. Сол себепті жаңа мектептер ашып, инновацияның пайдасын іс жүзінде халыққа көрсеткісі келді. Осы мақсатпен Бақшасарайдың Каймаз-Аға ауданында мектеп ашып, білім беруді бастады (1884). Бұл мектепте Исмаил Гаспыралы енгізген әдіспен 40 күндік қысқа мерзімде оқушылар әріптерді толық меңгеріп, жазуды, жылдам оқуды, жүзге дейін есептеуді, Ислам тарихын білуге болатынын көрсетті. Ол үшін Құран сүрелерін жаттау керектіін айтты. Исмаил Гаспыралы әдісінің негізі әріптер дыбыс жүйесі арқылы танылғаннан кейін әріптерді жаттамай, емле арқылы оқу болды. Гаспыралы Исмаил бей қасына жинаған ұстаздарына Усуль-и Жәдит туралы айтып, барған жерлерінде Усуль-и Жәдит мектептерін ашуды сұрады. Сонымен қатар, Исмаил Гаспыралы Түркістанда Жәдит мектептерінің таралуына ерекше мән берді.

Осы себепті 1893 жылы мамырда Бұхара әмірі Абдулахадпен кездесуге келеді. Келгеннен кейін Түркістандағы оқу орындарын жіті қарап, өлкедегі ғалымдармен ақылдасу мүмкіндігіне ие болды. Әмірмен кездесуінен қалаған нәтижеге жете алмаған Гаспыралы Қырымға қайта оралды. Орыстардың Гаспыралы қолдау көрсетпеуінен басқа, оны патша әкімшілігі үшін қауіпті деп санап, Бұхараның сол кездегі саяси-әлеуметтік жағдайы Бұхара әмірінің Гаспыралыны қолдауына кедергі болды. Қазірдің өзінде Түркістанда ескі үлгідегі мектептер мен медреселердің жағдайы студенттер мен жұртшылық арасында белгілі болды, халық бұл оқу орындарынан ештеңе күткен жоқ. Яғни, облыста білім саласына ескіше сенімсіздік орнады. Бұл аймақта, осы салада олқылық туғызды. Исмаил Гаспыралы идеяларын қолдайтын жергілікті ағартушылар Түркістанда жаңаша мектептер ашып, ескі медреселерді реформалауға кірісті. Осылайша Усуль-и Жәдит мектептері орыстар мен көнелердің кедергілеріне қарамастан XIX. соңғы ширегінде Қырымда, Иділ тайпаларында, Әзірбайжанда, XIX. ғасыр

90-шы жылдардан кейін Қазан, Уфа, Орынбор губернияларында және 20-ғасырдың алғашқы жылдарында осы аймақтарға келген татар зиялыларының ықпалымен бүкіл Түркістанға тарады. Қырғызстанда 1901-1902 жылдары Токмок, Преживальск, Пишпек, кейінірек Ош қалаларында Усуль-и Жәдит мектептері ашылды.

*Усуль-и Жәдит мектептеріндегі білім беру жүйесі*

Түркістанда ашылған жәдит мектептерінің ең үлкен және басты ерекшелігі ескі мектеп пен медресе оқуын жаңартып, діни біліммен қатар дүниетану ғылымдарын да қамту болды. Жаңа үлгідегі мектептерде ескі үлгідегідей оқу арасында оқушылар қабылданбайды, ал көктемде оқудың басында және ортасында жылына екі рет қабылданатын. қыста оқу. Гаспыралы білім беру жүйесінде әліпбидегі әріптерді оқушыларға аты ғана емес, сәйкес дыбыс арқылы да таныстырды. Сонымен қатар, балалар сөйлемдерді үйренуді тікелей бастамады, олар алдымен буындардан бастап, үйренген сайын сөздер мен сөйлемдерге көшті. Усуль-и Жәдит жүйесі әкелген басты жаңалықтардың бірі – мектепті ұлттандыру. Бұған дейін балалар араб тілінде оқу мен жазуды үйренуге тырысатын. Жаңа жүйе сауат ашуда да, басқа барлық курстарда да ана тілін араб тіліне алмастырды. Исмаил Гаспыралы әзірлеген бұл жүйені бүкіл Түркістан қабылдап, 1905-1906 жылдары Нижний Новгородта өткен Ресей мұсылмандары съездерінде осы жүйе талқыланды.

Осыған сәйкес Усуль-и Жәдит мектептері мен медреселеріндегі білім беру бағдарламасы келесідей болады:

1. Бастауыш мектепті алмастырған мектеп медресе оқуына дайындық кезеңі болды.

Медресенің алғашқы оқу кезеңі алты жылға созылған орта мектептен тұрды.

2. Орта мектеп: Бұл медреседегі білімнің екінші деңгейін құрады және Рүштие сияқты алты жылға созылды.

3. Медресе оқуының соңғы үш жылын құрайтын Ғалие деп аталатын жоғары оқу бөлімі медресенің үшінші бөлімі болды. Студенттер медреседе оқу кезінде осы үш бөліктің бірін егер аяқтаса, қаласа медреседен шыға алатын. Тағы да, медресенің әртүрлі сатыларындағы біліміне сәйкес шәкірт не мектептерде, не медреседе ұстаз бола алады. Профессор немесе жоғары лауазымды діни қызметкері де бола алады.

## Ғылыми талқылау

Жаңа әдістеме бойынша медреселерде оқытылатын пәндер аймақтарға қарай айырмашылықтар болды: Дінтану (хадис, фикһ, калам, т.б.), түріктілі мен әдебиеті, араб тілі мен әдебиеті, ислам тарихы, тарих философиясы, жалпы тарих, география, жаратылыстану, математика, физика, химия, психология, педагогика, денсаулық сақтау, каллиграфия, орыс және француз тілдері сабақтары сияқты. Түркістанда ашылған Жәдит мектептері ескі үлгідегі мектептерге қарағанда аз болды. Бірақ орыс мектептерінен гөрі көбірек ашылды және оқушылар саны көп болды. Жәдит мектептерінің шығындары халықтан жиналған қайырымдылық есебінен жабылды. Құрылған мектептерде ескі жүйедегі мектептерде жоқ мұғалімдер мен оқушыларға арналған үстел-орындықтар, тақталар, карталар және оқуға қажетті барлық материалдар болды. Сабақ негізінен татар түрік тілінде және жергілікті халықтың тілінде жүргізілді. Сабақтар арасында орыс тілі, араб тілі, тіпті музыка сабағы да болды. Жаңа әдістеме мектептеріндегі дін сабақтарына қосылған дүние сабақтары шәкірттердің санасының ашық болуын, күнделікті өмірмен астасып, діннің фанатизміне бой алдыруын қамтамасыз етті. Жәдит мектептерінде оқушылар сыныптарға бөлініп, төрт жыл бойы білім алды. Аптасына жиырма сағаттық сабақтың он шақты сағаты; Құран, Ислам тарихы және басқа да діни кітаптарды оқу; қалған уақыттарда жазу, математика, география, орыс тілі және басқа пәндерге арналды. Жаңа әдіс бойынша мектептерде оқу 3 сыныпқа бөлініп, 4 жылға тарады. Бірінші сынып бір жылдан тұрды, дауыстап оқу әдісі арқылы оқу мен жазуды бастау, араб мәтіндерін оқу мақсатында «Әліппеге кіріспе» кітабынан араб әліпбиі оқытылды. Одан кейін «Тәрбиял Бала» (Әдепті бала) және «Ибадат-ы Исламия» (Исламға ғибадат) кітаптары оқытылып, математикадан бастап жазуға дейін оқытылды. 2-сыныпта оқушыларды «Ислам дініне құлшылық» атты кітаппен жалғастырып, таза әрі жылдам жазуға мән беру, математика сабағында төрт және одан да көп таңбалы сандар, төрт амалды үйрету сияқты терең оқытылды. Бұлардан кейін Раабар-ы Сибян деп аталатын кітап оқытылып, Құранның дұрыс оқуына мән берілді. Сонымен қатар География сабағы енгізілді. 3-сынып 2 жылдан тұратын және бұл сыныпта жазу, түсініп оқу және баяндау, Құранды тәжүидпен оқу, Ислам тарихы курсы, жергілікті

халықтар тарихы, география, логикаға кіріспе, сәулет, араб әдебиеті, геометрия, денсаулық туралы ғылым курстары оқытылды. Мектепке алыстан келген студенттер мектептің жатақханасында тұратын. Мектеп бітіргендерге татар тілінде дипломдар берілді. Музыка сабақтарында бұрын Құраннан алынған бөлім Шығармалары жыр күйінде шырқалса, кейінгі ұлттық өлеңдер мен патриоттық өлеңдер орын алды.

Усул-и Жәдит мектептерін ашу әрекетін Исмаил Гаспыралы 1884 жылы Бақшасарайда қырық күнде оқу мен жазуды үйрететін мектеп құрды. Мектептің ашылатынын Терсүман газетінде жариялады. Гаспыралы осы жаңа мектептің мұғалімі болатын адамға тікелей білім берді. Сондай-ақ алғашқы «Усул-и Жәдит» мектебі болатын бұл мектеп Гаспыралы атында болды. Ол сонымен бірге мектептің «Ходжа-и Сыбян» (Somuncuoğlu, 2006) кітабын жазды. Мектепке күннен-күнге оқушылар көбейе бастады. Уақыт өте бұл мектептер Усуль-и Жәдит деп аталды. Қызметкерлер мен «Жәдитші» сөзін таратуды қалайтындар шақырыла бастады. Сөйтіп, Ресейде тұратын түрік қауымының ішінде жаңа зиялылар пайда бола бастады. Енді ескі үлгідегі ғылым жасау қызметі жаңа таптың әдеттерінен бас тарта бастады. Орыс тілі мен мәдениетіне салқын қарамаған Осман империясымен тіл табысып дәстүрлі құрылымдардың бәріне сыни көзқараспен қарайтын бұл зиялы қауымның түркі қоғамын инерциядан шығарып, азаматтық институттар орнататындай етіп қоғамға білім беру керек деген заманауи идеялары болды. Гаспыралы секілді ілім саласын реформалау керек деген пікірді алға тартқандар да көп. Түрік зиялылары көп болды, бірақ бұл идеяны практикалық салаға әкелген тұлға ретінде Гаспыралы бұл бағытты бейнелеуде табысқа жетті.

*Усул-и Жәдит мектептерінің оқу бағдарламасы*

Жалпы, Қырым, Қазан, Уфа, Орынбор мектептерінің білім сапасы жоғары екені белгілі (Ешенқұлова 2007). Жәдит мектептері негізінен төрт жылдық. Мектепке алты жасар балалар да алына бастады. Мектептер ұстанатын білім беру құрылымы қарапайым жүйе бойынша жүргізілді. Жоғары мектептерде математика, негізгі физика, тарих, география, жаратылыстану сияқты курстар оқытылды. Негізінде Жәдит мектептерінің бір түрі туралы айту мүмкін емес; үш түрлі арнадан құралатын түрлерін атап өтуге болады. Бұлардың біріншісі, бірінші кезеңдегі жәдидшілік қозғалысының идеологиялық негі-

зін де қабылдаған адамдар ашқан Жаңа усул мектептері. Бұл көзқарастың қайнар көздерін Ресейдегі түрік қауымдарының саяси бірлігі идеясы мен Гаспыралы алға қойған «тіл, ой, іс бірлігі» деген ұстаным ретінде жинақтауға болады. Мектептердің екінші тобына «Жаңа әдіс мектептерінің» құрылымы мен оқу жоспарын қолдағанымен, идеологиялық байланысы жоқ адамдар ашқан мектептер жатады. Және де, ескі үлгідегі мектептерде білім беретін молдалардың әсерімен және жұртшылықтың Жаңа усул мектептеріне деген жанашырлығымен өз мектептерінің оқу бағдарламаларын қайта құрылымдау арқылы құрылған мектептер.

Жаңа әдістемедегі мектептердегі оқу бағдарламаларын сараптасақ, әлі де болса діни сабақтардың айтарлықтай дәрежеде бағдарламаға енгізілгенін байқауға болады. Жаңа әдістеме мектептері сол кезең жағдайында заманауи білім беруді болжағанымен, қоғамның жалпы стилінен тәуелсіз және діни білімнен тыс оқу бағдарламасын дайындау мүмкін еместігі байқалады. Usul-i Cedit мектептері енгізген инновациялар ескі мектептерде оқу классикалық әдіспен жүргізілді. Мұғалім әр оқушыны алдына қойып, оған өз сабағын айтуды тапсырды, осылайша ол шектеулі мөлшерде сыныптағы барлық оқушылармен жұмыс істей алады. Гаспыралы енгізген жаңа әдістеме арқылы мұғалім оқушылармен топ қана емес жеке де көбірек білім берілді. Осылайша, сыныптағы жеке жетістіктерден туындаған теңгерімсіз прогрес те жойылып, ұжымдық ілгерілеушілікке қол жеткізіліп, мұғалімнің оқушылармен өткізетін уақыты көбірек болу керек. Ескі мектептердің білім беру қарқынды дамыды. Жәдит мектептеріндегі студенттер сынып жүйесі бойынша орналастырылғандықтан, барлық студенттер бір уақытта білім алуға қатыса алады. Жәдит мектебінің енгізген тағы бір жаңа әдіс түрі ескі әдіс оқу мен жазуды сөйлемдерді жаттаудан бастаса, жаңа әдіс әліпбидегі әріптердің сәйкес дыбыстары бар әріптерді және бұл әріптерді ішінара біртіндеп үйретуді мақсат етті (Somuncuoğlu 2006) Мұндай мектептердің тағы бір жаңалығы – білімге ұлттық сипат беру. Өйткені ескі әдісте оқу араб тілінде жүргізілетін. Жаңа жүйе бойынша білім беру басты орында тілде болды. Бұл осы мектептердің қосқан ең үлкен үлестерінің бірі.

Түркістандағы Жәдит мектептерін кеңейту Бакшасарайда ашқан мектебінің табыстылығының арқасында Гаспыралы сол аймақ хал-

қынан үлкен қолдау тапты. Бірақ Гаспыралы бұл мектептердің Ресейдің батысындағы мұсылмандармен ғана шектелуі қалмады. ол Түркістан генерал-губернаторлығына хат жолдап, өз жүйесінің жетістігін айтып, осы мектептердің Түркістанда ашылуын талап етті. Алайда Гаспыралының ұсынысы қабылданбады.

1893 жылы Түркістанға аттанды. Гаспыралының Түркістандағы алғашқы аялдамасы Бұхара болды. Ол жақтан Ташкентке өткен Гаспыралы бұл жерден үмітін таппай, Самарқанға аттанды. Гаспыралы Самарқандтағы кездесулерінде үмітін ақтайтын сөз сөйледі. Жетістікке жете алмаса да, ол Жәдит мектебін ашуға қол жеткізді. Гаспыралдың Түркістанға жасаған бұл алғашқы сапары нақты мағынада аса сәтті нәтиже бермеді. Алайда, өзімен келіскен адамдармен қарым-қатынас орнату арқылы кейінгі жылдары Түркістанға екінші сапарына дайындалды. Негізі, кейінгі кезеңдерде Түркістанда Жәдит мектептері көбейе түсіп тәрбиенің маңызды нүктесіне айналды. Усул-и Жәдит мектептері уақыт өте көбейгенімен, оларға Ресей әкімшілігінің қарсылықтары да болды. Бұл мектептердің сындары екі түрде болды; Біріншісі – Ежелгілер тарапынан айтылған сын болса, екіншісі – Ресей билеушілерінің Гаспыралы ашқан мектептері Ресейдің өлкедегі халықты ассимиляциялау мақсатына кедергі болған сындар. Өйткені орыстар бұрын түрік қауымдарына білім беретін мекемелер ашқан болатын. Бұл тұрғыда әсіресе Ильминский әдісімен ашылған мектептердің алатын орны зор. Бірақ бұл мектептер де орыс әкімшілерінің сынына ұшырады. Орыстардың, әсіресе Ильминскийдің Усуль-и Жәдит мектептеріне деген сынының негізі осы мектептерде қолданылатын оқу бағдарламаларының ұлттық сипатында жатыр. Ескі мектептерде белгілі болғандай, оқу араб тілінде, яғни оқушылар үйренбеген тілде жүргізілді. Жаңа әдіс бойынша мектептерде оқу ана тілінде жүргізілді. Бұл жағдай мектеп бітіретін балалардың ұлттық сезімталдығы жоғары тұлға болып өсуіне мүмкіндік берді. Әрине, бұл ресейлік әкімшілер қалаған жағдай емес еді.

Ильминский мен Гаспыралы арасындағы қарсылықтың бастауында; Гаспыралының қамы Ресейдегі түрік жамағаттарының ұлттық болмысын жоғалтуына тосқауыл болатын ортақ әдеби тіл құру арқылы түріктердің бірлігін қамтамасыз ету еді. Екінші жағынан, Ильминский өз ана тілінде білім беру арқылы түркі қауымдастықтары арасында бірлік орнатуға

кедергі болатын әдісті ұсынды. Дәлірек айтқанда, Ресей әкімшілігі әр қауымның басқа тілде қолданылуына қолдау көрсетті.

#### *Ежелгі және Жәдит мектептері*

Жәдидшілер мен Ежелгілер арасындағы пікірталас бұрыннан бар екені шындық. Мұның басты себебі – Ежелгілердің жәдидшілерге деген күдігі. Ежелгілер мен жәдидшілер арасындағы қақтығыс алғашқы Жәдит мектебі ашылғаннан кейін шамамен 10 жыл өткен соң білінді. Алғашында екі топтың келіспеушілігінің себебі тәрбие әдісіне деген әртүрлі көзқарастар болса, кейінгі жылдары алшақтық кеңірек тарады. Екі топтың дүниетанымы мен идеологиясы бір-бірінен толықтай тәуелсіз (Kanlıdere, 2010)

Ежелгі адамдар дәстүрлерді және классикалық білім беру әдістерін сақтауды қорғады. Сонымен қатар, олар жаңа әдіс мектептерінің оқу бағдарламаларында маңызды орынға ие орыс тілін оқытуға толығымен қарсы болды, өйткені түрік қауымдарын орыстандыру деп білді. Ежелгі адамдар Жәдит мектептері студенттердің діни сезімталдығын әлсіретеді деп ойлады. Жәдит мектептерінде діни сабақтар болғанымен, ежелгі адамдар оларда жалған діни идеялар бар деп қарсылық білдірді. Жалпы айтқанда, ежелгілер мен жәдидшілер арасындағы қайшылықтың бастауы – ескі мектептегі ғылыми өндірістік қызметтің ықпалын жоғалтудан қалған олқылықтың орнын Ресей арқылы, Батыс елдерімен толтырғысы келетін жәдидшілердің күресі – мәдени үлгі және қазіргі жағдайды сақтау арқылы билік бөлісуге жақындағысы келмейтін ежелгі адамдар 1884 жылдан кейін мектептерді модернизациялаудың танымалдылығының артуына байланысты Гаспыралы өзін және оның мектептерін Қырым мұсылман қауымының болмысына қатер төндіретін қатер ретінде қарастырған молдалармен үнемі қақтығысқа ұшырады. Негізінде, көне (дәстүршіл) көзқарасты білдіретін бір молда: «Аллаға, Мұхаммедке сенген адам модернистерге дұшпандық танытуы керек» деп айтуға дейін барды. «Шарифат олар үшін өлім жазасын талап етті». (Уильямс, 2001). Дәл осы сыншылар Гаспыралыны Қырым мұсылман халқын орыстандыруға бел буған орыс агенті ретінде көрсету науқанын бастады. Бір қызығы, ислам дәстүршілері оны орыстандырушы деп айыптағанымен, орыс бюрократиясының көптеген шенеуніктері Гаспыралыны «орыс мәдениетінің барлық артықшылықтарын қорғау үшін пайдалануға тырыс-

қан мұсылмандардың бірі болуы мүмкін» деген күдікпен қауіп төндірді» (Williams, 2001)

#### *Гаспыралыдан кейінгі жәдидшілер және олардың Қырым ұлттық күресіндегі рөлі*

Консервативтік дінбасыларының да, орыс шенеуніктерінің де қарсылығына қарамастан, көптеген қырым татар жастары Гаспыралының мектептеріне қабылданып, орыс революциясы қарсаңында география, тарих, ғылым, әдебиет, т.б. пәндерді оқып үйренен ұрпақтар өсіп шықты. Бұл жаңа ұрпақ үшін білімнің маңызды болғаны сонша, «Мектепті көру – қуаныш». Бұл мәтел әлі күнге дейін танымал қырым татарларының мақалы.

«Көптеген Қырым татар жастары білім беру арқылы өздерінің дәстүрлі шекараларынан құтылу процесінде, олардың жетекшілері сияқты, «жаппай көшу немесе надандық қабығында үмітсіз окшаулану сияқты қауымдастықтың өзін-өзі сақтаудың дәстүрлі формалары, іс жүзінде оның еріту процесін жеделдетті» (<http://www.ismailgaspirali.org/yazilar/bwilliams.htm> – dn\_21)

Бұл түсінік өзін заманауи, зайырлы терминдермен көре бастаған осы жаңа ұрпақ үшін исламды Қырым татарларының бірегейлігін анықтаушы элементтен алып тастаудағы маңызды қадам болды (Williams, 2001) Гаспыралының Қырым татарлары мен патшаның басқа түрік қол астындағы ұлтшылдықтың кейінгі қалыптасуындағы маңызын бағаламау мүмкін емес. Гаспыралы дінге емес, ең алдымен түріктің тегіне, тіліне негіздеді. Ресей империясындағы түркі халықтарының топтық болмысының бірден-бір айқындаушы элементі ретіндегі исламның рөлі бірте-бірте төмендеп, Ресей мұсылмандарының топтық болмысының айқындаушы элементтері ретінде тілдік және тектік байланыстар шешуші рөл атқарды. 1917 жылға қарай патшаның қол астындағы мұсылмандар этникалық әзірбайжандар, қазақтар, Еділ бойындағы татарлар, Қырым татарлары және т.б. содан кейін олар мұсылмандар ретінде таныла бастады (Williams, 2001). Гаспыралының еңбегі Қырымдағы мұсылман халқын кейіннен этникалықтандыруға негіз және интеллектуалдық атмосфераны жасап, «Дәуір татарлары», «Ватан (отан)» қоғамы және ұлттық партияның Ресей мемлекетінде тұратын саяси пассивті мұсылман халқын өзгерту үдерісін бастау мүмкіндігін ашты. Тавриданы қырым татар ұлтына айналдырды. 1905 жылға дейін әр қозғалысты орыстың өз мәселесі деп санап, басына қиындық түседі деп ойлаған қырым

татарларының көпшілігі саясатқа қызықпаған. Исмаил Гаспыралы және оның шәкірттері Хасан Сабри Айвазов, Махмут Рефат, Осман Акчокраклы, Исмаил Ломанов халықты ағартуға және Усуль-и Жәдит қозғалысын таратуға тырысқанымен, 1905 жылға қарай Қырым татарлары арасында Усуль-и Жәдитте өскен жастар және Орыс-татар мектептері, оқу-ағарту мәселелері мен басқа да интеллектуалдық мәселелерде белсенділік танытқан топ болды (Yüksel, 2003).

1905 жылы төңкерістер жүріп жатқан кезде Қырым түріктері ұлттық-революциялық қозғалыс құру мақсатында Ақмесжиттегі татар мұғалімдер мектебін бітірген жастардан құрылған «Жас татарлар» («Заман татарлары») деп аталады Қырым түрік тілінде) топ құрылды. Ара-тұра орыс революциялық топтарымен жұмыс істегенімен, «Жас татарлар» қозғалысы социалистік идеяларды қабылдамады.

«Жас татарлар Бүкілқырымдық мұсылмандар 1905 жылы желтоқсанда өз ой-пікірлерін жиналыстарда жұртшылықтың алдында айтты. Өте өткір революциялық стильде жасалған баяндамалар халықты үрейлендірсе де, Хасан Сабри Айвазов пен Решит Медиев сынды басшылар мәселелерді ұлттық көзқараста талқылады; Хасан Сабри Айвазовтың өз сөзінде патша билігінің қырым татар халқына жүргізген саясатының ащы зардаптары мен қырым түріктерінің жоққа шығарылған ұлттық құқықтарын талап етіп, абсолютизмге қарсы революциялық күрес жүргізу қажеттігін баса айтып, бостандық талап еткен. Жас татарлар Қырым татар халқын ағартуды, мектептерде Усуль-и Жәдитке қолдау көрсетуді, барлық халық, әсіресе әйелдер арасында білім беруді кеңейтуді, қалалар мен ауылдардағы Қырым татарларының арасынан ұлттық кадрларды дайындауды, озбырлыққа қарсы күш дайындауды мақсат етті. Патша үкіметі бұйрығымен Мехдиев, Бахчисарайдағы Жалал Муин, Хусейн Балич, Сейіт, Челил Каллиграф, Хасан Сабри Айваз, Сүлейман Бадракли, Яхья Байбуртлу, Әмір Али, Абдуррахман Хуснуді кездесу ұйымдастыру мақсатымен станцияға барғанда тұтқындалып, түрмеге жабылды. (Yüksel 2003) Қараша айында Ақмесжит түрмесінің есіктері халықтың жинаған күшімен ашылып, саяси тұтқындардың барлығы босатылды. Мехдиев енді революция қаһарманына айналды. «Терджұман» газетінің 1906 жылы 3 мамырда, «Ватан Хадими» газеті 1906 жылы 1 мамырда Қарасубазарда шыға бастады. Керісінше, 1906

жылы 5 мамырда Терджұманда Нуман Челеби Джихан Абдүлрешит Мехдиев Сүлеймен (Жас татарлар Сулкуевич Вели Ибрахим Гаспыралыны Ватан Хадими газетінің шығуына ықпалы бар деп айыптады) және Гаспыралыны сынға алды.» Көрнекті жас татарлардың бірі сондай-ақ Гаспыралдың әріптесі Хасан Сабри Айвазов Бақуде 1906 жылы шыққан «Фююзат» журналының 6-санындағы «Қырым не үшін сынға алынбайды?» деген мақаласында аудармашы болды. Ол жылдар бойы қызметтерін көрсете отырып, Қырым мәселесіне немқұрайлы қарайтынын сынады. Осындай сындар мен талқылауларға қарап, бұл екі топтың арасында өте өткір сызықтар бар деп айтуға болмайды. Керісінше, Терджұман мен Ватан Хадими газетінің интеллектуалдық құрылымы мен қызмет салаларының айырмашылығынан гөрі ұқсастықтары көп және Гаспыралының жақтастары мен жас татарларды ажырату әрдайым оңай бола бермейді. Сонымен қатар, екі топтағы адамдар саны тым көп, оларды бағаламау мүмкін емес. Оның үстіне бұл топтардың Ресей әкімшілігімен және дәстүрлі-консервативтік құрылымдағы Қырым түріктерімен арадағы айырмашылықтары әлдеқайда үлкен және тереңірек. Осыған байланысты Ватан Хадими газеті жабылып одан кейін газет жазушылары, әсіресе Хасан Сабри Терджұман газетесіне жаза бастады.

Олардың жалғасуы таңқаларлық емес сияқты. Тағдырдың жазуымен Терджұманның Ватан Хадимиден басты айырмашылығының бірі болған қалыпты және сақтық таныту Терджұманның баспа өмірін және Ватан Хадимидің бұрынғы жазушыларын жалғастыруына мүмкіндік берді. 1916 жылы Бірінші дүниежүзілік соғыстың қызып тұрған күндерінде барлық университет студенттерін Прапорщик (запастағы офицер) мектебіне қабылдау туралы бұйрық бойынша Кафер Сейдахмет Мәскеу запастағы офицерлер училищесіне, одан әрі Бессарабия майданында, Челеби Джихан Гөзлевеге барды. Челеби Джиханның қызмет орны – Ақмесжит еді. 1917 жылы ақпанда патша орталығында төңкерістің басталғанын естіген Джафер Сейдахмет Бессарабиядағы бөлімшесін тастап, Одессадағы құпия ұйымның көмегімен ауруханаға жатқызылған Челеби Джиханға келді. Халил Чапчакчы мен Ахмет Өзенбашлының қатысуымен жағдайды келіссөздер жүргізіп, бұдан былай жасалатын қадамдарды анықтауға тырысса, екінші жағынан Қырыммен байланысқа шығып, жаңа оқиғалар

туралы ақпарат алуға тырысты. Ресейдегі революциялық қозғалыстардан пайда алған Қырым түріктері 1913 жылдан бері бүкіл Қырымда әрекет еткен жасырын әрекеттерінің нәтижесінде 1917 жылы 25 наурызда демократиялық сайлау өткізді. Нәтижесінде олардың өкілдері Ел бірлігі мен дамуын қамтамасыз ету; ұлттық құқықтарды шешу; Қырымның болашағына қатысты саяси оқиғаларды күшейту мақсатында «Қырым Мұсылмандардың Орталық Атқару Комитетін» құрды. Осылайша Қырым татарлары өз тағдырларын өз қолдарына алды.

Орталық Атқару Комитетінің бірауыздан қабылданған шешімімен Челеби Джихан Қырым мүфтиі болып, Джафер Сейдахмет Құрылтай істері басқармасы болып сайланды. Челеби Джихан Қырымның ғана емес, сонымен қатар Батыс мұсылмандарының (Польша мен Литва) мүфтиі болып сайланды және бұл атақты Ресей үкіметі бекітті. Осы оң өзгерістерге байланысты Челеби Джихан мен Джафер Сейдахмет Одессада асыға күткен Қырымға келді. Челеби Джихан Қырымда бас мүфтилік міндетін қабылдап, уақытты босқа өткізбей, дін істерін дұрыс жолға қоюға ұмтылды; Мүфтилер мен кәдилер, шешендер мен имамдар арасындағы біліктілігі жоқтардың міндетін тоқтатып, елге қызмет ете алатын білімді жастарды, зиялыларды тағайындады. Челеби Джихан мектептерде де сол әдістерді қолдану арқылы ұлттық мектептерді аз уақыт ішінде белгілі бір деңгейге жеткізе алды. Барлық осы қозғалыстардың нәтижесінде Қырым татарларының алдында болашақта бүкіл Қырымда атқарылатын әлдеқайда маңызды қадамдарға қатысты маңызды база қалыптастырылды және халықтың қолдауына ие болды. 1917 жылы сәуірде Челеби Джихан, Сейитжеліл Каллиграф, Ахмет Өзенбашлы және Джафер Сейдахмет тарапынан ереже дайындалып, күшіне енді. Мамыр айының басында Ақмезджитте шақырылған «Мұғалімдер съезінде» мұсылмандарды орыстандыру мақсатымен ашқан орыс-татар мұғалімдер мектебін тартып алып, оны ұлттық мақсатқа сай етіп, тағайындау туралы шешім қабылданды. Қабылданған шешімдер съезден кейін бірден орындалды. Бүкіл Қырымдағы маңызды орталықтардың қарқынды енуі және басып алуы екінші жағынан «Қырым ошағын» Абдул-хаким Хилми 1917 жылы 20 маусымда конгресс қабылдаған шешімдерді қорғау және жұртшылықты ағарту мақсатында құрды. 27

маусымда Комитет «Миллет (Ұлт)» ресми ақпарат құралы ретінде шығарыла бастады, ал «Голос» қырым-татар седасы газеттері шілде айында Халит Чапчакчы мен Али Баданински тарапынан шығарыла бастады.

Кейінгі күндері оларға Гөкбайрак, Иш Халк және Албайрак газеттері қосылды.

Қырым татарларының саяси белсенділігінің бірте-бірте күшеюі орыстарда терең ынғайсыздық тудырды. Керенский үкіметінің Таврида губерниясының комиссары Богданов осы қозғалысқа нұқсан келтіру үшін 1917 жылы 20 шілдеде Қырым түріктерінің басшысы Челеби Джиханды тұтқындады. Бұл қозғалыс бүкіл Қырымда үлкен реакцияға ұшырап, барлық жерде митингілер өтті. Сонымен бірге Ресейдегі барлық мұсылман түрік ұйымдары да Ресей үкіметіне наразылық білдірді. Ақярда түрмеге қамалған Челеби Джихан халықтың күшеюімен 23 шілдеде босатылды. Тұтқындауды жасаған Богданов пен оның көмекшісі Биянски қызметінен кетті, ал Таврида мемлекеттік революция комитетінің басшысы Новицкий Челеби Джиханға ресми түрде барып, кешірім сұрауға мәжбүр болды. Әсіресе, бұл соңғы оқиғалар бүкіл Қырым халқының рухына өте жақсы әсер етті.

1917 жылы 30 қазанда Джафер Сейдахметтің өзі Қырым Еркан-ы Харбийесі (Қорғаныс министрлігі) құрды. Жафер Сейдахмет, Қырымнан тыс Украина Майдандағы Қырым татарлары әскер дивизияларын қайтаруға тырысты. Жоспарлы жұмыс пен ұйымдастыру барысында Комитет бірінен соң бірі маңызды қадамдар жасады. Қараша айының басында Гаспыралы мұғалімдер мектебі, Өнеркәсіп мектебі мен Хансарайда Ұлттық музей ашылды. Көк ту тігіліп Хансарайдағы Ұлттық музейдің ашылу салтанатында Челеби Джихан: «... Біз құрылтайды (Хансарайды нұсқап) сонда өткізуді шештік. Оған мемлекеттік туымызды көтеруге ант бердік. Енді құрлықта, теңізде, тіпті көкте желбірейтін осы ту болмақ деді. Гөкбайрак аман болсын. Қырымды гүлденген, өркениетті және бай елге айналдыру үшін біз Қырым үшін еңбек етіп, өмір сүруіміз керек. Бір жарым ғасыр бойы әдебиетсіз, ғылымсыз, өнерсіз, сауда-саттықсыз, саясатсыз түрмеде, жоқшылықта өмір сүрдік. Біздің ұлт Съезді тек өзін билеу үшін ашпайды. Біздің халық әділетті. Ол өзін ғана ойлап, өз бақытын қамтамасыз етуге тырысатындардың қатарынан емес, ұлтымыз өзге ұлттарды иығына алуды ұйғарды. Съезд мұсылмандардың мақсат-



мүдделері мен олармен іргелес өмір сүріп жатқан Қырымдағы жалпы ұлттардың істерін жалғастыратын болады.

1917 жылы 1 қарашада Қырым түріктерінің комитеттері сайлаған өкілдер Ақмесджитте жиналып, съезд шақырды. Съезд мақсаты Қырымдағы әртүрлі ұлттардың діни, ұлттық және саяси құқықтарына қатысты Қырым Халық Республикасын құрудың принциптерін анықтау болды. Осы мақсатта шақырылған съезде Қырымның сыртындағы сарбаздарды елге әкелу туралы да шешім қабылданды. Ерман-ы Харбийе бастығы Джафер Сейдахмет Қырымның сыртындағы Қырым әскерлерін Украина майданынан Қырымға қайтару үшін көп күш жұмсады. Қиын жағдайда Киевке барған Кафер Сейдахмет көптеген қиындықтарға қарамастан өзінің атты әскерлерді Қырымға жібере бастады. Бірақ Румыния майданындағы мұсылман және татар сарбаздарынан құралған 28 мыңдық әскерді Қырымға көшіру мүмкіншілігі ара қашықтыққа байланысты мүмкін болмады. Кейбіреулері кеш болса да Қырымға жете алды. Ұлттық үкіметті құру уақыты келді. 1917 жылы 17 қарашада Қырымда сайлау өтті. Әйелдердің де сайлау және сайлану құқығы болды. Сайлау нәтижесінде конгресстің 76 делегаты анықталды. Делегаттар арасында әйелдер де болды. Сондықтан 1917 жылдан бастап бүкіл Түрік әлемінде алғаш рет әйелдерге сайлау және сайлану және олардың қоғамдық істерге қатысу құқығын берген Қырым татарлары болды. Осылайша салтанатты шараларға жиналды. Түскі намаздарын делегаттар Хань мешітінде жамағат болып оқыды. Диван-ы Әли палатасына қарай съезд делегаттары өтетін жолда Сарбаздар командирлерінің пәрменімен сәлемдесіп сап түзеп, қолдарына әскери гармонь ұстап тұрды. Олар «Хүрриет» әнұранын ойнады. Бұл күндерді көрген жұртшылық, медресе шәкірттері, сарбаздар қуанышпен қуанып жатты. Құрылтайдың ашылуында Қырым мұсылмандары атқару комитеті атынан сөз сөйлеген Нуман Челеби Джихан былай деді: «Бір жарым ғасырдан бері жабылып қалған саясат тарихымыз бүгін қайта ашылуда. Бүгін осы Ұлы сотта жиналған Қырым конгресінің Мәжілісі Ресей үкіметі өлтірген татар Вил-и Миллийені қайта тірілтуде. Бүгін татар ұлты қайта туды...».

Алғашқы отырысы сайланған делегаттардың ең үлкені Капишорлу Хажы Али Эфендидің төрағалығымен өткен Конгрессте Төрағалық кеңесі де Челеби Джихан, Джафер Сейдахмет, Әбділхаким Хилми, Хажы Бедреттин және

Шефика Гаспыралыдан құралды. Джафер Сейдахмет дайындаған және Челеби Джихан мен Джафер Аблай келіссөздер жүргізген Бас Ассамблея дауыс беру арқылы мақұлдады. Олар өздерінің Ұлттық Парламентін құрғаннан кейін Нуман Челеби Жиханды өздері құрған Ұлттық үкіметтің басшысы етіп тағайындады. Нәтижесінде 26 желтоқсан күні кешке Челеби Джиханның төрағалығымен өткен қызу пікірталастардың нәтижесінде үкімет сенімін алды. Қырымда шиеленіс кезең-кезеңімен көтеріле бастады. Қарулы қақтығыстар да орын алды. Қару-жарақ қажет болған осы ортада большевиктік революция комиссарының қайтару талабына қарамастан, Гөзлеведегі екі вагон зеңбіректер Ақмесджитке әкелінді. Большевиктердің басқыншылығы күшейген бұл күндері қырым-татар жауынгерлерінің қатарына большевиктерге қарсы шыққан орыс офицерлері (меньшевиктер) де қосылды. Бұл шиеленіс халықтың руханиятына кері әсерін тигізді. Қырым татар халқына рух беру және барлық әскери күштерді жинау мақсатында Ақмесджитте соғыс министрі Жафер Сейдахметтің бақылауымен керемет әскери шеру ұйымдастырылды. Осы сәтте шиеленіс күшейе түсті. Қырым татар ұлттық үкіметі сарбаздары мен большевиктер арасындағы қақтығыстар туралы хабар әр жақтан дерлік естілді. Севастопольден Ақмесджитке 10 мыңға жуық большевик солдатты жөнелтілгенде, оқиға өте қиын болды. Ақмесджит пен Севастополь арасындағы Белбек стансасы төңірегінде болған қақтығыстарда өздерінен әлдеқайда жоғары болған орыс әскерлерін талқандаған Қырым ұлттық армиясы орыс әскерлерін Севастопольге айдады. Алайда қолдағы оқ-дәрілердің жоқтығынан әскерлер нақты нәтиже ала алмай, Севастопольді алуға аз уақыт қалғанда тарап кетуге мәжбүр болды. Қақтығыстар қарқынмен жалғасып жатқанда, Ақмесджитте ауыр дағдарыс басталды. Ұлттық үкімет «Народный дом» (Халық үйі) ғимаратын сатып алғысы келіп, орыстар одан бас тартқаннан кейін ғимаратты Ұлттық күштер басып алды. Бұл әрекет орыстардың үлкен наразылығын тудырды. Народный домдағы заставаларды жоюды талап етіп, Қырымның түкпір-түкпірінен орыс халқы Ақмесджитке ағыла бастады. Жиналған Ұлттық Үкімет Министрлер Кеңесі Народный домнан кетуге шешім қабылдағанда Челеби Джихан да қызметінен кетті. Ұлттық үкімет парламент мүшелерін Ақмесджитке шақырып жатқанда

большевиктер қалаға бірте-бірте басып кіре бастады. Көптеген Қырым татар сарбаздары шейіт болған қақтығыстар нәтижесінде Нуман Челеби Джихан большевиктердің президенті Миллер тарапынан тұтқындалып, көлікпен Севастопольге жеткізілді. 1918 жылы 26 қаңтарда большевиктер Қырымды толығымен басып алды. Тұтқындалған кезде Челеби Джихан қасындағыларға мына сөздерді айтты; «Қырым үкіметі мен Қырым халқы міндетті түрде қайта өмір сүреді». Севастопольде басқа Қырым татар моджахедтерімен бірге түрмеде отырған Челеби Джихан адамгершілікке жатпайтын қарым-қатынас пен қатыгездікке ұшырады. Оқ тиіп шейіт болған Нуман Челеби Джихан мен онымен бірге айыпталушының мәйіттері ешкім таба алмас үшін Қара теңізге лақтырылды. Қырым жәдиттері ұлттық және қызыл болып екіге бөлінді. Қызыл Армия ұлтшылдарға қарсы жаппай қырып-жою қозғалысын қолға алды. Бұл Қырым сечичилерінің алғашқы толқыны. Қырымда 1921 жылы Лениннің ағасы Ульяновскийдің төрағалығымен Қырым Автономиялық Кеңестік Социалистік Республикасы құрылды. Кейін Вранглер Қырымды қайтарып алғанда, бұл үкімет құлады (Üşümezsoy, 2010). Одан кейінгі кезеңде большевиктер Бела-кунның басшылығымен Қырымдағы большевиктерге қарсы жорықты басу операциясына кірісті. Лениннің бұйрығымен Ұлттық партияның сол қанатымен жасалған одақ пен келісім Ұлттық партияны заңды түрде жасады. Ұлттық партияның түрмедегі мүшелері босатылды. Сұлтан Ғалиев пен Фирдевстің ұлт коммунистерінің қолдауымен 1921 жылы қазанда Лениннің сөзімен айтқанда, «Шығыс жұлдызы» Қырым Автономиялық Социалистік Республикасы жарияланды. Бұл Лениннің Шығыс халықтарына да, түріктердің азаттық соғысына да жолдауы ретінде қарастырылды. Вели Ибрахим басқаратын және көрнекті татар тұлғасы бар бұл үкімет Анкарадағы Мұстафа Кемалдың парламентімен байланыс орнатты. Бұл Лениннің социалистік утопиясы Шығыс халықтарының азаттығы ретінде көрінген кезең. Бұл кезеңде Сұлтан Ғалиев және оның достары Башқұртстанның Қазан қаласында билікте болды. Ал Башқұрт-Қазан өкілдері Түркияда жұмыс істеген. (Üşümezsoy 2010)

Түркістан мен Бұхара әмірлігінде большевиктердің билікке келуімен Ежелгілердің ынтымақтастығы жәдидшілерді бұл процесте оң және сол деп екі топқа бөлді. Қазақстанда құрылған «Алаш-Орданың» бастаушылары,

алдымен «патшалық орыстардың» басшысы оларға Колчак, одан кейін қызылдар шабуыл жасады. Қазақ, қырғыз және Өзбек жәдиттері Ауғанстанға, Түркияға, Пәкістанға, Энверге қашуға мәжбүр болды. Олар Паша бастаған Түркістан азаттық соғысын қолдап, басмашылармен бір жақта соғысты. Иділ Оралда ұлтшылдар ыдырап жатқанда, Сұлтан Ғалиев достарымен ұлттық коммунизм ұғымын берік ұстануға тырысты. Түркістанда солшыл қолдар Бұхара коммунистік партиясынан Өзбекстан коммунистік партиясына дейінгі аралықта партия мүшесі болады. Әзірбайжанда Нариман Нариманов 1920 жылы 28 сәуірде Әзірбайжан Әскери Кеңесінің төрағасы және Премьер-Министрі (Халық Комиссарларының Төрағасы) болды. 1922 жылы Оңтүстік Кавказ федерациясының президенті және КСРО Орталық Атқару Комитетінің Төрағасы болып тағайындалды. 1923 жылы Ресей Компартиясы Орталық Комитетінің мүшесі болды. Одан кейін Сыртқы істер министрлігінің Шығыс бөлімінің бастығы болып тағайындалды. Нариман Нариманов саяси себептермен партиядан шықты. Бірақ оны Әзірбайжанда жақсы көргендіктен тікелей тұтқындамай, ресми құжаттарда жүрек талмасынан 1925 жылы 19 наурызда қайтыс болды деп жазылған. Алайда, соңғы жылдары оның өлімі саяси қастандық екендігі жиі айтылып жүрді, өйткені оның ешқандай ауруы жоқ еді. 1924 жылы Ленин қайтыс болғаннан кейін Сталин мен Троцкий арасындағы тартыс соқыр төбелеске ұласты. Бұл кезеңде көптеген зиялылар большевиктерге қарсы жәдиторлар мен басмашылар атанып, 1927-1928 жылдар аралығында Орал тауларына жер аударылып, атылды. Өкінішке орай, бұл жәдидшілердің екінші толқыны еді. Қырымда Вели Ибраимовтың барлық кадрлары атылғаны сияқты, Вели Ибрахим бөлген жерлердің иелері кулактар деп сипатталып, Сібірге жер аударылды. Қырым драмасы 1928 жылы қайтадан басталды. Бұл қысқа мерзімді, 8 жылға созылған социалистік арман Сталиннің контрреволюциялық төңкерісімен аяқталады. Бұл тек Қырымда ғана емес, Иділ-Орал мен Қазақстанда да күрт орын алады. Сталиннің сөйлеген сөзінде сол және оң ауытқулар туралы айтылған барлық сұлтан ғалиевшіл кадрлар; Ғалиев, Иділ Оралда ұлтшылдар жарылып жатқанда, Сұлтан Ғалиев және оның достары ұлттық коммунизм тұжырымдамасын ұстануға тырысты».

Фирдевс, Тұрар Рысқұлов, Хоқаев сияқты ұлт коммунистері батырлары атылды. Бұл жолдардың барлығынан басқасы ұлтшылдық ауытқуды айыптау, бай шаруаларды жою, социалистік билікті нығайту үшін пролетариат диктатурасын жүзеге асыру сияқты социалистік терминологияға енгізілген.

Адамгершілікке жатпайтын тағы бір әрекет Қырымда Хасан Сабри Айвазов 1930-шы жылдарға дейін жұмысқа берілмеу туралы үкім шығарылды. (Üşümezsoy 2010) Газет-журнал шығаруда, мақала жазуда осындай өнімді құрылымды ұстанған Айвазовтың 1930 жылдардағы бірде-бір мақаласы жоқ. Осы үлкен азаптан кейін ол 1938 жылы 60 жасында атылып өлтірілді. Қызыл ма, солшыл ма, әйтеуір, 1937 жылғы қанды ұсыныста «пантүркист», «түркішіл» деген айыппен жәдидшілердің барлығы дерлік, әсіресе жетекші қозғалысты басқарып, бағыт-бағдар беріп отырғандар ұжымдық түрде атылады. Өкінішке орай, бұл жәдидшілердің үшінші толқыны еді.

Жәдидшілдіктен түрікшілдікке және Түркия Республикасына дейін Исмаил Гаспыралының «Тержұман» газеті мен басылымдары күллі түрік әлемінде Ыстамбұлда да айтарлықтай оқырманға ие болды. Мемлекетің түкпір-түкпірінде ұлтшылдық өршіп тұрды, бірақ түрік ұлты Османлыға бағынышты болудан немесе Мұхаммедтің үмметі болудан аса алмады. Тіпті әртүрлі азшылықтар мен девширмелердің түрлі қорлауларына ұшырады. Танзимат (салқ салу) жарлығынан кейін білім беру жүйесі біршама жақсарды, бірақ проблемалар әлі де сақталды. Ыстамбұлдағы зиялы қауымға Исмаил Гаспыралдың «Тержұман» газеті мен басқа да басылымдары әсер етті. Ал Усуль-и Жәдит мектептерінде өскен түрік зиялылары жоғары білім алу үшін Стамбулға келе бастады. Түрік ұлтшылдығы мен түрікшілдік идеясы олар құрған қоғамдарда, әсіресе Түрік ошағында кең тарала бастады. Балқан және Бірінші дүниежүзілік соғыстың бірінен соң бірі жеңіліске ұшырауы бұл ұлтшыл интеллектуалдық қозғалыстардың кең таралуына және күшеюіне себеп болды. Осы аралықта орыс патшалығы жойылып, Түрік әлемінің түкпір-түкпірінде тәуелсіздік желдері соға бастады. Қырымда, Қазанда, Әзірбайжанда, Бұқарада, Башқұртстанда, Түркістанда жәдидшілер тарапынан ұлттық мемлекеттер мен республикалар құрыла бастады. Бірінші дүниежүзілік соғыс жеңіліп, Анадолы мен Ыстамбұл басып алынып, Османлы Парламенті Ұлттық пакт

жарияланып таратылғаннан кейін Анадолыда ұлттық күрес кезеңі басталды. Түрік әлеміндегі ұлттық мемлекеттерден көмектер жиналып, Анадолы қозғалысына әр түрлі материалдық және моральдық қолдау көрсетілді. Бұхара республикасының қазынасынан жөнелтілген 100 миллион рубль алтын ұлттық күрестің ең қиын кезеңдерінде Анкараға жеткізілді».

## Қорытынды

Тәуелсіздік соғысы жалғасып жатқан кезде дипломатиялық байланыстар жасау үшін 1921 жылы 17 қаңтарда Бұхара Халық Республикасынан делегация Анкараға келді. Делегация Мұстафа Кемалға үш алтын кестелі қылыш пен Темірге тиесілі Құранды сыйға тартты. Сакария Жеңісін құттықтау үшін жіберілген бұл сыйлықтарға алғыс ретінде Мұстафа Кемал Паша парламент мінберінен әсерлі сөз сөйлейді:

«Бұқаралықтар Түркиядағы түрік және мұсылман бауырларына сый ретінде жіберген Құран мен Түркия халық әскеріне алғыс пен құттықтау ретінде жіберген қылыш – ерекше әрі қымбат, ақиқат дін мен өмірдің күшін білдіретін қылыш – екі мұра. Қолдарыңыздан осы жәдігерлерді алып жатқанда жүрегім толқып кетті. Алыстағы ағаларымыздың бастама нышандары мен құттықтауларына халқымыз да, әскеріміз де ерекше мақтаныш болары сөзсіз. Тақуа және бауырлас Бұхар халқының тілегін орындап, мен бұл Киелі кітапты елге, әулиені Измирді жаулап алушыға жеткіземін. Алланың рақымымен Инөнү мен Сакария жеңістеріне қол жеткізген ұлттық армиямыз бұл қылышты да көп ұзамай жеңеді деп үміттенеміз. Құрметті делегацияңызға түрік халқы мен армиясы және Түркия Ұлы Ұлттық Мәжілісі үкіметі атынан алғыс айтамын.» (Hakimiligi Milliye, 8 Kanunusani, 1922).

Қылыштардың бірі Мұстафа Кемал Пашаға, екіншісі Батыс майданының қолбасшысы Исмет пашаға, үшінші қылыш Измирге кірген екінші атты әскер дивизиясының 4-ші полкінің рота командирі капитан Шерафеттин мырзаға берілді. 9 қыркүйек күні таңертең Үкімет үйіне түрік туын тікті. Исмет паша 1944 жылы «Ұлттық басшы» кезеңінде Әзірбайжаннан қашып Түркияны паналаған 144 жәдит алып жүрген қылышқа лайық емес екенін мәлімдеді. Өйткені Әзербайжан түрік зиялыларының Сталинге қайтарылып, өлтірілгенін «Боралтан көпірі оқиғасына» өзін кінәлі санады.

«Тәуелсіздік соғысы жалғасып жатқан кезде дипломатиялық байланыстар жасау үшін 1921 жылы 17 қаңтарда Бұхара Халық Республикасынан делегация Анкараға келді. Делегация Мұстафа Кемалға үш алтын кестелі қылыш пен Темірге тиесілі Құранды сыйға тартты. Барған сайын күшейе түскен Кеңес Одағы жәдидшілер құрған ұлттық республикаларды бірінен соң бірі

жұтып қойды. Бұл республикалардан қашып құтыла алатын жәдид зиялылары Ататүрік кемеңгерлігімен жаңадан құрылған Түрік мемлекетіне әкелінді. Бұл есімдер жас Түркия Республикасының білім мен өркениет негізін қалаған зиялы қауымға айналды. Жәдидизм жаңа Түркия Республикасының құрылу кезеңінде негізгі философиясы болды».

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