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I • CULTURAL STUDIES

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*Yem N., Pokhlebayeva N.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

E-mail: Natalya.Yem@kaznu.kz

natnickpok@gmail.com

Multiculturalism in Korean Way: the Difficulties of the Alternative Mass Media in South Korea

Abstract. Labor migration along with the new phenomenon in Korea such as marital migration found out weak sides of politics in the «New Korea». In research, attention is paid to selective policy of multiculturalism in the country. The governmental mass media as a basic instrument in forming the public opinion build the stereotypes in relation to the migrants in frames of such a policy. In turn the experience of the aspect the experience of the appearance of the alternative mass media «migrants for migrants» shows «deficiencies» in the existent paradigm about the social nature of migrants in South Korea. The limitations in the considered material gives the new directions for the following research of migrants in whole and marital migrants in particular.

The South Korea deserves special attention to discussion of the multiculturalism because it is considered as the most ethnically homogeneous country in the world. In spite of the Korean Mass Media, governmental channels release many programs the basic character of which is the stereotype of the compassion and pity to migrant workers. That causes the displeasure and the desire to show migrant workers as members of the Korean society who invest huge contribution to Korea. The author considers that Mass Media created by the migrant workers is instrument that connects the Korean society and migrant workers. The limitations in considered materials gives new directions for the further research of migrants as a whole and marital migrants as a part of this formation.

Key words: South Korea, multiculturalism, migrants, television programs.

Introduction

South Korea deserves special attention in any discussion of the multiculturalism as it considered one of the ethnic homogeneous countries. Therefore historical understanding of the notion «citizen» and «nation». Even ethnic Koreans are counted foreigners. However, in the light of the globalization the country begins «project of distribution of Korean nation». In 2006, Lee Myung Pak opens «multicultural politics» for the maintaining of the unity in the rapidly changing conditions. It is expected that the number of foreigners in South Korea will reach 2.5 million of people, in 2050 -4.1 million that will make 9.2 % from the overall population.

The reasons of such changes are the problems of low birth rate and aging population in Korea. As a result, the country is dependent beginning from 1990-es years, from the presence of the migrant workers, as a rule from Asian countries, for the

low-qualified workforce in condition of flourishing economy. In condition of the absence of competition with Koreans foreign workers fill the labor niche in process industry and construction identified as 3D working places («dirty», «dangerous», «difficult»).

Along with the constant increase of migrant workers, new demographic phenomenon appeared. From the end of the 1990, the country began to come into phase of the «multicultural marriages». South Korean outsiders especially in rural regions began to take as brides women from the countries as China, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand. In 2005, there were 36% of the marriages in rural areas between Korean man and foreign woman as it was 14% in whole Korea. As labor migrants, marital migrants and their children born in such marriages significantly grow in numbers[1, 72].

This wave of migrant include mainly women who officially immigrate in Korea as wives to create families with Korean men. Korean man as a rule

working in agriculture or city representatives of low and middle class having setback to find a bride refer to the services of marital agencies. Men are significantly older than women are and couples cannot find common traits having the serious problem to understand each other.

China is the biggest donor of the brides, Vietnam and Philippines, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and some East –European countries are bridal donors- countries for Korea. Nowadays more than 820000 people belong to multicultural families in Korea the number of which increased as twice within last eight years [2].

In result, the government has to change the policy of monoculture and attain to multicultural variety. The politics of the multicultural families brought to opening of the multicultural centers all over the country. The problems of the social adaptation of foreign wives and multicultural children brought to formation of new legal acts, understanding of the necessary solution of the issues of citizenship. The formation of postulate of the «new Korea with new Koreans» was specified by the Ministry of Education in school textbooks, what would influence significantly maintaining of the multiculturalism.

However, the policy of the multiculturalism was distributed only to the multicultural families but not migrant workers; in comparison from marital migrants, they had the status of the «ad hoc instrument for Korean economy» and even does not consider as people who contribute in Korean society [3,112].

According to data in March 2015 the government of Korea registered 1 813 037 born abroad, this number includes students, representatives of «white collars», migrant workers, not registered workers and «foreign brides». In 2014, the number of legal workers were 503 135 and altogether 64 507 not registered legal workers are 3D –workers who work in 3D industry and service sector[2].

Therefore separating marital migrants from the workers, the government employ the selective policy of the multiculturalism with the purpose of more effective control of growing population of foreigners in the country. However as researchers predict the government of South Korea will be needed to present the status of the resident to working migrants to maintain the stability of labor resources [1,75]. In such way, «Korean variant» of the multiculturalism was formed in historically monoethnic country.

Methods

In terms of methodology, media are considered in the paper as enterprises whose activities are sub-

ject to the laws of economics and management, and as a social phenomenon – the channels for exchange information between parts of society, and as an area of spiritual practice.

Main body

Nowadays there are four large television networks: Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), and Educational Broadcasting System (EBS). «Arirang TV» and «YTN» are popular channels, which cast in English and Korean. Besides, 38 television networks exist in South Korea, 20 of which commercial. There is also «AFKN TV»-television for American military and their families.

The country, which had no experience of acceptance of the migrants beginning from 1980, in result of economic development, the coming of the stream of not regulated migration, began to encounter with the difficulties. The incoming migrants have no equal rights with the citizens of the country. Thus, the programs of being in the country such as programs of the trainees for example was limited by definite periods, in the last case by 3 years. The reasons of these phenomenon researchers comprehended as «threat to having pure-blood national identity of Korea [4,679]». In result, trade union movement for equal legal rights and improvement of labor conditions began in Korea. The weak organization and appearance of rock-groups during meetings could not stop the upsurge during demonstrations of workers for their rights. Besides «unjust presentation of the migrants in Mass Media» caused Koreans to be indifferent to the problems of the migrants [5].

Korean television channel RTV had the initiative to create the television channel for labor migrants-migrant Worker's Television (MWTV). MWTV was created in 18 of April 2015 with the purpose «to show voice of working migrants who lived in Korea». Migrants united from following countries: Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, Mongolia, China, Germany, USA, Indonesia, and Philippines, Russia.

As distinguished from more «basic versions» of the multicultural broadcasting, this television network was created for the community of migrant workers. Among of the anchors there were noticed even not registered migrants. MWTV transmit news bulletin. These programs which are transmitted in 9 languages (Bengali, Burmese, Chinese, English, Indonesian, Mongolian, Nepalese, Russian and Tagalog) share quite a lot of time for the legal questions which are significant for workers, news from

those countries and news of South Korea for foreign citizens

Besides the channel regularly transmits program of Korean language. The anchor Mahbub told that when the channel was created: «At the beginning, it was the dream for us to create own TV program. We did interview during riots that concerned system of the permission of the legal employment, organized conferences and seminars. We talked about not exact, in our point of view, information, information of Mass Media about the problems of the migrant workers» [6].

The initiative of such activists caused that in 2003 the channel PTV had 100-minute program of the discussion of the problems of labor migrants with the participation of the migrants themselves. That had a positive effect and in 2005 the further initiatives received support in creation of own program. At the beginning the broadcasting was done through the sputnik on Skyline channel but it was the chargeable way of watching which costed 20-30\$ a month in result the people with high income could watch the programs. By broadcasting through cable TV and Internet, the audience of migrantsworkers was expanded. They could watch the monthly program in Korea «The World of Migrant Workers».

In 2006, the MWTN received the license of the RTV that presented the public access to the channels of the sputnik's broadcasting. MWTN released first programs, World of Migrant Workers and Multilingual Migrant Workers News (multilingual news for migrants). Complimented by worsening of the financial situation in 2009 MWTN moved their programs in Internet and began new program named Video Web-News (VWN) [5].

Active members among labor migrants are worried that in spite of the governmental channels transmit many kinds of the programs the main character of the programs to the audience involves stereotypes of the compassion and pity. This causes discontent and wish to show labor migrants as members of Korean society who also contribute lot in Korea. Gradually, many people acknowledge the channel. Moreover, the administration begins to contact with the authors of the programs in face of employees of the Immigration Office. The staff of the channel assesses that administration and government of South Korea that organization [6].

In 2005 the Ministry of Culture organized the large festival of the migrants, the main motto of which was «We are unified!». Simultaneously The Department of Justices and employees of immigration office with the participation of the military employed disruption of the meetings and processions of

migrants with the nets and gas as the weapons. They intruded at night in their homes, arrested and directed people in the centers of «protection» which were like prisons with the purpose to deport illegal migrants. It is actual that the demands of the cultural unity, granting cultural rights to migrants does not present any value because migrants are deprived of the labor rights. Authors of such programs build plans to create cultural and educational programs, which will demonstrate real life of labor migrants [6].

Television channel of workers (MWTN) in South Korea demonstrate the efforts of the migrants through the Mass Media to become the part of the Korean society. The Mass Media created by workers-migrants in Korea is the link between migrant's society and Korean society. South Korean researchers employed the analysis of the content of a more than two hundred programs, produced by the MWTN, non-governmental organizations of the migrant's Mass Media. They conclude that MWTN programs attain united community among ethnically different communities of the migrant-workers [5].

Later the students and marital migrants started to enter in the organization what changed the content of the MWTN. In result of the analysis of the activity in 2011 year there was raised the question about the change of the title in result of the demographic changes and increase of the number of the marital migrants. Marital migration increased from 25182 in 2001 to 125087 in 2009 as the large number of the men with the low level of the income looked for the brides from the foreign countries. More than 80% of marital migrants were the women from China, Vietnam, Philippines and Cambodia (Korean Immigration office, 2010). In 2015 marital migrant's number was more than 22 462. Besides the quantity of the applications about the granting of the refugee's status continued to grow during this time (from 37 in 2001 until 717 in 2007, until 324 in 2009). In result, Korean society have drastic changes in the period.

The author of the one article researched 30 minute program in Korean in format of the panel discussion on questions of the legal consultations with migrants where he discussed unjust conditions of the labor, presented information about the cultural activities for migrant workers. The purpose of the program is granting the practical recommendations on the solution of the problems of the migrants [5]. Researching MMWN (Multilingual Migrant Worker News), the author found out that among the indexed elements of the program the labor questions were dominant that clearly shows as their labor class in the quality of the important element among the

migrant workers in Korea. The programs included the information about the new governmental acts, trade-union questions of the migrants, groups of the support of the NGO and corresponding economic changes. The form of the employing of such programs are discussions in forums, symposiums, press conferences that are connected with the question of the migration and the labor.

All issues were about the modern changes and tasks that given to the migrants in Korea. Therefore, the programs that were created by the migrants themselves significantly differed from governmental channels of Mass Media in South Korea. The character of the delivering of the information significantly differed. The program *World of Migrant Workers* demonstrated the bright cases of labor exploitation, examples of wages liabilities, cases of unhuman repressions, forced deportation, sexual chase on the example of events in industrial city Ansan, which located south to Seoul [5].

The other direction of the enlightening the issue of the migrants on the channel was the category of the presentation of cultural events with the participation of the migrants –more than 30% of the information. The social cultural events, educational programs, concert programs were presented with the purpose to find the similarities and differences. One plot showed the trip to Korea of Buddhist priest from Burma who performed Burman traditional rituals in Korea. There was a story of Nepalese wedding ceremony in Korea and the activity of the Mongolian communities in Korea. These plots showed the acknowledgement of the fact that all the migrants in Korea are representatives of different cultures. In plots there were brightly demonstrated the perception of the migrants such as an example of the Mongolian worker who shared the story that never imagined to work together with Indonesian worker. All those brought to perception that all of them «are on the same boat», the appearance became the secondary, the migrants learned to hold the new identity in Korea [5].

The third category of the plots in the programs were international questions, events in the world and the information about the events in the countries of the migrants. However, those programs were directed to direct necessities of the audience so that they would not express interest to own country exclusively.

It was reflected the desire of the community of migrants becoming the members of Korean society in the fourth category of the plot of the Mass Media. Such programs included the cases when migrants saved Koreans in the fire, when children of the mi-

grants studied at school and pieces where migrants lived with Korean families.

One of the brightest examples that was broadcasted on TV was the program of the soccer mini World Cup with the participation of the laboring migrants. Symbolically event was at the same time as the World Cup in 2006. Hard crackdown caused the death of several migrants workers. It seemed it was comfortable to «cover» Korean government had, they arrested and deported migrants. The migrant workers organized the World Cup with 12 teams of migrants- players. The broadcasting of the event of the MVTV had two purposes. First is to pay attention to the Korean population to the life and the sufferings of the migrants so «that global village is near and it is destroyed». Second, the event of the soccer match formed the feeling of the commonness among the working migrants who felt themselves under threat that they were segregated by society when it was World Cup.

The other problem in the category of TV programs were the pieces of everyday life of working-migrants, for example, education of the children of working migrants, the cooperation between the life of the migrants and Koreans. The program MWTV in the category showed the image of the migrants, migrants as active participants in the society, well socialized in the society as a rule the fact is being ignored by the Korean Mass Media. Such programs shows that migrant-workers deserve that they were acknowledged as members in Korean society. They deserve to live with the same status as Korean citizen have [5].

Possibly the most famous production of the MWTV is the migrant Worker Film Festival (MWFF) which in 2011 had a six in a row time to take place. The mission of festival is the expansion of the dialogue on the problems standing before migrant and non-migrants in the world to show that migration traverse with the question of the labor, human rights, race, culture and gender. All variety of genres included documental films, dramas, and comedies, human rights along with the international and local full-length motion pictures. There was a separate accent on the short-length film of migrants about migrants.

The executive supervisor, the refugee from Burma, Aung Tinhtun is sure that it is necessary to show only those movies that were done by migrants in Korea in spite of the quality of the produced films. «Possibly the films deserve criticizing but we do not pursue commercial interest, our film festival is directed to the expansion of communication between migrants and Koreans». The film festival usually

begins in Seoul during one week-end and then during several weeks is passed to other regional cities in the country where there lot of migrants. There is hope that films will resonate with Koreans and migrants who live in the regional cities and stimulate the appearance of the new multicultural communities [3].

MWTV gradually made modifications in the programs. So in 2007 there was introduced the new program such as 20 minute talk show named: «Everything is all right, everything is right!» It was created to attract the expanded audience and by means of the talk with group from five or six foreigners of different cultural traditions, discuss such topics as family and different cultural traditions with the sense of humor. The talk show reflects different customs of migrant workers and their cultural festivity in South Korea. In result, according the words of the producer of the program MinodMoktan from Nepal the idea is being pursued to show to Koreans that migrants are unique people who should be perceived not just as cheap work force and it can change the image [3].

With the beginning of the administration of Lee Myung Pak in the beginning of the 2008 in the country there were consolidated the Ministry of Information and Ministry of Communication and Korean Broadcasting Commission into the new organization –Korea Communication Commission (KCC).

The public access to the broadcasting was accepted as unfavorable and threatening to the «Liberal Government». In result «Multilingual Migrants News» were shortened to one program in a month in eight languages (originally 11) and «The World of Migrant Workers» was changed to short month-ly non-arts program named «Special MWTV» [3].

With years MWTV was undergone the gradual transformation from the original attention to the questions of the labor of migrants workers, to the festivity of cultural variety of migrants workers. They became in some sense of the «a place of refuge» for the marital migrants, migrant workers and ‘multicultural children». The main priority became the programs for marital migrants as they are mothers of new generation of the «multicultural children» «Moreover, taking in the account the importance of the family and housework of the women in frames of the strategy of the conservation of the reproductive function in family in changing socio-economic conditions[7]. The importance of their presence in Korean society is self-explanatory.

South Korea received the highest assessment of the international observers in the process of the tran-

sition from ethnic homogeneity to multiculturalism. Korea acknowledge cultural variety and perform the real steps in the maintaining. However, in relation to the television programs as means of Mass Media there is tension and contradictions between officials and migrants themselves. The example of the MTWTV could become the standard for the multicultural dialogue and communication.

The reality is that there are limited quantity of migrants in Korea who has skills in creating television programs. The organization of the regular programs of media education was done with the purpose to teach migrants workers and foreign brides to make own Mass Media. «Media Academy» in frames of the «MWTV Media Production Team» unites the migrants from different places during two month. This ends as festival at night where participants gather to share own films and receive the feedback from their peers. The program was thought as the way to prepare the graduates of the academy for the future programs about the daily life of migrants at MWTV site. Special programs of the media education for marital migrants, workers, and courses of the photograph for migrants and activists were organized by MWTV [3].

Conclusion

In 2015, the official presentation of the Russian-speaking channel RusKor TV became new event for Russian-speaking population in Korea. The presentation of the first broadcasting in Russian language was declared on 25th of February in South Korea at the site of the Association of Russian –speaking population in Korea (ARusKor). Russian Mass Media reported that according the information of the creators of the channel the main purpose was the presentation of the interesting and useful information to Russian-speaking residents who live in South Korea and beyond its borders. The other purpose is to make familiar Koreans with Russia. RusKorTV televise live in on-line regime where there is access to the archive of the news, events, reports, commercials, exciting reports on the life of Russian speaking people in Korea and Korean themselves (the channel also includes feature films, documental films, reviews of the main events in the business sphere and innovations, different show-programs. On the air there can be seen the programs about social and cultural life of both countries, their history, traditions, customs, about the outstanding achievements of the science, culture and art in those countries [9].

For creating the programs there will be attracted not only corporate employees of the channel but

the independent correspondents will take part in the projects. This will increase the representativeness of the information and expand the audience among Russian-speaking countries. Moreover, the channel RUSKOR TV invites to cooperation bright young people (journalists, bloggers, and video graphs) from all regions of the country for the work of the free-lance TV reporters. They will thematically enlighten the most interesting events in South Korea and create author pieces and journalistic story. In such a way, the channel can become a new dialogue-oriented platform of one of the alternative

channels in South Korea. The production of the favorable conditions for the work of the alternative Mass Media can help to society to advance in correspondence with the multicultural standards of the understanding.

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II • ECONOMICS

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*Medukhanova L.A., Bekmuhametova A.B.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

*E-mail: letter3@mail.ru, sultasem@mail.ru

Essential Methods and Institutions of Supporting National Exports

Abstract. In modern foreign trade policy of the country the important place is taken by system of the measures directed to support of national export. These measures include the various methods helping entry of exporters of domestic production into foreign markets. The article discusses the main financial and non-financial supporting for exports methods which developed by international practices and their application in Kazakhstan. For the Republic of Kazakhstan participating in the international specialization as the exporter of mineral resources, problems of development of the processing sectors of production and, accordingly, the growth of non-oil exports are relevant. The possibilities of the solution of these problems are considered on the example of use of methods of the state support of export in activities of the specialized organizations of Kazakhstan for assistance of export of the processed products.

Key words: export, tariff and non-tariff regulation methods, financial methods, measures of non-financial support of exporters, non-oil export.

Introduction

In modern terms, when economic development of country is predetermined by its ability to export the goods and services to the world markets, support of national export becomes an important direction of foreign trade politics of the state. There are many effective systems of state support of national export in many countries. Instability of development of world economy, crisis phenomena in many countries, considerable price-waves on world markets make states to support the exporters. First, small and middle enterprises need such support, because it is difficult to get necessary information about the foreign markets of the production distribution need, foremost, facilities on financing of expenses on her advancement abroad for them.

About the export of Kazakhstan, which has a raw material character, large requirement exists in support of export of commodities of processing productions. For the decision of this problem in a republic created and the specialized organizations operate and they use different methods and instruments of state support of raw immaterial export.

Methods

Through the analysis of the insufficient level

of knowledge and skills, the gap between financial needs and existing financial instruments, regional disparities in development, insufficient use of new technology and innovations, attention is paid to significant source of state support, directed to economy strengthening and its competitiveness increasing.

Main body

Main groups of methods of state regulation of export

Now the system of state regulation of export includes various methods, which can be divided into certain groups depending on their orientation and a way of impact on export. So, on an orientation distinguish stimulating (or supporting) and the measures limiting export. It should be noted that the vast majority of methods of regulation of export belong to the stimulating measures as the countries are generally not interested in his restriction. It is known, that export production, being GDP component, promotes growth of economy and well-being of nation. As confirmation to it serves the world practice of fast economic recovery of countries of Western Europe and Japan during the post-war period due to strengthening of export, in the second half of the XX century – the new industrial countries of South-

east Asia, and in the last decades – People's Republic of China.

Restrictions of export are carried out only in some cases and take such forms as introduction of export duty and export quotas. The first of these tools – export duty – usually pursues two aims: replenishment of the state budget and control of export of those types of goods, which export, is undesirable owing to imbalance in domestic market of their demand with the offer. Export duties as a kind of tax payments, is among financial instruments of regulation of export. Proceeding from the developed division theory of tools of a foreign trade policy into tariff and non-tariff measures, duty on export are a tariff method. Practice export duties on the raw materials making the main articles of export of the country are most widespread in the world. The goods may include mainly on energy carriers and agricultural raw materials, for example oil and wheat. Export duties are applied usually by developing countries and are most often a source of the income of the state budget.

Another tool for export restriction quotas represent quantitative restrictions on export volume abroad of separate types of production and belong to non-tariff methods of regulation of foreign trade. They are applied by the state in two cases: 1) for the purpose of stabilization of the prices in domestic market of separate goods, constraining their excessive export, especially during growth of the world prices (as well as export duties); 2) as a result of the international or bilateral trade agreements between the countries.

In the second case, they take the form of the «voluntary» export restrictions introduced on an initiative and under the political pressure of the countries importing these goods. So, in the history of international trade for the first time such restrictions in the middle of the 20th century «voluntarily» were accepted by Japan at the initiative of the USA in relation to export of the Japanese cars and steel on the American market. Now «voluntary» restrictions of export are applied in China to export of textile products to the USA, Canada, 15 EU countries, and Turkey [1]. In certain cases, export quotas of separate goods can be entered by the country unilaterally and without coercion from the outside.

Therefore, in January of the current year the same China has cancelled the quotas of export of rare-earth metals entered by him in 2009. The reason of their introduction, according to an explanation of the government of the country, was the aspiration to minimize the ecological damage caused by excessive production of these minerals. According

to rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which member is China its participants shouldn't apply export quotas in mutual trade. This circumstance and protests of the import countries of rare-earth metals (the USA and Japan) have caused their cancellation by China [2].

Besides the measures aimed at restriction of export, other and more important component of state regulation of export is stimulating and supporting measures directed to export of domestic goods abroad. Currently, the whole system of state support to exporters is applied in the world practice, which includes a variety of methods, which differ from each other in a process of rendering assistance to domestic producers.

In the theory of international trade and a foreign trade policy all methods of export promotion are carried to non-tariff methods and on the content and nature of influence are considered as financial methods (preferential crediting, subsidies, insurance, etc.). At the same time, in practice, in activities of the state for assistance to national export, besides financial methods, also different non-financial measures are widely applied: organizational and legal and information and consulting ways of support of exporters. Here also special measures (ensuring diplomatic support, the help in certification of export production, in the organization of export advertising, including exhibitions and fairs, market researches, etc.), creation of positive image of the country, carrying out scientific researches in the sphere of foreign economic activity, etc. belong.

Therefore, in character and to a way of influence all existing methods on support of national export by the state can be divided into two groups conditionally: financial and non-financial methods. Actually financial instruments aimed at financial support of exporters belong to the first group. It is necessary to carry all other methods, which do not assume subsidizing and financial support of the factor cost of the exporter connected with production and realization of his production to the second group. However, certainly, also the exporter's costs of advance of the goods of foreign markets which essential part becomes covered due to activity of various government bodies and specialized organizations have important value.

However, such assistance according to the contents does not assume direct financial assistance to the exporter and can be considered as a non-financial measure. In turn, as a part of non-financial methods it is possible to allocate administrative (acts, international treaties, licensing, certification) and economic measures (carrying out market

researches, exhibitions and fairs, information and advisory services, compensation of costs of separate types of the works connected with promotion

of export). It is possible to classify them, demarcating the methods of state regulation of export. (Table 1)

Table 1 – Classification of methods of state regulation of export

	Methods of state regulation of export		
By an orientation	Restrictive	Stimulatory	
According to contents	Financial	Nonfinancial	
According to the way of influence	Tariff	Nontariff	
		Administrative	Economic
<i>Note: prepared by authors</i>			

Among ways of the state assistance to national export such instrument of macroeconomic regulation as devaluation of national currency or the politician of her underestimated course holds a specific place. However on the orientation this measure is not actually method of support of the export enterprises and is aimed mainly at regulation of the balance of payments of the country, though promotes country export growth. At the present stage of the politician of the underestimated rate of national currency, most brightly it is shown in activity of the government of China on yuan exchange rate, causing active criticism from the USA.

Institutes of the state support of export

Usually governmental bodies of the country carry out application of methods of state regulation of export directly, or by means of the specialized organizations of assistance to export. In the different countries, there were different schemes of organizational structure of system of the state support of export. These structures include considerable number of establishments: the ministries (economies, trade, finance, and foreign affairs), local executive bodies of the power, the specialized state and semi-state financial and consultative organizations of assistance to export, various state organizations abroad supporting exporters in the foreign markets. Now evolution of the state institutes of promotion of export from traditional structures towards the autonomous agencies [3] specialized, as a rule, is observed.

In the USA assistance to export is rendered by such federal departments as Export-import bank, Agency of the international development, in Japan JETRO export trade organization, in India – Export-import bank, Management of development of trade and some other the organizations. In Australia such

body as the Australian trade commission of «Aus-trade», in South Korea – the Korean agency on assistance to trade and investments of «KOTRA» works. The similar organizations exist also in many other countries of the world.

Kazakhstan is created and a number of the specialized institutes using various financial and non-financial methods of assistance to export of non-oil goods in the activity works. They include:

- JSC Export and Credit Insurance Corporation Kazeksportgarant (insurance/reinsurance of export of non-oil goods and services, trade financing of buyers of the Kazakhstan non-oil production, consulting services in questions of insurance of foreign economic activity);
- JSC Development Bank of Kazakhstan (financing of export and pre-export operations);
- JSC Center of Development of a Trade Policy (carrying out the system analysis of foreign trade);
- Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan (assistance in establishment of business contacts with foreign consumers of production);
- Union of producers and exporters of Kazakhstan (granting and protection of economic interests of exporters);
- The center of foreign economic activity (assistance to improvement and development of system of additional education for participants of foreign trade activities of the Republic of Kazakhstan); [4]
- JSC National Export Agency and Investments «KaznexInvest» (carrying out complex measures for promotion of export of finished goods) [5].

It is necessary to emphasize that the main feature of activity of the Kazakhstan organizations of assistance to export is their orientation on support of the

enterprises delivering abroad non-oil goods. First, hi-tech export, branches with a high value added are for this purpose supported. In recent years measures for support of the export which is carried out by the enterprises of small and medium business, in particular, in the special program for support of exporters adopted in 2010 – the Program of development and promotion of export «Export of 2020» are especially allocated.

Financial methods of stimulation and support of export and their application in Kazakhstan

Among diverse methods of the state support of national exporters, the effective and fulfilled in practice group of measures of assistance to export is formed by financial methods. Subsidizing of the credits and insurance of the export risks united in the concept «export crediting» concern to them. Direct subsidies, the state guarantees for receiving financial means by the exporter, tax benefits, tax refund for export of goods, and also such last resort of support forbidden by the international trade rules of the WTO as a dumping also belong to financial methods. Here it should be noted that are also forbidden by rules of the WTO application of direct export subsidies, subsidies, arising owing to full or partial release from direct taxes, preferential practice of granting the export credits, etc. With joining in 2015 Republics of Kazakhstan to WTO such prohibitions must be put in an operation. So all subsidies related to advancement of export will be forbidden. In particular, in accordance with taken obligations Kazakhstan stops a grant to the producers of grain of transport export subsidies.

The most developed and widespread financial methods of support of export are ways of insurance of export risks. Their emergence is connected with the specifics of risks of export operations generated by the increased competition in the world markets, more long terms of payment of foreign deliveries; need to follow more difficult rules of maintaining international payments.

The exporter also faces political risks, because importer fulfills the obligations for payment owing to changes of legislative rules and rules of state regulation of export-import transactions, including operations on converting of currencies, military operations, civil disorders, terrorism and to those similar events in the import country.

Insurance of risks of the exporter usually is followed by credit operations therefore; it is carried out within export crediting. Functions on export insurance carry out the specialized promotion of export agencies acting as the intermediary between the exporter and commercial banks which are carry-

ing out transactions of international payments. The export-import banks or development banks created by the state can be participants of export crediting.

In Kazakhstan JSC Export carries out functions of export and credit agency and Credit Insurance Corporation KazExportGarant created in 2003. It represents the specialized state organization as the affiliated organization JSC National Operating Holding Bayterek. «KazExportGarant» is the only specialized insurance company in the country providing insurance protection to exporters and banks from risk of non-payments by export deliveries of non-oil goods.

In the activity «KazExportGarant» carries out an assessment and insurance as commercial, so political risks. According to the scheme «Insurance of the Credit to the Exporter» the agency provides to the Kazakhstan exporter protection against risk of the loss connected with non-execution by the foreign contractor (importer) of the financial obligations under the export contract providing realization of goods, services and works on the terms of a delay of payment [6].

Besides export insurance, this organization provides export trade financing to foreign buyers of the Kazakhstan non-oil production since 2010. The schemes of insurance used by Corporation allow foreign buyers of the Kazakhstan goods to receive financial means on their purchase in the form of placement of conditional deposits in bank of the exporter for crediting of foreign buyers through banks of the second level within a letter of credit form of calculations. For instance, with the assistance of KazExportGarant in 2012 the budgetary loan of JSC «Locomotive building factory» for support of export of locomotives of this plant has been provided. The size of a loan has made 6 billion tenges for a period of 10 years. By means of «JSC Temir of bank», the agency has transferred export revenue into the account of the exporter. The loan to the exporter has been carried out by means of trade financing to the buyer in the person of the Tajik railroads and, respectively, insurance of risks of a non-return for the commercial and political reasons [7].

Along with financial measures of assistance of export, «Kazeksportgarant» renders consulting services in questions of insurance of foreign economic activity.

Financial methods of support of exporters also other state institute – Fund of development of business applies in the activity «DAMU». Within the mechanism of implementation of the Road Map of Business of 2020 program the fund «Damu» acts as the financial agent on support of export-oriented

productions. The fund carries out subsidizing of a rate of remuneration on the credits of banks of the second level to subjects of private business. Subsidizing is carried out for compensation of part of the expenses paid by the exporter as remuneration (interest rate) for the credits. Subsidies represent the periodic payments on a gratuitous and irrevocable basis, which are carried out to bank of the second level by Fund «DAMU» based on the Contract of subsidizing. This contract represents the tripartite written agreement between the financial agent represented by Fund «DAMU», bank and the exporter.

The number of the special financial institutions promoting exporters includes the Development bank of Kazakhstan offering to exporters of service of crediting including joint financing of export operations by granting loans. Loans are granted to both suppliers to the Kazakhstan production (residents), and her buyers (nonresidents) [8].

As for such financial methods as tax benefits to exporters, in Kazakhstan they are applied along with customs privileges only on condition of implementation of activity of the enterprises in the territory of free economic zones of the republic.

Measures of non-financial support of exporters in activity of the specialized organizations of assistance of export in Kazakhstan

Along with financial methods in system of the state support of export, the important role is carried out by a set of various non-financial instruments of assistance to national exporters. In the conditions of dynamism of an environment of the world markets, increase in number of their participants, periodic crisis shocks of world economy exporters need information and advisory support, market researches of foreign sales markets, the organization of exhibition and fair activity, advertising activities, etc.

The whole complex of various organizations among which the leading place is taken by the specialized organizations of assistance to export usually carries out such types of non-financial support. National agency on export and investments «KAZNEXINVEST» plays leading role among such organizations in Kazakhstan. The organization has been created 2010 in the status of the joint-stock company and works as body of the Ministry of RK for investments and development. She gives multi-lateral service support to national exporters of the processed production. In activity of agency, two main directions are allocated: development of export and promotion of export. The first direction includes: 1) providing information services to exporters concerning the state support of export; 2) assistance to business in the solution of the problem-

atic issues interfering the organization of export; 3) compensation of the expenses connected with an exit to foreign markets. The second direction covers assistance to the Kazakhstan exporters in an exit to foreign markets, by means of the organization of their participation in actions for advance of goods. Within these directions, the agency uses various instruments of support of exporters:

- information support;
- training of exporters;
- the solution of problematic issues when exporting;
- compensation of expenses, connected with production conclusion to foreign markets;
- search of potential buyers;
- assistance in preparation of export strategy;
- assistance through missions, foreign exhibitions, promotion of trademarks and so forth.

By means of these KAZNEXINVEST tools acts as the national operator on rendering a number of services and undertakes part of expenses of the exporters participating in the trade missions, foreign exhibitions opening representations abroad. Also the operator partially compensates the expenses of exporters connected with procedures of registration of trademarks, certifications of production for export abroad, advertising of production abroad, carrying out market researches of the foreign markets, development of export strategy and training of employees or involvement of foreign experts [9].

As compensation of such expenses is connected with expenses in a monetary form, not all above-mentioned instruments of assistance to export can be probably considered as «purely» non-financial methods. At the same time in character they cannot be carried to actually financial and form economic elements of organizational and information actions.

Besides the organization of various actions for assistance to export, «KAZNEXINVEST» carries out a big role on information support of the Kazakhstan exporters. The agency prepares and provides a number of editions for the acting and potential exporters: «For the aid to the exporter: How to enter a foreign market», annual «The guide of export», the Exporter magazine, etc., the containing state-of-the-art reviews about possible sales markets of the Kazakhstan production abroad, information on conditions of access to the markets of the certain countries, on exhibitions and lists of useful contacts. Exporters can request from agency and receive research of volume and capacity of the market of the world interesting their countries. The same information role is carried out by a brief analyses and industry reviews, which contain data on, export

opportunities of a concrete type of goods, on routes of delivery of production, on position of 4 branches of manufacturing industry of Kazakhstan. For providing complex information for exporters by KAZNEXINVEST agency has been created the export.gov.kz web portal and it works since the end of last year.

At the same time, despite of existence in the country of the afore-named specialized organizations on support of national export, state support of export still is not effective. In opinion of some national exporters, for example, of exporters of flour, support of export of the processed agricultural produce is absent in our country. And the system measures of development of export potential of country are not enough in activity of agency of «KAZNEXINVEST» [10].

In conclusion, it should be noted that in the modern conditions when information and ways of her fast receiving become the most important condition of efficiency of any activity, especially in the sphere of business, it is impossible to overestimate value of a uniform source of electronic information for businesspersons. Support of businesspersons, including exporters, in this plan from the state plays

a crucial role. In Kazakhstan since December, 2013 the uniform business portal for businessmen «The territory of business» which contains all complex of information on programs and instruments of the state support given to exporters of the country works

Conclusion

Consequently, now in world practice a set of various methods of state regulation of export are applied. One of them are directed to restriction, others – to encouragement of national export. All tools can be divided conditionally on financial and non-financial. Owing to raw nature of the Kazakhstan export and aiming of the republic at solutions of problems of development of processing industries, in Kazakhstan a number of various financial and non-financial methods of the state support of exporters of non-oil production is applied. These methods are realized by means of application of a large number of different measures and tools in activity of a number of government bodies and, first, the specialized state organizations for promotion of export. Among them, the leading role belongs to such organizations as JSC Export and Credit Insurance Corporation Kazeksportgarant and JSC National Export Agency and Investments KAZNEXINVEST.

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*Myrzakhmetova A.M., Nurabaeva G.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

*E-mail: myrzakhmetova@mail.ru

Analysis of the Banking System of Kazakhstan in Terms of the Present Crisis

Abstract. The article is devoted to the problematic issues of the modern banking system of Kazakhstan. Increased consumer and investment demand, coupled with the growth of business activity of the subject of the economy, has caused a steady growth of the banking sector in the pre-crisis period. At the same time it increased annually debits of banks, the real estate market and the construction industry formed the “bubbles” in asset prices, obviously, there has been a crisis.

Also article deals the with pre-crisis “credit bottom” left the banking sector with a large volume of non-performing loans, which have become the post-crisis for the banking system of Kazakhstan the main problem. Analyzes urgent measures to implement the principles and objectives adopted in the concept of development of the financial sector of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2030 in accordance with the realities of the moment.

Keywords: economy, Republic of Kazakhstan, system of bank, the Concept of development of financial sector, global economy crises.

Introduction

Over the years, the Kazakh banking sector developed successfully, approaching the level of development of the banking systems of Eastern Europe, which has become part of the European and global banking system. However, when there were clear signs of the global financial crisis, the Kazakh banking system has been sorely tested. When the international capital market was closed, it was stepped liquidity crisis; there was a threat of large banks defaulting on foreign loans.

In the early 90s, when the numbers of commercial banks in Kazakhstan were 204, before the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK), there was a question of improvement of the banking sector. Based on the Law “On the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan”, adopted on 31 August 1995, National Bank has launched a restructuring of the banking system. Weak banks liquidated or merged with large ones. During 1995-1999 Kazakhstan’s banking system was reformed, and second-tier banks made the transition to international standards. Second-tier banks of Kazakhstan had until the end of 2000 to reach international standards in terms of

capital adequacy, liquidity, asset quality, the level of management, accounting, administration and transfer of information. In 1997, the expansion of banking activities, as well as put higher demands on the opening of banks and their licensing division of investment and deposit banks was abolished provided.

In April 1999, by the decision of the government and the National Bank in Kazakhstan was regime of freely floating exchange rate based on supply and demand in the currency market, without significant intervention of NBK.

Methods

In this article, we implemented the system, structure, historical, comparative methods, and approaches. Structural analysis method allowed studying the situation in detail of banking system of Kazakhstan in terms of the present crises. Historic, historical and comparative methods allow studying each stage in the economic development of Kazakhstan. Application of the above methods and approaches helps to achieve a better understanding of the research problem.

Main body

Today, the banking sector of Kazakhstan remains the largest and dominant segment of the financial market of the state. By the 1 of January 2015 in the Republic of Kazakhstan operate 38 banks, including 16 banks with foreign participation (14 subsidiary banks), one bank with 100% of state participation ("Zhilstroisberbank of the Republic of Kazakhstan") and 3 banks with quasi-participation capital ("Halyk Bank", "BTA Bank" JSC, "Alliance Bank"). The share of five largest banks - "Kazkommertsbank", "Halyk Bank of Kazakhstan", "BTA Bank", "Bank CenterCredit" and "Sberbank" in total assets is about 52.4% in the total loan portfolio of 58, 9% by the 1 of January 2015. The total assets of banks are 18,239 billion tenge (\$ 9.6 billion), the total loan portfolio - 14,184 billion tenge (\$ 7.6 billion) [1].

Until the crisis of 2007, the Kazakh banking system was considered one of the best in the CIS. Banking reform has been carried out, created a two-tier system, well adapted to the market economy, created the legislative and methodological framework taking into account the experience of developed countries, implemented the basic principles of the control and regulation of the Basel Committee.

During the 2000-2007, annual GDP growth has averaged 10% in Kazakhstan. Increased consumer and investment demand, which is associated with the growth of business activity of economic entities, called the steady growth of the banking sector. There was cheap credit resources coming from external borrowing markets, banks received excess profits and successfully developed. Every year, increased external debt of banks: foreign loans by mid-2007 reached 45.9 billion US dollars or 50% of GDP [1, p.3]. Lending by banks economy over the period 2002-2007 increased by 13 times, banks' assets grew for 14 times, equity capital of more than 11 times. The level of loans to GDP reached more than 70%, which characterizes the dynamic pace of economic development in the pre-crisis period [1, p.4]. Banks actively offered consumer and mortgage loans. The availability of mortgage loans caused a high demand for real estate speculation in this market, the rapid rise in prices. At the same time housing prices in the primary market increased by about 5 times, on the secondary market - more than 10 times. In the pursuit of profit, ignoring the risk, banks have increased the scale of borrowing abroad, actively lending to the service sector and construction. House prices rise by tens of times faster than the dynamics of the solvency of the population. On the real estate market and construction was formed

a "bubble" in asset prices, and there has been a crisis [2].

NBK and the Agency for Financial Supervision (AFS), accept the methods of prudential regulation, failed to take adequate measures to stop the flow of excessive external borrowing. On the credit "bubble" the real estate market has grown, which subsequently burst and brought some major Kazakh banks into bankruptcy. Banks faced with a large volume of non-performing loans, which have become a major problem.

Kazakhstan is actively integrated into the global economy and dependence on world markets is high. The global economic crisis has come to Kazakhstan in 2008, before this moment the economy grew annually. With high rates were developed industry, construction, real estate market, the market of banking services (for the first half of 2007, loans to economy increased by 47%, deposits of residents - 24%) [3]. However, the first symptoms of stress in the financial markets began to appear in mid-2007. Worsened conditions for attracting foreign loans, the banks began to experience liquidity problems, have tightened credit policy and credit conditions. During the second half of 2007 the volume of attracted foreign loans declined by 6.3 billion US dollars. At the same time increased the interest rates on loans up to 15, 8% in tenge and 13.2% in foreign currency, respectively, instead of the 14.1% and 12.4% in the first six months [2, p.148]. In Kazakhstan liquidity regulation BWI carried out by providing short-term liquidity, early redemption of NBK notes and change the mechanism for calculating the minimum reserve requirement.

In conditions of limited access to external borrowing, the banks were forced to raise interest rates to tighten credit conditions. All this caused a reduction in lending to the economy as a whole. In 2008, banks of Kazakhstan have reduced lending to the economy by 39% [2, p.148].

The banking system of Kazakhstan was unable to avoid the negative consequences of the crisis. BWI showed decline in capital adequacy, assets, loans and deposits. The rapid growth of lending to the economy before the crisis, caused by the accumulation of interest rate risk in banks, easing requirements for borrowers and the deterioration of the quality of the loan portfolio. Deposits at the time also grew, but not as fast, their annual growth amounted to 32.6% [2, p.170].

Accumulated for the period from 2002 to 2007, the interest rate risk has caused the deterioration of the quality of the loan portfolio. Systematic measures to improve banks' capitalization and maintain

its liquidity helped to stabilize the situation in the economy. As a result, GDP growth in 2009 was 1.1%, at a time when Russia's GDP fell by 7.5% in the US by 2.7%, the loan portfolio of banks increased by 4.3% [3]. However, according to the FSA, there was a significant decrease in the total amount of the banking sector assets. Despite the fact that during this time there was a growth in assets after the devaluation of the tenge, deposits of more than 1.0 trillion tenge, as well as the completion of the assets in the form of investments to support the banking sector, in general, there was a significant reduction in assets. According to analysts' statements, these funds went to the repayment and servicing huge foreign debt of banks. Besides all this, the fall in prices for the main items of Kazakhstan's exports during the crisis, reducing the volume of investments, led to a decline in business activity and narrowing of the sales markets. This has a negative impact on the financial condition of borrowers and their ability to repay debts to the STB. All this, as well as carried out in February 2009, a 25% devaluation of the tenge, has undermined confidence in the domestic banking system. Thus, in 2009 the share of non-performing loans increased by 4.5 times and amounted to 37.7% of the loan portfolio [4]. The majority of non-performing loans and loans overdue more than 90 days accounted for three banks – "BTA Bank", "Temirbank" and "Alliance Bank". In this connection, it was decided restructuring solution.

In 2010, Kazakhstan's economy began to pick up the GDP growth rate. However, some banks have reduced their lending, respectively; on the lower level was the attitude of the loan portfolio to GDP. In 2011, the banking sector after stagnating in the previous years, began to show growth, increased the volume of lending. However, the ratio of banking sector assets and loan portfolio to GDP remained at the same low level.

Of the total volume of loans allocated in 2011, the share of loans was in the industry - 11.9%, agriculture - 3.8%, construction - 3.3%, trade - 9.1%, transport - 4.0%, communication - 0.05% and other loans - 43.5%. In 2014-2016, we observe a new wave of the global financial crisis, stagnation of the banking sector continues today. Thus, the share of non-performing loans amounted to 32-34% high figure in 2014. In world practice, the value of non-performing loans (NPL) does not exceed 10%, even more than 5% is considered to be above the norm. In Kazakhstan only by 2015, there was a decrease in this indicator to 23.5%. For the first time over the past few years, the share of non-performing loans tends to decrease. Unbalanced lending sectors of the economy,

low diversification of the loan portfolio of banks are reflected in assets and loan portfolio to GDP.

In accordance with the "Concept of financial sector development until 2030" assets of the banking sector should be not less than 80% of non-oil GDP, the loan portfolio - at least 60% of non-oil GDP, which involves the expansion of banks' participation in the financing of the economy, especially in the government development programs. The global financial crisis revealed the vulnerabilities of the banking sector of Kazakhstan: limited domestic resource base, strong dependence on foreign financing, the high level of credit risk, moderate risk - management, a large proportion of dollar-denominated loans, the ineffectiveness of the action the supervisor of instruments in the banking sector. In order to solve the existing problems in the financial sector and increasing the stability of the banking system to the high individual and structural risks in 2014 by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, this concept was adopted [5].

Currently, there is a relatively low level of external debt allows banks start to raise external borrowing that will not lead to a crisis of external debt in its moderate volumes and efficient management. NBK is trying to stick to a conservative policy of external debt, avoiding the excessive growth of the debt of banks to non-residents. A favorable level of external debt of banks NBK believes maintaining the share of external liabilities of the banking sector in the aggregate amount of its liabilities at the level of not more than 30%, except for the obligations on the bonds, convertible into capital. Many analysts see the solution to the problems in the banking capital consolidation, consolidation of banks to increase their competitiveness on the national and international level. To keep the leadership in the international banking business, the bank must have a capital of more than 30 billion dollars, and assets of 300 billion dollars [4, p.21]. In Kazakhstan, the equity of all banks in January 2015 was 2623 billion tenge (14.1, billion dollars), and the assets of 18,239 billion tenge (100 billion dollars) – it is less than the capital and assets of the average American bank. The total assets of the banking system of the three countries of the Customs Union by the end of 2013, the share of Kazakhstani banks' assets was 5.3%, while the share of Russian banks - 92.5% and of Belarusian banks - 2.2% [6].

Thus, a significant influence of modern global financial crisis on the banking sector and the economy of Kazakhstan took place in 2008-2010, and then increased in 2014-2015 during the second wave of the crisis.

In 2014-2015 observed a further deterioration of external factors for the development of Kazakhstan's economy. There has been a general slowdown in world economic growth and the strengthening of geopolitical instability with the events around Ukraine, the war in Syria, which caused flows of refugees from the Middle East and the strongest migration crisis in Europe. Entering mutual sanctions between Russia and the EU countries, the United States led to a drop in growth and destabilization of the macroeconomic situation in Russia, which affected the economy of Kazakhstan. Against the background of strengthening the pace of US GDP growth was the strengthening of the dollar and the devaluation of national currencies of many countries.

The decisive factors of deepening crisis in Kazakhstan have been a sharp and prolonged decline in the price of oil, food, raw materials and metals on world markets. These raw materials form the basis of Kazakhstan's export and export dependence on volatile world prices lead to a drop in industrial production, increase unemployment, higher inflation and lower consumption. This once again shows the need for structural change and economic diversification.

In February 2014, the NBK decided not to maintain the exchange rate at the same level, to reduce the volume of currency interventions and reduce interference in the process of formation of the exchange rate of tenge. The exchange rate is formed at the level of 185 tenge per US dollar. This led to a slight acceleration of inflation due to higher prices for imported goods, as well as the devaluation expectations, reinforced by the decline in world oil prices.

For liquidity management of banks, the National Bank conducted operations to provide short-term tenge liquidity. Stabilization of the foreign exchange market has allowed the National Bank to extend the corridor to exchange rate fluctuations of the tenge against the US dollar in September 2014 and to establish an asymmetrical corridor $185 + 3 / -15$ tenge.

Experience shows that the provision of a stable exchange rate is costly gold and currency reserves of the National Bank and consistent with the practice of functioning of an open market economy. Furthermore, strict regulation of the exchange rate creates favorable conditions for speculative attacks on the currency market. The current money and foreign exchange markets, the situation reduces the efficiency of government programs to provide credit entities of the economy. Conductors of these

programs mainly appear banks. However, they now prefer to keep their reserves in foreign currency and refrain from lending in tenge. This makes it necessary to revise state policy in order to improve the implementation of monetary policy, inflation targeting regime appropriate.

All this required the development of additional measures to stabilize and improve the national economy. Therefore, the Government had developed a plan of joint actions of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the NBK and the AFS to stabilize the economy and financial system for 2015-2016 years, the anti-crisis program. The anti-crisis program identified priority sectors of Kazakhstan's economy, which need the support of the state: the financial sector, the real estate market, small and medium business, agriculture, industrial-innovative and infrastructural sectors.

Conclusion

The state's role in the crisis manifested in the creation of conditions for the exit of banks, enterprises and firms from the crisis. In times of global crises in all countries enhanced the role of government and the central bank, as businesses and banks need government support to solve complex problems. Today, investors and international experts are closely monitoring the ongoing public policy in Kazakhstan, on the correctness and timeliness of interventions depends on early exit from the crisis, banks, companies and businesses, to the influx of investment and economic recovery.

In order to maintain the banking system is necessary to achieve the following objectives: to ensure the stability of the payment system; maintaining the necessary volume and lending terms of the real economy; creation of conditions for the preservation of the investment activity level. This will enable banks to generate the required level of reserves and expand the opportunities for lending.

To support the banking system was established the Distressed Assets Fund, whose task is to improve the loan portfolios of domestic banks through the purchase of bad assets. The government decided to increase the size of deposits guarantee of the population up to 5 million tenge. So the population having bank deposits up to 5 million tenge, guaranteed them a return on demand, which will cover up to 99% of all investors. In addition, the state will provide additional sources of liquidity to banks to ensure timely service their obligations.

In addition, in April of 2015, the Government body of NBK approved the monetary policy of Republic of Kazakhstan until 2020, which defines the

conceptual approaches and principles for further development, suggested the introduction of inflation targeting as the most appropriate at the current stage of development. The document contains a set of measures aimed at achieving the inflation target, comprising:

- Improving the inflation analysis and forecasting system and other macro-economic indicators;
- Improving the efficiency of the interest rate channel of the transmission mechanism by expanding the system tools of monetary policy. NBK's exchange rate policy will be aimed at maintaining the inflation target, and in the case of foreign exchange shocks, the priority will be to ensure the stability of the financial market;
- Changes in the current system of decision-making on monetary policy in accordance with international best practices;
- Improving the efficiency of communication policy. The main objectives of the communication strategy will be a shift in priorities of economic agents from exchange rate to inflation and anchoring of inflation expectations at a low level.

The implementation of monetary policy of Kazakhstan up to 2020 will allow National Bank to ensure price stability for sustainable economic growth and contribute to the achievement of strategic goals of the country to join the top thirty most developed countries in the world.

Thus, the introduction of fundamentally new for Kazakhstan financial sector regulation mechanisms, including the tools of macroprudential and countercyclical regulation, will consist in a maximum reduction of risk of the financial system and to minimize the negative impact of external factors on the economy and financial system of the country.

Government of Kazakhstan jointly with the NBK continuously monitors processes in the world economy in time to take the necessary measures for the sustainable development of economy and global challenges. Lessons from the crisis demonstrate the need for the establishment in the context of globalization of new tools to facilitate the removal of barriers to the further progressive socio-economic development of the country.

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III • EDUCATION

UDC 2:316

Nadirova G.E.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan
E-mail: gulnad@mail.ru

Modern Trends in Religious Studies Education

Abstract. Religious education plays an important role in preparing students for adult life, employment and training throughout life. This allows pupils to develop respect and sensitivity towards others, especially to those whose beliefs and convictions differ from their own, helping to recognize and overcome prejudice, hatred and aggression.

Potential of Religious Studies education in our country allow us to hope that, if we revise a number of existing courses on social, political, humanitarian sciences, fill them with elements and approaches that meet the needs of the time, modify the views and assessment, to introduce a wider range of sources, developing critical thinking, ways of working, to prepare a creative-minded teachers, modern educational and methodical base, then we can gradually move closer to the goal, which is forming a new generation of high school graduates that are widely knowledgeable and creative in the field of religious discourse.

Key words: education, religious studies, society, model, diversity.

Introduction

Issues of religious education and religious studies are relevant in many countries, in those where it has existed for many years, decades and even centuries, and where it is, as in Kazakhstan, only beginning to be realized as needed. Causes of pulses in the development of new forms and new curriculum content related to religion, are numerous, and they differ in every society. On the one hand, this is due to the general rise of the religious consciousness, that wins his position after the era of the domination of the scientific rational consciousness, and this phenomenon is noted everywhere, both in the West and in the East. On the other hand, even before uncompromising atheist societies, such as the CIS countries come to realize that religions have a right to exist, moreover, that they are part of national identity and cultural heritage.

Specific features of religious education are influenced by historical implications of various social processes.

Religious education to a certain extent, as well as education in general is one of the sources and regulators of morality in society. It is impossible to equate religion with only purely external, ritual

manifestations. Preparation of socio-humanitarian training programs for secondary and higher education of Kazakhstan, containing deep promises and thoughtful concepts can help in achieving the goal of Religious Studies Education with extremely effective way.

Methods

We use such research methods as causal analysis, comparative method (comparative-historical research), typological method (method of classification), the hermeneutic method of structural-functional analysis, scientific methods of theoretical knowledge – analysis and synthesis.

Main body

A comparative analysis of the various educational systems can identify a wide variety of options related to the implementation of religious education, in terms of both its planning and practical ways of ensuring it in teaching. There is, however, a number of common trends and issues:

1. Religious education is an important dimension of most foreign educational systems. European education policy recognizes the need to provide re-

religious education in public schools as a means of enrichment of knowledge, comparison of experience and promotion of dialogue and respect for differences, giving the space of religion, the state does not lose its secular character [1].

2. In the last few years, the focus in many countries changed from one religion training at the national level (as a rule, the religion of majority) to the teaching of several religions (usually religions recognized by the law), along with openness to ecumenism and inter-religiosity.

3. Mostly confessional approach to religious education that is specific to the majority of European countries, includes more and more elements of a common religious culture, analyzed from a secular point of view: the knowledge of the great religions, the history of religions, church history, different religious traditions, applied ethics.

4. There is a high demand for non-denominational approach to religion in all European countries. This approach is not necessarily seen as a replacement for confessional religious education, but as an alternative and a complement to this kind of education [2].

5. There is no single European model of religious education, but the identification of common values in this respect is one of the main concerns of all European countries.

6. The role of government is to ensure the rights of various groups (parents, religious communities) in the field of religious education, in support of this type of education in public schools, as well as guaranteeing the rights of the child to this type of education, preventing at the same time, indoctrination, and violations of freedom thoughts.

7. A class can become a space of language, cultural and religious diversity, and the school must also show understanding and acceptance of the fact that the values of many of life's concepts do not necessarily derive from religion.

8. Teaching religious and secular values in the open educational environment of the school should ensure that all students, regardless of race, religion, disability, language, gender or class, feel welcome participants of the educational process, emotionally balanced, and estimated at its true worth [3].

9. Religion is an important, though not the only source of moral values. Moral values are not the monopoly of religion, much less the exclusive property of any one religion. However, when religious education gets its rightful place in the education system, the importance of the education of moral values may be strengthened through training and studying religious and other value systems.

10. The teaching of religious subjects in schools should be appropriately conducted by trained professional teachers [4].

Any teacher, regardless of his or her personal religious orientation, aims to teach in a school pluralistic society, in which students are expected to belong to different religions.

Teacher provides training in the following areas:

- Reflect on ethical issues in religion, politics, human rights and the environment.
- Knowledge of the principles and practices of the world's major religions, customs, values and beliefs of the major cultures, constitutions and laws.
- Knowledge of ethical discussions in religions, politics, economics, human rights and the environment.
- Understanding the impact of class, race, gender and other identity forming forces in training.
- The expression of respect for people of different values, beliefs, practices and culture.
- The ability to respond to current social and educational issues, with special emphasis on the issues of violence, drug abuse, poverty, violence against children and women, AIDS and environmental degradation.

Public education should not turn the school into an appendage to any church or system of beliefs or lack of beliefs. Without a credible discussion of the distinctive role of education, solutions are more likely to be directed by the state to exercise political power, rather than to the educational needs of students, the subject demands, and informed opinion of teachers. Education figures traditionally believe that good education should avoid manipulating the beliefs of pupils and their zombification.

If the traditional religious instruction was directed mainly on the contents of which students had to master (knowledge of dogma), today's school curriculum advocate for an approach based on the student's personality, highlighting the implementation of its identity, the attitude towards differences, participation in social life, self-esteem, with a focus on values, taking responsibility for their own decisions. From this point of view, religious education contributes to the spiritual, moral, cultural and psychological development of the individual in school and society as a whole, is preparing him / her for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life. [5]

The development of religious education after gaining independence in Kazakhstan can be divided into three important main stages, each of which is characterized by a set of distinctive features.

The first stage – from 1991 to the beginning of the two thousandth – is associated with an acute awareness of the need to open the door to religion and religious knowledge, given the long period of isolation of the country from the religious world, and attempts to define its new identity. This sharp rise in religiosity has received considerable support of state leadership deliberate policy, which has set the task of strengthening national identity and a new image of the country. At this stage, educational institutions, which claimed responsibility for the mission to spread religious education, appeared without any system, each of them carried out the learning process on their own, according to their programs, plans, visions and possibilities.

The desire of the public to receive basic religious knowledge has caused quite a free penetration of Islamic missionaries in the space of Kazakhstan in the early nineties. Missionary activity, especially in the Southern Kazakhstan, initially conducted through mosques, Islamic centers of learning depended on external sources of financing. In an attempt to get a quality religious knowledge, many students went to study in Arab countries. This group of students came under the attention of the state, and in 2000, after the events in neighboring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan there was a need to return the students who have been abroad. This fact indicates attempt of the state to control religious education and at the same time so far the lack of a clear mechanism for the settlement of this issue in the state and religious structures of the period.

The second stage in the development of religious education – since the early 2000s up to 2011 – was a time of revision of attitude towards the missionary activities of foreign centers and bringing the learning process in line with the state standards in existing religious institutions, with the closure of those that do not meet these standards. Religious education in foreign Islamic centers is gradually losing its relevance since the need to adhere to local Islam and its regional specifics is increasingly emphasized in order to avoid the spread of foreign Islamic ideology. Official information says that the number of illegal religious groups that have a reputation as a «totalitarian sects» increased. They have been accused of targeting its members for violation of the laws of the country, evasion of military service and other civic norms of behavior.

Young people, that are more active than other social groups, were involved in radical organizations. That is why the policy of the state bodies and official clergy concerning the education of young people and improving religious literacy, increased

significantly. According to the presidential decree «On Measures to prevent and combat terrorism and extremism» from 10.02.2000, since 2004 a special course «Foundations of Religious Studies» was introduced in secondary schools. However, the lack of education of the clergy, as well as a small number of civil servants with professional theological knowledge, considerably slowed down the solution of this problem.

Faculty of Islamic Sciences of the Kazakh – Egyptian University Nur-Mubarak had to fill this gap. Its curriculum combines secular and religious subjects.

In addition, five universities in the country have begun preparation of bachelors and masters in religious studies. For parishioners courses were opened in almost all mosques in the country in order to improve religious literacy. Gradually, in the sphere of religious education public policy outlines began to appear.

Oct. 11, 2011, the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan «On religious activity and religious associations» marked the beginning of a new, third stage, which was a period of determining the state strategic lines in the area of religion in the new geopolitical conditions, characterized by the intensification of actions of radical religious groups in Kazakhstan, where the outbreak of violence and terrorism first appeared.

It was carried out re-registration of all religious organizations and associations of Kazakhstan. Some new structures have been created: the Agency for Religious Affairs, one of whose functions is the study and analysis of the spiritual (religious) educational organizations, NGO «Congress of Religions» for participation of experts in religious matters of training and retraining of civil servants and teachers. Informational – educational Internet portal «E-Islam» has been created to meet the cognitive, spiritual and religious needs of Muslims and all those who are interested in Islam

According to plans of SAMK, 500 imams of large mosques (regional, city and district levels) must have two diplomas – religious and secular, to be developed, politically literate, able to work with people.

November 24, 2015 the “Concept of development of religious education of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan till 2020” was adopted. It is expected that the concept will serve as a basic strategic document defining the future direction of the Islamic education system [6].

Religious education puts stimulating questions about the highest sense and the purpose of life, the

idea of God, the nature of reality, issues of law, and what it means – to be human. It develops students' knowledge and understanding of the major religions, religious traditions and other visions of the world, that offer answers to questions of this kind.

This opens up new opportunities for personal reflection and spiritual development. It reinforces the awareness of students and understanding of religion and beliefs, doctrines, practices and forms of expression, as well as the influence of religion on individuals, families, communities and cultures.

Religious education encourages students to learn from different religions, beliefs, learn values and traditions, issues of Truth, Faith, Ethics, as well as to analyze, interpret and evaluate their own beliefs and formulate their own answers, and, ultimately, to develop their critical thinking.

Conclusion

What is extremely important for the society of the transition period – religious education encourages students to form a sense of identity and belong-

ing. This allows them to be realized as individuals in their own communities and as citizens in a pluralistic society and the global community.

Religious education plays an important role in preparing students for adult life, employment and training throughout life. This allows pupils to develop respect and sensitivity towards others, especially to those whose beliefs and convictions differ from their own, helping to recognize and overcome prejudice, hatred and aggression.

The potential of Religions education in our country allow us to hope that, if we revise a number of existing courses on social, political, humanitarian sciences, fill them with elements and approaches that meet the needs of the time, modify the views and assessment, to introduce a wider range of sources, developing critical thinking, ways of working, to prepare a creative-minded teachers, modern educational and methodical base, then we can gradually move closer to the goal, which is forming a new generation of high school graduates, that are widely knowledgeable and creative in the field of religious discourse.

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IV • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

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*Baizakova K.I., Yermekov A.B.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

*Email: kbaizakova@mail.ru

Exploration of Kazakhstan's Position in the World Political - Informational Space from the Standpoint of Political Theories

Abstract. In the foreign policy of Kazakhstan, one of the most priorities it is a construction the image of the country abroad. Foreign citizen's ignorance about Kazakhstan became one of the specifics of Kazakhstan's citizens abroad. On this basis, and are composed of various stereotypes about Kazakhstan. The article reveals why Kazakhstan in the framework of the world information space was in such a situation. Kazakhstan's geopolitical attitude within Eurasian landmass made it in some extent its image in the global information space with its own political and cultural features. Wide concepts of political stereotypes are closely linked with Kazakhstan's foreign policy in some extent reminding situation with other regions around the globe, like Middle East and etc. Each political theory provides its approach to the disclosure of this phenomenon.

Key words: Foreign policy of Kazakhstan, World Political, Informational space, Political theories, Geopolitical space.

Introduction

In the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, one of the priorities in the realization of foreign policy priorities, it is the building of Kazakhstan's image. World system as a geopolitical links shaped its own separate environment, in spite of the international law. If in the international legal level, the relations between states are regulated through political institutions and diplomacy, meanwhile the shaping of the geopolitical process have a more complex character and it involves whole nations, their type of thinking, their outlook, historical, cultural memory and another substances. Kazakhstan is in the specific situation, separately from other countries of the world within global informational space and appropriately with subsequent in this situation with perception of Kazakhstan in the outer space. Dedication of this article it is the explanation of why Kazakhstan and Central Asian region have such position in the world politico-informational space.

Methods

According to the theory of psychology, stereotype thinking is especially conditioned by our con-

sciousness in order to be able to orient in any kind of conditions for identification of subjects for their recognition. This mechanism of thinking is also suitable not for only for human relations, but for intercultural communication too.

Main body

Cultural- Geographic positioning of Kazakhstan in the World Informational Space

In the sense of definition of the politico-geographical position of Kazakhstan, there are most four prominent culture-geographic spectrums: first – Borat movie; second – East Asian identity; third – identification with Russia and fourth – identification with the Middle East. First type of perception is rooted from the movie of British comedian Baron Cohen's on Kazakhstan. This movie has a strong effect inside in Kazakhstan. Figure, which was played and embodied by Baron Cohen in the face of Borat Sagdiyev, had firmly introduced to the view of foreigners stereotype thinking who is not a citizen of Turkey or any post Soviet country. Borat's outlook on Kazakhstan in the world informational space has a more exotic form originating from movie's sense.

Second trend is defined by racial factor when Kazakhstanis citizens are recognized as habitants of East Asian region. Many citizens of Kazakhstan, who went abroad, note the fact that they were perceived as Chinese, Koreans or Japanese.

Third trend – it is identification with Russia. This phenomenon is explained by that Kazakhstan in the long historical interim, it was a part of Russian Empire and Soviet Union. In the West as a former ideological adversary of the Soviet Union, in perception of the USSR the terms «Soviet» and «Russian» are identical for each other. For instances: in the national movements of Baltic peoples in the USA it was a trouble of perception the Soviet Union by Americans, because all nations habituating in the Soviet Union were perceived as Russians. This fact in informational sense complicated political activity of Baltic national movements inasmuch as many Americans could not know concretely on these countries (Baltic states) [1].

Fourth trend – it is identification with different «stans». In this sense broad role is played by such states as Pakistan and Afghanistan due to the conflict potential. «Stan's» identification is related with two tendencies: historical and security. Prefix «stan» in Turkic languages has a Persian or Indo-European origin [2].

This is explained that Iran historically had a broad cultural influence within the region and part of Iranian «cultural power» was projected to adjusting neighbors. Another factor within this trend is related with security factor, and as a result of American presence in the region and its subsequent coverage in the world mass media.

That is why Kazakhstan is not a competent subject of the international informational space (do not confuse with the term of «international community»). This phenomenon can be explained throughout various political theories predominantly by geopolitics, describing one or the other mechanism of this trend formation.

Halford Mackinder's Geopolitics. The Concept of «Heartland»

Sir Halford Mackinder is the most prominent thinkers of geopolitical thought of the XX century. His famous work issued in 1904 «Geographical Pivot of the History» explains world order from the standpoint of political geography. According to «Heartland» concept, the world is divided to the three spheres: first – «Heartland» internal areas of Eurasia which are composed of Ural, Western and Eastern Siberia, Far East (Russian), Central Asia and Caucasus; second – «inner crescent» – outer ar-

eas of Eurasia which are washed by World Ocean: Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Indochina and Eastern Asia; third – «outer crescent»: North and South Americas, Sub Saharan Africa and Australia with Oceania.

Mackinder noted in its geopolitical concept the central position of «inner crescent» for the development of world history, not for «Heartland». General his argument for this, it is historical fact that areas of the «inner crescent» always were under strong pressure and influence from both sides: from the Sea and from the Continent which thereby made political, economic, social and cultural development of the «inner crescent» more rich and dynamical with comparison with another regions [3]. The main historical processes developed exactly in the areas of «inner crescent».

Not last role in this sense was a historical circumstances within «Heartland» itself. The Soviet Union from the standpoint of geopolitics is perceived as a continental power. Central Asia as a indispensable part of «Heartland» was in the composition of the Soviet Union and closeness of the Soviet regime due to the facts of internal political security did not allow to open its border to the outside world. Argument for this statement that in the course of cold war, there were only approximately 5 experts on Central Asia [4].

Eurocentric model of the international relations which has existed since the period of XV-XVI centuries is rested on leading European empires. As a result, objects of expansion of European empires are the subject of the international cultural-informational space. Why such countries like Pakistan, India or Congo are famous around the globe? First – they were in the past colonies of leading European powers, British and French empires respectively; second it is a conflict potential which is broadly shown by mass media with conducting of various operations under the leading Western states.


In relation to Kazakhstan, consideration in the framework of «Heartland» is that, the Soviet Union was a close state and besides a central pivotal state – Russia, the other republics within the USSR for ordinary people in the globe and in the West were unknown. It means that network of world processes, which played crucial role in the development of world history according to Mackinder's view were in the areas of «inner crescent» and «outer crescent» and that's why in that areas all (under all is meant countries and nations) know each other meanwhile in «Heartland» on the dynamics of political processes

(development of dynamics of the political processes does not mean that historical processes and events are underestimated, it just means that their links with the global (global means *western*) empires lower, which than had a strong effect on perception of these countries in the world informational space) less active.

Conclusion: Central Asia and Kazakhstan as a part of «Heartland» and as a part of the Soviet Union

were closed geographically and politically, that's why in the international community information about Central Asian countries are not widespread.

Map 1. In this map is outlined the construction of the world according to Mackinder's view. Here, we can distinguish geographical dimensions in their regional classification



Source: https://www.academia.edu/8271412/Geopolitics_of_Eastern_Partnership

Map 2. In this map is clearly exposed geopolitical position of Central Asian states and Kazakhstan particularly. Main historical and geopolitical

mechanism which formed contemporary position on acknowledge about Kazakhstan is rooted in its distant area from inner crescent.



Source: http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2005/journal_eng/cac-04/02.megeng.shtml

Barry Buzan. Regions and Power. The Structure of the International Security

Barry Buzan it is one of the most outstanding scientist in the field of IR theories. Barry Buzan is the one of the founders of Copenhagen school of IR and the concept of «securitization» which is related to constructivism within IR. Here, basic role plays the Theory of Regional Security Complex) where the international system is rested on regional systems and subsystems. The concept of securitization is composed of two general pillars: first originates from political realism where the basic actors are states, the second originates from constructivism itself where various constructions of perceptions related with security are constructed.

Perception of security threats could change and evolve in the course of historical period, for instances: for Russia in the period of Soviet Union existence major threat was imposed by the United States and NATO and by maoist China. For the West, USSR. In the period after the end of cold war, threats became transnational, for instances: for Russia – secessionism, uncontrolled migration and hypothetical Chinese threat as a expansion or huge scale military conflict. The process of securitization is very important and central for security dynamics in Eurasia that is predominantly is featured as a «security regime».

Utility of the RSCT (Regional Security Complex Theory) for Kazakhstan is linked to its geographical identification. Every geographical region in the framework of RSCT has its own borders, which are rested on common historical, civilizational, social and cultural links, which were developed in the certain period. In order to understand Kazakhstan's informational position in the framework of RSCT or another country it is need to differentiate two approaches: first it is approach of the ordinary citizen whom knowledge of political geography is restricted by his own home region.

For instances, citizen of Argentine knows enough about his home region – South America or in other words Latin America, but he/she does not have sufficient knowledge about the other regions of the world, for instances of Central Asia, Africa or South-East Asia. Second approach – it is club of great powers whom contribution to the world history is high, from significant historical events till technologies, culture, economy and etc. Due to branding of those countries, economic brands of whatever product defines the image of that country.

Such states like the United States, Germany, Italy, and Japan have a huge soft power, which is generated by their national economies. For instances,

Japan has a huge soft power potential which is presented by its economy, to say precisely economic brands, culture – language, history, popular culture, anime and etc. which is worldwide known and recognized.

The countries that are less developed economically and in terms of the process of production, of course, are less popular. By this fact is explained knowledge on particular country. Samuel Huntington mentioned in his famous book «The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order» «soft power becomes power, only when it is based on hard power» [5]. Describing above-mentioned situation, for ordinary citizen the world is not composed of the whole globe, but it is confined by home region, meanwhile about outer part of the world ordinary citizen possesses scare notion.

According to Buzan, there are distinguished next regional complexes: East Asian RSC, South Asian RSC, Middle Eastern RSC, West African proto-complex, and Horn proto-complex, Central Africa RSC, Southern Africa RSC, post- Soviet RSC, European RSC, North American RSC, and South American RSC. From the standpoint of the RSCT, Kazakhstan is related to the post- Soviet RSC. Post- Soviet RSC takes a large part of the Eurasian space, its hinterland. Post-Soviet or Eurasian RCS or in other words – the common geopolitical space is composed of Eastern Europe (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, European part of Russia), Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and Russian internal areas (Ural, Siberia and Russian Far East).


Central or pivotal geopolitical place within the post-Soviet geopolitical space is belong Russia. Ultimate formation of Eurasian geopolitical space was in XX century. Formation of Eurasian geopolitical space was developed in two levels: since XVIII till end of XX century, the Russian Empire conquest of Eurasian hinterland areas and the second period, whole XX century, especially the Soviet period when all conquered territories and nations habituating there were under Russian cultural influence: language, social communications, social institutions, ideology, mentality and other influences. Important role between interstate and inter people's communication within RSC or the common geopolitical space play a people's movements. This allows to boost inter regional links among sub regions.

For instances, great amount of Americans have German ancestors or Irish or Italian ancestors. Kazakhstan it is a multinational state, many peoples of non-Turkic origin were brought into Kazakh-

stan, from Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Russian Far East. In this sense of world, Regional Security Complexes Kazakhstan is known for post-Soviet RSC and Turkey due to the common ethnic origin. In this sense, we have to differentiate some features of such terms like a Regional Super Complex and the Common Geopolitical Space. Regional Security Complex inherently is related to security issues

meanwhile Common Geopolitical Space considers over human relations based on same cultural and identity links.

Map 3. In this map various global RSCs are displayed as well as this map can depict the Common Geopolitical Spaces around the globe.



Source: <https://policytensor.com/2011/11/17/the-persian-gulf-as-a-regional-security-complex/>

What does the Common Geopolitical Space mean? It means that particular RSC was developed under certain period and it accumulated some similarities in social institutions. Mass Medias clearly expose this factor; people who are unified by one language, mentality are able easily to understand each other.

In the shooting of American movies, participate many non-US citizens as well as citizens of the British Commonwealth, from Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other European countries. If to judge in the context of Kazakhstan's geopolitical position, it could be explained why nobody knows about Kazakhstan around the world? Below are displayed factors and daily life examples that explain this situation:

1) As was mentioned by Samuel Huntington in his book «The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order»: history of mighty states became world history. This quote explains that Western

powers put themselves at the «center of the world»;

2) From Halford Mackinder's geopolitics of Heartland, global leading powers positioned within «inner» and «outer» crescents. That is why Great Powers know about each other and their domains. Why such states like Algeria, Pakistan and India have not gone under «Borat's phenomenon»? Because they were domains of leading Great Powers and their presence is known for their former metropolises;

3) If some bright events happen in Kazakhstan or in any Central Asia states, in the world (world means western) mass media will be noted event itself, but not exact the country. Instances: first, in one western report was noted on CCP Leader Xi Jinping's first official speech on the OBOR. In the report was mentioned Xi Jinping's speech and aspiration on OBOR policy but not the place of his speech. Second, during heavy rains in Almaty, Tesla model car has shown its effectiveness meanwhile other cars stalled. Leader

of «Tesla Motors» company in his twitter has mentioned about the effectiveness of his company's car, but he did not mention the place where it was. In addition, in the news the place where this situation happened was described as Russia;

4) In general for Western narrow person Kazakhstan is the some kind of exotic country existing in outer world even where the law of physics on the other. That is why success of «Borat movie» in psychological sense is necessary for narrow person, because he or she intends to see other world with its strangers and may be looking for it. In some extent, Borat's movie resembles movie «Alice in Wonderland». However, Borat's movie on its story is rigged to modern culture, which is rested on low morality and hedonism. That is why Western narrow person is searching some kind of land of weirdness.

Conclusion

The situation for Kazakhstan around its position within world-informational space is stalemate. In this situation faces two significant factors, on the one hand, this fundamental geopolitical processes that have evolved over a long historical period, on the other hand, it is high intensity globalization. Fundamental geopolitical processes as was mentioned above it is a Heartland theory geographically and the post- Soviet RSC politically. Due to it, Kazakhstan remains unknown country for outside world. In opposite to this process is the globalization, which appear in the development of tourism, education, social networks and more increasing of foreign tourists' visits to Kazakhstan in recent time. Barrier still exists but during some period it decreases in its size.

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*Umirzakova A.D., Aidarbayev S.Zh.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

*E-mail: ainur_umirzakova@mail.ru

The Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the WTO: The Main Agricultural Policy Provisions

Abstract. This article provides legal analysis of provisions of the Report of the Working party on the accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organization in the part concerning subsidizing of agriculture. Authors determine primary obligations in the field of agriculture accepted by Kazakhstan in view of joining the World Trade Organization. In particular, special attention in the article is paid to research of content of the subsections «Imports», «Exports» and «Internal policies» which provide reducing the volume of aggregate measures of agriculture support, prohibition of all forms of subsidizing connected with export and import substitution, increase of the size of tariff rate quotas on certain types of meat and also other obligations, accepted by the country. Authors also note that reducing the volume of «amber box» aggregate measures of support will be filled with proportional increase of share of «green box» support measures in a total amount of financing of agriculture sector. At the same time the main emphasis will be placed on measures supporting long-term competitiveness of sector.

Key words: World Trade Organization, export subsidies, agriculture, import, export, tariff rate quota.

Introduction

Agriculture is one of the key factors, which are directly influencing national economy. Therefore, in case of joining of Kazakhstan the WTO it was necessary to understand what kind of difficulties this step will bring to agriculture. Taking any cardinal steps, it is necessary to foresee legal consequences that landowners of Kazakhstan will have.

It is rather difficult to foresee in advance exact consequences of the accession to the WTO because the positive effect will be directly proportionally depend on carrying out of additional measures of domestic policy of the country. It is also obvious that the effect of the introduction won't be notable in the short-term period that is why forecasts are made for a long-term transitional period, namely 5-6 years after decrease of all tariff rates and elimination of barriers in trade [1].

Nevertheless, the detailed analysis of the Report of the Working party on the accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the WTO is absolutely important for revealing of final parameters of joining of Kazakhstan the WTO concerning the field of subsidizing of agriculture and by that contributes more effective and exact modeling of consequences

of country's accession to the trade organization. In this regard, the research of provisions of the Report is relevant today.

Methods

The research is made by set of such methods of knowledge as a dialectic method, the analysis and synthesis, classification (systematization). In addition, descriptive, legalistic, comparative and legal methods and system approach were used. At the same time, comparative and legal method and system approach were played the major role in question of regulation of subsidizing of agriculture, which contributed to a qualitative research of this area in legislation of Kazakhstan.

Main body

The agriculture policy is presented in the section «C» of chapter IV «Policies affecting trade in goods» of the Report in the form of recording of the main statements of the representative of Kazakhstan concerning current situation in the field of agriculture, rules existing in this field before accession of the country to the WTO and also the arrangements made during negotiation process. Certain provi-

sions of the report have referential character in order to avoid duplication of content of norms. In the part concerning agriculture policy the report is divided on three sequential subsections – imports, exports and internal policies, each of which is followed by ascertaining of actual data and numerical indicators on import and export of certain agricultural products for a certain period of time, and also causal conditionality of application by the country of subsidies in the field of agriculture.

Provisions of the subsection «Imports» concern questions of tariff quoting introduced by Kazakhstan in 2010 for import to customs area of EEU of meat (beef, pork and poultry) coming from the third countries and refer to the section «A» of the same chapter according to which agreements on increase of size of the tariff rate quotas on this meat are reached. According to the legislation of RK the tariff rate quota is understood as the measure of regulation of import to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan or export from its territory of certain types of goods providing application during the certain period of lower rate of import or export customs duty at importing or exporting certain quantity of goods (in natural or value term) in comparison with current rate of import or export customs duty [2]. The key moment of this determination is exactly the quantity of goods which called the volume of tariff rate quota and distributed only between certain suppliers whose list is fixed by the legislation.

The volume of tariff rate quota is understood as the amount of goods determined by the decision of the Eurasian economic commission of EEU and approved by the decision of authorized body in the field of regulation of trade activity for one calendar year, import of which is imposed by inside quote rates of import customs duties of the Common customs tariff of the Customs union [3]. Thus, though rather low customs duty is established for these goods, an obstacle for trade in the context of standards of the WTO is exactly quantitative restriction of goods. In addition, certain problem in the process of negotiations on joining consisted in distribution of quotas among suppliers, which is performed according to the principle of «historical suppliers». According to this principle, the volume of quotas is calculated from the volume of goods delivered by these suppliers for the previous year. Therefore, this formula of distribution of quotas does not cover new suppliers who will appear after joining of Kazakhstan the WTO. In this regard, Kazakhstan undertook obligation to provide a possibility of access to the tariff rate quotas for new participants, and to provide distribution of the tariff rate quotas in com-

mercially profitable quantities as it is stipulated by the Agreement of the WTO on agriculture.

In spite of the fact that introduction of new trade restrictions in the form of the tariff rate quotas is contrary to the general principle of non-use of trade restrictions within the WTO and represents a step backwards on the way to trade liberalization, Kazakhstan managed to defend the right to their application. In order to explain the necessity of their application it was noted in the Report that production of meat, in particular, poultry is one of the key segments of an agriculture branch of Kazakhstan providing with thousands of workplaces the population of the rural area. Thus, it was important to Kazakhstan to preserve the right to apply the tariff rate quotas on this type of goods.

The analysis of the subsection «Exports» shows that a necessary condition of joining of the country the WTO is the prohibition of all forms of subsidizing connected with export and import substitution.

At the same time it is noted in the Report that the need of application of export subsidies before accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO was conditioned on its geographical arrangement, lack of an outlet to the sea, the big extent of the territory, remoteness from the main markets of agricultural products and a high share of the transportation costs which are sharply reducing competitiveness of Kazakhstan's agricultural products. For example, delivery of wheat at the foreign markets from the place of shipment to the nearest Russian port, distance to which is 1200 km, costs 130 US dollars per ton. Taking into account the volume of the transported wheat these transportation expenses are incommensurably high that can affect its main price. These deliveries of wheat through the territory of the Russian Federation are significantly important for the Government of Kazakhstan for the purpose of maintenance of domestic agricultural producers in the form of cost reduction on high transportation expenses on deliveries to the world markets.

The last subsection «Internal policies» concerning the policy of subsidizing of agriculture contains a list of regulatory legal acts in this field. Among them the special attention is paid to the List of concessions and commitments on Goods attached to the draft of the Kazakhstan protocol on accession to the WTO which contains obligations of Kazakhstan on internal support and export subsidies. In this subsection, it is also noted that reducing volume of aggregate measures of agriculture support within the «amber box» will be proportionally filled with expenses within «green basket». So, the support share of «green basket» was increased in a total amount

of financing of sector according to the «Agribusiness-2020» program. The main emphasis at the same time is placed on the following measures of «green basket» supporting long-term competitiveness of sector:

1) improvement of access to key resources and services for producers of agricultural products in the following spheres: production of plant cultivation products, development of cattle breeding, granaries, financial services, investment projects, educational services;

2) improvement of phytosanitary and veterinary security systems;

3) development of water supply systems;

4) improvement of quality of fertilizers and efficiency of classification and enhancement of information services;

5) agricultural researches and consulting services [4].

Besides, in connection with risk of drought, land users and cattle breeders strongly depend on artificial water systems. For the solution of the existing problems, the «Agribusiness-2020» program provides a construction of irrigational systems for

the remote cattle breeding and development of the corresponding regulatory framework.

In general, the analysis of the Report allows to conclude that the volume of the aggregate measures of agriculture support («amber basket» on qualification of the WTO) is established at the level 8,5% of the gross volume of agricultural production of Kazakhstan. For comparison, within the EEU the volume of the state support, distorting trade, should not exceed 10% [5]. The set restrictions at the same time don't affect the measures realized since 2012 within the «Agribusiness-2020» program which concern granting subsidies. Thus, this possibility for agricultural manufacturers will remain in full.

According to the «Agribusiness-2020» program, the target indicators concerning volume of the state support of agriculture can reach 10% of GDP of agriculture [6]. That in principle doesn't contradict the changes made by joining of the country the WTO.

The total expenses provided in republican and local budgets on a program realization are also remained and in 2013 - 2020 will be equal to 2 986, 9 billion tenge, from them (Table 1):

Table 1 - The total expenses on «Agribusiness-2020» program realization [6]

№	Year	Quantity of the allocated subsidies, tenge
1	2013 year	328,3 billion tenge
2	2014 year	471,6 billion tenge
3	2015 year	281,6 billion tenge
4	2016 year	310,7 billion tenge
5	2017 year	359,4 billion tenge
6	2018 year	389,1 billion tenge
7	2019 year	403,7 billion tenge
8	2020 year	442,5 billion tenge

Thus, the overview of the primary obligations accepted by the country in the field of agriculture allows drawing several conclusions. First, fears concerning displacement from the Kazakhstan market of noncompetitive domestic goods are in vain, as there is a rather high level of tariff protection in the form of quoting in the country. Nevertheless, the average level of customs duties for agricultural goods decreased from 17 % within the Common customs tariff of the CU (CCT) to 10,2 %. For comparison,

in the Russian Federation before accession to the WTO the average arithmetic rate of CCT CU was at 18,6 %. Now it is equal to 18,3 %. For Kazakhstan, it appears to be a serious decrease.

Secondly, reduction the volume of measures of agriculture support will not create risks and threats of collapse of domestic agri-industrial complex because it does not assume complete cancellation of the state support to agriculture, and means the maximum reduction the measures distorting prod-

ucts price, in particular “amber basket” measures. “Amber basket” includes all measures of state support having influence on a competitive environment, that is directly or indirectly influencing on prime cost value or market price of output. However, what to consider as a direct impact, what – as an indirect, – is a conventional. For example, privileges on the VAT for domestic agricultural producers and agricultural processors do not directly effect on prime cost and to a large extent concern the profit. In this part, the next requirement is imputed to Kazakhstan – until January 1, 2018 to refuse from this measure as well as from export subsidies. Meanwhile, within the WTO there are other measures of state support, so-called measures of “green basket”, in respect of various compensations of the similar half-received income. Thus, reducing measures of “amber basket” will be filled with increase of the measures of “green basket” which are not distorting the total market of agricultural products. That will not affect significantly a condition of agriculture in the country.

Other aspect of the analysis, which caused certain doubts, is the refusing export subsidies. Certainly, these subsidies obstruct a fair competition

and an effective trade activity. However, it is known that for today some members of the WTO have this export subsidy, in particular, Australia. However, it states that it does not use export subsidies, but at the same time, there are not any prohibitions on their use in case of need. Thus, there is a situation when the meaning of a prohibition of export subsidies is lost in view of disparity and creation of preferable conditions only organization members. The positive result of introduction of such measures will be observed only in case of ubiquitous denying of such subsidies.

Conclusion

In general, the analysis of the Report of the Working party on the accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO in the part concerning policy of agriculture allows concluding that in spite of the fact that the threat of crash of domestic agro-industrial complex isn't observed, there is a probability of braking in development of agriculture. As, even considering recovery of the state support at the expense of measures of “green basket”, the sizes of these measures in Kazakhstan in comparison with the developed countries are significantly small, and they will be not enough for full development of agriculture sector.

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*Nadirova G.E., Amrayev D.D.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

*E-mail: gulnad@mail.ru

Social and Economic Aspects of the Exodus of Syrian Refugees to Jordan and Lebanon

Abstract. The article deals with the analysis of ethno-migration processes, which became the consequences of civil war in Syria, full of violent acts against humanity and civil rights, that has led to a mass exodus of Syrian peoples, its influence on the region of Middle East, its impact on the geopolitical policies. The Arab Spring dramatically affected all countries of the Middle East as well as their neighbors and allies, which completely shaped geopolitics of the region and caused the start of ethnic – migration processes.

We try to give an insight into the formation of the migration crisis in the region and define the role and significance of the actions of international community towards the provided problems.

Keywords: Syrian refugees, migration crisis, Jordan, Lebanon, economic, social tensions.

Introduction

The problems that persist in Middle East today, as never before, play a significant role in international community. The events of “Arab spring” of 2011 completely shaped balance of power in this region as well as changing geopolitical map. The series of civil wars in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and further consequence in the face of “migration crisis” caused international community to a sudden reaction because the migration and refugee crisis affected not only region of Middle East but moved towards developed countries of European Union. While each country has a different story to tell, Syria has stolen the modern spotlight and debate floor. Syria, a country many felt to be stable and secure under the Assad Regime has come toppling down in the past five years by a raging civil war. This civil war, full of violent acts against humanity and civil rights, has led to a mass exodus of Syrian peoples. Seeking refuge wherever will accept them; the refugee crisis has become a new focal point for political debate concerning the Middle East.

The war in Syria has been the single largest driver of refugees in the world, leaving over four million Syrians displaced outside of Syria. The majority of displaced Syrians have fled to neighboring countries such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.

The Syrian people are trapped between Assad’s ruthless regime, various rebel groups, constant air strikes from Russia and a US-led military coalition, and religious extremists (such as the Islamic State). The human toll has been devastating, as both the Syrian regime and the opposition have arbitrarily targeted civilian areas [1]. So far, the war has claimed over 310,000 lives, and forcibly displaced over 4.5 million more - making Syria “the world’s top source country of refugees, overtaking Afghanistan, which had held this position for more than three decades” [2].

Neighboring countries in the region like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey have hosted the overwhelming majority of displaced Syrians. Nearly two million Syrian refugees live in Turkey, more than any other country. In Lebanon, where formal refugee camps for Syrians do not exist, there are over a million Syrians, making up a quarter of its total population. According to the UNHCR, about 70% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live below the poverty line. Although fewer in number, more than 85% of Jordan’s 629,245 Syrian refugees live below the national poverty line [3]. The majority of Syrian refugees displaced in the Middle East live outside of camps, and self-settle in urban areas

Methods

The main methods of a research in this work are the system analysis - consideration of the designated processes in internal and external communications and dependences, the comparative analysis. With the help of a descriptive method, we describe the studied phenomenon, processes, and systems through descriptors. Therefore, when studying the phenomenon of migration we use such descriptors: country, person, society, religious consciousness, and social relations.

The base of the actual and digital materials is brought together according to publications in the Arab and European press of "Aljazeera", "The Journal of Arabic Studies", and a big portion of information was taken from the reports of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Main body

The Syrian sectarian divide as it manifests today is rooted in an unbalanced distribution of power: Alawi associates of the president occupy most of the central positions in the army and security services. The regime's ties with Shiite Iran and the Lebanese Shiite as Hezbollah strengthen its sectarian outlook [4]. Moreover, earlier domestic conflicts in the late 1970s and early 1980s has positioned the regime as being opposed to political, Sunni, Islam.

In 2000 the second son of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father. At first it seemed as though Bashar al-Assad was going to make important changes towards breaking way from the political course set by his father [5]. However, during his presidency, Bashar al-Assad lost control of the situation and in that lost his chance to build for a fruitful co-operation, particularly within regime's opposition, both secular and religious.

However, informally, religious affiliation played a role in institutions such as the security apparatus, stalling change and modernization. Sectarianism was not formally a strategy, but on an informal level, it caused Syrian institutions to behave differently. This caused dissatisfaction in Syrian society, especially in the well-educated group. Critique increased with an ultimate outburst during the civil war in 2011, also sparked by uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.

Five years since the conflict began, more than 250,000 Syrians have been killed in the fighting, and almost 11 million Syrians - half the country's pre-war population - have been displaced from their homes [2].

The Syrian government, led by President Bashar al-Assad, responded to the protests by killing hun-

dreds of demonstrators and imprisoning many more [6]. In July 2011, defectors from the military announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army, a rebel group aiming to overthrow the government, and Syria began to slide into civil war.

The Syrian conflict is seen as posing serious threats to the stability of the Jordanian government and the region. It is important to recognize that distances between Syria, Jordan and Lebanon are very short. Damascus is less than 200 kilometers from Amman. The sounds of the shelling in Syria can be heard from Jordanian border towns. The conflict in Syria is affecting Jordan's stability and security in a number of ways, most immediately in the dramatic and massive influx of refugees and the growing importance of the Jordanian-Syrian border.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Since it gained independence from Britain in 1946, Jordan has given refuge to waves of migrants fleeing regional conflicts: Palestinians, Iraqis and now Syrians. However, the country is struggling with increasingly difficult economic conditions, including a high unemployment rate, especially among women and young people. Officials say, Jordan is now home to more than 1.4 million Syrians, including over 600,000 refugees, who have arrived since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011 [7].

Syrian refugees began crossing into Jordan in significant numbers in the first half of 2012. Like refugees throughout the region, they initially moved in with family members or friends or rented accommodations in the towns and cities. However, as the number of arrivals began to increase dramatically, in July 2012, the Jordanian government established the Zaatari refugee camp, which by October 2012 housed 20,000 refugees. As of 2016, the camp's population stood at over 80,000. [8]

Nongovernment organizations and international aid groups generally see to the needs of refugees placed in camps. However, in Jordan, most of the Syrians are scattered in cities and towns, straining the resources of schools, hospitals and other services and fueling a festering resentment among Jordanians. This is especially true in the northern border towns, like Mafraq, where Syrians now constitute a majority of the population.

Arriving Syrians are considered asylum-seekers, rather than formally recognized as refugees. When Syrians arrive at the border, they are transported to Zaatari refugee camp where they are registered by UN officials and given accommodation. Refugees can legally move out of the camp if they are sponsored - or 'bailed out' - by a Jordanian citizen,

which involves both a statement of responsibility on the part of the sponsor and a financial guarantee. But in fact, the borders between the camp and the community are porous and there is constant movement in and out of the camp. By late 2012, some 4,000 Syrians were crossing into Jordan every day, leading to pressures to restrict entry.

Moreover, the large numbers of Syrians living in Jordanian communities are triggering a backlash against the government's policies, and the refugees themselves. In parts of northern Jordan, Syrian refugees make up more than half of the local population [9]. Popular resentment against the Syrian refugees is growing as Jordanians blame the Syrians for shortages of goods, rising prices, increasing rental costs, and increasing unemployment [10]. There are particular concerns about shortages of water, which has long been an issue in the country.

In terms of the impact of the refugees on domestic political life in Jordan, the Palestinian refugee population that now constitutes a majority of Jordan's citizens has already long threatened the tribal Bedouin support base for the Hashemite kingdom. The arrival of large numbers of Syrian refugees raises concerns that Bedouin interests will become an even smaller minority in the future [11].

Like the situation of internally displaced Syrians, the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan is not static. People are moving constantly, from the camp to the towns, sometimes returning to the camp when they cannot pay rent. Moreover, thousands of Syrian refugees have returned to Syria - some to fight, some to check their homes, some because they have heard it is now safer. To date, the Jordanian government has not sent refugees back to Syria.

While the Jordanian government's hospitality to the sudden arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees is admirable [12], if borders are to remain open, continued international support will be necessary.

At a conference in London to solicit support for Syrian refugees, donors pledged \$2.1 billion to Jordan over the next three years, along with other assistance. Nevertheless, after the conference, Jordanian representatives made it clear that the money came with conditions [13].

The World Bank announced that it plans to offer \$200 million in concessional financing to Jordan and Lebanon in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. According to the report, countries bordering conflict zones, many of which are already in fragile situations, are facing tremendous budgetary pressure. The World Bank said the Kingdom's estimates show that each refugee costs the Jordanian

government \$3,750 per year. "The influx of more than 630,000 Syrian refugees is thus estimated to have cost Jordan over \$2.5 billion a year," the report said. "Under this situation, government debt is accumulating fast estimated at 90 per cent of GDP in 2015," the report added [14].

According to the latest population census conducted late last year, 1.26 million of Jordan's population are Syrians, but only 50 per cent is registered as refugees. The World Bank's QEB indicated that unemployment rates in Jordan increased to 12.5 per cent in the first half of 2015, compared to 11.4 per cent during the same period in 2014. It added that increased insecurity and uncertainty have lowered foreign and domestic investments in Jordan and Lebanon as well. In Jordan, it explained, investment as a share of the GDP declined to an estimated 27.4 per cent in 2015, from its peak of 28.1 per cent in 2013 [10].

"These factors are expected to keep growth in 2016 and 2017 for both countries Jordan and Lebanon, well below their potential." Remittances have also taken a hit in countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan that rely heavily on flows from Gulf Cooperation Council countries and others. "Jordan is in the same situation with growth in remittance inflows dropping from 4 per cent in 2013 to 2 per cent in 2014 and 2015," the report said [14].

The latest population census has revealed that the Kingdom's population has almost doubled over the past decade, according to official data.

Non-Jordanians now represent around one third of Jordan's population with an estimated number of 2.9 million and 1.26 million being Syrians, the figures show. Syrians constitute 46 per cent of non-Jordanians living in the Kingdom and 13.2 per cent of the overall population, preliminary results of the national census conducted in late November showed.

The report, released by the Department of Statistics, showed that the Kingdom's population in 2004 was 5.1 million, while by 2015, it increased by 4.4 million, making the total population 9.5 million. The figures also revealed that Jordan hosts 636,270 Egyptians, 634,182 Palestinians, 130,911 Iraqis, 31,163 Yemenis, 22,700 Libyans and 197,385 from other nationalities [14].

In another development, in late 2015, aid officials and refugees themselves said that Syrians, sensing that the war in their homeland will not end in the near future, are leaving Jordan for Europe in growing numbers encouraged friends and relatives who are already there, pushed out by cuts in UN food aid. Jordan says it hosts more than 1 million Syrians in total, but the numbers are starting to

fall. The UN's World Food Program, which feeds more than half a million refugees in Jordan, says the number of aid recipients fell by about 2,000 in September and 3,000 in October. In a random survey of refugees in October 2015 by the UNHCR, 25 per cent said they were actively planning to leave Jordan [15].

Lebanon

Since both countries gained independence from France in 1943, relations between the two countries had been strained, especially with the 29-year Syrian Occupation of Lebanon. Following the end of the twenty-nine years of Syrian occupation of Lebanon in 2005, and Syria officially recognizing Lebanon's sovereignty in 2008 many Syrians have been immigrating to Lebanon in search of work and a better life. These workers were treated with respect from both the Lebanese people and the country's government even though Syrian migrant workers taking jobs from the Lebanese workers. However, because of the civil war in Syria between the government of President Bashar al Assad and rebel groups, refugees have been entering Lebanon by the thousands. This influx of refugees has resulted in the overpopulation of the camps and cities and rising tensions between the Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees.

As of March 31, 2016, Lebanon hosted more than 1mln of registered refugees from Syria, 53% of them children. The Lebanese government chose not to establish camps for people fleeing the civil war in Lebanon, and thus they have settled throughout country. While most of them rent their accommodations in around 1,700 locations countrywide nearly a fifth (18%) live in non-formal settlements mostly concentrated in border governorates. Because the government of Lebanon has increasingly made it difficult for refugees from Syria to renew their residency permits, the number of households in which all members are legally in the country has dropped from 58% in 2014 to 29% in 2015. Refugee households living below the poverty line increased from 49% in 2014 to 70% in 2015. Despite their struggling status, the Lebanese political parties fear the country's sectarian-based political system is being undermined [16]. On October 22, 2014, Lebanon has closed off its borders to Syrian refugees, with the exception of special cases, in an attempt to deal with the issue of overcrowding.

The Lebanese government has historically maintained an open door policy towards Syrian refugees; however, the UNHCR states that the Lebanese government has never signed the 1951 Refugee Convention which secures a refugees who belongs "to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom

would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" [2].

Therefore, there exists no international laws which Lebanon must follow in dealing with the refugees this has included the government of Lebanon not building any refugee camps. The refugees who are capable of working must compete with the poor of Lebanon for the country's lowest paying jobs to get work and make money, which has resulted in damage to Lebanon's economic infrastructure. The children of Syrian refugees must attend schools, which are already crowded with Lebanese children.

As the numbers of Syrians in Lebanon have grown, so have tensions; according to one Syrian refugee "When I first arrived, Lebanese people were very hospitable to me. They treated me like a refugee, like someone who needed protection and had fled from the war. Now, they treat me as if I am a security threat" [2]. The influx of Syrians into Lebanon has resulted in economic, political, social and religious tensions in Lebanon. Religious Syrian extremist groups have put curfews into place in some cities and villages to ensure public safety following attacks on police and members of the military. Many Lebanese citizens fear that there is a possibility of massive spillover of the Syrian Civil War in Lebanon.

Fighting from the Syrian Civil War has spilled over into Lebanon as opponents and supporters of the Syrian rebels have travelled to Lebanon to fight and attack each other on Lebanese soil. The Syrian conflict has been described as having stoked a "resurgence of sectarian violence in Lebanon", with many of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims supporting the rebels in Syria, while many Shiites have supported Assad.

By 2012, the conflict spread to Tripoli and Beirut, and later to south and east Lebanon, while the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed in north Lebanon and Beirut. Among Lebanon's political blocs the anti-Syrian Saudi-backed March 14 Alliance supports the Syrian rebels, and the Iranian-backed pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance supports the Syrian government [17].

The Syrian Civil War and its domestic impact have furthered the polarization of Lebanese politics. The March 14 Alliance, dominated by Christian- and Sunni-based parties, is broadly sympathetic to the Syrian opposition to Bashar Al-Assad. In August, youth members of 14 March parties including Kataeb, Lebanese Forces, National Liberal Party, Future Movement and Islamic Group held a rally to demand the expulsion of the Syrian Ambassador.

8 March parties generally supported the continuation of the Assad government, but analysts believe some groups within the coalition may seek new alliances if the Assad government falls. More moderate members of the coalition in government have begun distancing themselves from the Assad government. The waves of Syrian refugees seeking a safety have further exacerbated the division among the political parties in Lebanon. On opposite sides of the issue are the Lebanese Forces Party and the Kataeb Party—both members of the March 14 Alliance—and the Free Patriotic Movement. The LFP and the Kataeb are united by their opposition to the Syrian regime and opposition to the presence of Hezbollah as an armed force outside state control; the FPM is part of the March 8 Alliance and views the Syrian regime as a sustainer of minority rights and also supports Hezbollah's role as a defense force against Israel [18].

The refugee question has evoked fear among a section of Lebanese Christians, specifically the FPM, in that their presence will resemble that of the Palestinians, who came to constitute a viable political force in Lebanon and upset the delicate balance of power in the country's sectarian based political system. The different stands toward the Syrian regime and the disagreements on how to address the issue of refugees have revealed the far-reaching and fundamental divisions among Lebanon's Christian parties [19].

Ex-President Michel Suleiman included who have called on the international community to help Lebanon cope with the increasing number of refugees. Additionally, thousands of Palestinians have fled Syria; most of these have taken refuge in Palestinian camps in Lebanon, like Ain al-Hilweh in Saida [20]. Among Christian Lebanese there is considerable anxiety regarding the consequences of the tide of refugees, and plays into deep division of Christian communities over Syria.

More than 80 per cent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, who live in around 1,700 locations countrywide, rent their accommodation and pay on average \$200 a month. There are no formal refugee camps for Syrians [21].

Most refugees rent apartments, but as their vulnerability has deepened more and more have had to resort to living in unfinished buildings, garages, abandoned sheds, worksites and tents in informal settlements. Structural improvements are often only of a temporary nature due to the lack of authorization from the government or property owners for something more substantial.

Working with Lebanese municipalities, partners

and refugee outreach volunteers, UNHCR's five offices throughout Lebanon have also established inter-agency response teams as well as making contingency stocks of emergency supplies available countrywide.

The winter program prioritizes all those identified in advance as most in need, starting with families living in areas situated above 500 meters in altitude, those in very insecure shelters and those who are economically vulnerable. Hundreds of thousands of people, including poor Lebanese, are receiving some kind of winter assistance. This year's carefully planned inter-agency winter operation is providing at least US\$75 million in aid for both refugees and needy Lebanese families. "Since the first Syrian refugees crossed the border into Lebanon almost five years ago, Lebanese communities have extended their hospitality on a truly impressive scale," said UNHCR Representative in Lebanon Ninette Kelley, after meeting the refugee families in Abbasieh. "Lebanon today faces an unprecedented challenge to manage both its own population and Syrian refugees. It has the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world and more global support, including for long-term development, is urgently needed" [21].

While all countries in the region have been affected by the influx of refugees, no country has been more impacted than Lebanon in addition to perhaps 500,000 Syrian migrants working in the country at the time of the crisis. Lebanese officials refer to the present number of Syrians as 1-1.2 million. Lebanon, a country with a population of 4 million people, has also hosted Palestine refugees for decades.

As of May 2015, there are more 1.2 million in Lebanon and 628,000 in Jordan. Another 9 million people are displaced inside Syria, representing a pipeline of potential refugees [2]. The refugee-to-citizen population ratio, especially in Lebanon, is a particular cause for concern, unprecedented even compared to previous waves of Palestinians, Iraqis and other refugees. Lowball estimates approximate that one in four people in Lebanon are Syrian refugees; the equivalent of 125 million additional people entering the European Union within four years. With the growing numbers of refugees and their actual and perceived negative impacts on the host countries, the initial warmth and generosity that locals had extended to refugees is declining. Public sympathy has fallen sharply. In August 2014, 79% of Jordanians were opposed to receiving further Syrian refugees [22]. The level of distrust among communities is particularly troubling. In the American University of Beirut-Save the Children's study

of intergroup tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities, over 90% of Lebanese nationals surveyed perceived refugees as threats to their economic livelihood and value system, and over two-thirds perceived them as existential threats [23]. A majority of refugees also perceived the Lebanese as a symbolic and economic threat. The view of the “other” as a threat not only to social and economic well-being, but also to the physical self should sound alarm bells for those concerned about peace and stability in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq.

While incidences are still isolated, they are increasing in frequency. Social tensions are also creating lasting, long-term negative impacts that drive future vulnerability. For example, in Turkey and Lebanon discrimination against Syrian refugees from local students and teachers creates hostile environments for refugee children who become discouraged from attending public schools. Tensions also increase the stress experienced by an already traumatized population. The “lost generation” is therefore losing opportunities to maintain their economic, social and physical health to rebuild Syria one day, if peace is achieved; they are also particularly vulnerable to radicalization. The risk of unrest in host nations poses a threat to the region. The sectarian nature of the fighting in Syria has ignited domestic political cleavages that were already present in the refugee host nations. 85% of Syrian refugees currently reside in urban, semi-urban and rural settings, often among the poorest host communities, and tensions are growing quickly [24]. Refugees live closely with host populations, thereby highlighting natural, social and cultural differences. In addition, host citizens tend to perceive the refugees not only as economic competition but also as an existential threat, because the largely Sunni Syrian presence intersects with underlying political cleavages. There are social and cultural differences between the communities.

The refugees have also economically affected host communities. Even though economic slowdown is an effect of the Syrian crisis, host citizens disproportionately blame refugees for the deterioration. The largest cause of discontent is competition for jobs (perceived or actual), although this affects different segments of the job market unequally. The World Bank estimated that the labour supply in Lebanon would increase by 30-50% in 2014, with the largest impact on women, youth and unskilled workers [25]. Refugees have also increased demand and prices for essential goods and services. Housing rents in northern Jordan increased from \$55-70

per month before the crisis to an average of \$420 in early 2014 [26]. The dramatic increase has severely reduced the availability of affordable housing for poor Jordanians. Syrian refugees are thus viewed as sources of economic competition. Most importantly, the presence of Syrian refugees is construed as an existential threat, jeopardizing previously delicate balances in host countries.

In Lebanon, historical sectarian rifts are exacerbated by the influx of Sunni Syrians into a country with a confessional political system. This triggers fears of Palestinian integration and memories associated with their alleged role in Lebanon’s civil war. In Jordan, any indication of a long-term Syrian stay threatens tribal Jordanians who are already outnumbered by the Palestinians.

The polarization of the Syrian crisis has impeded the development of longer-term domestic and foreign policies on the Syrian refugee crisis. As a result, humanitarian organizations and local authorities can only provide short-term assistance. Many locals experience similar levels of vulnerability as the Syrian refugees, yet they benefit little from domestic or international aid; the disparity between assistance provided to equally vulnerable populations is a particular source of discontent. For example, the daily trucking of water to Jordan’s Zaatari camp is expensive and wasteful (costing around \$12,000 per day), [135] while Jordanians in surrounding communities, who experience water shortages, get piped water as little as once every 10 days during the height of summer [27]. While there are growing efforts to counter this problem, like rehabilitating the existing water infrastructure, programs have often addressed immediate humanitarian needs at the expense of community relations. There are a growing number of programmes aimed at building social cohesion, particularly through inclusive development. However, more needs to be done to target the drivers of social tensions. The refugee crisis, combined with the policy stalemate, has resulted in stressed services, overburdened communities, and rising disparities between and within populations. The problems are exacerbated by the tight international funding situation. Only \$3.8 billion was pledged for the \$8.4-billion regional appeal at the Kuwait III conference on 31 March 2015 for the Syria crisis. In light of the vast humanitarian need and political sensitivities, medium to long-term responses are receiving little attention and resources, endangering even the short-term stability of the host country.

Despite the growing urgency, there are significant obstacles to addressing social tensions between refugees and host communities. Host authorities

have been reluctant to engage in longer-term plans for water, sanitation, education, health, livelihoods etc. for many reasons; two are highlighted below.

Challenge 1: Weak International Obligations Protection is weak for refugees in the host countries. Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq are non-signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Turkey, although a signatory, has a geographical limitation that excludes any non-European refugees from its treaty obligations. While host countries have shown exceptional generosity to Syrian refugees, the states have also used their non-signatory status to limit the scope of provision. UNHCR has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with Jordan and Lebanon to provide some contractual basis for their interactions; yet these MOUs only cover the bare basics. Given the inherent reluctance to act, the lack of binding international law has offered a legal basis for limited assistance.

Challenge 2: Delicate Political Balance Struck for the Short Term Ruling elites in the host countries fear programs that could result in permanent national changes in demographics and in the political landscape. The status quo poses the greatest challenge to addressing social tensions; at present, an uneasy balance has been struck that schizophrenically appeases citizens' fears of refugee integration and provides just enough social support to silence refugees. Fears of integration paralyze the State's ability to make comprehensive crisis management policies, yet this is unsustainable as the crisis lengthens and the population grows. In addition to compromising the welfare of Syrian refugees and vulnerable host citizens, this balancing act ironically erodes the stability that leaders are so desperate to preserve.

The humanitarian system is unable to sustain a long-term response to a protracted refugee situation at the scale of the Syrian crisis. Greater long-term planning is necessary; Jordan's April 2015 announcement of a water distribution system at Zaatari

by the Water Network Task Force is an example of steps in the right direction because it reduces water drawn from surrounding communities. However, humanitarian spending for the Syrian refugee crisis is unsustainable in the context of the sheer number of major emergencies occurring worldwide.

Host countries have largely borne the costs associated with higher demand for services; optimistic projections show that international donors funded only 63% of the annual appeal for refugees at the end of 2014; the percentage has declined yearly since the beginning of the crisis [28]. Instead, bureaucratic hurdles for the reallocation of development funding to middle-income countries must be overcome to finance conflict prevention and inclusive development efforts. The sectarian fighting in Syria as well as the protracted refugee presence has not only affected host communities but also inflamed pre-existing political cleavages in host countries.

Conclusion

The stability of the Middle East depends on the timely prevention of tensions escalating between refugees and host communities. Therefore, while there must be a parallel push to resolve the conflict in Syria to prevent spillover effects, immediate attention must also be paid to conflict de-escalation in fragile host communities. Community and national leaders should assert a calming, rather than polarizing, influence to prevent the widespread outbreak of violence. Concurrently, systematic efforts toward addressing the drivers of social tensions, particularly regarding underlying developmental and political problems that worsen the refugee situation, are needed. Political stakeholders need to develop a long-term view of the situation and work together to produce comprehensive policies in order to jointly address the needs of vulnerable refugee and host communities.

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*Kudaibergenova R., Beisysenbayeva A.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

*E-mail: Renata.Kudaibergenova@kaznu.kz

Korean Soft Power and National Image of South Korea in Kazakhstan

Abstract. To date, the structure of the foreign policy has been undergoing big changes, and sometimes culture, education, ideology, values become more effective tool for influencing one country to another. Globalization, the rapid development of information technology and the ever-changing nature of the political situation in the international arena are pushing the world in the new environment, where no place for the old forms of diplomacy. South Korea demonstrates us an example of successful development of soft power, which can be called a forced, taking into account the speed of the spread and impact of the efforts made by the Government. The states of Central Asia, and Kazakhstan in particular, remain the focus of the foreign policy of South Korea since independence. Implementation of soft-power strategy of South Korea in Kazakhstan requires further study. However, in this paper on the basis of primary sources we analyzed the efficiency of South Korean soft instruments of influence, as well as how Soft power affects the creation of a national image.

Key words: South Korea, Soft Power, Kazakhstan, foreign policy, strategy.

Introduction

The power of the state had been determined by its military power for many centuries, and the main instrument for achieving a credible position on the world stage was war, and the entire foreign policy was based on this concept. Turn of the XX century considered to be the turning point. The age of globalization began to dictate the values, based on equality, unity and peace. The concepts of force has been revised. The new concept was formulated and developed by Joseph Nye. It was firstly presented in his works "Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power" [1] and "Soft Power" in the 1990s. Later, in 2005, the "Soft Power" as a phenomenon in international relations has been presented in the book "The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations" by Jan Melissen [2].

Joseph Nye defines two kinds of antagonistic forces in his concept: "hard power" and "soft power." These two concepts are rather similar, as in the first and in the second case, the main task is to achieve the desired effect by other actors of international relations. The difference is in resources and mechanisms the government used.

Soft power is "...the ability to influence and to attract, and not to force" [3, 6]. In contrast, Hard power is based on the desire to achieve military

and economic supremacy, by threats and pressure. That is to say, "hard" means of influence, such as military intervention or economic pressure. In addition, contemporary forms of Hard power also include information war and aggressive advertising [4, 2]. Unlike "hard" methods of influencing the government from the outside, the policy of Soft power, which mechanisms operate from inside, gives the country the right of free choice. Soft power is characterized by the ability to establish communications, based on such intangible components as personal attractiveness, culture, political values and institutions, political policy.

It is clear that each country is interested in forming their own national strategy of Soft power, which is determined by historical background and contemporary conditions of relations with other countries, and in addition to this so-called country's resources, i.e. competent domestic and foreign policy, the spiritual and cultural values etc. Joseph Nye has defined two types of strategies: traditional and modern. The traditional one includes the strategy of the USA and the EU. They are based on three components: popular culture, foreign policy and political ideology. Moreover, the second one is the strategy of China and Japan. A feature of modern strategy is to create new sources of Soft power. [1]

Methods

The research was based on quantitative data obtained because of the survey (opinion poll). The survey was conducted online via *Survio*. One hundred respondents have been involved under the survey.

Main body

In South Korean political discourse, the concept of Soft power was used relatively recently, despite the obvious appeal of this instrument of foreign policy. Lee Geun argues that, despite the identification of new positive aspects of international relations, the definition given by Joseph Nye is descriptive and requires the theoretical design. Nye noted that there were differences between 'hard' and 'soft' power, but did not offer any theoretical framework for understanding the mechanism of transformation of what he called "soft" resources into Soft power. The lack of theoretical development leads to the fact that it is very difficult to identify the discourses of Soft power beyond its resources. The basis of his theory is the distinction of Nye's Soft power and resources of Soft power. Lee argues that "...to be «soft» does not mean soft power...» Therefore, such resources as culture, values, ideology, know-how, etc. should be converted to Soft power. In this regards, he identifies three main stages of transformation: 1) the use of "soft" resources; 2) cognitive processes of the recipients; 3) production of "soft power".

In addition, in his article «A Theory of Soft Power and Korea's Soft Power Strategy», Lee Geun classifies five different types of soft power in accordance to the specific objectives of soft power. Lee identifies the following five categories of Soft power:

1. The Soft power, aimed at improving the safety of the world, projecting a policy of peace and attractive political values;
2. The Soft power to mobilize the support of other countries in its foreign and security policy;
3. The Soft power, which affects the way of thinking and preferences of other countries;
4. The Soft power, contributing to keep the unity of the international community and countries;

5. The Soft power, which goal is to improve the status of the country's political leaders and internal policy of the country. [5]

All of these categories of Soft power have the same kind of common denominator, namely, soft resources of the five categories used to influence others. As Lee noted, the link between the Soft power and soft resources is very important. He criticizes Nye's theory because of the ambiguity of "hard" and "soft". In some cases, strict resources can be used to enhance attractiveness to the other and vice versa. For example, the Allied Powers feel safe and sympathy, when the Allies destroy the enemies with the help of high-tech weapons. In order to dispel the confusion of Nye's original theory of Soft power, Lee gives his own definition: "when the impact on other uses intangible "soft resources", as a result, we are dealing with the "soft power", and when material, "hard", resources are used, the result is "hard power respectively. Therefore, Soft power might be attracting and forcing as «hard power» is.

This theory demonstrates us the importance of understanding the difference between Soft power' resources and Soft power. The existence of resources does not mean the existence of Soft power, until they are not modified into influence. As "soft" resources, Lee determines ideas, images, theories, know-how, education, discourse, culture, traditions, national or global symbols. In addition, the role of Soft power in the security policy, and particularly in addressing the North Korean problem, is obvious. [6]

The Table demonstrates the ranking of Soft power of China and Korea, published in the reports on the results of the "measurement" of Soft power of certain countries within the framework of research conducted by the Institute of Public Administration (Institute for Government) and the Monocle Magazine (The New Persuaders III. A 2012 Global Ranking of Soft Power, United Kingdom) [7], as well as Portland Agency (THE SOFT POWER 30 by Portland Agency) in 2015. [8] For comparison also shows information about the positions occupied by China, one of the main rivals for influence in East Asia and beyond.

Table 1 – Global Rankings of Soft Power

Ranking	The New Persuaders III. A 2012 Global Ranking of Soft Power	THE SOFT POWER 30by Portland Agency, 2015
Number	40	30
Leading countries	UK USA Germany	UK Germany USA

South Korea	11	20
China	22	30

There are some components of Korea' Soft power.

1. The experience of overcoming economic crisis, as well as the rapid democratization and modernization of society. According to the Democracy index, South Korea ranked with an index of 8.13, ahead of the US and many European countries [9].

2. Korean business, i.e. multinational corporations. In particular, the presence of the so-called "Chaebols" – Samsung, Kia, Hyundai, Daewoo, LG, which are well known for manufacturing high-tech, have promoted the image of the leader in the fields of technology and engineering.

3. The traditions of Korean art, crafts, cuisine, as well as Korean popular culture, have spread throughout the world. Being affected by fast-growing popularity of Korean entertainment industry in China, Beijing reports have created the term "Korean Wave", or "Hallyu". Korean pop singer PSY' hit, "Gangnam Style", became the first video to hit 2 billion views on Youtube and this is a clear example how Korean Soft power works.

4. Education undoubtedly should be noted as one of the main components of Korean Soft power.

The effectiveness of South Korean "soft" foreign policy model is increasingly felt in Central

Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan. Therefore, a positive image of South Korea, formed in Kazakhstan, is one of the main indicators of the effectiveness of the Korean model of Soft power. Spheres of influence of Korean Soft power in Kazakhstan are considered to be the business, medical tourism, education, traditional and popular culture.


This research was conducted to estimate whether Korean Soft power strategy is successful in Kazakhstan or not. The research was based on quantitative data obtained as a result of the survey (opinion poll).

The survey involved 100 respondents, of which 41% were males and 59% females, the overwhelming majority (90%) are 16-28-year olds. The respondents mostly represented Almaty region (60%), Karaganda region (20%) and Akmola region (13%).

The questionnaire consists of three blocks. The first block includes general issues, namely gender and age information.

The next block includes such questions, as: "What do you associate with South Korea?", "Is the image of South Korea in Kazakhstan positive or negative?". South Korea is associated with the K-pop – 22%; Korean dramas – 20%; IT-technology – 18%; as well as food, medicine, cars.

Chart 1. Question 7: What do you associate with South Korea?(%)




In general, respondents have positive view of South Korea and characterized its image as positive.

The results show us that the vast majority of respondents find Korean contemporary culture and high technology rather attractive. Most of the re-

spondents are attracted with Korean music and Korean dramas. Only 34% (older people mainly) said that they had never been listened to Korean pop-music; listen often – 13%, listen sometimes – 26% and listen rarely – 27%.

Chart 2. Question 5: Which three countries you have positive view of?(%)




As for the dramas, there is a little ahead of the USA (28%). South Korean dramas are preferred by 27% of respondents. Despite the obvious sympathy for the Korean culture, the majority of respondents have not heard about the phenomenon of «Korean wave» («Hallyu») (68%).

The third block includes questions about the recognition and preference of the respondents in such socially important spheres as education and medicine.

1. Respondents were asked to choose only two

from five countries (Russia, China, the USA, South Korea, and Malaysia) where they would prefer to get an education. The USA and South Korea lead by a large margin (79% and 50% respectively). It is noteworthy that the older age category has preferred Russia, possibly in addition to the advantages in the field of education, it is also dictated by the territorial proximity and common history. It was surprising that most of them had not been informed about the educational programs in South Korea, and even expressed regret about this.


Chart 3. Question 10: Where would you prefer to get an education? You can choose only two countries. (%)



2. According to the survey, South Korea has a slight advantage over other countries in terms of healthcare services the respondents would like to use (South Korea – 28,7%, Germany – 27,7%, Israel –

27,7%). In that case, the respondents' choice is indicative, due to the fact that, in compared to other two countries, it has not been a long time since Korea entered the Kazakhstani market of healthcare services.

Chart 4. Question 11: Healthcare services of which country would you prefer to use? (%)



Thus, culture (35%), business (19%), medicine (16%) and education (7%) were selected as the spheres where South Korean presence is strongly felt.

However, 19% of the respondents answered that they did not feel the Korean presence in Kazakhstan. It is noteworthy that more than half of them were residents of Karaganda and Akmola region, and that is the result of Korean business concentration mainly in South and East of Kazakhstan.

Conclusion

Thus, the concept of South Korea's Soft power has a modern character. The Government of the Republic of Korea plays a decisive role in the implementation of foreign policy strategy aimed at raising the status of the state, relying on the resources of the Soft power. The main instruments of the state in the

formation of Soft power are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Culture and their affiliated organizations KOICA, KOCCA, KOCIS.

According to the research findings, one of the main factors of efficiency of Korean model of Soft power in our country is Kazakh people's positive view of South Korea. Thus, South Korea was able to create a productive model of soft power, which is able to compete with the leading countries in this field, such as the US, UK, China and Germany. We believe that the experience of South Korea in the development and implementation of soft power strategy deserves further detailed examination and adaptation in the context of the formation of image policy of Kazakhstan.

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IV • PHILOLOGY

UDC 81'25

Mussaly L.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

E-mail: mj_laila@mail.ru

Character of a Russian Translation of Poem “Winter” (“Kys”) by Abai

Abstract. The article deals with the history, practice and character of a Russian translation of poem “Winter” (“Kys”) by Abai. The Russian-speaking readers may be limited in understanding the key inner thought of this poem, since the translators themselves did not fully “see into” what the original meant to say. They simply translated the poem word-for-word, and only carried across a certain part of its meaning. Simply by looking at them, we can see an absolute disconnect between the meaning of the original and the translations.

Keywords: winter, blind, literary interconnections, original, nature, fiction.

Introduction

The original by Abai, “Kys” (Winter), we see that the poet describes wintery nature through an animated image, by endowing the winter season, the blizzards, and the frost with a soul. Undoubtedly, this works toward immersing the reader, giving him an impression. Whereas, reading a Russian translation would not likely leave the same lasting impression. At the same time, the Russian-speaking readers may be limited in understanding the key inner thought of this poem, since the translators themselves did not fully “see into” what the original meant to say. They simply translated the poem word-for-word, and only carried across a certain part of its meaning. Simply by looking at them, we can see an absolute disconnect between the meaning of the original and the translations.

Methods

Literal and historical, typological, statistical methods and text comparative analysis were used because of the theme features, purposes and tasks except linguistic- literal research.

Main body

Nature is an environment for humans to work and live in. Descriptions of nature occupy a certain place in the literary works of all significant classical poets. Every one of them had a different unique way

to elegize Nature, depending on their time and environment. While some sang songs about the mysteries of being, others described human spirits. Among the many themes that Abai was elegizing, Nature had a special place. He grew up around Nature and knew how to love it. When you read such his poems as, “Küz” (“Autumn”), “Kys” (“Winter”), “Jaz” (“Summer”), you vividly see the diversity of different natural events. You see the images of a jolly summer, a cool foggy autumn, or the cruel frosts and winter blizzards. Many translators have provided Russian translations of Abai’s descriptive poetry about Nature. Among them, V. Rozhdestvensky, Yu. Kuznetsov, M. Sultanbekov, and others. Standing out from the rest is one poem by Abai, Kys (Winter).

Let us do a bit of analysis of those translations. We know that this poem starts with these lines:

Aq küimdi, deneli, aq saqaldı,

Soqır, mılqaw, tanımas tiri jandı.

Üsti-bası - aq qıraw, tüsi swıq, Basqan jeri sıqırlap kelip qaldı.

Abai uncovers winter’s special features by describing peculiar features specific to this season. Here, winter is represented not as a natural image but as a human figure: a giant in white clothes sporting a white beard, denying life, etc. These expressions form the main meaningful values that represent notions and images. Should one of them be omitted or

changed, the poem would lose much of its meaning and significance. For the translator, losing the content and meaning from the original would constitute a serious deficiency. Let us have a look at the Russian translation of "Kys."

*Aq kiiimdi, deneli, aq saqaldı,
Soqır, mılqaw, tanımas tiri jandı.*

Here is Yu. Kuznetsov's take on those lines:

*A giant in white coat, silver beard
There's no one he sees, for he is blind and numb
[1].*

When reading this translation, one would imagine a giant human figure in a white furcoat and a white beard. He does not see anyone, he is blind and numb. The translator has created a very sharp, concrete, and obvious image. Once read, this image will not fade away easily. From this particular point of view, it is obvious that the translator, while working on these particular lines, has been able to find a powerful solution. However, one cannot help but think that such an image describes, namely, a giant human figure, not winter at all.

Yu. Kuznetsov translated the word-group "aq kiiimdi" as *aq ton* (in a white furcoat), and the notion of "deneli," as *alıp* (a giant). The author of this translation fell short of carrying across the meaning of the words "kiiim," "deneli," since the expression *aq ton* cannot precisely translate the notion of "aq kiiimdi." Secondly, a word that translates a common, nominal meaning of a thing in the original, the author has replaced it for a specific, own name. Therefore, we are unable to assert with confidence that such a solution by the translator precisely carries across the content of the original or of its content unit.

The line "Soqır, mılqaw tanımas tiri jandı" is given this translation: "He sees no one, for he is blind and numb." Here, it would be advisable to look at such content and structural units as (a) *blind*; (b) *numb*; (c) *denying*. The author of the translation should have translated these three notions according to their own specific content. However, as we see he was unable to carry the translation fully. In the translation, two out of three notions have been translated: (a) *soqır* - *blind*; (b) *mılqaw* - *numb*. The third notion (*tanımas*) has been omitted. Instead, the author gives us the notion *eşkimdi körmeydi* "sees no one" (*registers no one*). First of all, this is the author's very own understanding that has been included in the content of the translation; secondly, this is similar to the notion "*soqır*" (*blind*).

Therefore, the author of the translation, by omitting one notion from the trinity in the original, creates two notions close in meaning to the one notion (*soqır* – *blind*) in the remaining double in the original (*eşkimdi körmeydi*; *soqır* – *see no one*; *blind*).

Üsti-bası aq qıraw, tüsi swıq,

- here is how Yu. Kuznetsov translated this line:

His steely face adorned with white frost[1].

When translated backwards, we will get this meaning:

Izbarlı bette aq qıraw jarqıraydı.

This translation absolutely does not correspond to the original. Abai described an unanimated event as an animated one. Whereas the author of the translation was unable to carry across an animated image of an unanimated notion. The notions "Üsti-bası," "tüsi swıq" in the original have been translated as "His steely face." Therefore, a system of two significant notions in the original, such as "üsti-bası aq qıraw" and "tüsi swıq" found no description in the translation. We assert so because the word "üsti-bası" found in this priceless original, was not translated altogether. At the same time, while the author translates the expression "aq qıraw" as "white frost," he somehow understands "tüsi swıq" as "his steely face." For a reader who has not had the opportunity to compare the Kazakh and Russian versions of the poem, the Russian version will definitely not carry across the content of the original. The Russian-speaking readers, therefore, will find it difficult to feel, through this translation, the mastery of Abai who describes winter as a human figure, by endowing an unanimated thing with a soul.

This line:

Basqan jeri sıqırlap, kelip qaldı, –

was translated by Yu. Kuznetsov as

Everything creaks and cracks under a heavy foot [1].

Here is how we translated this line:

Awır tabanniñ astında bäre sıqırlap, sıqırlaydı.

The expression "basqan jeri" was not translated from the original. If the word "Sıqırlap" (to creak) was translated word-for-word, the expression "kelip

qaldı” was absent from the translation. The author, by himself, his own “everything cracks” and “under a heavy foot.” On the one side, the translator did his best to carry Abai’s thought across, but fell short when describing it precisely. Despite there are several different variants of a Russian translation of this poem out there, we can confidently say none of them carries a detailed translation of Abai’s creative image.

Let us have a look at the translation by V. Rozhdestvensky:

In a whitefurcoat, broad-shouldered, snow color is his hair [1].

A reverse translation:

Aqtondı, üqti, qardan aq saqaldı.

V. Rozhdestvensky translates the word-group “aq kïimdi” as “in a white furcoat,” the word “deneli” as “broad-shouldered,” and “aq saqaldı” as “snow color is his hair.” Content-wise, the author adds his own wording thereby allowing himself a certain liberties with translation. The word-group in the original, “aq saqaldı” is presented to Russian-speaking readers as “snow color is his hair.” This part, “snow color,” is something that the author took the liberty adding by himself. Let us have a look at the next line in this translation:

Blind and numb, he is with a great silver beard [1], –

A reverse translation goes as follows:

Soqır, mısqaw, ülkenkümis saqaldı.

The words in the original, “tanımas tiri jandı,” were omitted from the translation. Instead, the author add his own “ülkenkümis”.

At the same time, both in the first and second line we see the word “сақал.” In other words, the translator used this word twice in two separate lines. Looking at this translation, we can say that the content and meaning of the original was not revealed.

An enemy to all that lives, with a clouded brow [1]

A reverse translation of this line reads as follows:

Kirtigen qabaqpen ömir süredi, barlıǵına jaw.

Not one word was translated precisely. The content of the original poem failed to be discovered.

He, the squeaky one, treads in the steppes, covered in snow, [1] –

A reverse translation of the fourth line of the poem: *Ol, sıqırlap, qarlı dalada jür.* In this line, words were added by the author all by himself. The author points at a certain human figure, calling it “He.” In the original, Abai was not describing a human image. Therefore, we conclude that the translator fell short understanding the meaning of the poem.

Here is M. Sultanbekov’s take:

*White-bearded, an old man in white clothes
Deaf and numb to anything and anyone, with no distinction [1].*

A reverse translation reveals the following meaning:

*Aq saqaldı, aq kïimdi qarıya
Barlıq närsege mısqaw barlıq närsege talǵamsız,*

–

in his work, M. Sultanbekov phrases as “an old man in white clothes.” In the original text, there is no word “old man” (“qarıya” in Kazakh). Word-groups “Aq kïimdi” and “aq saqaldı” are translated while there is no translation of “deneli.” Instead, the author added his very own “old man” (qarıya). In the second line, we see a Russian version (deaf) of the word “mısqaw.” The word “soqır” from the priceless original was not translated, and the meaning of *tanımas tiri jandı* was interpreted by the author as “to anything and anyone, with no distinction.” From a structural point of view, the translation was done the way it was. If we talk about the content side of this work, then it is a rather different picture as the readers who are new to this translation and have seen it for the first time, are presented with an image of an old man, not winter and Nature.

The author gives the following translation:

*White frost as his décor and cruel in the looks,
He steadily treads upon the squeaky snow [1].*

A reverse translation:

*Üstinde aq qıraw, tüsi swıq
Sıqırlaǵan qardı qayrattana bastı, –*

is a bit closer to the original. In this line, the author also failed to carry across the original’s notion of *basqan jeri, kelip qaldı*. We only see a translation of the word “squeaky” (sıqırlaǵan). As for the

content, the readers are obviously presented with an image of a snow-covered old man, not winter as a season.

Conclusion

Reading the original by Abai, “Kys” (Winter), we see that the poet describes wintery nature through an animated image, by endowing the winter season, the blizzards, and the frost with a soul. Undoubtedly, this works toward immersing the reader, giving him an impression. Whereas, reading a Russian translation would not likely leave the same lasting impression. At the same time, the Russian-speaking readers may be limited in understanding the key inner thought of this poem, since the translators

themselves did not fully “see into” what the original meant to say. They simply translated the poem word-for-word, and only carried across a certain part of its meaning. Simply by looking at them, we can see an absolute disconnect between the meaning of the original and the translations.

In order for foreign-language readers to be able to “feel” the same impressions as their Kazakh-speaking counterparts “feel,” a translator must be able to speak and understand the language at the same level as Abai. Unfortunately, those who can do it can be counted on one hand. As we said earlier, many people have tried translating Abai. However, poetic originality that is so intrinsic to Abai’s genius, is lacking from those translations.

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*Karagoishiyeva D.A., Ospankulova Sh.A.

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

*E-mail: karagoishiyeva.daneliya@gmail.com,

Effectiveness of Oral Speech Corpora in Language Teaching and Learning (On the Basis of Kazakh Speech Synthesizer)

Abstract. The article is devoted to characterizing the first steps taken in development of speech synthesizers in the Kazakh language and to defining benefits of using a speech synthesizer in the language teaching and learning process. The main aim of the article is to describe and to analyze the difficulties that developers faced in the process of inventing a speech synthesizer which produces speech in the Kazakh language. Authors try to define the notion of speech synthesizer in general and to show the stages in creating a speech synthesizer and some specific peculiarities of the Kazakh language developers should pay attention to. In addition the article gives the list of the most widespread speech synthesizers and analyzes their productivity.

Keywords: Speech synthesizer, reduction, sound, diphthongoid, utterance, synchronize.

Introduction

Speech synthesizers are software libraries (text-to-speech engine) which give other programs an opportunity to produce a speech from the text. Speech synthesizers differ by the quality of a produced speech, opportunities to change speech settings and can consist of several voices including female and male voices. Speech synthesizers are created on the basis of Speech Application Programming Interface (Speech API, SAPI) – software library for Windows which allows to identify and synthesize a voice in applications for the operating system. SAPI 4.0 was created in 1998, nowadays in modern operating systems SAPI is installed [1].

Methods

The main aim of the article is to characterize and analyze the difficulties we faced in the process of creating speech synthesizer which produces a speech in the Kazakh language.

During the process of speech synthesizer creating were used such methods: description, perceptive analysis, minimization of practical materials.

Synthesis of the speech is a technology which allows to sound (to read) the text by a natural human voice.

Where is it possible to apply synthesis of the speech?

- *Telephony: in the contact center and for creation of the IVR menu*

The most frequent and effective application of speech synthesis is a scoring of information in IVR systems of the contact centers. First of all, this is a scoring of dynamic information which is individual for each client. Scoring of sound rollers by the synthesized voice will be also useful in the case of quickly changing information, that is, balance of warehouse positions, repertoire of movie theaters, emergencies of Internet service provider, etc.

- *Scoring of information on the site*

You can connect our "cursor" of synthesis of the speech to any the Internet site/web-portal and sound necessary information aloud.

It can be useful when a visitor of the site has no opportunity to be in front of the monitor or he/she can listen to the text and at the same time work in other program. Sometimes there is a need to read the

text to a person who isn't near the computer. Also it will be useful for people with problems on eyesight.

- *Scoring of documents and office information in corporate systems*

Our speech synthesis can sound any information put in a system. For example, it can be educational exercises, medical complexes, warehouse systems of the account.

- *Scoring of books and their listening on mobile devices*

We developed the Reader mobile application which allows to read aloud any book loaded into the device.

- *Scoring of videos and educational courses*

You can sound subtitles to videos and you won't need the announcer any more [2].

Main body

It is clear that speech synthesis is novelty for the Kazakh language. It is obvious that there is hardly a speech synthesizer in the Kazakh language. One cannot find even an artificial voice in our Mother tongue in the Internet. And on the 13th of March of 2015 workers of the Rehabilitation Center for children and teenagers with restrictions on mental and physical development collaborative with Russian scientists produced a device for disabled people with eyesight problems which can voice texts in the Kazakh language too. Specialists of the Russian company "Elita Group" in the field IT headed by a group of scientists with Olga Yakovleva and Kazakhstani initiators including R.A. Suleimenova – Head of the Rehabilitation Center for children and teenagers with restrictions on mental and physical development, E.D. Suleimenova, D.A. Karagoishiyeva, S.B. Bektemirova, M.A. Zhana-bekova - teachers of the Faculty of Philology, Literary Studies and World Languages of al-Farabi Kazakh National University worked on producing speech synthesizer in the Kazakh language. Russian specialists were responsible for the technical side of the Computer Speech synthesis apparatus, and Kazakhstani linguists – for preparation of the necessary material for the device [3], [4].

Speech synthesizers started to be used even more often in everyday life. Speech synthesizers as it is already clear according to the name only, carry out synthesis of the speech, that is format the written text into the oral.

Due to speech synthesizers it is possible to learn new foreign words with the correct pronunciation, to read books without distracting from the affairs or, for example, in a transport. Initially the organizations specializing on equipment for people with

eyesight problems were engaged in development of such programs.

Now, any user can download one of programs, install it on the computer or a telephone and to synthesize the speech, including the Russian.

The set of various programs, enclosed and even the whole systems were developed for this purpose. Unfortunately, not all of them are intended for Russian-speaking audience.

Here is the list of speech synthesizers:

Acapela — one of the most widespread speech synthesizers around the world. The program distinguishes and sounds texts more than in thirty languages. Russian is supported by two voices: a man's voice — Nikolay, female — Alyona. The female voice appeared considerably after man's and is more advanced. It is possible to listen how voices sound on the official site of the program. It is enough to choose a language and a voice, and to type the small text. By the way, the separate dictionary of accents that allows to reach clearness of a pronunciation was developed for a man's voice.

Vokalizator – the second in our list, but not by popularity. It has a cursor Milena from the developer of the Vokalizator program of the Nuance company. The voice sounds very naturally, the speech is pure. There is an opportunity to establish various dictionaries, and also to correct the loudness, speed and an accent that is very important. As well as in a case with Akapela, the program has various versions for mobile, automobile and computer applications. It is perfectly suitable for reading books.

RHVoice – a speech synthesizer was developed by Olga Yakovleva. The program sounds the Russian texts in three voices: To Elena and, Irina and Alexander.

ESpeak – the first version of a free speech synthesizer was launched in 2006. Since then the company developer constantly issues more and more advanced versions. The latest version was presented at the end of spring of 2013.

Festival – this is a complete system of recognition and synthesis of the speech which was developed in University of Edinburgh. Programs and all modules absolutely free of charge also extend on source system [5].

Thus, the above given list of speech synthesizers are types that are found in the Internet. If you analyze these speech synthesizers the number of languages are limited, and you can hardly find the Kazakh language in them.

Our work included development of a device which can read the text in the Kazakh language, but not a speech synthesizer in the Internet. The device

itself is produced in the USA. The synthesis for a certain language is made by a local dealer. This is the result of collaborative work of the Rehabilitation Center for children and teenagers with restrictions on mental and physical development and Russian specialists. The aim of the speech synthesizer is to produce a Kazakh speech on the device which is helpful for handicapped people. We have achieved our goal. As the developers of the project we took part in a special demonstration in our turn, and had the opportunity to test the device.

As the philologists we passed such stages in creating the speech synthesizer:

1. Collecting electronic variants of written texts in the Kazakh language.
2. Scoring/sounding a text.
3. Listening to scoring texts, that is recordings.
4. Checking the recordings on naturalness.
5. Finding mistakes in recordings, suggesting other correct variants.

Collecting electronic variants of written texts in the Kazakh language.

We collected texts printed in the Kazakh language and other texts in the Internet, checked for mistakes and inadequacy. We selected suitable for scoring texts only and sent them to our companion.

Scoring/sounding a text.

Professional script readers were chosen for sounding the printed material, that is voices of a man and woman passed the special selection. Script readers tried to read every text according to naturalness. Unqualified texts were eliminated immediately.

Listening to scoring texts, that is recordings.

Finding mistakes in the sounded texts, interpreting them.

Checking the recording on naturalness.

We checked the texts and eliminated those which sounded artificially and were not adequate to the linguistic situation.

Finding mistakes in recordings, suggesting other correct variants. We found some mistakes in the written texts, compared them with the correct variant and gave the right variants.

After passing this stage we worked on eliminating difficulties appeared during the process of creating the speech synthesizer. That is, a script reader had various problems according to the mechanism of the speech synthesizer which were opposite to the standards of the Kazakh language. For instance, the first problem:

1. *Omission of sounds in the Kazakh language.*

In materials in the Kazakh language omission of sounds is explained by reduction, for example, *akel* (*alyp kel*) (*akel (alyp kel)*) – *apar* (*alyp bar*) (*apar (alyp bar)*) – *aket* (*alyp ket*) (*aket (alyp ket)*) – *soit* (*solai et*) (*sojt (solaj et)*) – *armen* (*ari taman*) (*armen (ari taman)*)).

According to S. Myrzabekov such shortenings can be found in archaisms. Omission of the sound *Y* is explained by reduction that is if the suffix begins with a vowel, *y* is omitted. We can say that decrease of the number of syllables is a phenomenon which is especially peculiar to obsolete words. It is known that majority of endings were once formed by reduction (omission) of complete words by sounds (syllables). As an example we can give the recent fact of the suffix *-tyn*, *-tin* (*-tyn*, *-tin*) and the ending of the ablative case.

“Therefore, when an ending that begins with a vowel is added, narrow vowels are in the second syllable of two-syllable words are omitted and the number of syllables decrease: *oryn* – *orna* (*oryn-y*), *orny* (*oryn-y*), *ornym* (*oryn-ym*). Such phenomenon in the Kazakh language is called reduction. It is correct to say that the sound affected by reduction doesn’t disappear, but becomes muffled and murmured. And in such words like *orny*, *myrny*, *auly* (*orny*, *murny*, *auly*) it is easy to notice omission of the whole syllable”. Initially reduction was shown in orthography, then writing with an omitted sound became a normality. «Narrow vowels often become muffled and omitted. For instance, *kishkene* (*kishikene*), *saržaj* (*saryžaj*), *kelsap* (*kelisap*), *børzhar* (*børizhar*)» [6, 40-41 p.].

“Every language has its own normality for the sound system, and it is one of the features that makes a certain language an individual one” [7, 7], however, the language can’t help borrowing words from other languages. Such words undergo reprocessing in the “plain language of people” (manner of pronunciation, articulation) and more or less have sound changings. Sound changing can be different. It is common that some unfamiliar sounds in the structure of borrowed words can be exchanged with the own sounds of a language, while other sounds, syllables are omitted, on the contrary some sounds and syllables can be added. Thus, a word undergoes quantitative as well as qualitative changes. Such changes can be noticed in proper words of a language.

Reduction (Latin *reductio* – return, shift) is a phenomenon which is peculiar to vowels. Vowel becomes muffled in the word. Usually narrow vowels undergo reduction [8].

In the Kazakh linguistics usually narrow vow-

els in such words like *orñy* (*orñn-y*), *erñi* (*erñi-i*), *m̋rñny* (*m̋rñn-y*), *q̋arñny* (*q̋arñn-y*) undergo reduction, narrow vowels are lost from the structure of words [9, 361].

2. Phonetic image of the letters *i* and *u*.

Pronunciation of the letter *i* is connected with the sounds around it, that is if the sounds are glottal, it is pronounced as a glottal sound. For instance, transcription of *tiin* (*squirrel*) is [tiin] [tiin], and if the sounds around it are front sounds, it is pronounced as a front vowel, *тиин* (*coin*), transcription is [tyiyn].

According to S. Myrzabekov, «Letter is a conventional sign of the sound. It is very important to estimate the relationship of sound and letter and differentiate them correctly. The letters *i*, *u*, *iu*, *e* are often confused with sounds in researches and manuals about the Kazakh linguistics. The phonetic image of the letters which are met in texts of the contemporary Kazakh language will be the following. The letter *i*. 1. When they are in the structure of obsolete words of our language: a) *yi*; *ki*, *mi*, *zhi*, *kikym*, *kisuk* etc.; b) *ij*: *ki*, *kiim*, *ti*, *tiin*, *tershidi*, *shani*, *shilti*; c) *yj*: *m̋kijāt*, *t̋ñfiyk*, *ok̋i*, *b̋lti*; d) *yj*: *tyski*, *ysi*, *osiet*, *dynie*, *tyrti*. 2. In the structure of words borrowed from the Russian language: monophthong *i* (*institut*, *universitet*). The letter *u*. 1. In obsolete words: a) *uu*: *u*, *bu*, *su*, *zhuan*, *oku*, *alu*. b) *yu*: *kylu*, *zhyru*, *kelu*, *ilu*, *tilu*. c) monophthong sonorant consonant: *tau*, *zhau*, *daulet*, *auyl*, *saule*, *ojnau*, *ojlau*. 2. In words borrowed from the Russian language monophthong vowel phoneme *universitet*, *uran*, *ukol*, *uchastke*, *avtobus*, *sputnik*, *turnir*» [6, 23].

There are two ways of pronunciation of the letter *y*: in the first case it functions as a vowel, in the second – a consonant. For example, *tau*, *au*. Here it functions as a consonant sound. Double vowels are used in the Kazakh language, that's why it is considered as a consonant vowel. Among vowels it functions as a consonant, on the contrary among consonants it functions as a vowel. For instance, *suyk*, *kelu*, *bilu*.

A diphthong (/ˈdɪfθɒŋ/ dif-thong or /ˈdɪpθɒŋ/ dip-thong[6]) (Greek: δίφθογγος, diphthongos, literally "two sounds" or "two tones"), also known as a gliding vowel, refers to two adjacent vowel sounds occurring within the same syllable. Technically, a diphthong is a vowel with two different targets: that is, the tongue (and/or other parts of the speech apparatus) moves during the pronunciation of the vowel. A diphthong is made when two vowels are met in the process of speech. Diphthongs are divided into real and false ones. In the structure of

a real diphthong both of the vowels are equal by the power of being pronounced and making a syllable. A real diphthong can be met in languages very seldom. For instance, in Lettish the diphthongs *ei*, *au* in words *meitci* (*girl*), *tauta* (*people*) are considered as real diphthongs.

In false diphthongs one of the vowels can make a syllable, but the other cannot. If the first one can make a syllable and the next functions as an auxiliary one, such diphthongs are called closed diphthong. For example, sounds *ii*, *xy* in words *kijim*—*kiim*, *zhxuar*—*zhuar*, *sxuat*—*suat*. If the first part of a diphthong cannot make a syllable, and the next part can make a syllable, it is called open diphthong. For example, sounds *e*, *o*, *oe* at the beginning of a word are pronounced as *j*, *u*, *jje* (*el*—*jjel*), *uo* (*ol*—*uol*), *uo* (*or*—*uor*). Actually, these types of the false diphthongs in the Kazakh language can be nominated as diphthongoid vowels.

Diphthongoid — a special type of the vowel which is close to diphthong. They are sounds *i*, *u*, *ie*, *uo*, *uoē*. For instance, *bu*, *su*, *zhuan*, *oku* [xy]. *kylu*, *zhyru*, *kelu* [yy] [9].

Thus, in the Kazakh language phonetic image of the above given sounds *i* and *u* is considered according to diphthongoid, but not diphthong. According to the materials given above it was identified that these sounds cannot function as complete sounds. They are given by double sounds and can be met in different positions. Their quality of pronunciation depends on the sounds around them, that is, if the surrounding sounds are glottal, they are pronounced as glottal sounds, and if the surrounding sounds are front, they are pronounced as front sounds too. That's why, if we want to provide naturalness of pronunciation and meet the requirements of the Kazakh language articulation in the speech synthesizer, we need to take into account above given problems in creating the apparatus. Thus we can more or less achieve naturalness of speech.

Conclusion

To sum up, problems that occurred in the process of creating speech synthesizer in the Kazakh language are connected with maintenance of mechanic pure, natural speech by a script reader. But we cannot say that a mechanic voice can completely exchange a natural human voice, of course, no matter how much we try, but we cannot gain 100 per cent pure and natural voice. However, in general a mechanic voice can be clear and understandable. It is clear that to sound a written text is possible with highly developed technology. Therefore, necessity of such device is indisputable. As a specialist of a

language it can help to teach the Kazakh language as a foreign language. Especially it is very challenging to have a free electronic synthesizer which is available in the Internet. Therefore the necessity of such a device is obvious. Moreover, as there is no standard transliteration of the Kazakh language,

giving letters in Latin can lead to various versions of writing. Nowadays each scientist uses his/her own transliteration. That's why standardization of the transliteration of the Kazakh language is one of the problem which is waiting for its solution in the future.

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INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mussaly L. – PhD of Philological Science, Assistant Professor. Faculty of Philology and World Languages, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, mj_laila@mail.ru

Karagoyshieva D. A. – candidate of philological sciences, Dr. PhD, Head of the Department of Foreign Languages and Translation affairs Faculty of Philology and World Languages Kazakh National University named after Al-Farabi. Mobile phone: 8 775 754 6606. E-mail: karagoishiyeva.daneliya@gmail.com

Ospankulova Sh. A. – MA, Senior Lecturer, Department of Foreign Languages and Translation affairs Faculty of Philology and World Languages Kazakh National University named after Al-Farabi. Mobile phone: 8 700 737 9990. E-mail: ospankulova.shynar@gmail.com

Nadirova G.E. – Doctor of Philological Science, Professor. The Department of Middle East and South Asia, Faculty of Oriental Studies. Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, e-mail: gulnad@mail.ru

Amrayev D. – Master of Humanities. The Department of Middle East and South Asia, Faculty of Oriental Studies. Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, e-mail: dilshat18@mail.ru

Kudaibergenova R. – PhD. Assistant Professor. Faculty of Oriental Studies. Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. E-mail: Renata.Kudaibergenova@kaznu.kz

Beisyenbayeva A. – 4th year student. Faculty of Oriental Studies. Al-Farabi Kazakh National University.

Umirzakova A. Dzh. – Master program student of 2nd year. International Law Department, Faculty of International Relations, al-Farabi Kazakh National University. 87029343164. ainur_umirzakova@mail.ru

Aidarbayev S. Zh. – Doctor of Juridical Science, professor. Head of International Law Department, Faculty of International Relations, al-Farabi Kazakh National University. 87012776002. aisaj@mail.ru

Baizakova K.I. – Professor of the Department of International Relations and World Economy, Faculty of International Relations, al-Farabi Kazakh National University. kbaizakova@mail.ru

Yermekov A.B. – 2nd year student of Master program

Medukhanova L.A. – Assistant Professor. Department of International Relations and World Economy. Faculty of International Relations, al-Farabi Kazakh National University. letter3@mail.ru

Bekmuhametova A.B. – Lecturer. Department of International Relations and World Economy. Faculty of International Relations, al-Farabi Kazakh National University. sultasem@mail.ru

Myrzakhmetova A.M. – Associate Professor. The Department of International Relations and World Economy. Faculty of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. myrzakhmetova@mail.ru

Nurabaeva G. – 2nd year student of Master program

Yem N.B. – Associate Professor. Head of the Department of Far East Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies. Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, e-mail: Natalya.Yem@kaznu.kz

Pokhlebayeva N. – Researcher of the International Center of Korean Studies, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, e-mail: natnickpok@gmail.com