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**АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТШЕНИЙ**

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN THE EU MULTILINGUALISM POLICY AND IN MULTINATIONAL KAZAKHSTAN

Multilingualism and ethnic diversity are becoming an integral part of any integration entity, such as the European Union or any geographic region with a large ethnic composition and different cultural traditions. Integration of entire regions, international mobility and migration of the population lead to the adoption of policies aimed at the formation of a multicultural society. The globalization and the abolition of borders increase the risks of conflicts on national, ethnic and linguistic grounds. For the multinational region of Central Asia, the experience of such a multilingual organization as the European Union is important in connection with the process of forming regional identity. The multilingualism policy is defined in the EU regulations, guarantees direct access to information and justice equally for all EU citizens. The article argues that the normative experience of the EU multilingualism is acceptable for any multinational state. On its territory, the 24 languages have equal status. These policies have their own peculiarities, most notably in institutional practice and norm-setting. These policies intersect on many fronts with common European cultural and educational policies, and even in the field of sustainable development.

Key words: regulatory environment, ethno-linguistic policy, multilingualism, European Union, linguistic diversity, multi-ethnic and multicultural society.

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ЕО және көпұлтты Қазақстандағы көптілділіктің нормативтік-құқықтық базасының кейбір аспектілері

ЕО мысалындағы секілді, көптілділік және этникалық әртүрлілік көптеген ұлттық құрамы және әртүрлі мәдени дәстүрлері бар кез келген географиялық аймақтың кез келген интеграциялық қалыптасуының ажырамас бөлігі болып табылады. Біртұтас аймақтардың интеграциясы, халықаралық мобильділік және халықтың көші-қоны мультимәдени қоғамды қалыптастыруға бағытталған саясатты қабылдауға алып келеді. Жаһандану процестері мен шекаралардың жойылуы ұлттық, этникалық, тілдік негіздегі қақтығыстар қаупін арттырады. Орталық Азияның көпұлтты өңірі үшін Еуропалық Одақ сияқты мультилингвистикалық ұйымның тәжірибесі біртұтас Еуропаның өңірлік бірегейлігін қалыптастыру процесінің үлгісі ретінде маңызды. ЕО-ның “алуан түрліліктегі бірлік” қағидаты қоғамдастықтың мәдени және этнотілділік саясатында толығымен көрініс тапқандықтан, бұл өз алдына халықтар, қауымдастықтар, этникалық топтар арасындағы қатынастарды икемді түрде реттеуге мүмкіндік береді. Көптілділік саясаты ЕО-ның нормативтік құжаттарында анықталған, ЕО-ның барлық азаматтары үшін ақпарат пен сот төрелігіне тікелей қол жеткізуге кепілдік береді. Ол үшін Еуропалық Одақтың барлық ресми және жұмыс тілдері белсенді қолданылады. Мұндай саясаттың өзіндік ерекшеліктері бар, олар көбінесе институционалды тәжірибеде және заң шығару саласында көрініс табады. Бұл саясат көптеген бағыттар бойынша, мысалы: мәдениет, білім беру және тіпті тұрақты даму саласындағы жалпы еуропалық саясатпен ұштасады.

Түйін сөздер: этнотілділік саясат, мультилингвистикалық, Еуропалық Одақ, мультиэтникалық және көпмәдениетті қоғам.

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Некоторые аспекты нормативно-правовой среды в политике мультиязычия ЕС и многонационального Казахстана

Многоязычие и этническое разнообразие является неотъемлемой частью любого интеграционного образования, например, Европейского союза и любого географического региона с многочисленным национальным составом и разными правовыми и культурными традициями. Интеграция целых регионов, международная мобильность и миграция населения приводят к принятию политики, направленной на формирование мультикультурного общества. Глобализация и упразднение границ усиливают риски конфликтов на национальной, этнической, языковой почве. Для многонационального региона Центральной Азии опыт такой мультилингвистической организации, как Европейский Союз, важен в связи с процессом формирования региональной идентичности. Политика мультилингвизма определена в нормативных документах ЕС, гарантирует непосредственный доступ к информации и правосудию в равной степени для всех граждан ЕС. В статье утверждается, что для любого мультинационального государства приемлем нормативный опыт мультиязычия ЕС. На его территории 24 языка имеют равноправный статус. Такая политика имеет свои особенности, более всего они проявляются в институциональной практике и в сфере нормотворчества. Эта политика пересекается по многим направлениям с общеевропейской политикой в сфере культуры, образования и даже в сфере устойчивого развития.

Ключевые слова: нормативно-правовая среда, этноязыковая политика, мультилингвизм, Европейский союз, мультиэтническое и мультикультурное общество.

Introduction

Throughout the process of European integration, Europe consciously asserts its identity through key factors – language, culture, traditions, education. The civilizational heritage in all its diversity as the basis of European unity and community is the theme line of the EU cultural and educational policy. This legacy has become part of EU legal and policy practice.

Even at the stage of the creation of the European Union, reservations were made that integration should not be limited only by economic and social components. The evolution of the approval of European cultural and educational policy is evidenced by the mass of documents and agreements on the creation of the EEC, the EU, the EU Constitution, etc. A few decades ago, Europe introduced a norm for each member State to dissemination «the best knowledge, understanding of the culture, languages and history of European peoples; preservation of European heritage; cultural exchange especially through means of communication and cooperation in the media space» (Handbuch, 1996:1080). Based on this, the EU develops cooperation on cultural issues with third countries and with international organizations. Implementing integration goals Brussels strongly recommends to take into account the cultural dimension.

The European Union adheres to the main international norms in its activities, especially those developed within the framework of the UN. The resolution by the General Assembly on 20 December 2013 notes that «cultural diversity is the common heritage of humankind and that the information society should be founded on and stimulate respect for cultural identity, cultural and linguistic diversity, traditions and religions, cultural and linguistic diversity, traditions and religions...» (Resolution, A/RES/68/198). This resolution expanded on the 2001 UN Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in Education, Science and Culture. The purpose now is that the development of dialogue among cultures and civilizations will contribute to the preservation of diverse cultural identities and languages and will further enrich the information society.

The EU Document «Towards a strategy for international cultural relations» is a milestones of European engagement in international cultural relations and mark an important step to steering international cultural relations to the forefront of EU foreign policy. «Cultural diversity is an integral part of the values of the European Union... The EU has a lot to offer to the world: diversity of cultural expressions, high quality artistic creation and a vibrant creative industry. The EU's experience of diversity and pluralism is a considerable asset to promote cultural policies as drivers for peace and

socio-economic development in third countries» (JOIN, 2016). Indeed, Europe can offer its peoples and the outside world, including Central Asia, a variety of «forms of cultural expression», a creative industry, and its own experience.

The choice of the article's problematics is interconnected with the study of the positive EU experience concerning the normative practice aimed at overcoming integration difficulties, including in ethno-linguistic policy. EU policy documents indicate the need to comply with a number of principled provisions. Among them, in the process of adaptation to the leading cultural meanings, "gradualism" and "tolerance" are important, and without the obligatory rejection of national culture, traditions and linguistic identity. These issues were taken into account when the new EU Strategy-2019 for Central Asia and the Enhanced Partnership Agreement between Kazakhstan and the EU was launched. With the development of project directions within the framework of the new EU Strategy, for example, the Erasmus + program, the role of educational mobility is increasing. At the same time, the attractiveness of European languages and culture is growing, and the need to study them appears.

It is worth emphasizing that cultural exchanges between EU member states have a direct impact on the level and development of relations between states. The research this process determines the relevance of this paper. The relevance of the topic can be argued by the need for further study of the link between the EU normative "soft" power in relation to the ethnolinguistic and multicultural community.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the significance of normative practice in relation to the ethno-linguistic and multicultural policy of the EU and to identify some experience of multilingualism in multinational Kazakhstan.

Theoretical approaches and normative component of the EU multilingualism

A comparative analysis of EU regulatory documents and the identification of the positions of scientists in relation to multilingualism policy is the main research method. One of the complex hypotheses is the identification of multilingualism as a socio-cultural phenomenon and a necessary component of integration, the formation of multiethnic community model of the united Europe acceptable for perception in new pro-integration processes.

Regulatory documents as the main source

Normative power is characterized by the influence it exerts. The first treaties on the European

Communities, on the EU are the first normative documents. The agreements contain the basic part of the European integration policy, its evolution in the ethno-linguistic and cultural spheres. It should be noted that the European treaties are the normative basis for the language and ethnic policy of a united Europe and the modern EU: ECSC (1951), EEC (1957), Nice consolidated version (2002), and two treaties on the European Union TEU (1992) and Treaty of Amsterdam (1997).

The signing of the Treaty of Rome was the beginning of the EU's language policy evolution. One of the key points of the Treaty should be called the development of regulations establishing the language regime of European institutions. For example, Article 217 of the Treaty provided that «the rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously» (EEC, 1957). A unanimous vote allows one to speak about the significance of the language issue and approves the veto power for each country, therefore can be changed by the decision of only one of the participating countries.

Among the most important documents that have the political, legal and conceptual characteristics, and actually valid agreements, we will name the European Cultural Convention 1954, Regulation No. 1/58 (1958), and *European Charter for Plurilingualism* (2005), of course, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on 2004. Thus, according to Article 2 of one of the key documents governing EU language policy, "a Member State or one of its citizens may write to Union institutions in any official language of the Union, and the reply must be in the language of the request" (Regulation No. 1/58). The reports of the European Union are necessary for demonstrating both qualitative and quantitative indicators. These indexes demonstrate the effectiveness of ethnic language policies. For this reason, we analyzed special documents of the EU (European Commission and European Parliament), as well as data from surveys of Europeans "Europeans and their languages" (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012).

Concerning the realization of multilingualism through legal base, the Charter of EU fundamental rights is as an appropriate example. Article 41, continuing the idea of the Amsterdam Treaty, states that «anyone can apply to EU institutions in one of the languages listed in the treaties and must receive a response in the same language» (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997). According to the Article 21 of the Treaty of

Nice, during communication with European institutions every citizen of the Union has the right to apply one of the languages listed in Article 314 and in Article 7.

Moreover, the institutions (the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors) must reply to the appeal in the same language, and they have the right to appoint an Ombudsman accordingly Article 194 and 195 (Nice consolidated version, 2002).

It is important to mention that language diversity makes the official documents of EU accessible to European citizens; they are publicly available in all EU languages. For example, an interesting linguistic history of the creation of a Nice Treaty. The Treaty had been drafted in one copy in Italian, French, German and Dutch, all four texts were equally valid. Moreover, upon ratification, the texts in Danish, English, Finnish, Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish are also considered authentic.

The national languages of all EU member States are recognized as the official languages of the Union, they become equal regardless of the population, economic development or political power of the state. The adoption of linguistic diversity as one of the values of the EU has led to the emergence of linguistic human rights in international law. Moreover, the legislative acts confirmed not only respect for linguistic and cultural diversity, but also non-discrimination on the basis of the language, where each official language is endowed with equal rights. In response to the modern development of multilingualism, various political institutions have adopted a number of legislative, administrative and organizational measures to change or maintain the existing functioning of language rights in order to introduce and maintain new language norms.

A key factor in determining the effectiveness of language policy is the clarity in understanding who owns the responsibility for carrying out an ethnic language policy. The issues of creating a new multinational European community acquired special relevance at the beginning of 21 century. Most likely, the policy of multiculturalism and multilingualism was proclaimed as the basis for strengthening European integration and establishing interstate partnership in the wake of EU enlargement and cooperation with "new" European members.

Theorists, researchers

Researchers of political thought formulate theoretical approaches and their own assessments of the effectiveness of the implementation of European ethno-linguistic policy respectively of multilingualism. Some authors also take into account the condi-

tions of globalization and migration. British sociologist Anthony Giddens, is known for the structuralist approach (theory), has explored the place, role and future of a united Europe in an era of globalization. The author argues that it is necessary to be prepared to innovate and to rethink the traditional foundations of EU states. In particular, he is inclined toward the idea of a common language in Europe – English (Giddens, 2006:218, 246).

The cause to due to the widespread and noticeable high motivation for studying and educational mobility among EU young people, and for free movement of labour of the EU citizens. The similar ideas has David Crystal (Crystal, 2003). Victor Ginsburgh (2017) and Moreno-Ternero J., Weber S. (2018) categorically reject the possibility of adopting English as the main means of communication in Europe. In the modern world, the concept of self-determination and preservation of cultural heritage is of great importance.

The renowned international policy scholar and EU foreign policy specialist Ian Manners analyzed the term and concept of «normative power». He came to one important conclusion that normative power is neither military nor economic. However, this normative power is created by ideas, meanings and opinions, and it is aimed at forming ideas about a «normal» legal society, including a «normal multicultural society» (Manners, 2002).

Results and discussion

When analyzing the integration process, we take into account the point of view of A. D. Schweitzer and L. B. Nikolsky on the acceptability of bi-and multilingualism in building a single social and communicative community, where languages coexist, functionally complementing each other (Shveytser, Nikol'skiy, 1978).

The European policy of multilingualism has been in the center of attention, above all, of philological researchers. But their research is a serious complement to the work of political scientists and sociologists. In addition, «European experience of multilingualism and the development of multilingual education in Kazakhstan» is important (Aubakirova, Mandel & Benkei-Kovacs, 2019) as well as related «outside view» on Multilingualism in the Kazakhstan (Sinyachkin, 2018). The effectiveness of ethno-linguistic policies in Europe in the current context of globalization and the increase in migratory flows is being studied by A.A. Piskaeva (2013) and others. Some authors consider the implementation of the ethnic language policy from the point of

view of the functioning of European institutions. These authors discuss the practical application of this policy among citizens, namely the knowledge and use of several languages (Rekosh, 2014; Paramonov, Stokov, 2018).

Kazakh researchers raise the issue of multilingualism in terms of political processes in the country, the positioning of Kazakhstan on the world stage and relations with the EU. According to Laumulin M, Aubakir (2011; 2020), Baizakova K., Gubaidulina M. (2009; 2011), Chebotarov A. (2013) and others, the model of ethnolinguistic policy of the EU is also interesting when applied to the complex and multifaceted Central Asian region. First of all, the scientific and political-applied analysis of Kazakhstan's relations with the EU in the context of the Enhanced partnership (OJ, 2016), EU Strategies for Central Asia and EU strategy for international cultural relations (JOIN, 2016), Foreign Policies of Kazakhstan (Foreign Policies of the CIS States, 2019) is important.

Examples of successful ethno-linguistic institutionalization and overcoming language competition

The principle of unity in diversity of the EU is fully expressed in the cultural and ethno-linguistic policy of the Community, which makes it possible to flexibly regulate relations between peoples, communities, ethnic groups.

Hierarchy and status of languages. Nowadays European Union recognize 24 languages as official languages of the Union (Article 1, Regulation No. 1/58)¹. However, there are more than 150 languages spoken by regional minorities (450 million people in 50 countries in Europe). As a rule, citizens of the European Community are fluent in two or more languages. In this case, a person or a group of people have the right to choose and use languages in accordance with a specific communicative situation.

The implementation of the concept "multilingualism" led to various institutional problems with the distinction between several statuses of languages – official/working/state/regional languages and

languages of national minorities and languages of migrants.

European parliamentary system is the only institution where integral multilingualism implemented in practice. This fact can be proven by the concept of «language torch», which «means that all official texts of documents, speeches and other things are translated into English, French and German» (working languages of EU). Then, these texts are translated into the rest European languages. Consequently, these processes complicate the work of the translators in European Parliament. Therefore, in 1958, 4 official languages gave 12 language combinations of translation, in 1973 there were already 6 languages and 30 combinations, and in 2013 – 24 languages and 552 translation combinations (Rekosh, 2014).

The Rome Treaty 1957 became the beginning of the focusing on the language issue. In the European integration, the special attention was given to ethnically diverse and multilingual population. To this end, according to the ECSC, «the Community will enlighten and facilitate the action of the interested parties by collecting information, organizing consultations and defining general objectives» (Article 5). Following the principle of multilingualism, «citizens of Europe have the right to address questions and appeals the main institutions of the Community (the Assembly, Council, Court of Justice) in their own language to» Article 7 (EEC, 1957).

The process of integration of post-war Europe was hampered by the uneven political and economic development of the six EU founding states. Given the strong mistrust of Germany, as well as the apparent Anglo-French competition for leadership in Europe, the question of the dominance of a particular language also arose.

English as the official language of the Community can be considered a "late" or rather a "young" language. Only after France allowed Britain to join the EEC as a member state in 1973 did English find its place in official policy. Let us note that at that time there were still opponents to the expansion of English, especially in French-speaking regions. Today, English is considered one of the most widely spoken languages in Europe. It is also used as a «working language in the work of European authorities, not counting the European Court of Justice, which applies French» (Ginsburgh, ect. 2018). In the Brexit context, the position of French President Emmanuel Macron, supported by the government authorities of his country, is interesting. He wants to change the language situation in favor of France, to return the leading status to the French language (TASS News Agency, 2018).

¹ The institutions of the European Union use twenty-four official languages: English, German, French, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Dutch, Greek, Danish, Irish, Spanish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Finnish, Croatian, Czech, Swedish and Estonian. With the enlargement of the EU and the accession of new member States, the number of official languages at the expense of the new country increases.

During the process of European integration, a multilingual mechanism for regulating relations between the member states was developed. The creation of the EU's supranational institutions has had a significant impact on its ethno-linguistic policy.

The ethno-linguistic policy of the EU contributes to the protection of all languages, peoples and ethnic groups. However, there are noticeable contradictions. In addition, there is a fact of incorrect definition of such terms as «lingua franca», «multilingualism», «working language» (Dyke, 1997: 254).

These concepts require a detailed explanation in the political discourse and the media, as misunderstanding concerning the terms leads to a misperception of the EU language policy by ordinary citizens. The language problem is especially acute in Belgium. There are two large ethnic groups: Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-speaking Walloons. De jure, the metropolitan area has been declared bilingual. De facto, it is almost entirely a «French city. 80-85% of the capital's residents consider French to be their native language», while almost the entire population of the city speaks French (Dyke, 1997: 254).

Today European multilingualism is recognized as a socio-cultural phenomenon, where over half of people in the EU can speak at least two or more languages with 38% able to speak English (Special Eurobarometer, 2012). Moreover, within the European Union, multilingualism is officially enshrined in a number of agreements.

It should be noted that the concept of European languages is understood in a broader sense than the totality of the official languages of the EU member states. This includes almost the languages of all ethnic groups in the European Union. During the European Year of Languages in 2001, the Council of Europe initiated another *European Day of Languages*. The purpose of this event was to preserve linguistic diversity and to encourage the learning of European languages in schools and universities. This initiative supported by the European Union. Since then the European Day of Languages is celebrated every year on September 26.

In general, all the participating states have the responsibility to control the implementation of cultural and linguistic diversity in the framework of their own states and during cooperation with other countries. The European Parliament and the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers have a special institutional role in regulating all procedural rules.

It is important to emphasize that European language policy and its main value “multilingualism” become the prerequisite for the formation of linguistic law. European scholars consider that “mul-

tilingualism” strengthens intercultural dialogue and social cohesion, aims at prosperity in all member states and opens employment opportunities. It can be mentioned that multilingualism is interconnected with the goals and tasks of integration law.

Multilingualism has an institutionalized character under the auspices of the EU, which can be evidenced by EU acts – the introduction of the Commissioner for Multilingualism, in language policy and jurisprudence. The EU treaties and regulations concerning all active and endangered languages generally define multilingualism as one of the principles necessary for the sustainable functioning of the European Union. It is the languages and their speakers – ethnic groups and peoples that witness the history and traditions of European peoples and all together determine the European and national identity.

Multilingualism and European intercultural dialogue

Leonard Orban (European Commissioner responsible for implementation of multilingualism) emphasized the idea of European ethnolinguistic diversity as an important feature of Europe that differs this continent from other parts of Europe. He have identified three main strands of preparatory action to new strategy on multilingualism: first, languages as an integral part of lifelong learning and enabling an effective intercultural dialogue; second, nurturing a space for European political dialogue through multilingual communication with the citizens; and last but not least, multilingualism in fostering competitiveness and employability (Orban, 2007).

Moreover, it is important to observe phenomenon – «*plurilingualism*» which is considered as an integral part of cultural diversity. Along with the objectives of plurilingual activities are defined as more follows: combining the tasks of the economy with the tasks of culture/ cooperation of science with civil society/ involvement of civil society/ development and coordination of initiatives at the European levels. It is here that it would be worth recalling the «dialogue of cultures», a significant phenomenon in the combination of European culture and European politics.

In the pan-European process, along with economic and political integration, “*dialogue of cultures*” is of special importance. Over time, the concepts of “education”, “culture” were transformed in EU documents as “cultural policy”, “educational policy”. It is important to mention that this aspect is less politicized; moreover, it plays a creative role.

Language, culture, traditions of ethnic groups are the main components of ethnocultural identity. The 2005 “*New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism*” defines language as “the most direct expression of culture, which gives a person a sense of identity”. The question of «the relationship between language and culture is of particular importance» in connection with the processes of standardization and globalization that threaten the planet’s linguistic and cultural diversity (UNESCO 2005).

For the first time in all 24 languages used by EU citizens, the Constitution of the European Union or the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004 has been issued. The main language of the original text of Constitution was French. However, in developing the terminology and definitions of the draft Constitution, the lawyers and experts by the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference used French, German and Italian. Experts that maximum precision, «punctuality characterized by German and more elegant Italian» (Ziller, 2004, p. 43).

The Charter approval procedure took place in 2000 at a special Convention of representatives of various EU institutions and representatives of its EU states.

The head of the Commission in Charter was lawyer and politician Roman Herzog. In the past, he was German President and the chairperson of the Federal Constitutional Court. He played key role in defining the terms that were used in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

Cultural heritage is one of the richest expressions of cultural diversity. Focusing on the dialogue as priority component, it is worth to mention the German chairmanship in the OSCE-2016. The head of the German Foreign Ministry Frank-Walter Steinmeier noted that it is important for Germany to support the human dialogue, especially in those difficult times. In this regard, one of its goals were the strengthening of the human rights and civil society. In light of the European migration crisis, special attention was paid to the issue of tolerance and anti-discrimination. Steinmeier also emphasized the main tasks of their OSCE chairmanship is «to renew the dialogue, rebuild trust and restore security».

The successful policy of multilingualism became at one time the basis for the establishment of the practice of multiculturalism in Europe, the idea of which quickly spread in all EU countries since the early 2000s. Around the 2010-s notable politicians from several leading European states are Angela Merkel (German Chancellor), Nicolas Sarkozy (French President) and David Cameron (British

Prime Minister) declared the failure of the politics of multiculturalism.

The policy of multiculturalism has gained relevance again in connection with the European migration crisis of 2015, when the flow of refugees from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia increased. The European authorities, proceeding from tolerance towards arriving migrants, were forced to resort to a policy of multiculturalism, the essence of which is to ensure the harmonious existence of diverse cultures within one state, to support such co-existence of traditions, customs, and languages.

EU’s cultural diplomacy in Kazakhstan

The EU Document «Towards a strategy for international cultural relations» document defined the *EU’s cultural diplomacy strategy* aimed at increasing cooperation with non-European countries (JOIN, 2016). The EU Delegations became the conductors of cultural diplomacy of the EU in the CA region; it was in this area that the role of the Delegations expanded. European Culture Houses, active civil society, artists, cultural operators, grass roots organizations, etc. are involved in the policy of spreading European culture, European values.

The right to access to educational services, to cultural values that satisfy the needs of a significant part of European citizens and the right to choose individually for spiritual and professional development can be referred to the humanitarian component of the EU. This is what the EU is spreading far beyond its borders, including the states of Central Asia. «We are Europeans, deeply convinced that it is political, economic dialogue and cooperation that are born and maintained through cultural ties: strong, open and diverse», – was emphasized essence of the cultural policy of European integration by the Consul General of France Guillaumethe Narjollet (DW, 12.05.2011).

Proceeding from the tasks of the new Strategy-2019 to strengthen its presence in Central Asia, European diplomacy is pursuing effective policy, using the tools of the “soft” power through culture and languages. The EU is active in Central Asia in the fields of education (mobility of students and schoolchildren, technical secondary education), culture (concerts, theatre, music, museums, exhibitions), and science (joint research, projects, conferences), etc. This is one of the most effective and traditional forms of mutual cooperation. According to the EU Ambassador, Sven-Olov Carlsson, «over 350 projects amounting to 180 million euros have been funded by the EU,

notably focusing on strengthening the capacity of regional and local government, justice sector reform and human rights». One of the most popular EU programmes, Erasmus+, has already offered nearly 2,000 scholarships for Kazakh students and staff to come to study in Europe, and approximately 800 scholarships for European students to study in Kazakhstan (The Astana Times, 2019).

The experience of rapprochement between the EU and Kazakhstan in the field of culture and education under Strategy 2007 has not always been consistent and effective. Perhaps the new Strategy, launched in 2019, will be able to adjust the linkages in this area and provide support in unlocking the educational potential in the countries of the region.

A notable trend in CA countries is the annual European Day of Languages, months of European cinema. The world's largest multilateral research and innovation program, funds research and innovation on cultural relations, science diplomacy and cultural heritage «Horizon 2020» was quite effective. Of course, such events and programs are very important for countries such as Kazakhstan and others in Central Asia, which have strategic relations with the EU. Let's note another direction «Investments in the young generation, education, innovation and culture», which is included in the final document «EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for Deepening Cooperation» (JOIN, 2019). This line consistently continues the previous Strategy for enhanced interaction. For example, in the field of higher education and scientific research, almost all CA countries meet most of the criteria of the Bologna Process.

EUNIC is a network with global reach unite agencies, cultural institutes, contributing to the exchange between the different bodies engaged with cultural relations. The 120 EUNIC clusters in more than 90 countries represent all of the EU Member States. EUNIC clusters, EU member states, European delegations in Central Asia and their partners in non-EU countries have been piloting a number of such projects ad hoc basis as European 'Houses' of Culture. EUNIC also implements the curators' exchange program between CA and the EU, and other mobility activities. Furthermore, EUNIC is an associated partner of *i-Portunus*, the Goethe-Institut.

i-Portunus is the Creative Europe program, bases itself on the experiences of international cultural cooperation, a consortium headed by Goethe-Institut with Institut français and Izolyatsia. *i-Portunus* continues in 2020-2021 to support the mobility of artists, creators and cultural professionals among

all countries participating in the Creative Europe Programme, organizes five open calls (*i-Portunus*). From the first days of the opening 1994 in Almaty of the *Goethe-Institute* students and teachers of Al-Farabi University maintain close ties with this German institution. The most demanded and popular structures of the Goethe Institute is a modern library with a well-selected book fund. The audio and video library is also popular among young people: a great opportunity to get acquainted with the classics and the modern trends in the youth subculture. German language courses have become a step and advantage in cooperation with the Center for German Studies at Al-Farabi University and the Institute Goethe. The main area of activity is language courses.

Social transformation presupposes a multilateral dialogue. The new program «Culture in motion: the regional mobility fund of the Goethe-Institut in Eastern Europe and Central Asia» promotes cultural exchange with the countries of the CA region and with Europe. It can be concluded that the German language is gradually returning its status as one of the widespread foreign language in Kazakhstan. It should be borne in mind that in the past Kazakhstan was home to one of the largest German diasporas. German was a compulsory foreign language in schools and universities. Despite the fact that the diaspora of the German population has decreased, interest to the German language is gradually growing among different ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, and especially among young people. An important reason in favor of the German language is the economic power of Germany, its social, cultural and educational sphere, which attracts migrants, including from Kazakhstan.

The EU seeks, through cultural diplomacy, to enhance the attractiveness of its culture and languages. Perhaps new approaches will attract the attention of Europeans to the civilizational heritage and cultural diversity of Central Asia, deepen contacts of mutual understanding between the peoples of the CA and European regions.

Multilingualism and the Kazakhstan experience in the context of relations with the EU

The key argument for strengthening cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU is the similarity of processes in the field of multinational and ethno-linguistic policy. However, each region has its special and original characteristics. EU course and our country is aimed at the integration of cultures, peoples, ethnic groups, communities and the formation of a unique Kazakhstani identity.

Kazakhstan is a unique multinational state where more than 100 representatives of ethnic groups and 17 denominations live in peace and harmony (Kazpravda, 2018). Thus, Kazakhstan is a multilingual society. According to the official data 2018, there are 29 state, 75 regional and 530 local ethno-cultural associations function in Kazakhstan (Official Strategy 2050, 2013).

As discussed above, the European Union from the very beginning has pursued a policy of multilingualism. European legal practice does not allow the dominance of one language, as this leads to the violation of the rights of other languages and cultures. Taking into account the linguistic situation in Kazakhstan, it becomes obvious that the policy of trilingualism (Kazakh, Russian, English) had pragmatic objectives, preventing the violation of the rights of other cultures.

The rise of national identity has led to an increase in demands for change in the field of language policy and language education. The transition of Kazakh alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin is a big issue today for discussion in society. The main task of language policy includes the strengthening of the role and status of Kazakh language. It can be stated that the special legal base is formed for regulating language regime: the Constitution, the Law on languages and state educational programs etc. It is important to emphasize that current circumstances lead to future changes in legal documents concerning ethno-linguistic relations.

The main goal of the language policy of Kazakhstan is to ensure the functioning of the state language as a condition for maintaining national unity with an equal position of other languages. According to the "Ruhani Zhangyru" concept, three-lingualism is the path to the country's competitiveness. The modernization of the Kazakh language plays an important role in the implementation of the program. It should be noted that measures of transformation of Kazakh language into Latin alphabet are aimed at expanding the possibilities for the development of the state language, as well as for better understanding and integration in the world community (Rukhani Zhangyru, 2017). Language policy is one of key directions of the national state policy. Language policy is still a very sensitive topic for Kazakhstani society. The ANC it plays an important role acts as a link among ethno-linguistic groups and the state, between ethnic groups and foreign states. We can call this experience national and international, since it is developed in the long-term practice of Kazakhstan. «The Assembly ensures the integration of the efforts of ethnocultural associations, helps the

revival, preservation and development of national cultures, languages and traditions» (Kazinform, July 2, 2016).

Conclusion

The ethno-linguistic policy of the European Union focuses on the legal and financial support for the preservation of the cultural heritage of each community of the Union. This policy is aimed at cultural interaction and mutual enrichment of European peoples, stimulates the study of official and rare languages of European countries. Moreover, European language policy is developing in a democratic direction, showing an example of a sensitive and tolerant attitude towards the preservation of a diverse linguistic landscape.

An integrative multinational entity – the European Union is an example of the creation and functioning a multilingual and multi-faith community. EU policy defines the most effective methods to maintain the current language situation, to regulate the interaction of ethnic groups in the economic, political and social life of the EU.

European integration is aimed at strengthening the dialogue of cultures, preserving cultural heritage and widespread dissemination of common European values. The EU policy defines the most effective methods to maintain the current linguistic situation, to regulate the interaction of ethnic groups in the sphere of economics and politics, public life of the EU.

The principle of multilingualism and subsequently the policy of multiculturalism characterize a united Europe as a democratic formation. The EU is based on democratic values, where every member state and every citizen has the right to express their opinion in one of the official languages of the EU.

The ethno-linguistic policy of the EU has an effective direction – "a dialogue of cultures". The dialogue of cultures can be likened to a soft power that allows Europeans to circumvent contradictions and conflicts on national grounds and to effectively interact between Europeans and representatives of other cultures.

Due to the coexistence of many ethnic groups and nations obeying the unified rules of the European Union, this area of integration is considered quite difficult, and the unity of the community in this direction is very fragile. Nevertheless, the difficulties of this EU policy can be summarized in the formulas of "surmountable obstacles to European construction".

According to scientists, multiculturalism as an ideology and policy of interethnic and intercultural solidarity has the right to exist. This is especially true for Kazakh multinational society.

It is important to implement multiculturalism into the education system of Kazakhstan, since it affirms mutual understanding and mutual respect, tolerance and openness for compromises, equality of ethnic groups and cultural pluralism as ideals of the world and as norms of the daily life in a multiethnic community.

Adherence to the universal values of intercultural dialogue and ethnic consolidation is the spiritual and moral basis for building a civil society and the rule of law, creating effective mechanisms of social protection, democratic resolution of acute social problems. However, this concept should not be a copy of the European model. It should be developed in accordance with particular qualities inherent to multicultural education in the Republic of Kazakhstan (Foreign Policies of the CIS States, 2019).

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THE ROLE OF COLONIAL NOSTALGIA
IN THE ARGUMENT FOR “GLOBAL BRITAIN”**

To what extent has the argument for ‘Global Britain’ benefited from elements of colonial nostalgia that may have permeated British collective memory until the present day? In other words, can a genealogy be established between Britannia (Thomas Arne composed Rule Britannia in 1740) and Brexit? Whilst the concept of Empire 2.0 has often been used to engage with the range of reasons put forward by Brexiteers to support the principle of a breakaway from the EU, commentators have often neglected the long-term ramifications of the feelings that may have played a role in the choice of 52% of the British population in the summer of 2016.

Yet, a *longue durée* approach reveals compelling continuities over several centuries. Historiographical developments since the 1980s have pointed towards the persisting influence of the imperial experience on the DNA of British culture and politics. This was reflected in a range of cultural manifestations reaching large constituencies of the population of the British Isles – what John MacKenzie has termed ‘Popular Imperialism’. This paper explores the hypothesis that this deeply rooted attachment to the Empire has been running consistently (although at varying degrees) at least since the eighteenth century, and has found a new lease of life among supporters of the Brexit process, who have celebrated often implicitly the strength of the imperial legacy as a suitable alternative to the EU project.

Key words: ‘Global Britain’, colonial nostalgia, Brexit, European Union.

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e-mail: b.c.sebe@bham.ac.uk**Брексит және Империя: «Жаһандық Британия» жолындағы
колониалдық ностальгияның рөлі**

Бүгінгі күнге дейін британдық ұжымдық санаға сіңіп кеткен колониалдық британдық империяны аңсау элементтері «Жаһандық Ұлыбритания» ұғымының жетістігіне қаншалықты себептеседі?

Басқаша айтқанда, Британия (1740 жылы Томас Арн шығарған Rule Britannia (Басқар, Британия) патриоттық әні бойынша) және Брексит арасында генеологиялық байланыс орнатуға бола ма?

Империя 2.0 тұжырымдамасы елдің Еуропалық Одақтан шығу принциптерін қолдайтын Брексит жақтастарының бірқатар себептерді негіздеу үшін жиі қолданылғанымен комментаторлар Британия халқының осы мәселе төңірегіндегі бұрынғы сезімдерін елеусіз қалдырғаны белгілі рөл атқарды және Ұлыбритания халқының 52% 2016 жылдың жазында Еуроодақтан шығуды қолдады. Сондықтан, әлі күнге дейін ұзақ мерзім тәсілі – (*longue durée*) бірнеше ғасырлар бойғы тұрақты сабақтастықты көрсетеді. 1980 жылдардан кейінгі тарихи оқиғалар британ мәдениеті мен саясатының ДНҚ-сына империялық тәжірибе ықпалының тұрақты сақталғандығын көрсетеді. Бұл Британдық аралдардың бүкіл тұрғындарын қамтыған және Джон Макензи «халықтық империализм» деп атаған бірқатар мәдени шараларда байқалды.

Бұл мақалада, кем дегенде он сегізінші ғасырдан бері терең бойлап кеткен империяға тәуелділік құбылысы (әр түрлі дәрежеде болса да) сақталып, империялық мұраның күшін ЕО жобасына қолайлы балама ретінде көбіне жасырын атап өткен Brexit жақтастары арасында жаңа өмір тапты деген гипотеза зерттелген.

Түйін сөздер: «Жаһандық Ұлыбритания», британдық империяны аңсау, Брексит, Еуроодақ.

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Брексит и империя: роль колониальной ностальгии в аргументах за «Глобальной Британией»

В какой степени доводы в пользу «Глобальной» Британии выиграли от основ колониальной ностальгии, которые, возможно, пронизывают британскую коллективную память до сегодняшнего дня? Другими словами, можно ли установить генеалогическую связь между Британией и Brexit (Томас Арн написал «Правь, Британия» в 1740 году)? В то время как концепция Империя 2.0 часто использовалась для обоснования целого ряда причин, выдвинутых сторонниками Brexit, поддерживающих принцип выхода страны из Европейского Союза, комментаторы пренебрегли давними чувствами Британского населения относительно данного вопроса, что сыграло определённую роль и 52% населения поддержали выход из Евросоюза летом 2016 г.

Поэтому, так называемый подход *longue durée* отражает убедительную преемственность на протяжении нескольких столетий. Историографические события с 1980-х годов указывают на сохраняющееся влияние имперского опыта на ДНК Британской культуры и политики. Это было отражено в ряде культурных мероприятий, достигших широких кругов населения Британских Островов – то, что Джон Маккензи назвал «народным империализмом».

В этой статье рассматривается гипотеза о том, что это глубоко укоренившаяся привязанность к Империи существует постоянно (хотя в разной степени), по крайней мере, с VIII века, и приобрела новую жизнь среди сторонников процесса Brexit, которые часто восхваляли, без колебаний силу имперского наследия как самую подходящую альтернативу Европейскому Союзу.

Ключевые слова: «Глобальная Британия», колониальная ностальгия, колониальная ностальгия, Евросоюз.

Introduction

The result of the referendum that took place in Britain on 23 June 2016, which asked the question “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” sent shockwaves through the world as it provided the relatively unexpected result that 51.89% of voters, or just above 17.4 m voters, chose to leave the EU, as opposed to 16.1 m, or 48.11 %, opting to remain. Thus a small majority of the British public decided that Britain’s future was better outside of the EU, than as part of the largest free-trade area of the world. This seemed to be an unexpected course, to say the least, for a country that had so often been the champion of free-trade, very frequently to the despair of its Continental rivals. This choice was confirmed on the occasion of the early general election of December 2019, which returned a majority of eighty MPs in favour of Boris Johnson’s Conservatives. Whilst the first-past-the-post electoral system decidedly skewed the result, with only 48 % of the vote going to openly pro-Brexit parties (therefore excluding Labour which, with the rest of the opposition, has gathered around 52 % of the votes), the path to ‘Get Brexit done’, as the Conservative electoral slogan put it, lay wide open and it had proved to be a decisive winning argument in the electoral battle.

Therefore, it is fair to say that Britain is a country which has not voted to leave the EU in a ‘fit of absence of mind’ (to paraphrase John Robert Seeley, of whom we will hear more below). To a small majority of the British population, Brexit appears as a project, the same way as, in John Darwin’s words echoing those of Adam Smith, the British Empire was ‘the project of an empire’. Could it be that Brexit was in the end the twenty-first century equivalent to Henry VIII’s decision to secede from Rome? Beyond blaming Britain’s current electoral system which has provided perhaps a skewed representation of the ‘people’s will’, as it is so widely referred to these days, there are some legitimate reasons grounds to look for reasons explaining the persistence of the British public’s aloofness, or even open hostility, towards the European project. Was the past, especially in its colonial form, sending palatable echoes to a significant fringe of British voters, who were lured into the prospect of an ‘Empire 2.0’? Could it be that the British bulldog was biting back, perhaps for the wrong reasons, but answering nonetheless an atavistic call?

As a historian of the British empire who, from a historiographical perspective, belongs decidedly to the camp of the MacKenzie-ites, perhaps of the sub-type of the MacKenzie-ites sans frontières (Sèbe 2019), and therefore believes in the pervasive

influence of the colonial experience on British culture, beliefs and values – what MacKenzie has termed the ‘imperial mindset’, one question becomes inescapable: could it be that all these sediments accumulated over centuries of overseas ventures, these echoes of ‘Britannia rules the waves’, played a role in shaping the 21st-century British worldview, singularly vis-à-vis the major political project of the post-war period, the EU? Could it be that not-too-distant memories of empire, and nostalgia towards it, have made it easier for the overwhelming majority of UK newspapers to develop a fiercely anti-European, jingoistic tone to the delight of their readers?

More broadly, can a genealogy be established between Britannia (Thomas Arne composed *Rule Britannia* in 1740) and Brexit? Whilst the concept of Empire 2.0 has often been used to engage with the range of reasons put forward by Brexiteers to support the principle of a breakaway from the EU, commentators have often neglected the long-term ramifications of the feelings of pride and nostalgia towards a time when, as the word goes, the ‘sun never set on the British empire’. Yet, such feelings may have played a role in the choice of 52% of the British population in the summer of 2016.

The case for such a perspective is compelling. A *longue durée* approach reveals robust continuities over several centuries. Historiographical developments since the 1980s, in the wake of MacKenzie’s *Propaganda and Empire*, have pointed towards the persisting influence of the imperial experience on the DNA of British culture and politics. It is now beyond doubt that a broad range of cultural manifestations reaching large constituencies of the population of the British Isles contributed to the creation of an intellectual and political climate congenial to the blossoming of feelings of exceptionality about Britain’s destiny.

In other words, did Britannia lead in some way, perhaps via a couple of detours, to Brexit, as some scholars have started to argue recently? (Ward and Rasch; Dorling and Tomlinson) More broadly, can historians contribute in meaningful ways to the soul-searching exercise that events in the last three years have inevitably led liberal thinkers to undertake? This was the case both in the wake of the June 2016 referendum and its sequel, the 2019 general election that gave Boris Johnson an unprecedented level of control over the legislative and executive future of the country, with a clear mandate to implement Brexit, ending the parliamentary limbo brought about by the deep divisions running through the Houses of Parliament about that matter throughout the summer of 2019.

This paper is based on the hypothesis that this deeply rooted attachment to the Empire has been running consistently (although at varying degrees) at least since the eighteenth century, and has found a new lease of life among supporters of the Brexit process, who have celebrated often implicitly, but also explicitly, the strength of the imperial legacy as a suitable and preferable alternative to the EU project, therefore giving vital historically-fuelled momentum to their movement. Spanning three centuries of British cultural history, this paper offers a reflection about the long-term dynamics that have made the unthinkable possible: that one of the leading proponents of post-war European cooperation and free trade, would decide one day to turn its back to the ideals it had actively promoted – for instance, as a founding member of the Council of Europe. Such a radical U-turn is bound to have deeper roots than a skewed parliamentary representation or an unexpected referendum result, and we will be exploring three key themes in the following pages.

First, under the heading of Britannia, we will consider the ways in which Britishness has taken shape hand in hand with imperial expansion, and how, conversely, the empire has been a major conduit for the emergence of this composite identity, gluing, sometimes with a bit of pressure that was not always welcome at the receiving end, the four constitutive nations of the United Kingdom.

Secondly, under the concept of ‘Bringers of Progress’, we will examine how imperial thinking fuelled a deep belief in the exceptionalism of British imperialism – a claim that would lay the ground for the third and last stage of our journey, which is Brexit. We will see how the rise of Brexit ideals was fuelled by what I call here the triumph of the ‘Absent-Minded “Civilizer”’ in the postcolonial era.

Finally, as a concluding coda, we will ask whether Brexit Britain could be seen as a new Brutus, condemned as it is to reinvigorate memories of past imperial grandeur, and the subjugation of others that came with it, to justify its claim for its own national independence, in a blatant example of historical collision that does not fall short of irony.

Britannia: Where it all started?

Whilst it might have become less fashionable to celebrate it ever since British policy-makers calculated that an orderly retreat from Empire was preferable to a string of costly wars against independence fighters around the world, the notion of Empire has been historically very closely associated with the concept of Britishness. Even if

it was nowhere to be found in the open in the post-colonial period, it still remained almost everywhere. When considering what it takes to be British, or even more generally what makes a British person, the Empire could never be too far. At times, it could even be at the heart of people's homes, especially when their own lives had included significant spells under imperial skies (Longair and Jeppesen). Ever since the Act of Union of 1707, the Empire offered an outlet to glue the four nations of the United Kingdom, alleviating the tensions between England and its other three junior partners, who resented the former's leading role, often to their detriment. Among the four nations, the Scots played a significant role in the administration of the empire, as recent scholarship has highlighted, bridging a historiographical oversight that is revealing in itself, as far as the Anglocentrism of Britain is concerned (MacKenzie and Devine). We also know that the Irish contributed to the population of both settler colonies and the 'Anglo-world' in general (Kenny; Belich). David Armitage has underlined the close relationship between empire, nationalism, patriotism and national identity, especially revolving around the Anglo-Scottish union of 1707, and the associated hallmarks of national identity that crystallized the 'British state and empire', which he has identified as being primarily the Union flag (often featured on overseas flags, until the present day), 'God Save the King' and 'Rule, Britannia' (Armitage 170) – the imperial echoes of which resurfaced on the occasion of the controversy around the inclusion of the piece in the BBC's Night of the Proms in the summer of 2020. One might add to the list the very fact that many key identity-related elements, some of which formed part and parcel of everyday life, sometimes made direct reference to the Empire: one of the most blatant examples being the 'imperial system' of measurements.

The way in which the empire was represented to the British public in the past might explain why its long shadow has influenced current reflections on the subject, sometimes reverberating until the present day. In that context, historian John Robert Seeley might offer a key to understanding the reason why Brexit has enjoyed higher levels of support in England than in any of the other constitutive nations. He began his first lecture on The Expansion of England developing as his main argument the exceptionalism of English history, which could not be put on equal footing with other European nations such as, he argued, Sweden or Holland. The long-lasting commercial success of The Expansion of England, as well as Seeley's role in the founding

of British imperial history, indicate that Seeley's ideas percolated into national self-representation, and influenced several generations of British people when it came to reflecting about the uniqueness of their country's trajectory (Burroughs).

Evidence suggests that the development of the feeling of belonging to the British nation – what Benedict Anderson has famously called an 'imagined community' (Anderson) – was deeply influenced by the belief in national superiority, relying essentially on its clout as a maritime superpower at the time. Historians of British nationalism such as Linda Colley and David Cannadine have given the empire a central role in their narratives about how Britain was forged as a nation, or how 'Ornamentalism', namely how the British saw themselves and their empire, trickled down also at home (Colley; Cannadine). As Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger have argued, the British monarchy played a leading role in the 'invention of tradition' throughout the nineteenth century, and within it, the empire played a central part (Hobsbawm and Ranger).

For his part, drawing on the school of thought pioneered by MacKenzie's *Propaganda and Empire* (first published in 1984), Andrew Thompson has shown how support towards the empire included 'various strands of discourse' and levels of interaction, citing in particular 'transnational family ties', 'international labour solidarity' and 'the adventure, excitement and spectacle of faraway and exotic places', the appeal of which was mostly felt amongst the working classes (Thompson, 240). More abstract political or economic concepts might have remained more exclusive but remained powerful markers of an imperial identity. Overall, Thompson has demonstrated conclusively how the British people 'developed a remarkably rich relationship with their empire that markedly extended the boundaries of their domestic society', rejecting in the process the idea that Britain was an 'empire-free zone' (Thompson, 239). Whilst Thompson's research focused essentially on the 'New Imperialism' of the nineteenth century, Kathleen Wilson has demonstrated in *The Sense of the People* that empire was also an element of British popular culture in the eighteenth century, a point which was central to the theories of the 'new imperial history' (Wilson).

What John MacKenzie has termed an 'imperial mindset' (MacKenzie 2009) penetrated into the interstices of the British psyche, associating closely Britannia and the empire, as was perfectly encapsulated in the famous 1886 world map of the 'imperial federation' by Walter Crane which, in spite

of some hidden second meanings, conveys a general celebration of the empire as a key constitutive element of what Britannia stood for (Biltcliffe). Through a variety of connections, ranging from the press to the economic sphere and politically-motivated arguments, the empire appeared as Britannia’s intrinsic ally. This association could crystallize around specific reputations attached to exemplary figures, such as imperial heroes widely celebrated as ‘standard-bearers’ of national greatness (Sèbe 2013). Thus in a movement similar to that of the ‘manifest destiny’ in the US, British imperial thinking developed the assumption that British imperialism, as a bringer of progress, was endowed with specific virtues that made it an exceptional political, military and economic achievement – a claim for exceptionalism that resonates until today.

Bringers of progress: Imperial thinking and British exceptionalism

As the ‘empire project’ took shape and gained more currency, giving rise to the largest and one of the most enduring colonial systems of modern times, another associated belief, which has been underlying a lot of the Brexiteers’ arguments recently, started to gain real traction among the wider British public: the idea that Britain had a unique legacy to give to the world, through its successes based upon the practice of imperialism. British exceptionalism could appear sometimes in rather crude forms, as when Cecil Rhodes defended the concept of a specific place in the world for the Anglo-Saxon race. In his so-called ‘Confession of Faith’ of 1877, the Oxford-educated diamond magnate, who gave his surname to two British colonies in Africa, formulated the ‘dream’ to create a ‘secret society with but one object: the furtherance of the British Empire and the bringing of the whole uncivilised world under British rule’ (Rhodes). Rhodes adopted an extreme nationalist perspective to advocate British expansion elsewhere, and not surprisingly given his professional and personal interests, on the African continent where he proved to be among the major British empire builders in history.

Such a line of thinking would be echoed in countless interventions, especially by Tory politicians, over several decades. Thus, Joseph Chamberlain, known for his philanthropic efforts at home, with a view to improve the sanitation of the city of Birmingham, and as the founder of the University of Birmingham, claimed in March 1897 that ‘I maintain that our rule does, and has, brought

security and peace and comparative prosperity to countries that never knew these blessings before.’ (Chamberlain). German-born and German-educated politician, colonial administrator and pro-colonial publicist Alfred Milner became a champion of British leadership in the era of ‘New Imperialism’. The man who was granted peerage in 1901 as Baron Milner of St James’s and Cape Town, in an association that reflected the central place of the empire in his trajectory, chose as his motto *Communis Patria*, or ‘patriotism for our common country’ (Lee Thompson, 1). This choice was directly in keeping with his self-depiction as a patriot for the Anglo-Saxon Race. Milner celebrated in the British Empire ‘the power of incorporating alien races without trying to disintegrate them, or rob them of their individuality ... characteristic of the British imperial system’, insisting that it ensures its success not by ‘what it takes away, but what it gives’ and emphasizing that it opened ‘new vistas of culture and advancement, that it seeks to win them to itself’ (Milner, xxxviii). A keen promoter of the empire, Milner could draw on his exchanges with his long-time friend W. T. Stead, editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, not only about his creed around government by journalism, but also his support for the empire, demonstrated repeatedly throughout his career.

Such pro-imperial views prevailed even among Liberal politicians. Rosebery felt comfortable defending the principle of a ‘sane imperialism’, which in his view was akin to ‘a larger patriotism’ (Jacobson, 86). Before him (and even before Cecil Rhodes himself), Charles Dilke had praised enthusiastically the ‘grandeur of our race’ which he sought to demonstrate through his globe-trotting account around the English-speaking world, revealingly entitled *Greater Britain* (Dilke Preface).

Such views, amply reported through a wide range of cultural productions ranging from films to books and newspaper articles, contained all the ingredients necessary to create a powerful superiority complex revolving around claims of exceptionalism and supremacy (Thomas and Toye). Fast forward a hundred years, once the dust of decolonisation has settled, and the revival of this rhetoric, as we shall see in the following paragraphs, tended to imply by contrast that EU membership would lead mechanically to a dilution of the unique genius of British values and practices. This is what I call the unexpected triumph of the ‘absent-minded “civilizer” in the postcolonial era’

Brexit: The Triumph of the Absent-Minded ‘Civilizer’ in the Postcolonial Era?

John Robert Seeley, whom we met earlier, once wrote that ‘we [the British] seem to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind’ (Seeley, 8). His view was given a new lease of life when Bernard Porter chose it as the title for his book challenging (at least for the period running up to the 1880s) John MacKenzie’s theories about the extent and depth of ‘popular imperialism’ (Porter). Perhaps the second decade of the twenty-first century has given us a good reason to recycle the concept of absent-mindedness, and to examine whether Britain has experienced on this occasion a bout of imperial nostalgia and self-delusion that might have amounted to the triumph of the ‘absent-minded civiliser’, as a new embodiment of the ‘absent-minded imperialists’ of the late nineteenth-century.

The outcome of the EU referendum of June 2016 has seemingly led to the resurfacing of old tropes that had somewhat disappeared under the veneer of a post-colonial, Liberal Britain specifically embodied by the Blair and Brown years (with the notable exception of the Iraq war of 2003). Emblematic of this resurgence is the episode when then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson was heard in September 2017 reciting the first lines of Kipling’s arch-imperial poem *Road to Mandalay* whilst on a state visit to the Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon, Myanmar, where colonial memories remain raw and politically sensitive. As the British government, backed by an ever-evolving political landscape, opted gradually for a more clear-cut divorce from the EU, secretary of state for International trade (2016-2019) Liam Fox returned to old friends in the Commonwealth and in the Anglosphere to woe them to sign free trade deals with the ex-metropolis (Fox).

Many leading Conservative figures have adopted a similar stance over the years, among them former party leaders William Hague and Michael Howard, as well as former ministers David Willetts, John Redwood and Norman Lamont. A new rhetoric has emerged, extolling the close cultural and linguistic connection with the kith and kin of the ex-White dominions, the soft power over ‘third-world’ countries which were formerly part of the British empire, the rule of law as a specifically British legacy, or the representation of the Anglosphere as a family that longs to be reunited after Britain’s perceived betrayal when it joined the EU in 1973.

Whilst imperial nostalgia associated with Brexit longings has been mostly the preserve of the Tories

or the far right in recent years, Labour has not been immune to it either. If Jeremy Corbyn’s half-hidden Brexit sympathies may have been influenced by his scepticism towards Brussels’s perceived liberalism, some of his predecessors openly used the imperial card to justify their hostility to closer partnership with Europe. The Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell argued at the 1962 Labour party conference that joining the then European Community meant both ‘the end of independence’ for Britain and no less than the ‘end of the Commonwealth’. Britain would become a mere ‘province’ in a federal Europe, bringing to an end ‘a thousand years of history’, Gaitskell argued (Gaitskell). Recourse to the Commonwealth was ‘a means of disguising from international observers, from the electorate at home, and even from the policy-makers themselves the full long-term implications of the transfers of power’ (Darwin 1986). Yet and above all, underlying Gaitskell’s argument against Britain joining the EC is a feeling of exceptionality, disguised in a humble but yet distinctive claim which hardly succeeds in hiding a deeply-rooted superiority complex: ‘We have a different history’ – in other words, having ‘civilised’ the non-European world gives Britain a special place as a ‘chosen nation’, a view I summarise here as being that of the ‘absent-minded civilizer’.

This ‘different history’, referred to almost humbly in 1962 by a Labour politician, has been ploughed in recent years, and with much less humility, by a new generation of historians, both popular and academic, who have extolled Britain’s exceptional legacy and, in the background, its claim to a unique role on Earth, based on the claim that it has bestowed the rule of law, free trade and the English language to mankind, setting it aside from the rest of the pack – and especially from the rest of the EU. The 2000s have been somewhat of a watershed in that regard, starting with Niall Ferguson’s *Empire: How Britain made the Modern World* published in 2003, followed eight years later by Kwasi Kwarteng’s *Ghosts of Empire: Britain’s Legacies in the Modern World*. Both made a case for the exceptionality of the British Empire, the former on the basis that ‘it sought to globalize not just an economic but a legal and ultimately a political system too’ (Ferguson 362). Among the many discussions that have taken place around the question of colonialism and imperialisms past and present, three have direct ramifications for our understanding of present forms of ‘popular imperialism’, and its impact on Brexit thinking in the UK.

The first of these discussions broached ethical and philosophical considerations about the accept-

ability of imperialism. In stark contrast with the opinion that has prevailed overwhelmingly in academia since the 1960s, some controversial voices have argued in favour of a revision of the standards by which this fact of world history is appraised in the global human trajectory. Particularly vocal in this school of thinking, and drawing upon the likes of Ferguson and Kwarteng, are Bruce Gilley and Nigel Biggar. Secondly, the development, fate and meaning of English-speaking countries worldwide have attracted renewed interest in the last two decades. The ‘end of history’ as it had been identified by Francis Fukuyama meant an almost absolute triumph of the West, in particular in its English-speaking version. With the triumph of English as the world’s *lingua franca*, the origin of this global success attracted renewed interest from a generation of new imperial historians such as James Belich and his study of the ‘rise of the Anglo-World’ since American independence.

With Britain still soul-searching in an ever-changing world (one has in mind Dean Acheson’s famous word in 1962: ‘Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role’), recourse to the Anglosphere, as opposed to ‘ever closer union’ with its continental neighbours, seemed to become an alternative, and increasingly promoted, proposition. As a new millennium started, historian Robert Conquest delivered a stringent critique of the world order in the West, including the EU, and offered as a potential solution closer unity between the Anglosphere nations (whilst advocating Britain’s withdrawal from the EU). This proved not to be an isolated case. The Anglosphere has been equally presented as a way of coping with the challenges of the twenty-first century by both US businessman James C. Bennett (*The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-first Century*) and UK historian Andrew Roberts (*A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900*). Whilst the racial undertones of the concept might have slowed its spread in earlier decades, right-wing parties in English-speaking countries, and especially in the UK, seized the opportunity to give a new lease of life to a concept that had existed for a long time, but had become dormant as the sun of post-colonialism rose (Kenny and Pearce; Vucetic). Even the revival of the heavily racialized alliance with the ‘white dominions’ of Canada, Australia and New Zealand became a prospect often used to justify Brexit or as a means of reassurance in the transition period, through the project of CANZUK (Geoghegan).

Whilst such positions were oblivious of the ‘fun-

damental contradiction of Brexit – a reassertion of imperial self-confidence and an anti-colonial insurgency all at once’ (in the words of Fintan O’Tool), they exerted considerable traction among the public. In his recent *Empires of the Mind*, Robert Gildea has argued that ‘ambitions and fantasies about empire in the global and metropolitan spheres had an important impact on a third sphere too: Europe’ (5). Indeed, the result of the referendum of 23 June 2016 was a potent sign of the close links between narratives of empire and the Brexit project. The last British Governor in Hong Kong, and chancellor of the University of Oxford, Lord Patten of Barnes, said nothing else when he accused Boris Johnson and his negotiating tactics in the divorce discussions with the EU, to be on a ‘runaway train of English exceptionalism’ (Patten).

Conclusion

Is Britain betraying some of its fundamental values by turning its back to the EU project, which owes so much to its ideas and to its practices – often marked by clear and resolute opposition to the views of its Continental partners, which it was able to enrich and to nuance at times? Or is it reconnecting with its imperial past by turning its back to Europe and instead claiming to seek to deal directly with the rest of the world because, in the words of Boris Johnson, ‘We used to run the biggest empire the world has ever seen’, and therefore ‘Are we really unable to do trade deals?’ (Johnson 2016).

In this context where ‘Global Britain’ is actively championed by its governmental backers, can we argue that being ‘imperialily literate’, or, in Andrew Thompson’s word, not ‘imperialily illiterate’, played a role in diminishing the appeal of being a member of the largest economic ensemble in the world, which sits just across the Channel? The concept of ‘popular imperialism’, and above all its legacy today, provides a powerful explanation as to why the 22 miles that separate Dover from Calais might seem to some British voters wider than the 3,800 miles between Cornwall and New York.

Theresa May’s Lancaster House speech in January 2017 was enlightening in that regard: post-Brexit Britain would be a ‘country free to leave the European Union and embrace the world’ – in other words, answering this call, felt ‘instinctively’ in her view, to ‘get out into the world and rediscover its role as a great, global, trading nation’ (May). This is what Stuart Ward and Astrid Rasch have described as akin to ‘embarking on a voyage of *rediscovery*’ (2). Whilst the Brexit vote has seemingly resulted

from the coalescence of a variety of factors, ranging from fears of being socially downgraded, expressed by sizeable sections of the white working class, to immigration fears and sheer xenophobia, it seems beyond doubt that the long-standing influence of the imperial experience on various constitutive layers of the British public has played a key role in the ultimate success of the Brexiteers's narrative. A potent drive towards Brexit may have been the sadness at the idea that the British feeling of being 'the chosen ones' (or the 'chosen race' in the terminology of some nineteenth-century commentators) was being lost in the transnational and possibly supra-national aggregate that the EU is seeking to emulate. Generations of patient and passionate work proudly 'showcasing empire' have left a deep imprint in the country's imaginary, demonstrating once again the intricate relationship between culture and politics and how they can coalesce powerfully at times of national soul-searching. We have every reason to believe that the British Empire, and its image in

popular culture, has been, and is bound to remain, a powerful and meaningful key to unlock many aspects of British collective consciousness, past and present.

NOTE

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EVOLUTION OF WORLD TRADE WARS: THE HISTORICAL ASPECT

This article analyzes trends in international trade regarding trade contradictions and attempts to define “trade wars”. The growth of global trade has changed the economic impact and political contours of trade protection. The study revealed that today trade disputes and wars, which have turned into the biggest problems for the global trading system, this is a matter of great concern, and certain contradictions in trade relations between states are characterized as “trade wars”.

Since the establishment and development of international trade relations, in the context of competition between countries for markets, serious trade conflicts have begun to arise and escalate, and in connection with the development of the international trading system, the consequences of trade clashes have become increasingly large-scale. Countries have used a variety of methods – from diplomacy to military intervention to protect their own markets from foreign competitors’ goods and strengthen their positions in foreign markets.

The article examines the history of development and the reasons of world trade wars. The study of the evolution of international trade contradictions and disputes from the time of Ancient Greece to the present day, showed that the objects of disputes were different, different methods and tools were used during trade wars. Although trade wars have always been destructive, at the present stage, these conflicts causing divisions can escalate into new geopolitical confrontations and lead to a prolonged global recession.

Key words. trade and economic relations, trade contradictions, trade war, regulatory tools, USA, China.

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Әлемдік сауда соғыстарының эволюциясы: тарихи аспект

Бұл мақалада автор халықаралық сауда саласындағы сауда қайшылықтарына қатысты тенденцияларды талдауға және «сауда соғыстарына» анықтама беруге тырысқан. Жаһандық сауданың өсуі сауданы қорғаудың экономикалық салдары мен саяси құрылымын өзгертті. Зерттеу барысында қазіргі уақытта жаһандық сауда жүйесі үшін ең үлкен мәселеге айналған сауда даулары мен соғыстары үлкен алаңдаушылық тудыратыны және мемлекеттер арасындағы сауда қатынастарындағы белгілі бір қайшылықтар «сауда соғыстары» ретінде сипатталатыны анықталды.

Халықаралық сауда қатынастары пайда болғаннан және дамыған кезден бастап, елдер арасындағы сауда нарықтары үшін бәсекелестік жағдайында елеулі сауда қақтығыстары пайда болып шиеленісе бастады, ал халықаралық сауда жүйесінің дамуына байланысты сауда қақтығыстарының салдары барған сайын ауқымданып келеді. Елдер өз нарықтарын шетелдік бәсекелестердің тауарларынан қорғау және сыртқы нарықтардағы ұстанымдарын нығайту үшін дипломатиядан бастап, әскери араласуға дейінгі әртүрлі әдістерді қолданды.

Мақалада әлемдік сауда соғыстарының даму тарихы мен себептері қарастырылған. Ежелгі Грециядан бастап бүгінгі күнге дейінгі халықаралық сауда қайшылықтары мен дауларының эволюциясын зерттеу нәтижесіне сәйкес, даулардың объектілері әртүрлі екендігі көрсетілді, сауда соғыстары кезінде әртүрлі әдістер мен құралдар қолданылды. Сауда соғыстары әрқашан жойқын болғанымен, қазіргі кезеңде бұл қақтығыстар келіспеушіліктерді тудырып, жаңа геосаяси қарама-қайшылыққа ұласып, ұзақ жаһандық құлдырауға алып келуі мүмкін.

Түйін сөздер: сауда-экономикалық қатынастар, сауда қайшылықтары, сауда соғысы, АҚШ, Қытай.

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Эволюция мировых торговых войн: исторический аспект

В данной статье анализируются тенденции в сфере международной торговли, касающиеся торговых противоречий, и делается попытка дать определение «торговым войнам». Рост глобальной торговли изменил экономические последствия и политические контуры торговой защиты. В ходе исследования выявлено, что сегодня торговые споры и войны, которые превратились в самые большие проблемы для глобальной торговой системы, вызывают серьезную озабоченность, и те или иные противоречия в торговых отношениях между государствами характеризуются как «торговые войны».

С момента установления и развития международных торговых отношений, в условиях конкуренции между странами за рынки сбыта начали возникать и обостряться серьезные торговые конфликты, а в связи с развитием международной торговой системы последствия торговых столкновений стали приобретать все более крупномасштабный характер. Страны для защиты собственных рынков от товаров иностранных конкурентов и укрепления позиций на зарубежных рынках использовали самые разные методы – от дипломатии до военного вмешательства.

В статье рассмотрена история развития и причины возникновения мировых торговых войн. Изучение эволюции международных торговых противоречий и споров со времен Древней Греции до наших дней показало, что объекты споров были различными, использовались различные методы и инструменты в ходе торговых войн. Хотя торговые войны всегда были разрушительными, на современном этапе эти конфликты, вызывая разногласия, могут перерасти в новую геополитическую конфронтацию и привести к длительной глобальной рецессии.

Ключевые слова: торгово-экономические отношения, торговые противоречия, торговая война, инструменты регулирования, США, Китай.

Introduction

Globalization and economic integration are a distinctive feature of the modern world. In particular, the growing division of labor and fragmentation of supply chains have led to the globalization of the production and delivery of many goods and services, which has strengthened international economic cooperation. The increase in trade flows is a strong indication of such cooperation (Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz, 2014). However, against this trend of globalization, international politics does not necessarily become more cooperative – an idea that has been promoted in popular scientific circles (Friedman, 2000; Mandelbaum, 2002; Witt, 2019). Political tensions can significantly hinder all aspects of economic integration, such as trade, investment, supply chain and transport logistics.

Thus, in connection with the intensive development of globalization processes at the end of the XX – beginning of the XXI century, with the growth of international trade and with the change in the position of countries in the world market and the structure of their trade, the desire of countries to maintain their competitiveness of their own producers and protectionist trends in new forms are actualizing the problem of aggravated

trade relations between countries. In the course of the evolution of international trade, various instruments of its regulation were developed and applied. Since the development of trade relations, each country, protecting the interests of domestic producers in all available ways, has tried to provide the most favorable conditions for them, even if it discriminated against a trading partner. In world history, almost every country has had internal and external political, economic conflicts and wars. There were many reasons for the outbreak of wars, the implementation of ideological, foreign policy, diplomatic and other goals.

In the age of globalization and the development of new innovative technologies, when the human being depends on financial capital, one of the most common and destructive phenomena is trade wars. They have a negative impact on the global economy, international trade and global financial markets. Studying the historical consequences of trade clashes, it can be noted that they can cause serious damage to consumers and businesses in both countries, and even lead to complete ruin.

Trade wars are generally considered a side effect of protectionism. Protectionism refers to government actions and policies that restrict international trade. A country typically takes protectionist actions to

protect domestic businesses and jobs from foreign competition, raising import duties or imposing other restrictions on imports imported from other countries. Trade wars are generally considered a side effect of protectionism. Protectionism refers to government actions and policies that restrict international trade. A country typically takes protectionist actions to protect domestic businesses and jobs from foreign competition, raising import duties or imposing other restrictions on imports imported from other countries. An important goal of trade wars is to protect national economic interests and cause great damage to a rival country in the market of any product, which leads to destabilization. Based on this, various measures are used as a tool in such wars (trade and political, economic, legal, administrative, etc.).

Thus, a trade war is a trade rivalry between two or more countries, which is carried out in order to capture foreign markets or prevent the trade "occupation" of the national economy (Mytareva, 2010).

Literature review

Today, the problem of studying contradictions in interstate trade and economic relations is more or less complicated by the lack of a generally accepted theory of conflicts in international trade. Scientific research that is devoted to a comprehensive study of the essence, causes, nature, forms of trade contradictions, evolution under the influence of economic, political, and other factors is still insufficient. As you know, modeling or analyzing trade wars is not an easy task. Heckscher-Olin tried to create a model that was successful, but on a limited scale. The main work on this model was done by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Olin in 1933. Johnson (1953-54) (Johnson, 1953) demonstrated that any country can win a trade war if it has a high elasticity of import demand compared to its trading partner. In this situation, he can set a non-zero tariff, and despite the retaliatory actions of his trading partner, he can win. Kennan and Riezman (1988) (Kennan, Riezman, 1988) in their work "Do big countries win in the tariff war?" are of the opinion: that large countries can win a tariff war because of their size of security for every good in the world. The work of Bobylov Yu. A. (2015) was devoted to economic wars in the light of economic theories, and this paper defines the concept of "economic wars". In the works of Korstjens, D.

(2005), and Byalogo Yu. (2013), Mytareva E. A. (2010), the phenomenon of trade wars, the causes and consequences of historical trade confrontations are investigated. Gordeeva T. (2013) analyzed the problem of international trade disputes arising between countries in the modern regulatory paradigm. The study of Makarov V. L., Vu Ts, Vu Z., Khabriev B. R., Bakhtizin A. R. (2019) assesses the consequences of trade wars.

Despite the fact that many international trade wars have been recorded in history, the problem of forming a paradigm of controversial relations in international trade still remains unresolved. Some aspects of this issue are addressed only in a small number of available research papers.

Materials and methods

The problem of trade contradictions requires theoretical understanding, special methodology and holistic analysis. The theoretical basis of the study was the fundamental work of foreign, Russian and Kazakh authors considering global instruments for regulating world trade, foreign trade policy and interests of states, international trade disputes. In the course of the research, materials of official foreign policy departments and information agencies that are in the public domain were used. The interrelation of systemic, evolutionary and institutional paradigms of foreign economic development and international relations were used as methods of theoretical understanding. The study used the methods of historical, systemic, critical analysis. When studying individual issues of the research topic, the authors used an interdisciplinary approach.

Results and discussion

Researchers distinguish between defensive and offensive trade wars.

- offensive war, carried out with the aim of capturing foreign markets and the acquisition of strategically important enterprises and organizations (investment companies, banks);

- defensive wars are conducted in order to avoid trade "occupation" of the national economy, the desire to maintain the current situation of the domestic market (Bobylov, 2015).

There are several methods of conducting trade wars (Bobylov, 2015).

Trade wars often result in armed conflicts when trying to break through a trade blockade.

The methods are used in offensive warfare:	The methods are used in a defensive trade war:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - tariff escalation (lowering of export customs tariffs); - an increase in export quotas; - application of dumping prices; - embargo on certain goods, blockade of services; - hidden anti-advertising of goods of foreign competitors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - increase in import customs duties (including the use of countervailing duty), which involves raising the price of imported goods to the level of domestic prices in order to prevent dumping; - reduction of import quotas; - introduction of non-tariff restrict-barriers related to the complication of licensing procedures and customs formalities; - introduction of technical barriers that contribute to difficulties with the compliance of imported goods with national standards and technical conditions.

The retrospective of the world trade wars

Since the establishment and development of international trade relations, in the context of competition between countries for markets, serious trade conflicts have begun to arise and escalate, and in connection with the development of the international trading system, the consequences of trade clashes have become increasingly large-scale. Countries have used a variety of methods – from diplomacy to military intervention-to protect their own markets from foreign competitors ‘ goods and strengthen their positions in foreign markets.

This study examines the well-known”trade wars” in world history, which could give clear ideas about their nature, causes, methods of confrontation and other aspects.

One of the first manifestations of trade conflicts can serve as an example of the ban imposed by Athens on trade with the Megarians. (432-430 BC). In ancient Greece, rival city-states used military force or the threat of military force to support their trade expansion or restrict foreign trade. Athens pursued an expansionist economic policy against Megara and banned trade with them. This conflict resulted in a serious war, which was later called the “Peloponnesian War”. Similar trade conflicts also occurred in Ancient Rome, Byzantium, and ancient Egypt.

In the X–XIII centuries on the ancient water and land trade route from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and then to Byzantium “The Way from the Varangians to the Greeks”, there were also trade wars. Nomads living on this route seized the property of merchants and charged a fee for their transportation. In this case, the method of controlling trade routes under economic blockade was used (Boxer, 2018: 268-270)

In the era of great geographical discoveries, trade confrontations between the leading powers and rivalries for control of the sea routes intensified.

In the XVI century, the spice trade was considered profitable, the Portuguese controlled this area. A state monopoly was established on foreign trade in Portugal, and independent traders were required to pay high taxes, which sometimes reached 50% of profits. At the beginning of the XVII century, during the trade confrontation, the Netherlands managed to oust the Portuguese from world trade. There, favorable conditions for doing business were created and effective organizational forms of doing business were formed. In 1602, the world’s first joint-stock company, the Dutch East India Company, was formed in Holland, which later monopolized trade relations with Eastern countries.

Also, the most famous events of the use of weapons as a tool for promoting national interests and realizing commercial ambitions were:

- The Navigation Act of 1651, passed by the English government, which granted only English ships the right to export goods from their colonies and led to the three Anglo-Dutch wars (The Navigation Act, 1651),

- The “Boston Tea Party” of 1773, when the British government abolished the import duty on the export of tea to its colonies in North America by the English “East India Company”, which caused the beginning of an anti-colonial struggle.

In the XIX century, trade clashes were characterized by the emergence of protectionism, the rapid development of industrialization and urbanization, as well as the transformation of trade tensions into real military actions. During this period, two opium wars in China are known in history, which were unleashed by Great Britain with the support of France and the United States. As a result, China was forced to sign the Treaty of

Nanking (1842), under which five Chinese ports were opened for British trade, import and export duties were established that were favorable for Great Britain, and Xianhan Island (Hong Kong) was transferred to the property of the United Kingdom (Treaty of Nanking, 1842).

The two “opium wars” are a clear example of the use of military force in trade conflicts.

In the XIX century, Great Britain, as the world leader in industry and trade, supplied almost half of the world’s industrial production to the world market, pursued a strict trade policy against its competitors (France, Sweden, Germany, etc.) through targeted trade sanctions, including full or partial embargoes, or exceptions to the principles of free trade in certain goods. During this period, countries tried to protect their national markets with high import duties (at that time, the average import duty was 35-45%) (Byaly, 2013).

However, the countries used not only legal methods of entering foreign markets. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in order to oust Great Britain from Persia, Germany secretly imported goods in large quantities with the trademarks of Turkish or Persian companies through the sea routes of Turkey to the territory of Persia.

The growth of Germany’s economic power caused concern among the industrialized countries (Great Britain, France, etc.), which tried to slow down the growth of its commercial expansion in every possible way. The rivalry is often transformed into a local armed conflict.

However, later in the subsequent trade clashes, military power receded into the background.

In the XX century, “trade wars” were waged in the light of decolonization, during the emergence of new economic unions and blocs, in the context of the formation of the international free trade system (GATT), scientific and technological progress. At the same time, during this period, trade contradictions intensified in the struggle for consumer markets and trade corridors, which often led to crises and recessions. In some cases, trade disputes have led to military conflicts.

Among the trade and economic wars of this period, which developed into a real war, one can note the “banana wars” (1898-1934) between the United States and Spain. The United States began to increasingly promote its political, military, and economic interests in Central America and the Caribbean in order to maintain its sphere of influence and protect the Panama canal, which was opened in 1914. Some American companies, such as the United Fruit Company, had a financial stake in

the production of bananas, sugar cane, tobacco and other goods throughout Central America, northern South America and the Caribbean.

The First World War had a huge impact on humanity, significantly reduced the volume of world trade and led to economic losses. Customs duties, which were slightly reduced before the war, rose sharply again after the war.

In the early 30s of the twentieth century, the global economic crisis led to a further deterioration of international trade relations. Almost all states found themselves in a difficult economic situation, and they tried to improve their condition with the help of international trade. For example, if in the early 20s in the United States customs duties averaged 40% of the value of imports, then in 1930 the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was passed, which increased the already high import duties to 64-65%. (Barlow, 2016). After that, total U.S. imports dropped from \$ 4.4 billion in 1929 to \$ 1.5 billion in 1933. European countries responded to these actions by setting their own trade barriers for goods from the United States. Moreover, countries whose goods were subject to prohibited duties did not receive revenue in dollars, which, in turn, did not allow them to make purchases in the United States. As a result, US exports decreased from \$ 5.4 billion to \$ 2.3 billion, and almost all exports from European countries were blocked. Thus, the process of trade and settlement between Europe and the United States was disrupted. This led to devastating consequences, first for the banking system of European countries, and since 1931 – for the United States itself. As a result, the monetary and international trading system was destroyed (Kizilov, Sapov, 2006).

During World War II, the participating countries suffered severe economic destruction. On the agenda was an acute problem of post-war recovery of the national economy. The countries realized that the problem of economic recovery could not be solved without expanding foreign trade relations. In 1947, after lengthy negotiations (1944-1947) aimed at establishing a stable multilateral economic order, 23 countries signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Although there was no broad agreement on liberalizing a significant sector of international trade, it was recognized that the unilateral and discriminatory practices of the period between the two World Wars had negative consequences for all parties. One of the main principles of the GATT was the principle of protecting the domestic market through duties, rather than through quantitative or administrative instruments. During the first round of negotiations,

45 thousand tariff concessions were made, covering one-fifth of world trade. The basic documents included the rules of trade between the parties and a list of reduced tariffs.

In the context of increasing liberalization of international trade, countries sought not to lose their positions in the world market, and applied new and new methods of non-tariff regulation of trade. A striking example of the widespread and successful use of such trade policy instruments can be considered Japan. The set of tools was very diverse: from non-compliance of imported goods with certain standards or Japanese traditions to endless bureaucratic approvals and licensing difficulties.

But since the 1970s, new methods of non-tariff import restrictions began to appear: phytosanitary, environmental, non-compliance of imported goods with the conditions of consumer safety or labor safety, etc.

Tariff reduction issues were discussed at the initial rounds of multilateral negotiations, and later these interstate negotiations touched upon other areas, including anti-dumping and non-tariff measures. At the Uruguay Round of the GAAT (1986-1994), the WTO was established, which, continuing the GAAT, oversees a wider range of trade agreements. Thus, the GATT system was adapted to the new conditions of modern international trade.

Another example of the trade wars of the twentieth century is the “Banana wars” between the European Union and Latin American countries (1993-2012), which arose as a result of the EU’s imposition of high duties on imported bananas from the Latin American region. Latin American countries accused the Europeans that they allowed banana producers from Africa and the Caribbean to enter their markets on preferential terms to their detriment, and several times filed lawsuits with the WTO. Due to the long consideration of these trade disputes, the “banana war” turned into a protracted “trade war”, which ended only in 2012.

As for the **“trade wars” of our time**, the peculiarity of these wars from the previous ones is that they turn into an instrument of geopolitics. In addition, in the context of globalization and interdependence, almost all States feel the consequences of “trade wars”.

A vivid example of “trade wars” in the modern world is the tense relations between the United States and China. The reasons for the war were laid in 2017 by the election campaign of D. Trump and today it is growing every day. In the election platform, Donald

Trump promised to raise trade duties on imported goods from China by 40% and deal with what is happening in relations with the largest trade and economic partner of the United States (Vinogradov, Salitskiy, 2018).

The main reasons for the start of the “trade war” was the negative balance in the US foreign trade balance, most of which is accounted for by trade with China. According to the American president, the excess of imports over exports is the result of unfair trade with China and other trading partners (Sinyu, 2018). In addition, the United States has accused China of conducting unfair trade and stealing intellectual property.

At the beginning of 2020, the parties to this conflict came to some compromise and took a step towards resolving the trade conflict by signing an agreement on the “first phase” of the trade deal. However, despite this success, this trade standoff has the potential to become a protracted conflict, and has a significant impact increasing uncertainty and destabilizing global markets. In addition, the situation was worsened by COVID-19, which threatened to disrupt the “first phase” of the trade deal. Some experts believe that the risk of developing a “trade war” into a viral one, and then into a full-scale one, is increasing.

Conclusion

The analysis made it possible to draw the following conclusions.

- being a historical phenomenon, trade wars occupy a significant place in international trade, and are reflected in the history of many countries, and continue to be actively conducted in the modern period. In world practice, trade wars took place regularly. Many states tried to protect their producers and at the same time capture new markets for their goods. In world history, there were “banana”, “cheese”, “cigarette”, “automobile”, “gasoline” wars, which led to a deterioration of relations between states and caused significant damage to national economies.

- trade contradictions, conflicts and wars are one of the methods of conducting foreign policy and can ignite a new level of armed conflict, which will significantly damage the financial and economic system and the social sphere of state agencies;

- modern trade wars develop into more complex methods of capturing national markets, turning into a tool for achieving the geopolitical goals of states.

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2-бөлім


**ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯҒА ҚАТЫСТЫ
ЖАҢА СЫРТҚЫ САЯСАТ ЖӘНЕ
ЕО ЖАҢА СТРАТЕГИЯСЫ**

Section 2

**QUESTIONS OF THE NEW FOREIGN
POLICY AND NEW EU STRATEGY
FOR CENTRAL ASIA**

Раздел 2

**ВОПРОСЫ НОВОЙ ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ
И НОВОЙ СТРАТЕГИИ ЕС
ДЛЯ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ**

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THE BIDEN WHITE HOUSE AND THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

The world anxiously waited for the results of the US presidential election in 2020, expecting a new direction by the new president and his White House's policy towards its friends and foes alike. Now President-elect Joe Biden and his administration will assume power on January 20, 2021, the White House's worldview and policy will most certainly either change or modify President Donald Trump's diplomatic, economic, and military engagements in the Central Asian countries. These and other issues will become critical concerns for policymakers and scholars of international relations for years to come.

This article explores the background of the US foreign policy in these Asian countries and presents an analysis and potential areas for engagement of the Biden administration in the Central Asian region. The modern dynamics of international realities requires a constant analysis of the ongoing changes for the operational calibration of internal and external management decisions for both regional and non-regional actors. As an international actor the US will have to be responsible to keep the world and regional balance in the region by trying to get its place in the region in the realities of Chinese – Russian dominance.

Key words. Central Asia, US, Joe Biden, White House, policy, geopolitics.

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Байден басшылығындағы Ақ үй және АҚШ-тың Орталық Азиядағы жаңа сыртқы саясаты

Бүкіл әлем 2020 жылғы Америка Құрама Штаттарындағы президенттік сайлауды асыға күтті, себебі жаңадан сайланған Президент АҚШ өзінің альянстары мен қарсыластарына бағытталған сыртқы саясатын түбегейлі өзгертеді деген үміт бар. Алайда, Джо Байденнің әкімшілігінен АҚШ пен Орталық Азияның қарым-қатынастарында нені күтуге болады және жаңа президент аймақтағы Дональд Трамптың саясатын қалай өзгерте алады деген сұрақтар саясаткерлер мен халықаралық қатынастар мамандарының арасында қызу талқыға түсуде.

Бұл мақала Америка Құрама Штаттарының Орталық Азияға қатысты соңғы онжылдықтағы сыртқы саясатын қарастырып, талдап және болашақ 4 жылдық Джо Байден президенттігіне болжам жасалынады. Халықаралық қатынастардың заманауи динамикасы аймақтық және халықаралық акторларда болып жатқан ішкі және сыртқы әкімшілік саяси шешімдерін талдап отыруды талап етеді. АҚШ әлемдік ойыншы ретінде аймақтық және әлемдік тепе-теңділікті сақтауға жауапкершілік ала отырып, осы аймақта Қытай – Ресей үстемдігіне төтеп беріп өз орнын табуға тырысады. Шын мәнінде, қазіргі уақытта Америка Құрама Штаттарының Орталық Азиядағы мүдделері АҚШ пен ҚХР арасындағы жаһандық қарама-қайшылықпен және Ауғанстандағы жағдаймен байланысты болып отырғандығы айқындалады.

Түйін сөздер: Орталық Азия, АҚШ, Джо Байден, Ақ үй, саясат, геосаясат.

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Белый дом Байдена и новая внешняя политика в Центральной Азии

Мир с нетерпением ждал результатов президентских выборов в США в 2020 году, ожидая нового курса со стороны нового президента и политики Белого дома в отношении как своих друзей, так и врагов. Теперь избранный президент Джо Байден и его администрация придут

к власти 20 января 2021 года, мировоззрение и политика Белого дома наверняка изменят дипломатическую, экономическую и военную тактику президента Дональда Трампа в странах Центральной Азии. Эти и другие вопросы станут критически важными для политиков и исследователей международных отношений на долгие годы.

В этой статье исследуется предыстория внешней политики США в азиатских странах, а также представлен анализ и рассмотрены потенциальные области взаимодействия администрации Байдена в регионе Центральной Азии. В качестве международного игрока США должны будут нести ответственность за поддержание мирового и регионального баланса в регионе, пытаясь занять свое место в регионе в условиях китайско-российского доминирования. Фактически интересы США в Центральной Азии на данный момент связаны с глобальным противостоянием США и КНР и ситуацией в Афганистане.

Ключевые слова. Центральная Азия, США, Джо Байден, Белый дом, политика, геополитика.

Introduction

Central Asia has traditionally been considered a place of confrontations and conflicts between and among the great powers. At least it is how Central Asia has been viewed back in the nineteenth century in the Russian-British “Great Game” (Edward Ingram, 1982). In his seminal article in 1904, “Geographical Pivot of History” in *The Geographical Journal*, British geographer and strategist Halford John Mackinder put forward the Heartland Theory, which extended a geopolitical analysis (Mackinder, 1904). Professor Mackinder theorized as who governs the Eastern Europe he will command the Heartland; who governs the Heartland will command the World-Island; who governs the World-Island will command the world” (Mackinder, 1942). This insightful observation has increasingly become relevant, especially after the USSR collapse, which has brought the CA republics into the international stage as newly independent states.

Today, public opinion and economic diplomacy continue to push the idea that Central Asia or Eurasia is indeed a place for “flexing muscles” between the Russian initiated Eurasian Economic Union and China with its One Belt and One Road Initiative (Gaziza Shakhanova, Jeremy Garlick, 2020). Thus, Central Asia is now a contested zone in “flexing muscles” for both world and regional powers (Wang Dong, 2015).

The dynamics of geopolitics and geo-economics are controversial for two reasons. First, all world and regional powers occupy certain niches in the region, the result of which direct rivalry between and among them is not openly confrontational. Second, the Central Asian states are by no means passive actors; thus, they in many aspects set the rules of the game themselves. In addition, they are excellent at playing on the contradictions between and among external power-players.

The changing of american policies

In conducting US foreign policy, the Biden administration is widely viewed as refreshing but traditional in its American approach to great power politics. To highlight this importance, President Biden’s transition teams have started to assemble robust and experienced groups of people in the new Cabinet and the National Security Council positions. The new policy initiatives that the Biden White House would establish and its approaches to the Central Asian region will be of great importance to these countries in the coming four years and beyond. Those countries include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmen Republic, and Uzbekistan. The ways in which the Biden White House engage in these countries will play a vital role in the region’s ongoing economic and political growth as well as how the new administration navigates the escalating rivalry between great powers, especially Russia and China.

Since the collapse of the USSR, US foreign policy in CA 3 different stages can be distinguished in this background analysis. To begin with, from the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US had three needs:

Firstly, to secure the weapons of mass destruction acquired from the USSR;

Secondly, offer support the CA nations fortify and defend their recently procured sovereignty, freedom, and regional keenness within the occasion of a resurgence of Russian colonialism;

Thirdly, break the Russian imposing business model of pipeline frameworks and transit courses for Central Asian oil and gas as a ensure of the region’s freedom from Moscow.

The USA has unequivocally rejected a geopolitical approach to Central Asia in favour of a long-term approach of supporting the arrangement

of a main rule framework within the locale, a free market, and financial integration. In any case, in spite of the talk, US authority did not prioritize Central Asia in its outside arrangement plan (Rumer E., Sokolsky R., Stronski P. 2016). In reality, the USA endeavors to advance steadiness, security, financial thriving, and administration within the locale have been direct. The depicted approach can be called “US Policy in CA region 1.0”

Moment, after the terror attack of September 11, official Washington’s demeanor to CA region and the nature of participation with the states of the locale changed significantly: the arrangement of “US Policy 2.0” started. Surely, intrigued in seeking after a long-term strategy of political and financial change proceeded, but military and security contemplations came to the fore. The require for calculated back for the US military operations in Afghanistan, and subsequently reliance on getting to the region’s military framework, won over the craving to advance political and financial changes and regard for human rights. Washington started to connect more prominent significance to security participation with nations where it had military bases, and where it held favourable geopolitical positions for the Joined together States within the locale. The primary two stages of American relations with the independent nation-states of Central Asia are connected by a common subject: the national security interface of the United States that lay exterior its borders and Washington’s activities were the results of approaches, needs, and connections with the individual nations that encompassed the locale. When the nearness of US military units in Afghanistan started to scale down, Washington required to rethink its interface, build priorities, and connections within the locale when Russia’s preparation and its capacity to meddle within the inside undertakings of its neighbours started to extend. Other than the long-term objective of growing effect in Central Asia sought after by both Moscow and Beijing might raise the weights between them also, among the nations of CA region itself. The rivalry between the two actors the United States and Russia prompted the Central Asian states to endeavor to guarantee that the interest of the West within the issues of the locale is protected to contain the desire of China. All of these events provide the third stage and its context for US Central Asia Policy 3.0.

The de facto rupture in the summer 2005 of the alliance between Washington and Tashkent—the largest city in Central Asia, which was the basis of USA policy during 2001-2004, led to the expulsion

of the American military base from Uzbekistan and contributed to the strengthening of Russian and Chinese positions in the region. Under these conditions, the US administration took a number of milder measures, which were followed by a comprehensive reassessment of the goals and priorities of regional policy (Socor, 2005). In July 2005, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, after which Kyrgyzstan leaders reported that their discuss base in Manas would proceed to operate, and the Tajik administration affirmed that it bolstered the US activities in Afghanistan and retained the rights to use the airspace for the anti-terrorist coalition (Socor, 2005).

In the fall of 2005 and the spring of 2006, Washington developed a new concept of policy directives in Central Asia. Its main ideological source was the works of Dr. Frederick Starr, an influential American expert on Central Asian issues (Star, 2005). He summed up that there was a formation of “Greater Central Asia,” a new region covering Afghanistan with the CA states. The formulating of this new opinion extended to the need for improving a regional US policy towards these countries.

Declaring its intention to support the states of CA “integrate with each other and with neighbors”, the US administration preferred to “ignore” the mechanisms of multilateral military-political and economic cooperation already operating in the region (Troitskiy, 2011). Thus, Washington and the NATO leadership in Brussels pointedly ignored the attempts of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—a Russia-led military alliance of seven The United States too denied backing the draft settlement on the Free zone of Nuclear-Weapon in Central Asia as the record including an arrangement protecting the rights and commitments of the parties beneath the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Except that, official Washington tried to anticipate the nearness of UN agents at the marking ceremony of the arrangement on a nuclear-free zone. The US organization has too appeared skepticism almost the exercises and prospects of the Shanghai Participation Association (SCO)—a Eurasian political, financial and security union reported in 2001 in China. The US declared that it does not see “the concrete achievements” of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and does not completely get what this structure is doing in common (Troitskiy, 2011). When talking about almost financial improvement in Central Asia, American authorities did not indeed specify the existence of the Eurasian financial cooperation (Troitskiy, 2011).

American policy revisions

In the past years, the US government has formulated many bold concepts which were beneficial to the US and Central Asia and relations with these countries. During his visit to all five Central Asian capitals in November 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry outlined his vision of “Partners for the 21st Century” (Kerry, 2015).

There were in the plans:

Firstly, the thought of nonpartisanship from the competition of superpowers;

Secondly, the thought of turning the region into a source of energy power for the entire world;

Thirdly, the thought of a union within the worldwide “war on terror;”

Fourthly, the thought of association for the advancement of the region. All of these concepts given experiences into the current American national security interface that have changed habitually. The USA does not have close financial, political, and social ties with CA. In addition, the White House proceeds to decrease its military presence in Afghanistan and is active with emergencies in other regions. For these reasons, the United States ought to put its engagement with the region on a long-term, economical balance, reliable with current objectives and accessible assets. The USA does not have the same geographic focal points and noteworthy interface in Central Asia as Russia and China (Layne, 2002). Given these substances, White House ought to receive one of the long-range adjusting methodologies by utilizing its political, financial, and, in the event that essential, security devices to specifically act as an assistant to Central Asia and counteracted the geopolitical weight of its provoke neighbours. Altering from an inaccessible put might be a way to decrease the United States of the facilitated security burden by delegating to other countries the errand of keeping up the alter of control in unsteady regions.

In quintessence, this approach is comparable to the position taken by Russia and China after September 11, 2001, when Moscow and Beijing, in truth, depended on White House, that accepted the part of guarantor of security within the region. Any balancing act must be carefully calibrated to meet the needs of the CA republics, but not be overly committed to the USA, notably the role of the fire brigade in situations that do not require the White House’s active assistance.

Biden’s policy approach

As the Democratic Presidential Candidate, Joe Biden said ahead of the election that he

intends to “strengthen democracy” and “fight authoritarianism” in the world. What does this mean for the republics of Central Asian region? The USA is in the middle of the most consequential rethinking of its foreign policy since opening of the iron curtain. Although Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close. The debate now is over what comes next (Kurt M. Campbell, Jake Sullivan, 2019).

Since 2015, the “C5 + 1” cooperation format has been operating between the five Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—and the USA. Since that period, the foreign ministries of the five Central Asian states and the US secretaries of state have met frequently to discuss relations between Central Asia and Washington. The C5 + 1 format was chosen during the presidency of Barack Obama. It continued with the Trump presidency, and in February 2020, the State Department presented Washington’s new strategy for Central Asia until 2025.

The US plan is aimed at strengthening the independence of Central Asian countries, reducing the threat of terrorism in the region, expanding relations between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan, and improving the humanrights situation. In addition, Washington’s plan until 2025 provides for the equalization of the influence of neighboring countries in the region. It has all the reasons to believe that the new occupant of the White House will not fundamentally change US policy towards Central Asia.

According to some incoming Biden officials and others, the C5 + 1 format with the USA and Central Asian republics will remain under Biden as Trump’s policy will continue (Kurt M. Campbell, Jake Sullivan, 2019). In fact, the C5 + 1 format was adopted during the Obama presidency, when Biden was vice president, and before that as one of the most active senators in foreign policy establishment, this platform will most likely remain under the Biden presidency.

The Biden administration will primarily fight the coronavirus in the country and will return to a number of international agreements from which Trump has withdrawn, such as the Paris Climate Change treaty. It is difficult to predict that the US interests in CA will increase, decrease, or radically change due to these prevailing circumstances. During his presidential campaign, candidate Biden said that he would work to stop the spread of the coronavirus in the country and reunite a society torn

apart by racism. As president, he plans to return to the Paris agreement on climate change, from which Trump withdrew, to strengthen democracy and to fight authoritarianism in the world, including in Central Asia. However, according to some observers, Biden's words about the fight against authoritarianism will not greatly affect Central Asia given Washington's economic interests in the region (Asautai, 2020).

Inconvenient truth and making exceptions

All Democratic presidents talk about the fight against authoritarianism. This is a reoccurring feature of American political philosophy; however, one should not forget that Democrats are also quite pragmatic and realistic in their approach to foreign policy when it is convenient. When candidate Biden talks about the fight against authoritarianism, he of course means Russia and other countries that, from a geopolitical point of view, pose a danger to the USA. For instance, he does not really mean the same for Belarus and China.

US interests in Central Asia were declining even under President Obama. The only country in Central Asia that has always more or less attracted Washington's attention is Kazakhstan, and for one simple reason: large American oil and gas companies are present here. Therefore, Kazakhstan has traditionally been the number one economic partner for the United States. For example, the size of investments that came into Kazakhstan after the collapse of USSR is almost \$53 billion (Official information resource of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, 2020).

This is a large amount of money compared to the investments that were directed to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan combined. It was the oil and gas emphasis that the United States placed on Kazakhstan that has always been the key consideration. Regardless of who occupied the White House, all presidents have practically built more or less normal relations with the authoritarian leadership of Kazakhstan. This is the economic realism that Washington cannot resist over its democratic idealism. If authoritarianism ensures the stability of business contracts for an American oil and gas company, US foreign policy is a subset of corporate policy and political campaign strategy.

Professor Dosym Satpayev, respected political commentator in CA and the head of the Risk Assessment Group, thinks "the United States mostoften begins to rely on some kind of democratic values when it comes to trying to neutralize a serious

geopolitical adversary, and when it comes to states that are not too large, not too large, which do not pose serious threats to the United States, then in this regard, the White House is beginning to look at it with tolerance" (Asautai, 2020). For example, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are states with tougher authoritarian regimes and human rights violations, but even with such records the United States maintains bilateral relations.

Even in such environment, Uzbekistan will soon compete with Kazakhstan to gain American attention. For the USA, Uzbekistan is a profoundly serious actor in CA region. In 2020, the Uzbekistan foreign affairs minister visited the United States to promote Uzbekistan and to attract American investment. In that year, the Uzbek administration hosted an important defense meeting of the leaders of the armed forces of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan with the commanders of the US armed forces (Azattyq, 2020). An Equally important point of interest is that the envoy of President Trump got Uzbekistan involved in a negotiated settlement with the Taliban of Afghanistan. The United States later acknowledged that Washington had entered into an agreement for a truce with the Taliban and that Uzbekistan was actively helping in this process. When the Taliban representatives arrived in Tashkent, the American negotiators worked very closely with the Uzbeks on the Afghan issue. For the USA, the war in Afghanistan—the longest conflict in American history is still a paramount national security interest.

For Kazakhstan, it is not geographically close to Afghanistan and it does not have a shared border. Considering foreign investments for the United States, Kazakhstan is a priority player in Central Asia's oil and gas endowments. In terms of military-political situations, Uzbekistan comes to the fore.

Economic interests over democratic values

Among many considerations in all this, the first focus of national interests of the Biden White House was placed on the pre-election announcements of "tough foreign policy" against China and Russia, for which the latter will most likely turn out to be the main enemy of the United States (Iskanderova, 2020).

At the same time, in relations to China, the Biden administration may announce the easing of economic sanctions. Even if this happens, it is unlikely to translate into friendship between Washington and Beijing. The dimensions of pressure will simply change from economics to the politics of human rights.

Moreover, US congressional leaders believe that the threat is not Russia, but China. In terms of military power, economic strength, and the general Chinese presence in all regions of the world, a large portion of Chinese investments goes to Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are China's largest debtor-nations.

Trump's policy was primarily aimed at developing the economy and domestic interests of the USA. President Biden, on the other hand, has always been focused on processes taking place outside the United States, which, in principle, is characteristic of the politics of the Democrats. Obviously, the focus of the new US president will be on Central Asia. According to Kazakhstani political scientists (like Professor Satpayev and others), the stake will be made on the development of interstate relations with the countries of CA region on the basis of the multilateral platform C5+1, and the negotiating agenda between the USA with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan will return to the categories traditional for Democrats (Azattyq. 2020). In the field of security, the Afghan direction of reduced US military presence may be realized; however, the fight against terrorism, radicalism, and drug and arms trafficking will continue. In the humanitarian sphere, there expects a turn towards a moralizing position and special attention to regimes that respect human rights and freedoms. This means that various NGOs and non-profit organizations will again become the mouthpiece of the "western truth" in Central Asia, for which the Biden administration would support.

According to Professor Odd Arne Westad at Yale University, the United States has two main traditional rivalries in Central Asia: China and Russia (Odd Arne Westad, 2020). China's priority is its economic rise so that the Chinese nation becomes stronger domestically. The second is to establish China as the predominant power within much of Asia, including Central Asia. Its policies elsewhere, so far, are largely strategic. Furthermore, the renowned Yale professor writes in the Foreign Affairs magazine that this process has been aided by "the weakness of Russia, the long malaise of Japan, and the waywardness of US foreign policy" (Odd Arne Westad, 2020). However, these factors were not responsible alone; China's behavior is driven mainly by domestic factors.

Blaming Chinese expansionism on the American mistakes, as the State Department's report does, is not just self-centered and therefore faulty but also analytically dangerous, Professor Westad argues (Odd Arne Westad, 2020).

Given these complicated issues, the second important question is whether the relations between Russian Federation and the United States has any meaning for Central Asia. It may seem that such questions are a legacy of the Cold War that slyly ignores the new reality on the ground. Both the RF and the USA see that their influence in the world in general and in the Central Asian region are steadily declining. In this regard, another question arises: are American and Russian relations still conclusive for the CA region?

In the foreign politics of Russia and the United States, Central Asia occupies a different place. The United States assigns Central Asia a secondary role. Regardless of what US officials may state publicly, the region is of little relevance to US national security interests. For Washington, it is important only for its relations with other countries: Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. A striking example of this low status is the work of the Bureau of Central Asian Affairs in the US Department of State, which is focused more on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India than on Central Asia. During the period when it was worsening of relations with the US in 2014 because of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: "As for Ukraine. It is vitally important for us, and in America, issues regarding Ukraine were resolved at the technical level (Putin, 2014). The same words can also be applied to Central Asia: unlike the United States, Moscow's interests in the region are vital.

American role and interests in central asia

The USA was one of the primary states to support the gaining of independence of five CA countries, and has worked closely over the past three decades to maintain the security, development, and prosperity of each of these countries. Central Asia has always been a strategic and trade crossroads for civilizations between Europe and Asia. The main strategic interest of the United States in this region is to create a more stable and prosperous Central Asia, which can freely pursue political, economic, and security interests with various partners on its own terms:

- a) linking to world markets and open to international investment;
- b) having strong democratic institutions;
- c) upholding the rule of law and respects human rights. A stable and secure CA region contributes directly to US efforts to combat terrorism, help assistance to regional stability, enhance energy

security, and enhance economic prosperity in the region and beyond.

To this end, the United States has provided more than \$9 billion in direct assistance to support peace and security, democratic reform and economic growth, and to meet humanitarian needs (Global Public Affairs, 2020).

Equally important, under the leadership of the USA, the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD, and the ADB have provided more than \$50 billion in loans, borrowings, and technical assistance to support the region's development (Global Public Affairs, 2020). Meanwhile, the US private sector has invested more than \$31 billion in businesses in the region, creating thousands of local jobs and building human potential (Global Public Affairs, 2020).

Finally, the US had forged strong nation-to-nation ties with each of the Central Asian countries, including through direct funding of over 40,000 educational and professional exchanges. Many Central Asians have immigrated to various American cities and now form energetic and dynamic diasporas that maintain deep ties to their home countries.

Make america great again?

Since the previous White House Strategy for CA was approved in 2015, new presidents in the region have created new opportunities for reform-oriented improvement, inter-regional linkages and cooperation, and greater engagement with the United States (Borisov, 2020). In particular, new governments in the region have pledged a deeper commitment to political and economic reform, including through bilateral cooperation with the United States. In addition, improved interregional linkages and a growing understanding of the value of cooperation as a regional group have expanded the potential for engaging with the US through the C5 + 1 platform.

Efforts by Central Asian states to increase foreign investment and attract American business are raising the wish of Central Asian presidents to follow rule of law reforms and comply with international norms. The United States has funded more than 70 projects across Central Asia (Global Public Affairs, 2020) that defend and preserve the Central Asia's unique cultural and traditional artefacts, traditions, and archaeological sites for the future.

The new US Strategy for Central Asia assumes that some of the persistent factors from the previous strategy regarding key developments in the region will be maintained: domestic and cross-border terrorism will remain a major security problem,

and CA states will proceed to confront dangers to steadiness such as radical extremism, drug trafficking, and disinformation.

There are some basic principles underpinning this new strategy. Central Asia could be a geostrategic region imperative to the national security interface of the United States, notwithstanding the level of US action in Afghanistan. The United States needs to pay particular attention to cooperation in areas where it has a comparative advantage, in particular by encouraging private sector activity and transparency in public policies and regulatory regimes that promote compliance with international standards, including environmental safeguards and labor rights protection. When reform advance is uneven, the United States ought to, in coordination with like-minded accomplices, offer concrete help to overcome these obstacles, while explaining the benefits of complying with international norms and laws. After the victory of Joe Biden in the US presidential elections, the entire world is beginning to expect the inevitable change in American foreign policy.

It is difficult to say just how positively it will affect the situation in the world in common and in Central Asia in particular. One is certain that President Trump's transactional diplomacy in the genre of American military-industrial complex and isolationism will be thoroughly redefined by the new policy architects of the White House's National Security Council.

The future Washington dispositions would surely make the think-tank and academic communities to postulate the prospects of a new Biden foreign policy doctrine. In this regard, how will the new foreign policy play on global contradictions and set them in the Central Asian context? What diplomatic contours for Central Asia does the renewed administration in Washington promise? Do the old Democrats, who can be called excellent students of political continuity or the alumni of President Obama, return to power in the United States with new ideas? Or is it a coincidence that Joe Biden, at the end of his "victory speech" directly referred to the 12-year-old management directive formulated by the previous Democratic President Barack Obama? These questions are at the forefront of the testing grounds for the Biden-Harris foreign policy approaches to address and to restore the pre-Trump benchmarks set in the 2015 National Security Strategy (National Security Strategy, 2015). When applied to Central Asia, the region was given a modest place among the geographic priorities of Washington's foreign policy. In a 2015 document, the CA region is on the agenda once in the context of the

tasks of balancing American strategic partnerships in Pacific and South Asia.

The current practice of the Central Asian context of American foreign policy will also appeal to the regional approaches that were developed during the tenure of Secretary of State John Kerry under President Obama. The stake on the improvement of inter-state relationship with the states of CA region on the basis of a multilateral platform between the foreign ministers C5 + 1 and thenegotiating agenda with the USA and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan will return to the traditional categories for Democrats who are now in-charge of the White House and both the

House and Senate of the US Congress. The expected focus of Washington policies includes the areas of economic, political, security, and environmental concerns that target in attracting and supporting Western investments in the most marginalized sectors of Central Asia.

These include the development of green energy with the construction of wind turbines or solar energy platforms, and the fight against terrorism and radicalism as well as illegal drug and arms trafficking. Not limited to these but human rights considerations are on the table for President Biden to “Make America Great Again” in the true sense of American Way.

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ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CENTRAL ASIA WATER&ENERGY PROGRAM IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NEW EU STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL ASIA

The recently launched European Union (EU) Strategy for Central Asia is expected to continue activities that were not completed during the implementation of the previous strategy on the basis of already existing successes and achievements, gaps will be filled and cooperation in emerging new areas and spheres will be established. In the framework of the New Strategy, the Central Asia Water & Energy Program (CAWEP) was implemented to help the Central Asian countries strengthen their energy and water security through knowledge exchange, analytical work, policy advice, and project preparation.

The article will be focused on the analysis of implementation of the CAWEP in Central Asian states. CAWEP has been implemented since 2009. Therefore, there are goals reached successfully and projects that need to be worked on further. The article will discuss how the program is being realized in each Central Asian state and what actions have already been done under the program.

Key words: CAWEP, Central Asia, European Union, World Bank.

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ЕО-ның Орталық Азияға арналған жаңа стратегиясы шеңберінде Орталық Азия су-энергетикалық бағдарламасын іске асыруды талдау

Жақында басталған Еуропалық Одақтың (ЕО) Орталық Азияға арналған Стратегиясында қол жеткізген жетістіктер мен жетістіктерге сүйене отырып, алдыңғы стратегияны жүзеге асыру барысында аяқталмаған іс-шаралар жалғасады деп күтілуде, олқылықтардың орны толып, дамып келе жатқан жаңа бағыттар мен салаларда ынтымақтастық орнатылады. Жаңа Стратегия шеңберінде Орталық Азия су-энергетикалық бағдарламасы (CAWEP) Орталық Азия елдерінің энергетикалық және су қауіпсіздігін білім алмасу, талдау жұмыстары, саясат кеңестері және жобаларды дайындау арқылы нығайтуға көмектесу мақсатында жүзеге асырылды.

Мақала CAWEP-тің Орталық Азия елдерінде жүзеге асырылуын талдауға бағытталған. CAWEP 2009 жылдан бері жұмыс істейді. Осылайша, сәтті орындалған мақсаттар бар және әрі қарай дамыту қажет ететін жобалар да бар. Мақалада Орталық Азияның әр мемлекетінде бағдарламаның қалай жүзеге асырылып жатқандығы және бағдарлама аясында қандай іс-шаралар өткізілгені қарастырылады.

Түйін сөздер: CAWEP, Орталық Азия, Еуропалық Одақ, Дүниежүзілік Банк.

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Анализ реализации водно-энергетической программы для ЦА в рамках новой стратегии ЕС для Центральной Азии

Ожидается, что недавно запущенная Стратегия Европейского Союза (ЕС) для Центральной Азии продолжит деятельность, которая не была завершена в ходе реализации предыдущей стратегии на основе уже имеющихся успехов и достижений, пробелы будут заполнены и сотрудничество в возникающих новых областях и сферах будет установлено. В рамках Новой стратегии была реализована Центрально-Азиатская водно-энергетическая программа (CAWEP), чтобы помочь странам Центральной Азии укрепить свою энергетическую и водную безопасность посредством обмена знаниями, аналитической работы, рекомендаций по вопросам политики и подготовки проектов.

Статья будет посвящена анализу реализации CAWEP в государствах Центральной Азии. CAWEP реализуется с 2009 года. Таким образом, есть успешно достигнутые цели и проекты, над которыми необходимо работать дальше. В статье рассматривается, как программа реализуется в каждом центральноазиатском государстве и какие действия уже были выполнены в рамках программы.

Ключевые слова: CAWEP, Центральная Азия, Европейский Союз, Всемирный банк.

Introduction

The 2007 strategy included collaboration in a wide range of areas, from regional, environmental and energy cooperation to cooperation in the security, human rights and the rule of law spheres. The first phase of regional collaboration can be described by the creation of a formal framework for communication and cooperation. These are, in particular, the annual meetings of the EU and Central Asian countries at the ministerial level, which have become a platform for the regular coordination of cooperation and clarification of its parameters. The Strategy is an ambitious framework document that brings together 10 major areas of cooperation, divided into three blocks; a “cross-cutting priority” for all areas is to promote regional cooperation in Central Asia. The radical yet realistic formulations of the Strategy point to important new developments, a broader context and the comparative advantages of partnership with the EU, as well as a positively balanced framework for cooperation.

Adopted in 2019, the new EU Strategy on Central Asia entitled “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a stronger partnership” defines three interconnected priorities on Resilience, Prosperity and Working together and has specific objectives on “Enhancing Environmental, Climate and Water Resilience.”

Relevance of the research topic. Central Asia is a dynamically developing region with a diverse geography, sustainable economic growth and new development opportunities. An important factor on which economic growth, welfare, stability and welfare of the population depend is the rational management of its energy and water resources. Despite the growing globalization of the region, development decisions are still driven by national concerns such as food security and energy security. Competition for energy markets and expected water scarcity complicate relations between the countries of the region, climate change and population growth could exacerbate resource scarcity and relations between nations in the future (CAWEP Brochure, 2019).

The purpose of the study is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of the program in Central Asia and identify the success and benefits of this program for the countries of Central Asia.

The methodological basis of the study was formed by general scientific and special methods of scientific cognition, in particular, synthesis, analogy, the method of system-structural analysis and content analysis.

Developed in the framework of the first EU Strategy for Central Asia, the Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP) focuses on strengthening water and energy management processes at the national and regional levels, which can contribute to income growth, poverty reduction, sustainable development, shared prosperity and increased resilience to climate change in the region. The program is a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank with a total funding of US \$ 12.6 million provided (in chronological order) by the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) (US \$ 3.5 million), Ministry international development of the UK (1.0 million US dollars) and the European Union (7.0 million euros). The structure of the third phase of the program was developed taking into account the results of the previous phases. The development target has been adjusted to enhance the focus on strengthening water security and to ensure that the necessary conditions for this are created at the regional and national levels (CAWEP Annual Report, 2019).

According to the EU Ambassador to Kazakhstan Sven-Olov Carlsson, the united regional work and resource management is vital for region’s overall development and prosperity. This is due to the fact that water and energy are inevitably connected in Central Asia. Furthermore, with the help of CAWEP, the EU promotes better regional communication and cooperation on energy and water security issues. This is done in order to assist the states in improving conditions for sustainable investment and socio-economic development (The World Bank press release, 2019).

Discussion

The Central Asian countries are largely interdependent in their water and energy resources and environment, taking into account that they are linked by several transboundary rivers, including those flowing in the Aral sea basin, which connects all five countries. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that distribution of energy and water resources is uneven. Moreover, hydropower resources are concentrated in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, countries located upstream of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, while hydrocarbon resources are concentrated in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The existing hydropower capacities of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are limited by the agreed regime of summer water releases for irrigation in the lower reaches. The greatest challenges for Central Asia are the growing demand for water between Central Asian countries, provoked by huge water losses in irrigation infrastructure, causing drainage problems and increasing ecological degradation of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems (Janusz-Pawletta, Gubaidullina, 2015). Another problem is the weak cooperation between the CA countries in the management of shared water resources, which can have severe economic consequences, especially in the face of increasing climate change threats. Another issue is the deficit of institutional capacity to transform policy into investment to modernize the current outdated infrastructure (Paramonov, Stokov, 2015). Lack of maintenance and limited investment in infrastructure, science and technical education resulted in a loss of technical knowledge. Improving the infrastructure and management of regional water resources to meet competing demands for human consumption, agriculture, industrial use, and power generation is vital to the economic prosperity and political stability of CA states. This gap can be partially filled with investments that must be cost-effective, appropriate and environmentally sound (Berndtsson, Tussupova, 2020).

Since its inception, CAWEP has functioned to solve these issues and made a significant impact. New regional projects have been launched. Moreover, governmental strategies have been developed related to dam safety, climate change etc.

Consequently, it is noteworthy to demonstrate the success of the previous phases of CAWEP. First of all, more than 13,000 Uzbekistani and Tajikistani farmers have been able to carry out climate-smart activities and enhance their crop production. This is performed, certainly, with the support of a climate

change adaptation and mitigation project in the Aral Sea Basin. Secondly, 87 weather stations and 19 river stations were successfully restored in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This has resulted in precision of weather forecasts in given countries by up to 30 percent under the Central Asia Hydrometeorology Modernization project. Thirdly, in Tajikistan the Nurek rehabilitation project was developed in the framework of CAWEP. The Nurek hydroelectric plant, which operates at just 77 percent, will endure major overhauls and expand winter output by 33 million kWh. Finally, the Central Asian Youth for Water Network was created. This establishment currently brings together students and practitioners worldwide, assisting scientists to find solutions to the most emergent problems in their countries (World Bank press release, 2019).

The work plan for 2019 included 27 projects: 9 – under the component “Water Security”, 9 – under the component “Energy Security”, 7 – under the component “Water and Energy Links”, as well as supporting activities for program management and communications. CAWEP is implemented taking into account the findings of the previous phases of the program and pays special attention to activities at the national level as components of regional security. Technical and policy dialogue at the regional level, coupled with capacity building, remain important drivers of cooperation.

In 2019, following the EU contribution, CAWEP has allocated another US \$ 6.48 million, i.e. total funding increased to US \$ 8.76 million. In 2019, 27 grants were supported, the implementation of 5 of which was started during the 2019 calendar year. One grant was completed in 2019. In 2019, the first recipient-executable grant was approved under the Energy Security component (Tajikistan).

Payments in 2019 amounted to USD 1.3 million (15% of total funding). Currently, funding is distributed as follows: Water Security – 41%, Energy Security – 22%, Water and Energy Links – 29%, Program Management and Communications – 8%. Payments at the end of 2019 exceeded USD 2.0 million (23% of total funding) (CAWEP Annual report, 2019).

Central Asian governments are aware of the challenges and issues associated with the water and energy, environment and climate change at the national and regional levels. Accordingly, states came up with reforms, state and regional strategies.

In 2019 a new Ministry of Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources was created in Kazakhstan with the mandate to deal with water management issues.

The new ministry is tasked with improving water management processes and combating poaching and deforestation. To this end, a Water Resources Management Program until 2030 and a new Environmental Code are being developed. Several international events took place in Kazakhstan during the year. At one of the sessions of the XII Astana Economic Forum, held in May in Nur-Sultan, – “Water as a factor of economic growth and security in Central Asia”, moderated by the Swiss Special Envoy for Water Resources in Central Asia. The head of the World Bank Office in Kazakhstan stressed that the economies of Central Asia do not experience a shortage of water resources, but they are far from using their water potential to the full. During the Second Central Asian Expert Forum on the topic “Dialogue on water issues in Central Asia: through the national to the region-wide”, held on September 5 in Nur-Sultan, the role of regional cooperation in solving water and energy problems was discussed. The first regional summit on mobilizing funds for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, which was held in November in Almaty, focused on strengthening water, energy and climate resilience, attracting private capital and mobilizing international resources to accelerate the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (CAWEP Annual report, 2019).

According to Gaukhar Beiseeva, Deputy Head of the International Center for Green Technologies and Investment Projects “water resources for Kazakhstan are in the first place in the transition to a green economy.” The Concept for the transition to a “green” economy defines terms and target indicators. The goal is to eliminate water scarcity at the national level. By 2020, the main indicator is the provision of water to the population, by 2030 – the full provision of water to agriculture and by 2050 – once and for all solution of the problem with water supply. As she noted, based on the experience of the European Union, Kazakhstani experts should determine the possibilities of using the most accessible technologies. “Today’s experience that we use is the creation of technology reference books as part of the implementation of the best available technologies. These are technologies that help to reduce the negative impact on the environment. We took this experience from the European Union. For 30 years, the EU first developed directives, and on the basis of them, special technological manuals were created, which clearly state what technology, what management and production process should be applied in order for the company not to pollute

the environment”, – said the deputy head of the Center Green technologies. Meanwhile, the head of the cooperation department of the EU Delegation to Kazakhstan Johannes Stenbek Madsen expressed that Europe intends to offer specific proposals to Central Asia to improve the quality of water resources (KazInform, 2019).

Moreover, Kazakhstan decided to transit to a green economy model, as announced in the country’s 2050 Strategy (December 2012) and further detailed in the government’s Green Economy Concept (adopted in May 2013) which proposes a comprehensive set of sustainable-development initiatives in six priority sectors, such as water resources, agriculture, energy efficiency, power sector, air pollution, and waste recycling. It also must be noted that Kazakhstan has also established a multi-stakeholder, cross-sectoral and voluntary Green Bridge partnership program. This is done in order to ensure a sustainable and long-term framework for green investment, transition of new technologies and innovations to establish a sustainable economy, create new and long-term green jobs and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (Green Economy: realities and prospects in Kazakhstan, 2018).

In July, the State Agency for Water Resources was created in Kyrgyzstan, the main objectives of which are to introduce an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) mechanism, ensure rational water use and develop effective interstate cooperation. The Department of Water Management and Land Reclamation and the Department for Development of Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation have been transferred to the new agency. In November, at the forum “Accelerating Reforms for Sustainable Development”, which was opened by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sooronbai Jeenbekov, priority development directions, including IWRM and climate change, were discussed. A draft National strategy for the development of the fuel and energy complex until 2030 has been developed (CAWEP, 2019).

Key priorities of the Kyrgyz Government’s programme include reforming policy making and legislation through use of the Strategic Environmental Assessment and wider public participation, development of national policy on climate change, safeguarding biodiversity and rational use of natural resources and developing international cooperation to resolve national ecological problems. The National Sustainable Development Plan adopted in December 2013 includes measures for mitigating

impact and reducing ecological consequences of economic activities; improvement of (drinking) water supply and sanitation, and measures on disaster risk reduction and management. The Government of Kyrgyzstan is in the process of adopting the National Strategy 2040 and associated five-year programme. These will reflect the country's socio-economic, political changes and transformations that have taken place since last years, and address issues relevant to the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030. This strategy acknowledges the importance of environmental approaches as a guiding principle for all measures taken and policies for the country development. The significance of the development of water (irrigation and drinking water sectors) is acknowledged to be an impactful outcome for the country's economic and environmental development, and eradicating food insecurity and malnutrition at large (Action Document for Sustainable Environment, Water and Energy Development, 2019).

In April, Tajikistan's government agreed on a six-year financial recovery program "Barki Tojik" (the national energy company) to improve its efficiency and financial sustainability, and the long-awaited project to expand and modernize the Nurek Hydroelectric Power Station was launched. The modernization will include the technical rehabilitation of three hydraulic units, the replacement of six autotransformers and the introduction of advanced safety procedures. In September, the second turbine of the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Station was commissioned. As a member of the UN High Level Panel on Water, Tajikistan convened a parallel meeting during the 74th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, dedicated to transforming action on water to accelerate the achievement of climate change goals at the global level. This event provided an opportunity to highlight the achievements in water management and climate change and provide participants with up-to-date information on the implementation of the International Decade for Action "Water for Sustainable Development" (2018–2028) (CAWEP Annual report, 2019)

In 2007, the Government of Tajikistan adopted the Concept of Transition of the Republic of Tajikistan towards Sustainable Development until 2030. In 2008, the Government approved the "Environmental Concept" aimed at rational use of natural resource. An Action plan for implementation was approved in 2010. The Government of Tajikistan is particularly involved in the water sector: at

the end of 2015 the Programme of Water Sector Reform in Tajikistan for 2016-2025 was approved. This programme delineates the institutional and operational framework required to implement Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). In line with the Plan of Action of the UN High Level Panel on Water, Tajikistan initiated the UN General Assembly draft resolution to declare the period of 2018-2028 as the International Decade of Action "Water for Sustainable Development", which was adopted by consensus on 21 December 2016. The decision to build the Rogun Dam is a major undertaking for the country and is expected to significantly improve energy supply while there are some question marks about macroeconomic implications and environmental concerns. During the recent visit of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Tajikistan on 9-10 March 2018 an agreement was reached on Uzbekistan's participation in the Rogun Dam project (Action Document for Sustainable Environment, Water and Energy Development, 2019).

In April, Ashgabat hosted bilateral discussions initiated by the Turkmen-Afghan coordination group on water issues with the aim of developing a mutually acceptable mechanism for the integrated and balanced use of transboundary water resources. Such a mechanism should be created in accordance with generally recognized norms and principles of international law and taking into account the interests of all countries in the region. In November, Turkmenistan organized and held an international conference "Rational use of water resources – the basis for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals", at which the Global Water Partnership presented its Strategy for 2020–2025 (CAWEP Annual report, 2019)

In Turkmenistan, the new Water Code has been elaborated introducing the principles of the IWRM. The country's economy is largely based upon the production and export of gas. Since 2017, the Executive Committee of IFAS has been located in the capital of Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, and is foreseen to remain there until August 2019. The country is a strong promoter of the organisation and its objectives (Action Document for Sustainable Environment, Water and Energy Development, 2019).

Speaking about the actions taken by Uzbekistan's government, on the basis of medium and long-term goals and agreed priority directions of development, the Water Strategy for the period up to 2030 is being developed. Presidential decrees were adopted

on: (i) efficient use of land and water resources in agriculture; (ii) improving water resources management; and (iii) the agricultural development strategy for 2020–2030. In February, a Ministry of Energy was created to integrate the oil and gas and energy sectors. In March, the President adopted a resolution “On the strategy for further development and reform of the electric power industry of the Republic of Uzbekistan.” In April, a reform of tariffs for electricity and water was initiated and a new procedure for setting tariffs was adopted. This is a significant step towards achieving a full return on the cost of organizing urban water supply, based on multi-year investment planning. As a result of the reorganization of Uzbekenergo JSC, three new joint-stock companies were created: Thermal Power Plants, National Electric Grids of Uzbekistan and Regional Electric Grids.

In October, a strategy for Uzbekistan’s transition to a “green economy” until 2030 was approved. This will ensure that commitments under the Paris Climate Agreement are met, prioritization of energy efficiency, renewable energy development, and climate change adaptation coordination. In November, the Ministry of Housing and Communal Services was entrusted with the task of keeping records of water resources (CAWEP, 2019)

In parallel to the multitude of national strategies and policy documents, there is a growing recognition among CA governments that national approaches are insufficient to address the complex water, environment and energy challenges, many of which are transboundary by nature. On 30 January 2018, the Board of the International Fund for saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) passed a resolution to develop the fourth edition of the Aral Sea Basin Programme (ASBP). As a result, CA partners have expressed interest to foster cooperation with the European Union to benefit from European experiences and know-how

(Action Document for Sustainable Environment, Water and Energy Development, 2019).

Conclusion

The EU Strategy for Central Asia provides a framework for enhanced cooperation and an increasingly regional approach to foster integrated and efficient resources management. This has taken the shape of various programmes and projects implemented by EU in CA countries. The Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP) aims to create conditions for enhancing energy and water security at the regional level and in the beneficiary countries through increased cooperation. CAWEP promotes energy and water security by working to build the capacity of national institutions and improve performance across sectors, while supporting regional cooperation and dialogue to promote energy and water security at the national and regional level. The program is being implemented in cooperation with governments, which allows it to take into account national priorities in its activities. In their turn, Central Asian states develop strategies and documents at the governmental level. CAWEP funds initiatives to improve water and energy management processes, develop and strengthen national and regional institutions, and promote regional dialogue on water and energy security. The program helps realize the benefits of regional cooperation for sustainable development and increased resilience to climate change. In the framework of CAWEP, a lot of measures were carried out by Central Asian states. Moreover, CAWEP continues to work with development partners to expand work to create conditions for deepening cooperation at the technical and institutional levels, strengthening existing databases and information, and harmonizing industry policies and regulations.

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THE NEW EU STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL ASIA ONE YEAR LATER: FEARS AND WISHES

The EU adopted a new strategy for Central Asia and that was adopted in July 2019 in Bishkek. One year later it is necessary to evaluate what is written there and if it is useful or not. Although the states of that region are very different among them, as the impact of the EU strategy, it is possible to depict a general outlook. This can be useful for the authorities in Brussels whether to reorient the strategy or to maintain the course. In the following pages, there is a description of the main goals set by the EU strategy and an analysis of the results during this strange year affected by Covid-19. Besides that, it is necessary to talk a little bit about the role played by the other main competitors at that area (China, Russia and the USA) and about the economic and political developments in the region. As a resolute, the conclusions of this research are very clear: the EU wants to promote stable political systems and Human Rights friendly as well as developed economies in its neighbourhood and beyond for security and trade reasons. Some researchers and politicians accused EU of revive the colonialism as the EU speaks about its “economic leverage” for democratisation purposes or about its normative power.

Key words: Central Asia, European Union, New Strategy, Security, Energy, Human Rights.

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Бір жылдан кейін Орталық Азия үшін ЕО-ның жаңа стратегиясы: қорқыныш пен тілектер

Еуроодақ Орталық Азияға қатысты жаңа стратегияны 2019 жылы шілдеде Бішкекте қабылдады. Бір жылдан кейін құжатта көрсетілген стратегиялық қадамдардың қайсысы пайдалы, ал қайсысы жұмыс істемейтінін бағалау қажеттігі туындап отыр. Орталық Азиядағы мемлекеттер бір-бірінен қатты ерекшеленеді және мұны Еуроодақтың аймаққа қатысты стратегиясын қабылдау мәнерінен көруге болады. Бұл Брюссель билігіне және оның аймаққа қатысты стратегиясының бағытын өзгерту немесе алған бағытын жалғастыру үшін пайдалы болуы мүмкін. Келесі беттерде Covid-19 әсер еткен осы ерекше жылдағы нәтижелерді талдай отырып, Еуроодақтың стратегиясында белгіленген негізгі мақсаттар сипатталған. Сонымен қатар, осы аймақтағы бәсекелес негізгі сыртқы акторлардың (Қытай, Ресей және АҚШ) ықпалды рөліне аз көңіл бөлінеді, сонымен қатар Орталық Азия аймағындағы экономикалық және саяси оқиғалар сипатталады. Бұл зерттеудің тұжырымдары айқын: Еуроодақтың қауіпсіздік пен сауданы дамытуға негізделген тұрақты саяси жүйелер мен адам құқықтарын, сондай-ақ жақын маңдағы және одан тыс дамыған экономикаларды қолдағысы келеді. Еуроодақты отаршылдықты жандандырды деп айыптаған кейбір еуропалық зерттеушілер мен саясаткерлердің көзқарасын көрсетеді, өйткені Еуроодақтың демократияландыру мақсаттарын немесе оның нормативтік күшін алға жылжытатын «экономикалық тұтқасы» туралы айтады.

Түйін сөздер: Орталық Азия, Еуропалық Одақ, жаңа стратегия, қауіпсіздік, энергетика, адам құқығы.

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Новая стратегия ЕС для Центральной Азии год спустя: страхи и желания

ЕС принял новую стратегию для Центральной Азии в июле 2019 года в Бишкеке. Через год необходимо оценить, что из намеченного в документе является полезным, а что не работает. Несмотря на то, что государства этого региона сильно различаются между собой, по восприятию стратегии ЕС можно представить общую картину. Это может быть полезно властям Брюсселя

для переориентации стратегии или для продолжения взятого курса. На следующих страницах приводится описание основных целей, поставленных стратегией ЕС, анализируются результаты в течение этого необычного года, затронутого Covid-19. Кроме того, уделяется немного внимания роли, которую играют основные внешние акторы, конкурирующие в этом регионе (Китай, Россия и США), а также описываются экономические и политические события в регионе ЦА. Выводы этого исследования предельно ясны: ЕС хочет поддерживать стабильные политические системы и права человека, а также развитие экономики по соседству и за его пределами, исходя из соображений безопасности и развития торговли. Показана точка зрения некоторых европейских исследователей и политиков, которые обвиняли ЕС в возрождении колониализма, поскольку ЕС говорит о своих «экономических рычагах» для продвижения целей демократизации или о своей нормативной власти.

Ключевые слова: Центральная Азия, Европейский Союз, Новая Стратегия, безопасность, энергия, права человека.

Introduction

When the EU adopted its New Strategy for Central Asia in June 2019, few expected that the following months would take such an unexpected turn of events. One year later the grand presentation of the Strategy during the 15th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting in Bishkek (July 7th, 2019), Central Asia, the EU and the whole world have changed a lot and major changes are still expected. However, some of the basic assumptions of the document presented by Mogherini are still valid and work to achieve the main objectives established in it. This article will talk about the fears and desires that underlie the relationship between these two large neighbouring regions (although they are not neighbours *strictu sensu* now).

In a year focused on the crisis caused by the coronavirus, few have analysed the impact of the Strategy for Central Asia, so this article makes a small contribution in this field, opening a debate on the validity of that document.

The starting hypothesis of this article is that the EU wishes to establish a relationship between equals with Central Asia, while other actors have neo-colonialist aspirations. It is true that the EU has its own economic interests and cultural influence, but with claims that are very different from those expressed by Russia or China. On that field it is possible to see the confrontation between very divergent views of the world. The question here is whether it is a zero-sum game, where one wins everything and the other loses everything, or is it rather a cooperative scenario where very different models can be built by combining elements of both proposals to varying degrees.

This article describes the objectives of the New Strategy, explains the main events in Central Asia over the last year and assesses whether the role of the EU has been strengthened or reduced, especially

in relation to other traditional competitors in the area (Russia, China and the United States).

Fundamental keys to understand the New Strategy

According to the New Strategy itself, it “aims to forge a stronger, modern and non-exclusive partnership with the countries of Central Asia so that the region develops as a sustainable, more resilient, prosperous, and closely interconnected economic and political space” (European Parliament and Council, 2019). Besides that, this document is coherent with other strategies, fundamental for the foreign action of the European Union: “It will build upon the lessons learnt from EU engagement in the region, take into consideration other relevant strategies including the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, the New European Consensus on Development, the EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia and EU Strategy on Afghanistan, and be guided by the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (SEn-ECA recommendations, 2019).

The main purpose of this Strategy is to set the legal base to finance the development of that area, following the EU traditional asset of values and principles, what is usually called “the EU’s *acquis*”. The “*acquis communautaire*” or the EU’s ‘*acquis*’ is the body of common rights and obligations that are binding on all EU countries, as EU Members. It is constantly evolving and comprises: the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU; declarations and resolutions adopted by the EU; measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; measures relating to justice and home affairs; international agreements concluded by the EU and those concluded by the EU countries between themselves in the field of the EU’s activities. Since the inception of the Common Market during the ‘50’s of the

20th century, peace and economic development are intertwined goals; if that is good for member States, it should be also good for their neighbours. This is how the process of enlargement started and there are 27 member states and 5 candidates (Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are candidate countries), apart from the special relationship with the neighbouring countries through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), supported by the Eastern Partnership (EP) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (now, the Union for the Mediterranean or UfM) (EUCAM Working Paper, 2019).

The EU employs its normative power and its economic leverage. Later on, it will be discussed if that is useful or not. For now, it is enough to say that this is a strong belief in Brussels: they really think that they can influence the political culture of the masses and the behaviour of the leaders as they offer a great market for their goods and services and they can extract raw materials from those countries. Of course, non-European countries may be attracted to EU political stability and economic well-being. This is not an opinion, it is objective: there was no war inside the European Union countries for more than 75 years, something that it is an exception in European History as our ancestors were involved in continental wars in every generation during the past centuries. Of course, the European Union has its own political and economic problems, such as the rise of populism and racialism, the failure of the migration and integration policies, the lack of knowledge and confidence on EU institutions the public opinion has, the crisis of Euro, the global economic crisis of 2008, the “coronacrisis” (the health, social, political and economic crisis triggered by the coronavirus and the inadequate political management), the wars emerged around the continent, the problem created by jihadism and the Islamic State, the misunderstandings with Russia and China (and sometimes even with the United States) among others.

In any case, the EU is offering always “carrots” to attract the partners, never “sticks”. The only “stick” they use is the threat of not investing more funds wherever. On the other hand, when is the EU stopping the flood of funds to any country or project? There are three inalienable fields to respect for: Human Rights, Liberal Democracy and Trade Market. It is possible to say that they are red lines for the EU in its relationship with third countries. In fact, it should be noted that during the negotiations of this Strategy and the subsequent EPCA, which stands for the new-generation of bilateral Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs),

the European institutions and representatives insisted very much on the necessity of a stronger involvement of Central Asian leaders to improve their democratic records. Step by step, at their own pace, but without any delay (Manners, 2009).

As in any political system, there is much to do to improve the situation. The OSCE recommendations after every election observation mission deployed in those countries, comprise a to-do-list compatible with the EU standards for democracy or even Human Rights. The EU institutions pay attention to the electoral process, the competitiveness among candidates, the pluralism of political parties, the freedom of speech and expression the candidates enjoy or the existence of two legislative chambers. Besides that, some European countries expressed their grave concern regarding the situation of minors, children of mixed couples (European and Central Asian citizens) kidnapped by Central Asian partners; those concerns are shared by many EU member States as some Kyrgyz women don’t let their fathers to see to their children.

Talking about kidnappings, the old tradition of *ala kachuu* or bride abductions, where young women are kidnaped to get marriage, mainly in Kyrgyzstan, are also worrying for EU institutions. Generally speaking, they pay a lot of attention to the role of women in society and the rate of women empowerment.

It is obvious that the political life is very different in Europe or in Central Asia. Very probably because History is also different and the political developments were divergent in both sides. For example, political parties are fundamental for political life in Europe but in Central Asia are more important the clans (parties are Western inventions). Accountability and corruption are also delicate topics when EU is talking to Central Asian partners.

Besides that, there has been an evolution of the concept of “Human Rights” in Europe and another very different in Central Asia as EU defends the “gender ideology” as a main driver at their Foreign Policy, which is a set of “new rights” related to sexual identity disconnected to Biology (objectivity, Science) but stick to self-perception (subjectivity). According to some authors, people have no biological, binary sex (male-female), but there is a set of different genders, depending on the feelings and self-perceptions, disregarding the sexual organs. This is a logical consequence of the relativism, so appreciated in Western countries. This relativism has other negative impacts on moral ethics and values, as there is no objective support for Human Rights on human nature, but they depend only on the be-

nevolence of the Governments. If the States want to recognise those rights, they exist; otherwise, they do not. So, the EU is pressing to other Governments to accept the so called “gay rights” instead of focusing on improving the women’s lives. Feminism is part of the “gender policies”, but not part of the “gender ideology”. However, the term “gender” appears at this document only two times, always referred to the improvement of the role of women in society.

The earlier version of the strategy from 2007 has been updated to focus on resilience (covering areas such as human rights, border security, environment), prosperity (with a strong accent on connectivity), as well as regional cooperation. The 2019 Strategy established three main goals (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019):

1) Partnering for Resilience. According to this objective, EU and Central Asian countries are partners, placing them at an equal level, looking for promotion of “democracy, human rights and the rule of law, intensify cooperation on implementing the Paris climate commitments and tackling trans-regional environmental challenges”. This is a political objective clearly. Thus, this is the most concerning objective for the EU, more interested on spreading their concepts on democracy and Human Rights than on trade or economic cooperation (in any case, EU is the biggest trade partner for Kazakhstan and is among the first in the rest of the Central Asian countries). In this section, such topics as environment or climate change are at the top level of the political agenda and the EU invests in many projects to help this region to stop the global warming and the negative impact of that in Central Asia (Sahajpal, 2019).

2) Partnering for Prosperity. Both players would seek to unlock “their significant growth potential by fostering the development of a competitive private sector and promoting a sound and open investment environment” (Gubaidullina, 2014). This is clearly an economic objective, so the most interested partner here should be, a priori, Central Asian countries, which seek the development of their land-locked economies. These countries received and will receive a huge amount of money to invest in projects via programs such as the INOGATE Energy portal, the TRACECA Transport Corridor, the Baku initiative on energy and transport and the BOMCA (EU Border Management Programme). Adding to these programs, the region will receive EUR 124 million as a solidarity package from the EU. As part of that solidarity package, the EU created the Central Asia COVID-19 Crisis Response (CACCR), a 2 years-long regional programme for Central Asia, launched in July 2020 (European News, 2020).

3) Working Better Together. Here it is clear that the EU doesn’t want to impose its plans or perspectives, but it seeks to improve the general environment in that region as it is aware of the many advantages it brings for Europe, that is why EU wants “to strengthen the architecture of the partnership, intensifying political dialogue and opening up space for civil society participation”.

Central Asia one year later

Future is always uncertain and indefinite, sometimes is also unpredictable. However, this year 2020 was completely unexpected. Of course, there were pandemics previously in History, but this time no Government was ready to face the challenge of this strange influenza.

To summarize, it is possible to list some of the main political events in the past five years. In Uzbekistan, there was a peaceful change in the leadership of the country in 2016 (the EU recognises the key role played by Shavkat Mirziyoyev. He started a new era in Uzbekistan and changed the regional dynamics, too. In domestic policies, opened a communication channel with citizens, liberalised the economy, opened its borders to improve the touristic sector, fought corruption, warranted the religious freedom, diminished the forced labour during the cotton harvest time, among others. In the region, he solved problems that were stuck for years; suddenly, they just disappeared. He showed a new kind of leadership, not showing strength but ability to communicate and efficiency), as it was in March 2019 in Kazakhstan. The situation in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan remained unchanged, but there were rumours on the health condition of Berdimukhamedov and on Rakhmon’s continuity (even, it was said that he was preparing his son, mayor of Dushanbe and Chairman of the Majlisi Milli at the same time). Unexpectedly, the situation worsened in Kyrgyzstan, where the former President, Atambáyev, was in jail accused of corruption; after the Parliamentary elections on October 4th there were claims of unfairness and some people (hundreds, maybe thousands) occupied the streets of the capital, stormed the houses of Parliament and the office of the Prime Minister and some did selfie. One of these was the current interim President and Prime Minister, Sadyr Zhaparov.

During the previous years, with the rubble crisis and the decrease of the oil price, there were some problems for Central Asians as their economies depend heavily from the migrants remittances and, generally speaking, on the economic situation in Russia. The GDP per capita decreased and the

state failed to their citizens in some aspects. When the pandemic started, most of the countries couldn't face it properly and they failed again. Some people are angry but there is no great opportunity to show it, only in Kyrgyzstan (with the usual result, as it was in 2005 and 2010) and Kazakhstan (where some rallies took place in Almaty and other cities).

In these years, Russia increased its presence there; it seems Putin wants to be more and more influential. Even he said on an interview that those nations around Russia (*id est*, Former Soviet Union countries) are not States really. China has improved its situation in that area too; even after the economic crisis of 2008, it is possible to see how their GDP grew up every year around 10%, sustained for 20 years, which means that they have created a big mass of consumers and even rich people (Boonstra, Tsertsvadze, 2016). China has shown its interest on participating at the Premier League, not as a secondary player. They are feared because they are a nuclear power, advanced technologically, strong economically, offering the rest of the world an investment plan in their infrastructures, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), supposedly to export their products to the open markets, apart from solving the endemic problem of a landlocked region such as Central Asia. What can we say about the Chinese Human Rights records? Not very good things. For instance, it is well known there are re-education camps for Uyghur people in the Western region of Xingjian, where more than one million people needs to learn how to improve their "citizen knowledge", how to be a good citizen. European Union is worried about the so-called debt trap due to the BRI; although some experts underlined the falseness of such idea, some others are warning about the danger of having a huge debt with China; the Tajik case is eloquent. Some Chinese scholars asked the Communist Party to review historical territory claims of China in Tajikistan during the summer of 2020. It seems is a clear gambit to squeeze on Tajik authorities, as Tajikistan already ceded 1% of its territory to China in 2011. Besides that, some Asian countries have serious unsolved border problems with China, such as Nepal, India or Pakistan.

This is a fundamental point for the White House in Washington. One of the main issues Mike Pompeo talked about while his visit to Central Asia in February 2020 was this topic regarding the Chinese impositions on Central Asia; after the outbreak of the pandemic, the American opinion on the role of China abroad worsened even more. It is useful to remind the words at the *USA National Security Strategy* (2017): "China and Russia challenge American

power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence" (Laumulin, 2019). It seems that Obama started to withdraw from war scenarios abroad (although the Peace Nobel Prize awarded had to begin some wars) and Trump (the first US President in decades who does not start any war) confirmed that trend. However, by the end of 2019, USA tightened China from many sides (trade war and North Korea among them).

Keeping an eye on violent conflicts, it should be noted that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan played a major role in trying to solve the problems in Syria and Afghanistan respectively, something well estimated by EU institutions. Although Central Asia is a model of religious tolerance and peaceful ethnic coexistence, EU pay attention to any event related to this problem as that remind them the '90's Balkan ghost. That was the case of the ethnic tension and violence in Masanchi, on the Southern border of Kazakhstan, near Bishkek. It seems that the tension wasn't based on ethnicity but it was problem among individuals.

Are all these interests compatible in this region? Is it possible for Kazakhstan to keep its traditional multivector policy? Regarding the exchange of goods, for instance it seems that Eurasian Economic Unity and EU are competing for the same space, so there is an underground fight among them. Moreover, the perception from Brussels is that Putin wants to restore the greatness of the Tsarist Empire, protecting its (Russian or supposedly Russian) minorities in the near abroad, promoting the use of Russian as *lingua franca*, remembering the wars they fought together (here, the military parade in Moscow on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Victory Day was an unavoidable appointment for the Central Asian leaders, even if that was delayed until June 24th 2020). Apart from that, it seems that the Chinese BRI is not compatible with the EU Strategy for Connectivity with Asia, as they pursue different rules for international relations.

Is there any EU Normative power or economic leverage there?

Looking at this region, it is possible to realize that the EU influence in this region has limits. Since the years of the independence, EU invested millions of Euro in different projects, but this Central Asia states are completely independent, so they decide

their future and the way they organise their social, political or economic life.

Of course, EU institutions are aware of the importance of keeping the cooperation with those countries while respecting their sovereignty. However, European countries would like to be more influential there, without any doubt. They would prefer getting more contracts with local Governments or State companies. In addition, they would like to find there real likeminded partners, with a similar conception on democracy and Human Rights (Savrovskaya, 2015). However, the actual political culture and public opinion/mentality of Central Asian peoples find their roots in Turk-Persian-Arabic and Russian-Soviet influence; academy, university, companies are ruled in that old style although some changes are introduced slowly. For instance, more and more women are filling positions in the political life (ministries, congress of deputies, regional governments, town halls).

For some years, Kyrgyzstan was considered “the most advantaged student” by EU institutions, but it is easy to see the disappointment present in their eyes as that experiment failed completely with Akayev in 2005, with Bakiyev in 2010, with Atambayev in 2011 (when he wasted the Constitutional reforms introduced in 2010 to reduce presidential powers and strengthen democracy) and with Jeenbekov (when he wasted the political impulse to improve the political and economic situation in Kyrgyzstan chasing his political adversaries).

The relationship between Europe and Kazakhstan is also stained by the Ablyazov case. The former powerful tycoon and politician fell in disgrace and he fled from his country to enjoy a luxurious life in Great Britain, France or even Italy. Several countries, Kazakhstan among them, requested the extradition of the entire criminal organised group he leaded to defraud at least 7.5 billion US\$, but European authorities (also the Spanish ones) failed in helping their good partner. He received the help of some Soros’ institutions (as the Open Dialogue Foundation), founded a political party (Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan) and sponsored the creation of the political platform *Zhana Kazakhstan* (“New Kazakhstan”), presented in Brussels in 2018. This frustrated extradition is not an example of lack of interest in cooperation between Europe and Central Asia but a division of powers one. Anyway, this wounded the relationship between the countries involved, as the main reason the courts adduced to reject the extradition was the political situation in Kazakhstan (they trusted the arguments of the accused, which means they believed that Ablyazov and company

were poor opposition politicians, they would receive tortures in their home countries, European countries should protect them, etcetera). This is what messed up the relationship between those countries, not the non-extradition in itself, as it was evident that EU member states thought the political progress in Kazakhstan was not real nor reliable. In other words, had the EU influenced political life in Kazakhstan, the EU would have sent back home those people (Ablyazov group) with some warranties of avoiding ill-treatment; but it happened the opposite.

The EU is the first trade partner for Kazakhstan, but this institution is not as strong as the USA are there. This happens for some reasons. First of all, because Kazakhstan sees that the EU is not a country nor a union of countries, but it is an addition, a group of divided (and sometimes opposed) members; that is why they negotiate on bilateral basis with everyone and not with the EU alone. Second, the EU is not a neighbour country, so they can think that the relationship exists today but who knows until when; that relationship is plenty of uncertainties. Third, Central Asian partners are prone to trust more on people who invest there; the establishment of offices (or embassies) there is for them a serious evidence of how trustable are those new partners coming from far territories. In short, it is easier to trust on those traditional partners you know better than the new ones.

Finally, it is necessary to understand what perception has the EU on every country, depending on the interests and the level of political progress and the rule of Law (regarding the confidence on the legal system to start or maintain business there, due to bad experiences suffered in other countries where European companies were expropriated).

Conclusions

As conclusion, it is possible to say that EU cannot change the mentality of those countries and, very probably, it doesn’t want to do that, but it desires to promote a stable and safe neighbourhood. According to EU mentality, reflected at the EU’s acquis, having in the near abroad a like-minded and stable partner is always better than having a problematic, unstable, underdeveloped environment.

The strength of other global players in that region, such as Russia, China or the United States, combined with the weakness of not very united European institutions and member states, makes more difficult to have a clear, strong voice in that scenario. Even more, the outbreak of the coronacrisis didn’t help to solve these problems or deficits.

Besides that, the last political developments in Central Asia show that these countries have not adopted the European concepts of democracy or Human Rights. Even more, the so-called “island of democracy”, a kind of European lab, it is not a good model for the rest of Central Asian countries because it is not stable at all. According to this example, it seems that it is better for

this region having all the power in the hands of one political party/ruler, combining it with dialogue with civil society (the Uzbek model) better than having useless pluralism of political parties (reflection of a huge division in society). Any political entity needs unity, not uniformity; it doesn't matter the way they express themselves this axiom.

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3-бөлім

**МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ МЕН ҚОЛДАНБАЛЫ
ЛИНГВИСТИКАНЫҢ КЕЙБІР МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ**

Section 3

**SOME ISSUES OF METODOLOGY
AND APPLIED LINGUISTICS**

Раздел 3

**НЕКОТОРЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ МЕТОДОЛОГИИ И
ПРИКЛАДНОЙ ЛИНГВИСТИКИ**

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NATIONAL AND CULTURAL FEATURES OF PRAISE IN KAZAKH, FRENCH AND ENGLISH

Within the framework of this article, the authors will analyze the national and cultural features of evaluative conversations in Kazakh, French and English, methods of their transmission in these languages, comparative study of structural and semantic differences of these speech actions and determine their national and cultural harmony. Like other speech acts, the assessment reflects the culture, traditions, customs, rules of decency, and rituals of the nation. Each nation has its own assessment system. An object, phenomenon, action, or behavior that has a high, positive rating in one country can be negatively evaluated in another country. If a person's actions and behavior correspond to the rules of decency, Customs and traditions of that country, then a positive assessment is given to him, and a negative assessment is given if the opposite is true. Each nation, when evaluating actions, behavior, objects and phenomena, is based on its own national essence, national worldview. That is why the culture, customs, rules of etiquette, life experience, and worldview of each nation are the basis of national culture of speech assessment

Key words: intercultural communication, praise, national culture, cultural features, linguistic characteristics.

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Қазақ, француз және ағылшын тілдеріндегі мақтаудың ұлттық мәдени ерекшеліктері

Бұл мақала шеңберінде авторлар қазақ, француз және ағылшын тілдеріндегі бағалаушылық сөйлесімдердің ұлттық-мәдени ерекшеліктерін, олардың осы тілдердегі берілу тәсілдерін сараптап, аталмыш сөйлеу әрекеттерінің құрылымдық, семантикалық айырмашылықтарын салыстырмалы-салғастырмалы түрде зерттеп, оның ұлттық-мәдени уағдаластығын анықтауға арналған. Басқа сөйлеу актілері сияқты бағалауда да ұлттың мәдениеті, салт-дәстүрі, әдет-ғұрпы, әдептілік ережелері, салт-жоралары көрініс табады. Әр халықтың өзіне тән бағалау жүйесі болады. Бір елде жоғары, жағымды бағаға ие болатын зат, құбылыс, іс-әрекет, мінез-құлық екінші елде жағымсыз бағалануы мүмкін. Егер адамның іс-әрекеті, мінез-құлық сол елдің әдептілік ережелеріне, салт-дәстүріне сай болса, онда оған жағымды баға беріледі, егер керісінше болған жағдайда жағымсыз баға беріледі. Әр халық іс-әрекетке, мінез-құлыққа, зат пен құбылысқа баға бергенде өзінің ұлттық мәдениетіне, ұлттық дүниетанымына сүйенеді, соны негізге алады. Міне, сондықтан да, әр ұлттың мәдениеті, салт-жоралары, әдептілік ережелері, өмірлік тәжірибесі, дүниетанымы бағалай сөйлеудің ұлттық мәдени негіздері болып табылады. Дүние жүзіндегі кез келген халықтың ұлттық дүниетанымының, төлтума мінез-құлықтарының, әдептік ұстанымдарының қалыптасуында өзі өмір сүретін геоортасының да әсер-ықпалы айтарлықтай маңызды.

Түйін сөздер: мәдениетаралық коммуникация, мақтау, ұлттық мәдениет, мәдени ерекшеліктер, лингвистикалық сипаттар.

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Национально-культурные особенности в похвалах на казахском, французском и английском языках

В рамках данной статьи авторы проанализировали национально-культурные особенности оценочных разговоров на казахском, французском и английском языках, способы их передачи на этих языках, сравнительно-сопоставительно изучали структурные, семантические различия

данной речевой деятельности и определяют ее национально-культурную договоренность. В оценке, как и в других речевых актах, отражаются культура, традиции, обычаи, этические правила, обряды нации. У каждого народа своя система оценки. Предмет, явление, действие, поведение, которые получают высокую, положительную оценку в одной стране, могут быть негативно оценены в другой стране. Если действия, поведение человека соответствуют этическим правилам, традициям и обычаям данной страны, то ему дается положительная оценка, а в противном случае дается отрицательная оценка. Каждый народ, оценивая деятельность, поведение человека, предмет и явление, опирается на свою национальную культуру, национальное мировоззрение. Вот почему культура, обычаи, этические правила, жизненный опыт, мировоззрение каждой нации являются национально-культурными основами речи. Влияние геосреды, в которой проживает любой народ мира, также существенно играет важную роль в формировании национального мировоззрения, самобытного поведения, нравственных ценностей.

Ключевые слова: межкультурная коммуникация, комплименты, национальная культура, культурные особенности, лингвистические характеристики.

Introduction

The process of globalization in the world raises the question of how to preserve the national culture and linguistic characteristics of each ethnic group living today. The high level of cooperation and development of relations largely depends on the ability of people of different nationalities to communicate with each other.

In this regard, the study of the language, reflecting the characteristics of the nation, reflects the scope and worldview, the mental field of the nation, layers of artistic thinking, is a mirror of the national culture. This is one side of the issue.

Secondly, in the process of entering the global intercultural space, as many scientists note, intercultural communication, interconnections and interactions of languages, nations and societies are intensively studied, since representatives of different nationalities Knowledge of the social, spiritual and national specifics of interlocutors in the process of communication and Knowledge of unique cultural peculiarities of native speakers – intercultural language provides full use as a means of communication and is a prerequisite for mutual understanding of cultural objects found.

Experience has shown that for successful intercultural communication it is necessary not only to know the language and culture of peoples, but also to know this knowledge. You must be able to use it correctly in the process of communication. Our planet is inhabited by people of different nationalities, as well as the most different cultures, customs, traditions, that is, they have no place. There are as many cultures as there are nations. One and the same culture, ignorance of customs, ignorance of the characteristics of each language can be understood in relations between peoples. can cause infertility.

Since language is the main means of communication, it is necessary to know all the nuances of the language in order to fully understand each other. To master the language and speech habits of any nation, which are reflected in the language of this nation. It's necessary. From this point of view, the results of comparative studies, conclusions, practical recommendations helped to understand the adequacy of mutual understanding. He touches the skin. Comparative study of two or more languages at different levels from a cognitive, pragmatic and communicative point of view. This allows us to identify all aspects of language, national and cultural characteristics.

1. The communicative aspect of assessment

Relations between different cultures are developing rapidly today. Travel, tourism, scientific and professional congresses, commercial, economic and university relations. The exchange of dentists and applicants contributes to the development of international relations. Some misunderstandings and difficulties arising in relationships between different cultures are associated with the language of communication. It was necessary to study from a statistical point of view.

In the context of this article, compliments and speeches in Kazakh, French and English are considered from a communicative point of view. To determine the national and cultural characteristics of the use of modern humanities, first of all, modern humanities are one of the basic concepts. Let us dwell separately on the concept of "religion". This concept is used in different senses in different sciences. Thus, there are about 400 definitions of the term "culture". A.P. Sadokhin classifies the definitions of "culture" as follows:

- "In social definitions, culture is an idea, principles and social institutions that ensure the collective

existence of people. The set of values is interpreted as a factor in the organization of social life. Evidence of this understanding of culture can be found in the following definition: "Culture is a learned action, a test of behavior. It defines the social aspect of the personality. The culture and the person who accepts this culture change depending on time and circumstances."

- Culture according to historical definitions is the result of coexistence and culture. The main components of the world are a group of people and the history of their existence. Culture develops through the fruits of the history of society and its transmission from generation to generation.

- Psychological definitions of the relationship between culture and psychological abilities of a person. I can take. "Culture is our way of life, our way of life, our way of thinking, our way of feeling and our way of life. The context in which we interact with the world. Culture is the glue that holds a group of people together. Culture is a program inherent in the mind from childhood and controlling a person's activities in society. Ideas, customs, knowledge that characterize a group of people of a certain cultural period. This can be understood as methods, methods."

- From a didactic point of view, culture is seen as a set of human qualities. A person does not perceive such qualities genetically, on the contrary, he perceives them in the process of learning in life.

- From an anthropological point of view, culture is a person's life in different spheres of life during a certain period of time. or a set of actions of human society on various factors (ideas, customs, traditions). From this definition it follows that culture is a nation's understanding of its environment, worldview and behavior. It is a set of symbolic systems, norms and values of the society in which the nation lives, which is reflected in its actions" (Sadokhin 2004:19-20).

1. Among Kazakh scientists S.E. Isabekov SK Abdygapparova, G. Zakirova, A. Zhapieva NN Koroleva, A.K. Nazarbetoova and others. Linguists consider and take into account intercultural communication in their research (Isabekov 1998; Duissekoova 2003; Isabekov 2001; Zakirov 2004; Zhapieva, Koroleva 2004).

There is a specific culture or a specific set of rules and rituals that people in a country follow in their interactions. It should be noted that such rules are not based on the behavior and actions of only one person, but vice versa. Each person acts in accordance with the rules common to all representatives of the same culture, that is, relations are always governed by the customs and rules of a particular

society. For example, verbal and non-verbal actions and interactions between friends in the relationship between the boss and the person working under his leadership. Thus, in addition to linguistic education, sociocultural education also plays an important role in communication. Linguistic competence consists of making sentences for the speaker and listener, conveying his thoughts and making these sentences. If there is a system of grammar rules that allows you to learn, communicative competence is grammatical rules and potential. It consists of material and cultural education. Such knowledge helps a person to achieve good results in various communicative and cultural contexts. Communicative competence also includes the rules of communication, norms of ethics, that is, different communes. Greet, thank, praise, petition, etc. According to the negative situation, there are different ways (Nazarbetoova 2002: 90). As we all know, it is not enough to be grammatically correct for a sentence to be used. Each word or sentence is subject to its own rules of use. Thus, speech skills consist of language and communication skills.

2. The pragmatic aspect of the assessment

The pragmatic component provides information about a person's use of a specific word in relation to a word target or addressee. A person expresses his various emotional states (satisfaction, dissatisfaction, sympathy, antipathy, etc.) not only in words, but also in the words of the speaker. , not only in words expressing an attitude towards a phenomenon, a person in an explicit form (like, like, like, etc.), but also using the concept of a general assessment. For example, saying that this is a good apple, a person says that he (the apple) likes it and he is satisfied with its taste. It should be noted that Kazakh, French and English, which are the subject of our research, are positive. Words and phrases expressing appreciation are also used to describe the speaker's emotional state, his or her relationship to things, objects, and emotions. Shows a person's point of view, self-esteem. For example: in Kazakh: Dear, you are very young, you are a real man! There are no words that you have not heard, you are the best! (Etc.). Oh, well, I'm tired! (Etc.).

Example in French: C'est une étoile de cinéma <This film is a star>.

C'est un vrai boute-en-train! (S-G) <This person is the soul of the group, cool and bright>.

C'est un grand cerveau! (M.R.) <His head works really well. He's very smart.

As for the speaker's relationship to an object, a phenomenon expressed in words, the meaning of

many words in a language. Does not contain information about the speaker's relationship to an object or phenomenon. For example, compare the following words in French and Kazakh: see -Regarder, at-cheval, jump-sauter, help. chi-aide, helper-assistant, read-lire, chauffeur (conducteur) – driver, écrire – to write, louer – to rent, complimentator – to praise, etc. In these words, we cannot see the speaker's attitude to actions, things, people that are reflected in these words. In addition to such words, there are words that express the speaker's attitude to the emotional assessment of an object and action.

The pragmatic orientation, which expresses the speaker's attitude to the object of emotional assessment, is set in the following ways:

1. *Through words in descriptive semantics:*

For example, in Kazakh: a shepherd is also a horse, but a horse is slow, lazy. This word shows the speaker's negative attitude to the name, negative meaning. You can also speak in words like lazy, lazy, stingy, cowardly, lazy, lazy, timid, calm, honest, polite, polite, brave, brave. You can see a person's positive or negative attitude.

In French: smart (e) – smart, poli (e) – polite, délicieux (-euse) – tasty, friendly – respectful, compréhensif (-ive) – understanding, There are words like bon (-ne) – good, mauvais (-e), mal – bad. These words can directly indicate the speaker's positive or negative meaning for the object. For example: C'est un bon médecin – He is a good doctor; griffonner, gribouiller – spelling, incomprehensible writing. For example, Les médecins grifonnent leurs ordonnances – doctors prescribe medicines. These words show the speaker's attitude to action, to a person.

2. *Occurs in the derivative meaning of words formed with the help of suffixes:* in the Kazakh language: Author-performer, smart, wise, etc. These words show a negative attitude of the speaker to the addressee, a negative assessment.

In French: vantard – arrogant, politicard – politician, pendard – hatred, criard – cross, zonard – 1. simple, smoky; 2. judge, bully; shofard is a bad driver. Using the word Shauffard, the speaker negatively evaluates the target's driving skills.

3. *The speaker's attitude to the object of emotional assessment is set by phonetic methods.* In the pragmatic component of the lexical meaning, the lexical meaning of words from words that reflect the speaker's emotional-evaluative relationship is emotional. and be able to distinguish between words related to assessment. In this regard, it is necessary to pay attention, first of all, to the emotional attitude or cost to words that are related to their denotative

or significant meanings. This is, first of all, a lover, like – a braid, hatred – hair, detectors and so on. the words. Such words do not express the speaker's attitude, attitude or appreciation of the phenomenon or emotion they represent. For example, he loves Pierre Anne – Pierre Aimé Anne. In this sentence, the speaker does not express his opinion either about Pierre, or about Anna, or about their feelings. Of course, in this sentence, if the speaker has timbre, tone, facial expressions, gestures, etc. can express their views non-verbal methods. Therefore, one of the ways to convey pragmatic meaning is the phonetic approach.

4. *The attitude of the speaker to the object is set using auxiliary words.*

For example, He ate five apples! – Il a mangé cinq pommes! “He has five apples!” He ate only five apples or He ate only five apples – Il n'a mangé que cinq pommes (Il a mangé seulement cinq pommes) – He ate all five apples. In these sentences, the speaker's attitude to action is intonational and only ... auxiliary words, given in French for intonation and ne ... que, seulement. In the first sentence, the speaker thinks that the person who ate this action has eaten more than five apples, and in the second sentence, he thinks that he ate five apples. The apple is considered small.

3. Types, construction, structure and use of words and phrases “praise” in French and Kazakh languages

The main purpose of praise is to appreciate the merits and worth of the object of praise.

Praise is, firstly, an expression of the speaker's good attitude to the addressee, his actions, the subject, and secondly, good relations between people. thirdly, the speaker praises the addressee and expresses a good attitude towards him, which contributes to the development of communication. through the family he raises a gift to the addressee, and the addressee also has a positive opinion about the speaker, the fourth However, the speaker sometimes praises in order to achieve his goal. For example: “Starting this year, we decided to listen to the works and works of the communist every month. Kalizhan Bekkozhin will be next on the plan ... you need! We have not found a better poet than you”(Zhas Alash). By this example, we mean that if the speaker immediately tells the addressee to “report”, the addressee does not have time, referring to another job. He may disagree, but if he praises in front of the applicant, he will be happy and will come right away. We think it will grow.

What words and phrases, sentences are praised by native speakers of French and Kazakh? The most commonly used word of praise in French is “(je vous / te fais) tous mes compliments.” This also applies to the personal qualities of a person (intelligence, decency or beauty of appearance, beauty of the eyes) and things that he owns (car, clothes, apartment, etc.) or about what he did and what he did (things). and others) can be considered a compliment. You can also praise the person's relative (brother, father or child, etc.).

Both the form of praise and the word of praise depend on the level of communication between the communicators, age and gender, national differences, and the time and place of the relationship. For example, at the beginning of a meeting, the speaker often praises the listener for changes in their height, clothing, hairstyle, and appearance when they visit the house, compliment the owner's apartment, and offer a tablecloth.

Praise is often given at the beginning of a conversation. This is because, firstly, when a person notices a noticeable change in their height (changes in hair, clothes) or praises new clothes, and secondly, words of praise help to strike up a conversation. American linguist Erwen Hoffman combines praise with greeting (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1998: 64).

We have divided praise into two groups depending on the form in which it is directed:

1. Direct praise;

2. Indirect praise.

Direct praise is praise addressed to the listener. For example: you are very polite and kind. Your novel is very interesting. Vous êtes bien amiable. You are kind. Votre ouvrage est très intéressant <Your work is very interesting>.

The main form of indirect praise is not the listener, but the person close to him. For example: *Your child is very smart and resourceful. Your student is smart and resourceful.*

This extraordinary film by Eric Romer, « l'Amour, l'Après-Midi », embodies the illustration: the copine address is a compliment to copin: “Ta gosse est formidable. Ça me ferait plaisir d'avoir une petite fille blonde et bouclée “<Example from Eric Romer's film Afternoon Love: When he sees his girlfriend's daughter, he praises her friend:” Your daughter is wonderful. I want to have such a short blonde with curly hair. “

Some words and expressions of “praise” are not addressed to the person they represent, that is, from the outside, in his absence:

Oh, what a real citizen!

He is a wrestler whose shoulders do not touch the ground.

What a hostile heart!

C'est un vrai cheval! <This is a real horse !: He's very patient!>

Il est gentil <He's polite>

- Tu la connais, this actress? “Do you know these actors?”

- Oui, elle joue très bien ... <Yes, she plays the roles very well ...>

- Oui ... Et Lea, where are you from? <Yes. What do you think of Leah?>

- Lea? Elle est sympa, gentille, agréable, intelligente aussi, et puis elle est jolie com un coeur ... <Lea ma? She is polite, kind, charming, intelligent and very beautiful.

- Wee. J'adore Bruno. Il est tout le temps poli. <Yes. I like Bruno. He is always polite

The words “praise” and speech reflect the different emotional state of the speaker, admiration, gratitude, a positive attitude towards the addressee:

Okay, eagles! Oh my God! You are a real hero!; Tu es vraiment doué!; “You are really talented!” ; You are brave!; “You are brave!”; Quel courage! “What courage!”

The word “praise”, which is the subject of research, refers to good behavior of a person, good in him. For example, in the Kazakh language: *a hero, generous, honest, smart, brave, kind, respectful, polite, etc.*

In French: *courageux <brave, travailleur <diligent>, intelligent <smart>, patient <patient>, sage <dana>, etc.*

Depending on the way in which praise is expressed in the language, they can be divided into two groups:

1. Praise the explicit

2. Praise the implicit

Explicit praise is given in the formative sentence, that is, in the sentence, a positive assessment is not hidden, but clear, obvious:

He is a fighter who did not touch the ground;

... And E. Ertysbayev is one of the loudest politicians who knows where the wind is blowing from and does not speak for free. (“Aikyn” newspaper, No. 124, September 4, 2004, p. 1). Comme tu est belle! «You are so Beautiful!» ; Ce que tu es brave! What are you brave! «How dare you!»

Je vous félicite pour votre conférence. C'était passionnant! <Congratulations on reading. It was wonderful>.

Implicit praise is given in a positive way.

Examples: – *On n'a plus d'appétit quand on mange à côté de jolies filles! “No appetite when eating with pretty girls”*

- Il en a de la chance votre mari! “Your husband is happy!”

These two compliments are illustrated positively. In the first example he praises the beauty of the girls, and in the second he says, "You are beautiful, you are as beautiful as you are, and a man with a good wife is happy."

An example from the Kazakh language: ... According to some reports, Akhmet Baitursynov himself fell in love with Fatima. They say that Akhmet Baitursynov said to Fatima: "If I had a thousand eyes, all these thousand eyes would only be with you." (Newspaper "Aikyn", No. 124, September 4, 2004, p. 4).

It should be noted that a single compliment can have one or more implicit meanings in a sentence along with an explicit meaning. The implicit value is added to the explicit value. In some speech situations, these values can be in the same direction, which means that both values are positive. For example, consider an example from Eric Romer's movie « The Lion's Den »: *Elle est jolie votre fille. Elle a les beaux yeux de sa mère.* <Your daughter is beautiful. Her eyes are as beautiful as her mother's> ; *Il en a du goût votre mari.* "Your husband has good taste." ; *You chose a guy like Askar as your life partner, you have good taste.*

In some cases, these two values may be in conflict. French linguist Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni calls such praise "treacherous" because the meaning of praise is meaningless (Kerbrat – Orecchioni 1976; 85). For example, *Tu es bien coiffée aujourd'hui (cette fois-ci)* <You are well known today (this time)>.

The object of praise is the listener's appearance, in particular his hair. However, it can be said that the opposite meaning of this praise is hidden in the evaluative meaning, and the negative meaning is hidden. Refers to the listener's former hair, behind which the minus is hidden. The above compliment can be understood as follows: *today you are well distributed, on other days you are poorly distributed, you are dispersed.*

Thus, the conclusion suggests itself that some compliments can have completely opposite meanings.

Irony is usually the opposite of the literal meaning of a word or sentence and its subtext. At first glance, irony seems to praise and appreciate the object to which it is directed, but if we pay attention to the metaphorical meaning, then it varies through the metaphorical content (Kerbrat – Orecchioni 1976; 87). For example, *C'est vraiment un ami! Voilà ce que j'appelle ami!* <Here's a real friend! Call it a friend!> . This is when a person who calls himself a friend does something unfriendly.

... Do not be surprised. In the country, assistance is provided not anonymously, but anonymously. During the public meeting, we realized that before Kulekeev, Karakusova was the person who carried out small reforms in the village. There is no limit to the "gratitude" of the people to this person (newspaper "Zhas Alash", №105, September 2, 2004).

... Alas, you are married in the market age, hey! You borrowed a lot of money as "debt" and didn't pay it back. Oh man ... my husband is the moon! ...

«... Since the steppe is dark, I see in the window the shadow of the "cute image" of my belly, turned upside down.

The "cute image" in this example does not show any charm, because no one can imagine having a "cute image" in the belly that is upside down. Again, the ironic phrase "cute image" in this context "imagines an ugly and unpleasant picture underneath" (Goffman 2005 : 146-147).

The meaning of praise varies depending on the context in which it is used, in other words, words, sentences, phrases that mean praise in one communicative situation are different, but words of praise in another.

Praise differs in form of expression, place and function in different linguistic and cultural environments. For example, in Kazakh society, a guest must do what he likes to the guest (or a compliment made by the host to something is an indirect form of a request for a gift). This can be evidenced, for example, by a compliment between a niece and nephew.

Kazakhs have many traditions. For example, the day after the wedding, relatives, neighbors and guests drink tea from the bride's hands. The young bride is praised: *sweet tea, which she drank from the hand of the bride. The tea is delicious. The tea served by the bride is thick. Tea is hot* (Akhmetov 1995:79).

It is not possible to find performative or illocutionary verbs that match all speech acts. For example, *What a beautiful belt you have! What a wonderful person! Quelle belle ceinture! Quelle technique! Quelle grâce!* There is no verb that expresses the illogical function of such idioms. According to A. Vezhbitskaya, this problem can be solved as follows: the illocutionary function of the brain can be divided into semantic components, that is, the illocutionary function can be determined and its meaning revealed. Accordingly, two different semantic components stand out from illocutionary activity: the utterance and the illocutionary goal (Murzagalieva, 1998:79). For example, in the above

sentences the saying is given as follows: In Kazakh: *I said: – How beautiful is your belt!* in French: *Je dis: Quelle belle ceinture! Comme elle est belle, votre ceinture!*

The illusory goal is this: In Kazakh: *I want you to know that I like this belt*; in French: *Je voudrais faire en sorte que vous sachiez que cette ceinture éveille mon admiration (que j'admire votre ceinture)*. From these examples, we can see the concepts of dictum and proportion. In informal communication between the speaker and the addressee, the main condition for the success of the act of communicative praise is honesty and truthfulness.

Regardless of the nationality of the communicator, that is, in any nation, in most cases, a man praises a woman, that is, the speaker (man) is the addressee (woman).

In many cases, age hierarchy doesn't matter much, although peers praise each other.

In France, like Russians, it is customary to praise a small child: when he sees a small child, praise him, even if he is a child of someone whom he does not know:

- *Hey, what a beautiful baby! Qu'il est mignon, ce bébé!*

In the following example, the object of praise is praised by a stranger:

Qu'il est beau, mignon! Quel âge a – t – il? There is a portrait of her mother ...

Although the praise of a child's appearance in French is not limited to any conventions of communication, on the contrary, in Kazakh they say that strangers do not praise a child very much, and this language is a little offensive. In the Kazakh language, praising the appearance of a child is taboo, and in the Kazakh language, words of praise perform additional functions, such as gratitude, wishes, advice. This is one of the differences between the Kazakh language and the Russian and French languages. Standard household rituals prove this. By asking a child questions, Kazakhs receive information not only about the child, but also about his father, origin and place of birth. In the process of communication, the speaker enlivened the conversation using all the meta-communicative techniques (words such as “correct”, “good”, “good”, etc. are also praise and applause) (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1998:79).

Ways to form words and phrases “praise” in French:

1. Consists of adjectives. Evaluative adjectives in combination with a noun or turn into a noun reflect the positive (or negative) qualities of a person. For example: *Il est intelligent* <Ol arqyldy>, *Que tu es brave!* <How brave you are!> *Il est poli* <He's polite>.

2. The verb is formed by adding suffixes. For example: *travailler – travailleur* <work, labor – labor>, *briller – brillant (e)* <brilliance – brilliance, brilliance>, *charmer – charmant (e)* <surprise, surprise, surprise – amazing, wonderful>, *adorer – charming* <to love, cherish – enchant, please>.

3. Made metaphorically. Metaphor is a primitive novel based on the comparison and juxtaposition of two things, a phenomenon, an approximation a word or phrase that gives meaning. The emphasis in the metaphor is on the similarity, continuity of feelings and emotions between two things: *C'est un lion!* <This is a real lion!>; *C'est un vrai Saint-Bernard!* <This is a real St. Bernard (variety of dogs) – always ready to help people>; *C'est un coeur de lion!* “This is the heart of a real lion!”; *C'est un vrai bulldozer!* “A real bulldozer!”; *This is one of his favorite tempos!* “This is one of the stars of its time.”; *C'est un panier de cerises!* – *C'est une collection d'objets aussi séduisants les uns que les autres, entre lesquels il est difficile de faire un choix. L'image vient de Madame de Sévigné, qui a dit, à propos des fables de La Fontaine: “C'est un panier de cerises! On veut choisir les plus belles et le panier reste vide”* <This is a basket of cherries! – These are very interesting, catchy, beautiful, wonderful things that passed from one to another. It is difficult to choose one of them. This phrase is taken from Madame Sevigne's comment on La Fontaine's examples: “This is a basket of cherries! When you choose the most beautiful one, your shopping cart will be empty”>.

4. This is done metonymy, that is, by naming the whole part, the whole part. For example, *C'est un grand cerveau!* – *Personne remarquablement intelligente* <It's a big brain! (He is a very smart person)>. *C'est une grosse tête!* – *personne savante, intelligente* <This is a giant head, that is, his head works well. Educated and intelligent person. C'est un gros bonnet! – influential character <This giant hat: This is a very powerful person>.

The words “cerveau- brain” and “tête – head” in these examples refer to parts of the human body, and the words “cap” is the name of a person's headdress, that is, the name of a person's body. ... In these examples, the words “cerveau – brain”, “tête – head” mean “very smart, wise”, “hat – hat, headphones” mean “influential”.

5. When creating compliments, equations are widely used:

Fort comme un boeuf <strong as a bull>, *connu comme le loup blanc* <known as the gray wolf, famous: very famous>, *adroit comme un singe:* *très habile* <smart as a monkey. Very skillful>, *Il est fort comme un Turque* <he is a strong Turk>, *il*

travaille comme un cheval <he works like a horse: hardworking>, *il chante comme un rossignole* <sings like a nightingale and sings well>, *il est doux comme un anneau* <she tender as a lamb>.

6. A person's opinion about something, a phenomenon or another person is an assessment of this thing, phenomenon, or person. This opinion, point of view, price is expressed in several verbs: *aimer* <love>, *adorer* <love>, *plaire* <like>, *apprécier* <appreciate>.

Some verbs can be used to compare: *préférer* <... see more than ... forget>, *aimer mieux* <... love more>: *Je préfère la tarte aux pommes que la tarte aux cerises* <I prefer apple pie cherry pie>.

After some verbs, in particular verbs expressing a person's opinion, the word evaluation follows: *penser* <thinking>, *croire* <thinking>, *estimer* <calculating>, *Trouver* <searching>, *considérer* <calculating>, etc.: *Je pense que le program est is great* <I think this is a very good program>.

7. Adjectives or adjectives are used to strengthen an opinion, point of view, assessment:

a) Addition:

1. *J'ai trouvé le dernier roman de Clézio très bien* <I think that the last novel by Clézot was written very well>.

2. *(in this play) Il y a beaucoup de bonnes idées* <(in this play) There are many good ideas>.

3. *Le film de Godard ne m'a absolument pas plu* <I didn't like Godard's film at all>.

4. *L'acteur en fait trop (il exagère)* <The actor works too much>.

5. *La soirée était Assez intéressante* <The evening was quite interesting>.

6. *L'exposition est dans l'ensemble très bonne* <Overall the exhibition is very good>.

b) Adjectives help make a positive impression: *Ce film est (très) intéressant* <This film is (very) interesting>. *Les acteurs sont excellents* <These are great actors>. *C'était une soirée (spectacle, événement ...) superbe, merveilleux, formidable* <It was a wonderful, wonderful, wonderful evening (performance, event)>. *Il / elle est beau / belle, élégant (e), smart (e)* <She is beautiful / smart, smart>.

8. In French, they also praise, comparing the positive characters of legends, literary works, films: *C'est un Tarzan!* "He's the real Tarzan!" – he calls a good athlete. This is a comparison with the protagonist of the movie Tarzan.

Formation of the word and phrase "praise" in the Kazakh language:

1. Adjectives are formed by connecting nouns: *An intelligent person, an enthusiastic student, an experienced teacher.*

2. In the Kazakh language, as in the French language, some words and phrases of praise are expressed metaphorically: – *My lion Amangeldy, which frightened the enemy!*; – *Oh good old man!*; – *I was hungry!*; – *Raimbek is the country's shield, the enemy's stronghold*; – *Raimbek, Nauryzbai, Bogenbai, they are all blue wolves!*; – *How much has changed! How the song and lyrics have changed! Such words are so mysterious, so excite the soul! ...* – he nodded and silently looked at them.

3. We can say that the use of the names of folk tales, characters of fiction is widespread in the Kazakh language, as well as in the formation of words and conversations "praise". For example, *He is truly Generous! You are a real Zhelayak! in praise*

The words *Atymtai Zhomart* and *Zhelayak* are positive characters in the legends of the oral literature of the Kazakh people.

As you can see from the examples above, parallels of social roles are typical forms of role relationships. The role relationships of such couples are as follows:

- The role of the first participant in a communicative situation is higher than the role of the second participant;

- The role of the first participant is lower than the role of the second participant;

- The roles of the two participants are equal (Vejbitskaya, 2001:60).

4. Representation of a compliment in modern English

The compliment began to attract the attention of linguists in the 70s and 80s of the last century. The problem of complementary statements based on the Russian and English languages was studied by N. I. Formanovskaya, V. I. Karasik, I. A. Sternin, O. S. Issers, R. V. Serebryakov and others. One of the main problems that these scientists solved was the problem of determining the place of complementary statements in the system of speech acts and distinguishing them from praise and flattery.

A compliment is a set of various emotional and evaluative statements that convey a positive assessment of the addressee in direct communication with him and may relate to appearance, character traits, intellectual abilities, as well as objects belonging to a person (Yu.d. Apresyan).

The analysis of dictionaries of synonyms of the English language allowed us to identify the following synonymic series with the General meaning of "compliment" – compliment, flattery, praise, commendation, acclamation,

congratulations, admiration, approval, glory, honor, worship. The keywords of this synonym series can be called compliment, flattery, and praise. A compliment in English has both lexical and syntactic means of representation. Lexical tools – good, nice, beautiful, smart, and so on. Basically, these are adjectives chosen according to the speaker's goal.

The compliment also has a number of syntactic features:

1 it's + Adjective(an adjective that does not have a positive evaluative charge) + of you+ to Verb It's so nice of you to be here.

2 it's + Adjective(adjective, non-positive evaluative charge) that It's wonderful that you are so honest and moral.

3 exclamation points Gosh! What address!

4 the Structure I love/like I love your dress.

In addition to the usual structures that formalize a compliment, it is appropriate to talk about structures that become a compliment only in certain situations. Such constructions can be considered interrogative sentences, which do not serve as a means of requesting information, but carry pleasant information for the interlocutor. Wasn't that smart of David?

Constructions *glagolomvsoslagatel'nakloniyiwi hiwereaselegantasyou*.

The choice of lexical units and syntactic design of the complement depends on the situation and purpose of the utterance.

In the United States, I noticed one thing that unites them – they knew that the words of praise were spoken in time (words of praise) improve the quality of work of subordinates by an order of magnitude.

Several times after a particularly difficult day at work, our boss thanked us with words Great job, guys! (Great job, guys), I don't know what I'd do without you!(*He знает, что бы я без вас делал!*) We immediately broke into a smile, feeling like superheroes that at least saved the planet from disaster.

I won't say that praise is a part of American culture, but my experience has shown that native speakers often use it as a successful communication tool. So why don't we learn a few phrases that will benefit both others and ourselves?

It's no secret that praise works wonders (praise works wonders). Even the most confident people from time to time want to (longed for) get praise (to be praised / receive praise), as proof of their worth in a particular case. This is our nature.

Let's look at the most popular expressions to praise (to praise / give praise to) a person in English.

1. The first in our rating – the phrase well done, – I passed the test. – Well done! I'm proud of you.

1. Good job! / Way to go!

It is used to evaluate not only the work of a person, but also the performance of a task. The first expression is more formal than the second.

The house looks great – good job, guys!

"Way to go!" said Mary when Bob finally got the car started.

Good thinking! –

This phrase is used when you are actively looking for new ideas and someone suggests a great option.

– The best way would be to get our customer feedback before we proceed to the next stage.

– Good thinking, Max.

2. Good/Excellent idea!

– Pizza, anyone? – Excellent idea. Where's the menu?

3. You've outdone yourself!

Oh my god, your new painting is fascinating. You've outdone yourself!

Let's hear it for... / Hats off to...

Both expressions are used in a situation where you want to pay attention to the merits of another person.

Let's hear it for the winning team.

Hats off to Perry for planning the dinner and finding such a good band.

Compliments to the chef! –

This expression will be useful to you both in a restaurant and when you eat delicious dishes at a party.

The food was delicious! My compliments to the chef!

You rock! / You rule!

That was the best party ever!

If a person is still not able to complete the task, you can support it with the following expressions: *Don't give up. Nice try. You can do it! You are improving. You are nearly there. / You are almost there. / You are getting there.*

Well, if it happens that you can't remember the appropriate phrase for the situation, you can also praise others with a single word, for example: *perfect, brilliant, great, fantastic, excellent, bravo.*

Conclusion

After analyzing the positive and negative assessment of words and phrases in Kazakh, French and English in a communicative, pragmatic and cognitive direction, we came to the following conclusions:

- *communicative point of view*, the illocutional purpose of acts of praise in French is mainly to

approve, approve, like, and is partly used for illocutical purposes of gratitude, gratitude, and congratulations. Acts of praise in the Kazakh language can serve a lot. They will have illocutical goals of approval, approval, gratitude, gratitude, desire, blessing, etc. ;

- praise in French languages is never limited to a communicative convention, in Kazakh languages it is not allowed to praise children in spite of religious beliefs, praise is used without conditions;

- words and conversations of zoo component assessments are widely available in the two languages being compared. However, in the Kazakh language than in the French language, the names of the four animals are positively evaluated (pampered, loved, praised, thanked, wished). It is often found in words and conversations that express appreciation (curses, insults, curses). Many of these words in the Kazakh language – pets in the life of Kazakhs, who for centuries have been engaged in nomadic animal husbandry. It is understood that it takes up a large space. Livestock breeder Kazakh four-limbed animals, their characteristics, good, positive qualities and negative behavior. The poet was able to observe and understand the valley. In addition, the distinctive good qualities of pets are reflected in the good behavior, personality (beauty, the most important). love, heroism, perseverance, etc.), if you use it to describe the negative aspects of the human body. used for sale;

- the reason for comparing the two languages being compared with the things that are often used

in everyday life, in the living conditions of the population. There are words and conversations that express the positive and negative assessment of the situation;

- in both languages, the types of responses to praise are similar: praise – agreement with praise; praise – to say thank you, to lower the grade given in praise – praise, to praise – to praise against, to praise – to accept praise only with a smile;

- both languages have their own situational applications of gratitude and desire; some lacunae and uniquenesses are due to the absence of traditions, customs in the second culture;

- there are traditional conversations of praise in the Kazakh language;

- *pragmatic point of view*: in the Kazakh language, wishes are used not only to wish the addressee well, but also to positively assess his actions;

- manifestation of affective communication in the Kazakh language, the main part of the word love is the names of the offspring of four animals and the names of relatives;

- *cognitive point of view*: the environment and thinking, cognitive abilities of the human being, regardless of cultural differences and the universal concept of the biological nature of man and the general properties of social interactions. There are similarities in languages, universal values and values.;

- the concept that is the basis of the nation's worldview, combined with centuries of life experience and culture will be a set of.

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L'APPROCHE PAR COMPETENCES DANS L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANÇAIS DE SPECIALITE (le cas des specialites droit international et relations internationales)

In this article we make a brief review of the literature in the field of teaching French as a foreign language (FLE) and try to give an outline of concepts such as: "French language for specific purposes" (FOS), "French language of specialty" (FS), "French as a professional language" (FLP) and «Competency-based approach». Currently, there is a difficulty in the differentiation of "French language of specialty" (FS) and "General French language" (FG) in terms of purposes, content and the role of the teacher. Moreover, in the light of concepts of the scholars, we try to define the approach of teaching French as a foreign language suggested by Kazakhstani high educational institutions. Last years, the implementation of the "French language of specialty" (FS) to educational process for the non-linguistic specialties has taken special role due to the increasing role of foreign language communication in professional activity. Thus, the implementation of teaching French language of specialty in high educational institutions of Kazakhstan is intended to the integration of students in the professional environment as well as to the enhancement of the competitiveness of Kazakhstani universities.

Key words: French as a foreign language, French language of specialty, French language for specific purposes, professionalization of teaching, competency-based approach, non-linguistic specialties.

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Мамандыққа бағытталған француз тілін оқытудағы құзыреттілік тәсіл («Халықаралық құқық» және «Халықаралық қатынастар» мамандықтарының мысалы негізінде)

Біз бұл мақалада француз тілін шет тілі ретінде (FLE) оқыту туралы әдебиеттерге қысқаша шолу жасап, «Арнайы мақсаттағы француз тілі» (FOS), «Мамандыққа бағытталған француз тілі» (FS), «Француз тілі кәсіби тіл ретінде» (FLP) және «Құзыреттілік тәсіл» деген тұжырымдамаларға сипаттама жасауға тырысамыз. Бүгінгі таңда академиялық ортада оқытудың мақсаттары, мазмұны және мұғалімнің рөлі тұрғысынан «Мамандыққа бағытталған француз тілі» мен «Негізгі француз тілін» (FG) оқытудағы ерекшеліктерді ажыратуда қиындықтар бар екені мәлім болып отыр. Сонымен қатар, осы сала бойынша зерттеушілердің тұжырымдамаларына сүйене отырып, біз француз тілін шет тілі ретінде оқытудағы тілдік емес мамандық студенттеріне білім беруді кәсіптендіру үшін қазақстандық жоғары оқу орындары қандай тәсіл ұсынып отырғанын анықтауға тырысамыз. Соңғы жылдары, мамандыққа бағытталған француз тілі тілдік емес мамандық студенттерінің білім беру үдерісіне енуі кәсіби қызметтегі шет тілдік қатынастың рөлінің артуына байланысты ерекше маңызға ие болды. Осылайша, Қазақстанның жоғары оқу орындарында мамандыққа бағытталған француз тілін оқыту студенттерді кәсіби ортаға кіріктіруге, сонымен қатар қазақстандық жоғары оқу орындарының бәсекеге қабілеттілігін арттыруға әсерін тигізеді.

Түйін сөздер: француз тілін шет тілі ретінде, мамандыққа бағытталған француз тілі, арнайы мақсаттағы француз тілі, білім беруді кәсібилендіру, құзыреттілік тәсіл, тілдік емес мамандықтар.

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**Компетентностный подход в преподавании французского языка по специальности
(на примере специальностей «Международное право»
и «Международные отношения»)**

В данной статье мы делаем краткий обзор литературы в области преподавания французского языка как иностранного (FLE) и пытаемся очертить контуры концепций, таких как: «Французский язык для специальных целей» (FOS), «Французский язык по специальности» (FS), «Французский как профессиональный язык» (FLP) и «Компетентностный подход».

В настоящее время, в академических кругах по-прежнему существуют трудности в дифференцировании преподавания «Французского языка по специальности» (FS) и «Основного французского языка» (FG) с точки зрения целей, содержания и роли преподавателя. А также, на основе концепций исследователей данной области мы постараемся определить, какой подход преподавания французского языка как иностранного предлагают казахстанские вузы для профессионализации обучения студентов неязыковых специальностей. В последние годы внедрение в учебный процесс французского языка по специальности для студентов неязыковых специальностей приобрело особое значение в связи с возрастающей ролью иноязычного общения в профессиональной деятельности. Таким образом, внедрение обучения французского языка по специальности в университетах Казахстана направлено на интеграцию студентов в профессиональную среду, а также на повышение конкурентоспособности казахстанских университетов.

Ключевые слова: французский язык как иностранный, французский язык по специальности, французский язык для специальных целей, профессионализация обучения, компетентностный подход, неязыковые специальности.

Introduction

Le problème de la professionnalisation de la formation des étudiants de spécialités non linguistiques par le biais de l'enseignement du français est toujours d'actualité, car les exigences aux compétences des futurs spécialistes se sont accrues avec l'intégration de l'approche par compétences dans le système de l'enseignement professionnel supérieur du Kazakhstan.

L'idée de professionnaliser la formation des étudiants des spécialités non-linguistiques par l'enseignement de la langue de spécialité dans les universités du Kazakhstan est née d'un véritable besoin identifié dans le cadre du Programme d'Etat du développement de l'éducation au Kazakhstan pour les années 2011-2020 où une *attention particulière* est portée à l'enseignement technique et professionnel. Ainsi, la langue étrangère y compris le français représente la force motrice des relations économiques et socio-politiques, c'est à dire elle devient une langue des professionnels. Compte tenu de ce qui procède, nous pouvons constater que l'une des priorités du système éducatif supérieur du Kazakhstan est la professionnalisation de la formation des étudiants des spécialités non-linguistiques à travers l'enseignement de la langue étrangère.

En général, les universités kazakhstanaïses offrent des cours du français général (FG) à des futurs enseignants du français langue étrangère (FLE) et à des étudiants de différentes spécialités non-linguistiques. Donc, la problématique de cette recherche provient de ce que les facultés des langues des universités kazakhstanaïses ne forment pas d'enseignants de français de spécialité. Cela crée aussi des problèmes liés aux programmes de formation en différentes spécialités, aux curricula de français de spécialité, aux techniques pédagogiques et autres. En plus, le manque de consensus parmi les enseignants de français sur le programme à adopter a fait que chaque enseignant de FS travaille à sa manière en donnant des cours personnalisés.

L'inclusion du FS dans les universités kazakhstanaïses pourrait offrir de nouvelles possibilités pour renforcer l'enseignement du français au Kazakhstan. Aujourd'hui, les langues deviennent l'un des outils d'accès au marché de travail et de réussite professionnelle. Le FS est la principale composante de l'apprentissage des langues dans la préparation de spécialistes qualifiés dans divers domaines, c'est-à-dire qu'aujourd'hui, les diplômés doivent être un spécialiste qualifié ayant une connaissance d'une langue étrangère. En ce qui concerne l'enseignement du FS dans les facultés non-linguistiques, il est

à noter que durant les premières étapes d'apprentissage de français, les apprenants sont exposés aux cours FG.

L'insertion professionnelle des étudiants reste une préoccupation des responsables des universités kazakhes, la langue étrangère devient aujourd'hui l'un des outils d'accès au marché de travail et de réussite professionnelle. Selon Melnichuk chaque type d'activité professionnelle exige d'un spécialiste les connaissances, les compétences et les qualités personnelles importantes sur le plan professionnel (Melnichuk, 2000 : 20).

Comment identifier la démarche didactique pour professionnaliser la formation des étudiants des spécialités Droit international et Relations internationales dans les universités du Kazakhstan? Le FOS, FLP ou FS ?

Avant de répondre aux questions ci-dessus, il convient d'analyser les différents concepts des chercheurs traitant des problèmes de l'enseignement des langues étrangères dans le contexte de la formation professionnelle.

Zhetpisbaeva, parlant des besoins des futurs spécialistes, constate que «Le diplômé de l'université doit être un spécialiste professionnellement et psychologiquement adapté, capable d'acquérir et d'utiliser constamment et activement des connaissances, des compétences et de l'expérience pour résoudre des problèmes professionnels. Il doit également avoir une compétence professionnelle et communicative en langue étrangère bien formée et être capable de l'intégrer dans la structure de son activité professionnelle» (Zhetpisbaeva 2017 : 25).

Historiquement l'expression du français sur objectif spécifique (FOS) a été calquée de l'anglais « English for specific Purposes » (ESP). Selon les constats des chercheurs, le FOS est une démarche de la didactique du FLE, c'est-à-dire qu'à l'issue de la formation l'apprenant doit savoir mener une activité professionnelle qui requiert l'utilisation du français. Cet enseignement vise à amener l'apprenant d'être apte à faire quelque chose à l'aide de cette langue. L'objectif est « la maîtrise de la langue nécessaire à l'appréhension des notions (de spécialités)» (Mangiante et Parpette, 2004 : 144).

Selon la définition donnée dans le Dictionnaire de didactique du français langue étrangère et seconde dirigé par J-P Cuq, le FOS « est né du souci d'adapter l'enseignement du FLE à des publics adultes souhaitant acquérir ou perfectionner des compétences en français pour une activité professionnelle ou des études supérieures » (Cuq, 2003 : 109).

Mangiante et Parpette ne séparent pas le FOS du FLE et le FOS est considéré comme un sous-champ du FLE. (Mangiante et Parpette, 2004 : 159). Autrement dit, un enseignant du FOS est l'enseignant de langue. «A partir du moment où émerge un projet de FOS jusqu'au moment où se déroule la formation, se construit un processus assez long qui est schématisé en 5 étapes» (Mangiante et Parpette, 2004 : 7).

La première étape nous permet de définir s'il faudra mettre en place un programme de FOS ou un programme de FS. Dans cette étape il faudra diviser les groupes soit selon le niveau de langue, ou selon le niveau d'étude, ou selon la spécialité.

En deuxième étape le concepteur du cours de FOS ou FS devra déterminer les besoins d'enseignement/apprentissage du FOS/FS, faire l'analyse des besoins des apprenants et de l'entreprise ou du centre prestataire de la formation. Dans cette étape on peut faire le questionnement avec les étudiants et les enseignants afin d'identifier leurs besoins.

En troisième étape l'enseignant pour construire le programme de formation, doit entrer en contact avec des acteurs du secteur professionnel, recueillir des informations, collecter des discours. Cela permet de confirmer les hypothèses faites par l'enseignant, de les compléter et modifier.

Quatrième étape «... pour l'enseignant-concepteur, le degré de familiarité avec les situations cibles est différent d'un cas à l'autre. Les prévisions faites sur les contenus de formation varient dans les mêmes proportions, d'où la nécessité d'analyser attentivement les données recueillies pour connaître les composantes des situations de communication à traiter» (Mangiante et Parpette, 2004 : 7).

Cinquième étape permet à l'enseignant de construire les activités pédagogiques en intégrant à son programme les données collectées et analysées. L'enseignant construit les activités d'enseignement du FOS/FS.

Aux concepts français de spécialité, français sur objectifs spécifiques F. Mohon-Dallies ajoute le concept du français professionnel subdivisé en français à visée professionnelle et le français langue professionnelle (Mohon-Dallies, 2008 : 15). Une nouvelle appellation «français à visée professionnelle» est apparu dans le champ de la didactique du FLE au début des années 1990 (Mohon-Dallies, source : Inernet).

De ce point de vue Mohon-Dallies constate que les démarches visant à enseigner le français à des publics d'adultes en voie de professionnalisation ou en activité ont été tout aussi nombreuses, car près de dix appellations ont été forgées, variées parce que chaque courant témoigne d'options méthodo-

logiques distinctes (Mohon-Dallies, 2008 : 9). Par rapport au FOS et au FS, le français à visée professionnelle offre sans doute un marché plus porteur (Mohon-Dallies, 2006). Ils s'agit de travailler en français en restant dans son pays d'origine ou de partir dans un autre pays, pour étudier un métier ou pour l'exercer en français.

La dénomination « langue de spécialité » a été utilisée entre 1963 et 1973 à l'époque de la méthodologie structuro-globale audio-visuelle. A la suite de l'apparition du français fondamental, l'attention est portée sur les spécificités lexicales et sur une sélection syntaxique (Lehmann 1989 : 19). C'est-à-dire, que le terme français de spécialité est apparu avant les autres méthodes destinées aux apprenants étudiant le français dans une perspective professionnelle.

Quelles sont les divergences et les convergences entre les notions français de spécialité et le français sur objectifs spécifiques ?

Arrivés à ce *point*, nous remarquons des points divergents et des points convergents entre les notions de français de spécialité et celle de français sur objectifs spécifiques et afin de déterminer leur rôle dans le système d'enseignement supérieur du Kazakhstan, nous tenterons d'analyser les défini-

tions de ces concepts. Etant donné que l'objectif prioritaire pour les enseignants assurant les cours du français de spécialité est le développement de la compétence de communication liées aux domaines d'étude des apprenants J- M. Mangiante précise que: «Le français enseigné aux étudiants dans les filières scientifiques vise la langue de spécialité, ou plus particulièrement l'ensemble des discours propres à une spécialité ou discipline donnée. Il répond à une offre de formation plus exhaustive, moins urgente, couvrant l'ensemble des situations de communication d'un domaine spécialisé qui comprend plusieurs métiers lorsqu'il s'agit d'un domaine professionnel» (Mangiante, 2007 : 129). Selon les recherches des mêmes auteurs il y a des points divergeants et les points convergeants entre les notions FS et celle de FOS. Le terme FOS a l'avantage de couvrir toutes les situations, que celles-ci soient ancrées ou non dans une spécialité. Le FOS travaille au cas par cas, ou en d'autres termes, métier par métier, en fonction des demandes et des besoins d'un public précis». (Mangiante et Parpette, 2004 :16).

Pour identifier la démarche didactique pour professionnaliser la formation dans universités du Kazakhstan, il nous semble important d'utiliser le tableau de différences entre le FS et le FOS proposé par les mêmes chercheurs.

Table 1 – (Mangiante et Parpette, 2004 : 18).

FRANCAIS DE SPECIALITE	FRANCAIS SUR OBJECTIF SPECIFIQUE
1. Objectif plus large couvrant un domaine 2. Formation à moyen ou long terme 3. Diversité des thèmes et des compétences liés à une discipline 4. Contenus nouveaux, a priori non maîtrisés par l'enseignant 5. Travail plus autonome de l'enseignant 6. Matériel existant (insuffisant dans certains domaines) 7. Evaluation interne au programme de formation	1. Objectif précis 2. Formation à court terme (urgence) 3. Centration sur certaines situations cibles 4. Contenus nouveaux, a priori non maîtrisés par l'enseignant 5. Contacts avec les acteurs du milieu étudié 6. Matériel à élaborer 7. Evaluation extérieure au programme

Les chercheurs constatent qu'il n'y a bien évidemment pas de frontière rigide entre le français de spécialité et le français sur objectifs spécifiques (Mangiante et Parpette, 2004 :18). En nous basant sur les définitions faites par les chercheurs, nous pouvons constater que: le FOS est un domaine ou un sous-champs du FLE (Mangiante et Parpette, 2004:159).

Selon cette distinction précise entre le FOS et FS, nous pouvons suggérer que les universités du Kazakhstan offrent aux étudiants des spécialités Rela-

tions internationales et Droit international des cours de français de spécialité (FS) parce que:

Premièrement, les cours ont l'objectif plus large couvrant un domaine, par exemple:

Français *de la diplomatie* pour les apprenants de la spécialité «Relations internationales»;

Français juridique pour les étudiants de la spécialité «Droit international »;

Deuxièmement, la formation de professionnalisation en français est souvent à long terme. Dans les universités l'enseignement du FS pour

les étudiants des spécialités Droit international et Relations internationales se décompose en 4 modules (troisième, quatrième, cinquième et sixième semestres, c'est-à-dire qu'en 2^{ème} et 3^{ème} années).

Troisièmement, dans l'enseignement du français de spécialité au Kazakhstan, les universités ou les facultés définissent leur programme académique pour chaque spécialités sans identifier les besoins des apprenants et du marché du travail. Chaque année on prépare le programme d'étude conformément au référentiel d'Etat et le programme de type d'enseignement de la spécialité. Selon le nombre d'heures donné dans le programme d'étude des spécialités nous devons préparer un programme du FS. «...le contenu du programme, les documents qui serviront de support, le type d'évaluation, etc. ne sont pas contraints par une demande extérieure, ils sont déterminés par l'institution et l'enseignant, dans les limites du domaine de spécialité concerné...» (Cuq et Gruca, 2008 : 363).

Quatrièmement, contenus nouveaux non maîtrisés par l'enseignant. L'enseignant de FS au Kazakhstan a plusieurs difficultés dont la principale – est le manque de formation dans ce domaine. Au Kazakhstan les enseignants de FS sont généralement de formation linguistique et ont des difficultés pendant l'élaboration du cours du FS, notamment du cours de Français *de la diplomatie* et de Français juridique.

Cinquièmement, évaluation interne au programme de formation, c'est à dire on ne collecte pas des données sur le terrain afin de les analyser pour identifier les besoins réels des apprenants et du marché du travail.

Les dernières années trois universités du Kazakhstan, notamment : Université nationale pédagogique Abai, Université nationale Al-Farabi, Université des relations internationales et des langues du monde Abylai khan ont intégré l'enseignement de français de spécialité dans leurs cursus dans le cadre de licence et master.

Il est important de noter ici que l'élément le plus essentiel dans la planification d'un cours de FS est la définition de l'objectif d'apprentissage. En perspective, afin de construire des activités répondant aux besoins précis *des apprenants nous devons produire un curriculum et un programme de FS adapté aux universités du Kazakhstan et construire les activités pédagogiques en intégrant les données collectées et analysées*. Il faut tenir en compte que l'une des principales exigences pour la formation des futurs spécialistes est la maîtrise d'une langue étrangère de la spécialité.

L'adhésion du Kazakhstan au processus de Bologne a donné un nouvel élan à la modernisation de l'éducation et a déterminé la mise en œuvre l'approche dans l'éducation basée sur les compétences.

L'approche par compétences dans l'enseignement du FS dans les universités du Kazakhstan

Au stade actuel du développement de l'enseignement supérieur au Kazakhstan, l'intérêt pour l'approche par compétences dans la didactique des langues étrangères est plus grand que jamais. Donc, l'approche par compétences est un outil méthodologique le plus important pour rapprocher le système éducatif du Kazakhstan des systèmes d'enseignement étrangers dans le cadre du processus de Bologne.

Selon la définition du dictionnaire « LE PETIT LAROUSSE » une compétence c'est : «Ensemble de dispositions, capacités, aptitudes spécifiques qui permettent à tout un sujet parlant une langue de la maîtriser, et qu'il met en œuvre à l'occasion de ses actes de parole effectifs dans des situations concrètes. » (Dictionnaire « le petit Larousse », 2008 : 82). Cette définition nous permet de constater que la compétence est un concept principal dans l'enseignement / apprentissage de FS. Elle consiste à la mise en œuvre des connaissances, attitudes, et capacités dans différentes situations. C'est-à dire, que l'approche par compétences dans l'enseignement professionnel supérieur ouvre de vastes possibilités pour une meilleure formation des spécialistes dans la vie réelle.

La plupart des chercheurs se réfèrent aux composantes de base de la compétence communicative: linguistique (grammaticale, linguistique); discursive (pragmatique, stratégique); socioculturelle (sociolinguistique, linguistique et régionale).

Bien que tous les chercheurs confirment la composition multi-composantes de la compétence communicative, il n'y a toujours pas d'uniformité dans l'attribution de ces composantes.

La compétence à communiquer langagièrement peut être considérée comme présentant plusieurs composantes : une composante linguistique, une composante sociolinguistique, une composante pragmatique (CECRL : 17, source : <https://rm.coe.int/16802fc3a8>).

Dans ses recherches Lebedev constate que: l'approche par compétences est un ensemble de principes généraux pour déterminer objectifs de l'éducation, sélection du contenu éducatif, organisation du processus éducatif et évaluation des résultats de l'éducation (Lebedev, 2004 : 5).

Les enseignants utilisent de plus en plus une approche par compétences visant à l'efficacité de la formation professionnelle et au développement des compétences générales et professionnelles d'un futur spécialiste qui est prêt pour des activités professionnelles compétitives sur le marché du travail. Dans les conditions modernes, «pour une personne, il est extrêmement important non pas tant de savoir encyclopédique que de pouvoir appliquer des connaissances et des compétences généralisées dans des situations spécifiques pour résoudre des problèmes qui surviennent dans la vie réelle. Ainsi, la connaissance est à la base de la compétence humaine, qui est prise en compte dans l'approche par compétences » (Ivanov 2003 :101).

Ainsi, l'orientation du processus pédagogique vers l'orientation professionnelle de l'étudiant et le développement de supports pédagogiques combinant l'enseignement d'une langue et d'une spécialité apporte une contribution significative à l'augmentation du niveau de compétence communicative professionnelle du futur spécialiste (Zarutskaya, 2018 : source internet).

Conformément au Référentiel d'Etat de l'enseignement supérieur de la République du Kazakhstan, la composante obligatoire du cycle des disciplines de base pour les spécialités non linguistiques comprend la discipline «Langue étrangère à orientation professionnelle / Профессионально-ориентированный иностранный язык» au moins 3 crédits (Référentiel d'Etat de la République du Kazakhstan). Ainsi, l'enseignement à orientation professionnelle devient une partie intégrante de l'enseignement des langues dans les universités du Kazakhstan.

On peut en conclure que nous devons définir les compétences dans l'enseignement du FS afin de professionnaliser la formation des étudiants de la spécialité «Droit international» prenant en compte les besoins des entreprises et en nous basant sur les compétences du Modèle de diplômé (модель выпускника) de la spécialité "Droit international" (DI). Ce modèle de diplômé est élaboré sur la base de la loi de la République du Kazakhstan "sur l'éducation"; Documents normatifs et administratifs dans le domaine de l'éducation de la République du Kazakhstan; La norme d'Etat obligatoire de l'enseignement supérieur de la République du Kazakhstan, approuvée par décret du gouvernement de la République du Kazakhstan du 08.23.2012 n ° 1080; Le programme de type d'études pour la spécialité 5B030200 – Droit international, approuvé par arrêté du Ministre de l'éducation et des sciences de la République du Kazakhstan du 16 août 2013 n ° 343;

Théorie des compétences de l'apprentissage; Les descripteurs de Dublin, qui font partie intégrante du cadre européen des qualifications de l'enseignement supérieur et mettent en œuvre les exigences de qualité convenues pour l'enseignement supérieur dans le contexte du processus de Bologne.

Selon le Programme de type d'études de la discipline Langue étrangère professionnelle (Типовая учебная программа по дисциплине «Профессионально-отраслевой иностранный язык». 2016 : 6), élaboré et approuvé par l'Université kazakhe des relations internationales et des langues du monde Abylaï khan, le résultat final en l'absence d'un environnement linguistique est la formation de la compétence interculturelle et communicative.

En nous basant sur la théorie de la «langue de spécialité», nous devons créer des supports pédagogiques qui aideront les étudiants à maîtriser le «français de spécialité» dans le domaine de certaines activités professionnelles et à accroître leurs compétences professionnelles. Etant donné que les apprenants des spécialités non-linguistiques ont des besoins langagiers professionnels, en même temps, de la formation plus efficace, nous devons utiliser en classe de FS des supports pédagogiques qui correspondent à leur niveau de langue, ainsi qu'au contexte de l'enseignement supérieur du Kazakhstan. En plus nous devons valoriser l'enseignement et l'apprentissage du français de spécialité selon une logique de compétences pour répondre aux besoins du marché du travail ou d'entreprise.

Conclusion

En guise de conclusion, on peut considérer que la professionnalisation de la formation concerne en premier lieu l'intégration des disciplines professionnalisantes dans les cursus universitaires y compris les langues, notamment le FS, FOS et le FOU. Les dernières années les établissements d'enseignement supérieur du Kazakhstan ont intégré l'enseignement du français de spécialité dans leurs programmes d'études dans le cadre de licence et master. A cet égard, les universités du Kazakhstan doivent élaborer des programmes d'études, basé sur la prise en compte des besoins réels des étudiants dans l'apprentissage du français, dictés par les particularités de leur future profession ou spécialité. Donc, cela nous permet de constater que les universités du Kazakhstan vivent aujourd'hui une période de transition du français général au français de spécialité et au français sur objectifs spécifiques.

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